Regulation of Television Advertising in the United ngdom by Gantzias, G.
Gantzias, G. (1995). Regulation of Television Advertising in the United ngdom. (Unpublished 
Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Gantzias, G. (1995). Regulation of Television Advertising in the United ngdom. 
(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7702/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
I 
Regulation of Television 
Advertising 
in the United ngdom 
George Gantzias 
Thesis submitted for the qualification of Doctor of Philosophy 
City University London 
Department of Sociology 
February 1995 
This thesis is dedicated to my mother 
Contents 
CONTENTS 
List of Tables and Figures 
Acknowledgments 
Abstract 
General Introduction 
Theoretical Framework 
Methodology 
1. Some General Theories of Regulation 
1.1 Introduction. 
1.2 Horwitz! s Fivefold Classification of Regulation Theories. 
1.2.1 Public Interest Theory. 
1.2.2 "Perverted" Public Interest Theory: Instrumental, Structural 
and Capture Models of Influence. 
1.2.3 Conspiracy Theory and its Variants. 
1.2.4 Organisational Theory. 
1.2.5 Capitalist State Theory. 
1.3 Four General Approaches to Regulation. 
1.3.1 The Institution-centred Approach. 
1.3.2 The Culture-centred Approach. 
1.3.3 The Coalition-centred Approach. 
1.3.4 The International-centred Approach. 
1.4 The Public Interest in Broadcasting. 
Page 
vii 
viii 
ix 
1 
2 
3 
9 
9 
9 
9 
12 
15 
17 
19 
20 
21 
21 
22 
22 
24 
i 
Contents 
2. The Origins of British Broadcasting Regulation: 
Development of a Model. 
2.1 Introduction. 
2.2 From Company to Corporation: The Experiment Begins. 
2.3 Advertising in the Sykes Committee Report. 
2.4 Advertising in the Crawford Committee Report. 
2.5 Conclusion. 
3.1927 
- 
1947: A Period of Consolidation. 
3.1 Introduction. 
3.2 Advertising in the Selsdon Committee Report. 
3.3 Advertising in the Ullswater Committee Report. 
3.4 Advertising in the Hankey Committee Report. 
3.5 Conclusion. 
4. The Beveridge Committee: Movement for Change. 
4.1 Introduction. 
4.2 Advertising in Beveridge Committee Report. 
4.3 "Sponsored Broadcasting": Beveridge's Assessment. 
4.4 Conclusion. 
5. Commercial Television: The Early Years. 
5.1 Introduction. 
5.2 The First White Paper and the Beginning of the Great Debate. 
5.3 The Television Act 1954. 
5.4 Trial and Error: The ITA Begins Operations. 
5.5 Conclusion. 
29 
29 
30 
34 
39 
42 
46 
46 
46 
48 
52 
53 
59 
59 
60 
69 
72 
74 
74 
75 
82 
87 
98 
ii 
Contents 
6. Advertising Regulation: The First Critique. 
6.1 Introduction. 
6.2 Advertising in the Pffldngton Committee Report. 
6.3 Some Repercussions of the Pilldngton Report. 
6.4 The Television Act 1964: Further Controls on Advertising. 
6.5 1964-1972: Regulation as Usual. 
6.6 Conclusion. 
7. The ITA Becomes the 1BA. 
7.1 Introduction. 
7.2 The Run-up to the Annan Committee. 
7.3 Advertising in the Annan Committee Report. 
7.4 A Change of Government: A Shift in Policy. 
7.5 The Broadcasting Act 1980 
7.6 Conclusion. 
8. The New Media: AH Change for British Broadcasting? 
8.1 Introduction. 
8.2 Cable and Satellite in the UK: Implications for Advertising Control. 
8.3 Advertising in the Hunt Committee Report. 
8.4 The Government's Plans for the New Media. 
8.5 Advertising in the Peacock Committee Report 
8.6 The White Paper: Broadcasting in the 90S. - Competition, Choice wid Quality. 
8.7 The Broadcasting Act 1990. 
8.8 Conclusion. 
101 
101 
101 
108 
112 
116 
118 
122 
122 
123 
125 
132 
134 
135 
139 
139 
140 
142 
145 
148 
154 
156 
157 
Hi 
Contents 
9. 
- 
The Broadcasting Act 1990 : Continuity and Change 164 
9.1 Introduction. 164 
9.2 Changes Instituted Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act. 165 
9.3 The Statutory Authority and the Advisory Bodies. 167 
9.3.1 The Independent Television Commission. 167 
9.3.2 Specialist Advisory Committees on Television Advertising. 171 
9.3.3 The Broadcasting Standards Council. 173 
9.4 Government Departments and Agencies. 174 
9.4.1 The Department of National Heritage. 174 
9.4.2 The Office of Fair Trading 174 
9.4.3 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission 176 
9.5 Bodies Involved in Self-Regulation of Television Advertising. 176 
9.5.1 The ITV Network Centre. 176 
9.5.2 The Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre. 177 
9.5.3 The Advertising Liaison Group. 178 
9.5.4 The Advertising Association. 179 
9.5.5 The Advertising Standards Authority and the Code of Advertising Practice 
(CAP) Commission. 179 
9.5.6 The Incorporated Society of British Advertisers. 179 
9.5.7 The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising. 180 
9.5.8 The National Consumer Council 180 
9.5.9 The Consumers' Association. 181 
9.6 Conclusion. 182 
10. The Dynamics of Regulatory Activity: Control and Resistance. 183 
10.1 Introduction. 183 
10.2 The Operation of Television Advertising Regulation: 
A Definition and Some Illustrations. 185 
10.3 Four Diagramatic Representations. 187 
10.4 The ITC and the State. 191 
10.4.1 The Department of National Heritage. 191 
iv 
Contents 
10.4.2 The Office of Fair Trading. 192 
10.4.3 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 197 
10.5 The ITC and the Advisory Bodies. 198 
10-5.1 The Broadcasting Standards Council. 198 
10.5.2 The Advertising Advisory Committee. 200 
10.5.3 Dealing with Complaints: Policy and Procedures. 201 
10.6 The ITC and the Regulated Industries. 206 
10.6.1 Regulator/ Industry Relations. 206 
10.6.2 Copy Clearance 207 
10.6.3 The Advertisers' View 212 
10.6.4 The Agencies'View. 214 
10.6.5 The Television Industrys View. 215 
10.7 The ITC and the Consumer Organisations. 218 
10.7.1 The Consumer's View. 218 
10.8 Conclusion. 223 
11. Deregulation or Re-regulation? The Paradox and the Problems. 230 
11.1 Introduction. 230 
11.2 Deregulation: More, or Less? 230 
11.3 Sponsorship: A Slippery Slope? 233 
11.4 Additional Problem Areas: Broking, Bartering and Product Placement. 240 
11.5 Advertising Minutage: The Right Balance? 247 
11.6 Conclusion. 249 
12 Case Study: The Regulation of Female Sanitary Protection 
(San-pro) Advertising on Television. 251 
12.1 Introduction. 251 
12.2 The History of San-Pro Regulation. 253 
12.3 Conclusion. 270 
V 
Contents 
13. EC Regulation of Television Advertising; 
Consumer Protection vs. Freedom of Commercial Speech. 274 
13.1 Introduction. 274 
13.2 Battle Commences: The Rise of the Consumer Movement in the 1970s. 275 
13.3 The Debate Continues. 279 
13.4 The Advertisers' Success and the Formation of EAT. 283 
13.5 The Position of the UK on the Draft Directive. 284 
13.6 Regulation of Transfrontier Television: The Appeal to the International 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 10. 286 
13.7 EC Broadcasting Policy: The Green Paper and the Broadcasting 
Directive on Transfrontier Television. 288 
13.8 Summary of the Current Legal Position of the EC on Freedom of 
Commercial Speech Under Article 10 (1). 298 
13.9 Conclusion. 300 
14. General Conclusion. 303 
14.1 Overview. 303 
14.2 Theories and Approaches: An Assessment. 308 
14.3 Television Advertising Regulation in the UK: Success or Failure? 312 
14.4 Advertising and Television: A Look to the Future. 318 
List of Interviewees 322 
Appendix 1 323 
Appendix 2 324 
Appendix 3 327 
Appendix 4 328 
Appendix 5 329 
Bibliography 338 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLES: Page 
12.1 Should TV advertisements for SanPro be allowed? 263 
12.2 How comfortable or uncomfortable would you find it if SanPro 
was advertised on TV ? 263 
12.3 Should TV advertisements for SanPro be allowed ? 
(Sex Differences) 264 
12.4 Should TV advertisements for SanPro be allowed ? (Age Differences) 265 
12.5 Should TV advertisements for SanPro be allowed ? (Class Dfferences) 265 
FIGURES: 
5.1 Advertising Minutage 1958-59. 94 
6.1 Advertising Minutage 1955- 63. 110 
10.1 The three paradigms of UK broadcasting regulation. 187 
10.2: The hierarchy of authority in television advertising regulation. 188 
10.3: Power relations within the regulatory system. 189 
10.4: The ITC as consumer protection agency. 190 
10.5: Diagram. How The ITC Deals with Complaints. 202 
10.6: The ITV Network Centre as buffer between the ITC and the advertising industry. 208 
10.7: Script Clearance. 209 
10.8: Film Clearance. 210 
vii 
Acknowl ed gem ents 
I would like to thank all those who have helped me in carrying out this research. Their 
contribution in terms of knowledge and expertise, and their general support and encouragement 
have been absolutely invaluable. I would like to thank, first of all, my supervisor, Dr. Howard 
Tumber, who gave me enormous support advice and guidance thoughout the period of my 
research. I am also extremely grateful to all my interviewees who gave up their time to answer 
my questions, and without whose willingness to share their insight and experience of the many 
different practical aspects of regulation, broadcasting and advertising this thesis simply would 
not have been possible. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to Frank Willis of the 
ITC for his unfailing patience and generosity in dealing with my constant appeals for help, and 
Angela Salt and Miranda Scrase of the ITC for providing crucial archive material. I am 
indebted to the NATO Research Programme for providing the necessary funding. Finally I 
would like to thank my mother, Chysanthe Gantzias, for her continuing support over the long 
period of my study abroad. 
viii 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the current state of regulation of 
television achertising in the UK, chiefly in the light of its historical 
background. A number of general theories of regulation are also used to 
analysc both developments in regulation policy and some of the events and 
processes in the practical activity of regulation. 
The thesis seeks to demonstrate that the present structures have not simply 
arisen haphazardly, nor do they represent anything especially new, but are 
the result of a long process of evolution during which continuity rather than 
change has been the dominant theme. Broadcasting in the UK has enjoyed a 
much longer period of stable independent development han most countries 
of continental Europe, which has enabled it to establish strong and effective 
regulatory traditions. The advantage of a historical perspective is that it 
shows how these traditions were built up, who was responsible for the 
primary regulatory structures and what motivated them, and what were the 
causes of change in the system. It has an important explanatory value for an 
understanding of the present. My arpunent is that television advertising 
regulation cannot be divorced from broadcasting regulation as a whole, and 
although advertising has only been part of the broadcasting system since the 
inauguration of commercial television in 1955, the form and methods of its 
regulation cannot be divorced from their roots in television and radio's non- 
commercial past. 
Ile fact that broadcasting started as a private enterprise subject, in the 
words of one government minister, to "drastic" regulation, was soon re- 
constituted as a non-commercial public corporation acting as trustee for the 
national interest, and that business and advertising interests were only 
permitted a role in the broadcasting system after thirty years of operation, 
under similarly drastic regulation, has an important bearing on how 
advertising regulation is done today. Political, social and cultural influences 
on broadcasting and broadcast advertising regulation policy and its 
implementation are traced by looking at the Committee system of policy- 
making, and by examining numerous published and unpublished (confidential) reports and documents dealing with a variety of aspects of 
broadcasting and television advertising regulation. The extent to which 
public interest theory and other theories of regulation are relevant to 
broadcasting is also assessed. I have therefore sought to explain the present 
in terms of the past and with reference to several wider theoretical 
frameworks. 
ix 
General In&odudion 
General Introduction 
In the introduction to his book Goveming the BBC, broadcasting historian Asa Briggs claims that "it 
is impossible to understand the current structure of British broadcasting, a unique structure within the 
world context, without 
... 
tracing its origins back to the 1920s"'. This study of British television 
advertising regulation, also a unique structure, takes the same approach. Although advertising has 
only been a part of the broadcasting system since 1955, the regulatory structures governing 
commercial television were closely modelled on the existing constitution of the BBC, Ile same fine 
of reasoning which had excluded advertising from the BBC for thirty years lay behind the original 
provisions for control of advertising within these structures and stiff informs advertising regulation 
policytoday. 
British broadcasting is at present undergoing a period of upheaval as a result of developments in 
media technology and change on the political front. At the same time that the new media of Cable 
and Satellite began to make spectrum scarcity as ajustificafion for regulation obsolete in the 1980s, a 
shift to the political right in Britain and America brought the whole concept of state regulation of the 
economy under critical scrutiny. The 1990 Broadcasting Act deregulated the economic side of 
Independent Television in order to promote competition and bring broadcasting into fine with the 
prevailing free market ideology. Advertising, as part of the economic structure of ITV, has been 
subject to deregulation, but the regulatory apparatus for the control of advertising content has 
remained remarkably intact. Traditional concepts of social responsibility in broadcasting, which went 
ainst the individualistic and enterprise-oriented mood of Thatcherism in the 1980s, have survived in 
advertising regulation policy and the current procedures for copy control, al2hough considerably 
enlarged, are not significantly different from how they were at the time of the 1964 Television Act. 
So in order to gain a better understanding of the current situation in the regulation of television 
advertising it is essential to look at the conditions and circumstances in which it has its roots. By 
examining the origins and development of the broadcasting system in this country, particularly the 
attitudes which influenced its regulatory arrangements, it is possible to learn about how the present 
1 Asa Briggs, GoPeming theBBC, British Broadcasting Ccrpomfiolý 1979, p. I 
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control structures for television advertising assumed their shape. Regulatory arrangements do not 
arise in a vacuum, but evolve over a period of time, and within the context of a particular set of 
Political, economic, social, and cultural determinants. 
Despite the huge increase in the scope of its operations and in its technical capabilities, the story of 
broadcasting in Britain is mostly a case of 'plus ca change, plus Oest la meme, chose. ' Although in the 
last seventy years radio and television services have expanded far beyond the expectations of even 
the most optimistic early pioneers, many of the same fundamental issues they had to deal with are 
still alive today. Much the same questions are being asked and the same anxieties are being voiced. 
Some of these issues are connected to larger political, economic and social concerns: state control 
versus free enterprise; monopoly versus competition; the public interest in broadcasting; freedom of 
expression, accountability and access; regulation 
- 
what form and how much or how little ; methods 
of finance 
- 
licence fee, government assistance or advertising? Some are more specific to 
broadcasting: particular aims and objectives; public service ideals and obligations; programming 
policy, detailed guidelines for advertising control and so forth. The relationship between advertising 
and broadcasting cannot be considered in isolation from this background or apart from the broader 
relationship between broadcasting and society. 
Theoretical Framework 
There is a very extensive literature on regulation from numerous different perspectives, and a number 
of general studies which bring all these perspectives together for comparative purposes. Differences 
in terminology and different ways of defining regulation sometimes cause confusion. I have followed 
John. G. Francis's inclusive definition of regulation as "state intervention in private spheres of activity 
to realise public purposes #92. Francis extends the traditional view of regulation as restrictions on 
choice to include the notion of regulation as actually strengthening choice by protecting people from 
undesired choices, particularly in the area of social regulation. This interpretation is especially 
relevant o broadcasting regulation, the primary purpose of which has always been social rather than 
economic. The initial regulatory decision to exclude advertising as an undesired choice was crucial to 
2 John G. Francis, MePoliacs ofReguLatiog Oxfoa- BlackwdL 1993. p. 5 
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the future direction of the broadcasting systerný. It strongly influenced the way in which the 
advertising option was presented once policy-makers had come to the conclusion that audiences no 
longer needed protection from having to decide whether they wished to be exposed to broadcast 
advertising or not. 
As the theoretical framework for analysing television advertising regulation, including the "negative" 
period when regulation policy ruled that advertising and broadcasting were a socially unacceptable 
mix, I have used Robert Horwitz! s classification of five general categories of regulation theory. 
These five categories 
- 
public interest theory, "perverted" public interest theory, conspiracy theory, 
capitalist state theory and organisational theory 
- 
cover most ways of looldng at regulation, and this 
study explores to what extent any of them throw fight on the empirical history of broadcast 
advertising control. I have also made use of Dennis McQuail's definition of the public interest in 
communications, and some general approaches to regulation outlined by Kenneth Dysons. 
Methodology. 
In reviewing the historical context, I have drawn on contemporary reports and documents including 
policy recommendations, tatements of intent, pleas by special interest groups, prescriptions for 
actual regulation 
- 
rules and guidelines, and descriptive records of regulatory activity such as the 
Annual Reports of the commercial television regulatory authorities. Government White Papers and 
the relevant Broadcasting Acts have been examined in detail and general background has been 
provided by published historical accounts of broadcasting and television advertising. 
The evolution of certain structures, and of British attitudes to regulation and to advertising; can be 
quite clearly traced in the reports of a succession of Committees of inquiry appointed by the 
government of the day to investigate various aspects of broadcasting and recommend appropriate 
courses of action. I have relied heavily on these reports, together with their memoranda of evidence, 
3N 
ote.. The negative aspects ofdecisionqmUng, i. e. the finpact on subsequent policy of excluding catain 
Options from the proctss, has been explored by Steven Lukcs in Power., A Radical Viewý British Sociological Association, 1974, 
Pp. 16-20 
4 Robert Bzitt Harmt7, Yhe Irony offtulahon Pefo? m: 7he Da-egulation ofAmencon Teleramnwfication New Yoric Oxford 
5 
University press 1989 
D. McQuail, Media perfommc4 
Dartmouth: 1992 , 
Laxbm- Sage 1992 and. Kcrmeth Dyson, 77w Polifics of Reguladon in Gamany, 
3 
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not only because they were extremely influential in determining regulation policy, but because 
nowhere else is there such a concentration of vivid detail Which reveals what people with an interest 
in broadcasting really felt about it. It is these subjective feelings and opinions that continue to 
influence the regulatory mode and style even when objective political, economic or technological 
developments force radical structural changes. And in the committee reports these opinions are 
delivered directly rather than filtered through the perspective of an historian or commentator. 
In dealing with the present situation in advertising control, and with the recent past, I conducted an 
extensive series of taped interviews with leading figures in the television regulatory authorities, past 
and present, the television companies, the advertising industry (which term I have used to cover both 
advertisers and agencies) and from consumer organisations. This has been particularly illuminating 
because regulation is not just a matter of drawing up a fixed set of rules which then operate 
automatically Eke clockwork, it is an aedvity carried out by individuals with their own convictions, 
ideals and prejudices. Within the broad parameters of the job, what people think and feel about the 
purpose of regulation and the practical dffficulties of implementing it has an important effect on the 
process. Regulation involves numerous interactions between the various participants which help to 
shape its development. The interviews were all conducted on the record and comments have been 
attributed to named individuals. A full list of interviewees is given at the end. I was also allowed 
access to the unpublished confidential minutes of the Independent Television Commissiorfs 
Advertising Advisory Committee on condition that no individuals were named and no specific 
attributions were made. I have therefore included general information obtained from the minutes in 
the Case Study on regulation of female sanitary protection (San-pro) advertising, which gives a real 
insight into the decision-making process of regulation, without identifying particular Conunittee 
members. 
In order to clarify the way in which regulation works in practice, I have made a methodologically 
useful typological distinction between measures designed to affect the processes of the enterprise to 
be regulated, i. e. its form and structure, and those intended to deal with what the enterprise 
produces. In broadcasting, this distinction corresponds roughly to that between regulation governing 
the economic, technical and administrative aspects of the system, and regulation bearing on 
Programming. The same distinction can be made with respect to television advertising: regulation of 
4 
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advertising within the commercial television system deals with it both as part of the financial structure 
and as a series of broadcast messages with a content. Process regulation also includes determining 
the amount and distnbution of advertising. 
In broadcasting, this is a vital distinction because it is a basic premise of British broadcasting policy 
that the quality of the product is dependent in an essential way upon regulation of the process. 
Regulatory arrangements have always been based on the assumption of a causal link between the 
form, or process, of the broadcasting system and its content, or product. Tbs was, until recently, one 
of the main reasons behind having regulation at all, since it was believed to be the best way of 
providing the right structures for good programmes to be made. But the impact of the process on the 
product has been reinforced by specific regulatory requirements for programming as well. The 
quality of the broadcasting product is a function of the interaction between regulation determining 
the process and regulation bearing on the product. 
The relationship between process and product in the non-commercial sector of the UKs public 
service broadcasting system is relatively unproblematic. Here, the sole purpose of programmes is to 
inform, educate and entertain the audience. They are ends in themselves. Although there are many 
conceptions ofwhat makes quality programming, most include the notions of range and diversity as 
regards the package as a whole, and creativity and innovation i  the case of individual programmes. 
Regulation of the broadcasting process in the UK was designed from the outset o enable programme 
makers to achieve the highest standards possible for the benefit of the public. 
Advertisements, on the other hand, serve quite a different purpose. Iley are a means to an end - the 
promotion of goods and services - and the dependence of a broadcasting sc--vice on advertising 
revenue inevitably means that programmes also become, to an extent, a means to this end. 
Advertisers will pay for programmes to be made only if they deliver audiences who are potential 
consumers of what is being advertised. 
Regulation of television advertising has two main aims. The first is to protect the interests of the 
consumer, both as a viewer of programmes and as a potential buyer of the goods and services 
5 
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advertised. The second is to ensure that the trading practices of the two regulated industries are fair 
and that competition, within the permitted parameters, is not distorted. 
Protecting the viewer, as buyer, from misleading harmful or offensive advertising on the air does not 
pose too many problems for regulation if a strict supervisory regime is set up and enforced. Fair 
trading and competition problems which occur after regulation has been drawn up are an industry 
matter and do not have a direct bearing on the quality of the television service. But the inclusion of 
advertising in the broadcasting system as an integral part of its structure has always been considered 
to be potentially damaging to the service in terms of programming. From the start, a link was 
identified between broadcast advertising and programme standards, and it was assumed that 
advertising in the system would have a negative impact on programmes precisely because the 
service would then have the "ulterior motive" of supplying audiences to advertisere. IUs assumption 
has been modified over the years, but the fear that the need to satisfy advertisers would undermine 
public service broadcasting ideals of quality, range and diversity, along with related concerns uch as 
the influence of sponsors on programme content and scheduling, and the spoiling of audience's 
enjoyment by excessive amounts of advertising, have made process regulation a difficult and 
sometimes controversial operation. It is process regulation which protects the interests of the 
consumer as a viewer of programmes. 
The relationship between the broadcasting process and the broadcasting product is a complex one 
and distinguishing between regulation governing the former and that governing the latter has proved 
useful. The same distinction has been made throughout with respect to advertising regulation. 
Broadcasting regulation is unique because, unlike the regulation of industries such as gas, electricity 
or airlines, it operates to a large extent with intangibles and immeasurables. it zuempts to promote 
cultural and social values and benefits about which there are strong feehngs but which are difficult to 
evaluate objectively. The primary goal of advertising regulation in the UK has been to try and ensure 
that the introduction of market forces into broadcasting 
- 
and television was the test bed for this 
endeavour 
- 
did not destroy the social purpose of the service which had been so well served by the 
previous, non-commercial system. 
One of the reasons -Ahy the Beveridge Report came out against broadcast advertisingAras that it introduced an Igterior motivC 
f I or its CYAu saier. P into broadcasting and represented --an abdication of broadcas* qxxt of ffie Broadcasting Committee 1949 
Appendix H: Memranda Subuittcd to the Comnittee (Cumd. 8117) London: MM, 1951 
6 
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Chapter I sets out the theoretical framework for an analysis of broadcasting and broadcast 
advertising regulation over the seven decades of its existence. Robert Horwitz! s five categories of 
regulation theory are summarised along with four general approaches to regulation outhed by 
Kenneth Dyson. T'his chapter focuses in particular on public interest theory of regulation and ways in 
which the concept can be adapted to suit broadcasting. 
Chapter 2 describes broadcasting! s earliest years and the events which led to establishment of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation. It looks at the role of the first two Committees of Inquiry into 
broadcasting, and their influence on regulation policy, and analyses ome of the factors behind the 
decision to exclude advertising from the BBC and constitute it as a non-commercial public service 
monopoly 
- 
the first paradigm of broadcasting regulation. 
Chapter 3 follows the progress of regulation once the principle of unified control of broadcasting had 
been put into operation, and looks at what the next three Conurfttees; of Inquiry have to say about 
the connection between broadcasting, advertising and the public interest. 
Chapter 4 deals with the Report of the Beveridge Committee, the first official report to give 
extensive coverage to the pro-advertising lobby and to discuss in detail the arguments for and against 
broadcast advertising. McQuail's concept of the public interest in communications is applied to the 
field of broadcasting. 
Chapter 5 describes the circumstances leading up to the inauguration of ITV under the 1954 
Television Act, and the regulatory arrangements for commercial television M'. 11ch resulted in the 
heavily regulated BBC/ITV duopoly 
- 
the second regulatory paradigm. It outlines some of the early 
problems encountered by the regulator in implementing advertising regulation. 
Chapters 6 and 7 trace the development of advertising regulation from the 1960s to 1980, taldng in 
the Pilldngton and Annan Reports and the 1980 Broadcasting Act. They analyse some of the failures 
and successes of adverfising poficy and fts implementation. 
7 
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Chapter 8 deals with broadcasting during the 1980s when Thatcherite ideology and the new media of 
Direct Broadcast Satellite and Cable began to challenge the traditional assumptions behind 
regulation. It assesses the influence of the Hunt and Peacock Reports on the deregulating 1990 
Broadcasting Act which ushered in the third paradigm 
-a plurality of services with different 
regulatory regimes. 
Chapters 9,10 and II describe in detail the new regulatory structures for commercial televisior4 
concentrating on the current machinery for advertising control. The effects of deregulation on 
standards of television advertising and programming are also discussed, particularly with reference to 
sponsorship. 
Chapter 12 is a Case Study Which shows how the category of female sanitary protection has been 
treated by the television regulating Authority. It explores the role of the Advertising Advisory 
Committee in Policy-making and gives a detailed insight into the actual practice of regulation. 
Chapter 13 is devoted to the development of European Community policy on advertising regulation 
and its impact on the LTK. It looks at some of the issues surrounding the potentially conflicting 
objectives; of consumer protection and freedom of commercial speeck 
8 
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Chapter 1 
Some General Theories of Regulation 
1.1 Introduction. 
The concrete exercise of television advertising regulation is best examined against the theoretical 
background of regulation in general. Control of television advertising in the UK is, for the most part, 
an aspect of broadcasting regulation, although independent domestic and EC consumer protection 
and competition legislation also play a significant role. Broadcasting regulation, in turn, is framed 
with reference to, "rider policy issues, political, economic and social, and is just one of vaiious ways 
in which the state seeks to control industry. 
No single theory or approach wholly explains every event in the history of broadcasting regulation in 
Britain, which has evolved over time, but all have at least something to say about the most salient 
features of British regulatory structures and operations over the years. A useful classification of 
theories of regulation has been made by Robert Horwitz in his book 7he Irony of Regulation 
Reform. He groups them into "five general, ideal typical categories: public interest theory, regulatory 
failure or 'perverted'public interest theory, conspiracy theory, organisational behaviour theory, and 
capitalist state theory"'. These categories are not mutually exclusive and overlap to some extent. 
1.2 Horwitz's Fivefold Classification of Regulation Theories. 
1.2.1 Public Interest neory. 
Public interest theory, oldest of the theoretical perspectives on government regulation of private 
business, holds that "regulation is established in response to the conflict between private corporations 
and the general public. The creation of regulatory agencies is viewed as the concrete expression of 
Robert B. Horwitz, The irony ofRegulation Reform: The Deregulation ofAmerican Telecommunication, New York 
O. xf, brd University Press 1989, P. 23 
9 
Some General 7heories ofRegulation 
democratic reforM,, 2. According to this view, the state intervenes in the economy to protect the 
community from the undesirable ffects of either outlight monopoly, or of the concentration of 
economic power in too few hands. This happens because free markets are inherently unstable. Left to 
their own devices they fO to provide a mechanism for ensuring that their benefits are distributed 
equitably among all sections of society. The theory's earliest formulation, made in the last century, 
equated the public interest with the interests of the individual small producer struggling to survive in 
competition with increasingly dominant national corporations. With the twentieth century came the 
mass market, the concept of the mass consumer and the accompanying realisation of the importance 
of advertising. As the public utilities such as gas, electricity and telecommunications reached more 
and more homes, the number of consumers of the services they provided increased. Regulation was 
then designed to curb the power of private interests in the management of these 'natural monopolies' 
and to safeguard the citizens right to benefit from the development of a national infrastructure. 
T'his later 'progressive' version of public interest theory shifts the emphasis from producers to 
consumers. Based on the notion of market failure, progressive public interest theory maintains that it 
is necessary for the state to intervene in the economy, not just to look after the interests of those who 
are vulnerable to exploitation in specific areas, but to introduce rationality and fairness into the 
system generally. Regulatory agencies are able to do flis because they represent "impersonal, 
non-partisan, scientific expertise vested in a body wlich is continually in session"3 
- 
As independent 
administrative apparatuses they act as counterbalances to the partisan interests of private business. 
According to public interest theory, regulation combines an economic response - promoting 
efficiency and consumer welfare by anti-monopoly and fair competition measures - with the political 
goal of promoting democratic rights. This view is based on a pluralist theory of power wHch 
conceives of political power as a coalition of numerous competing interests. The political system 
functions best when it is able to balance these different interests and cater for awide, range of social 
needs. And as markets cannot adequately respond to many legitimate social needs, regulation is 
necessary to ensure that the needs of society, as a group of consumers, are served. 
2 ibid. p. 23 3 R. B. Homitz, op cit. p. 24 10 
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According to Horwitz, the weakness of public interest theory is that it does not sufficiently recognise 
the importance, in practice, of economic power and, as a result, it cannot account for many of the 
features of regulation as it is actudy carried out. It also confuses two distinctly different aspects of 
regulation: genetic and operational. Horwitz believes that "the origin of an institution is different 
from the set of reasons and muctures by which that institution operates or is maintained over time"4 
. 
So, although some regulatory agencies may originally be set up by the state to serve the public 
interest, commercial realities dictate that a great deal of regulation ultimately benefits industry not the 
consumer. Regulatory agencies may even be established in the first place as a response to industry 
pressure, and as a means of protecting the regulated parties' commercial activities rather than the 
interests of the buying public. 
Public interest theory, therefore, is only a partial explanation of the genesis of regulatory institutions 
and does not have enough to say about the operation of an agency once it has been established. It 
also suffers from the fact that it is not always easy to identify the public interest in any given set of 
circumstances. The term is often loosely used and only vaguely defiried. The International 
Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences says that the notion is "elastic and relative 
.... 
(and) has no a priori 
content waiting to be revealed 
... 
(It) serves to remind parties concerned that there are considerations 
extending beyond their goals"'. While noting its centrality to discussions of public policy, political 
action and social value, Virginia Held, writing in 1970, admitted that "there is at present no 
agreement as to what we mean when we use the term"6 
. 
Given the difficulty of defining the public interest objectively, it is hardly surprising that vested 
interests often simultaneously propose completely opposite solutions to policy problems, each one 
clairning to be acting in the wider public interest. In fact, it would be difficult to find anyone who 
claimed otherwise. Traditional public interest theory'relies on the somewhat simplistic assumption 
that a clear-cut judgement can easily be made between policies which are in the interests of the 
community and those which are not. Such a judgement can only be made in a relatively simple 
situation, with a limited number of factors to be taken into consideration -a rare occurrence in the 
4 ibid. p. 9 
P. L. Sills, Public Intemst, in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciencesý New Yo& Nfimillan, 1986, 
pp. 170-174 
V. Held The Public Interest and individual Interest New Yoric Basic Book, 1970, p vii 
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context of regulatory decision-malcing. But in spite of the problems urrounding its interpretation the 
concept has nevertheless been widely used in the sphere of public policy and is the cornerstone of 
much theory of regulatioW. 
1.2.2 "Perverted" Public Interest neory : Instrurnental, Structural and Capture 
Models of Influence. 
By the 1960's, it was becoming quite clear that public interest theory was unable to account for 
many of the dynamic aspects of regulation, and its frequent failure, despite an enormous increase in 
its scope during the post-war decades, to achieve what it set out to do. This led to the development 
of various forms of regulatory fOure, or "perverted" public interest theory'. These are attempts to 
explain the behaviour of agencies once they have been established Which offer critiques of the 
empirical facts of regulatory operation. They are highly critical approaches because their proponents 
feel that the public interest has in reality been betrayed and not advanced by government regulation. 
Richard Posner, for example, claims that agencies "are established for 'public interest' purposes but 
subsequently become the tools of the industry they regulate"9. Such critiques do, however, accept 
the basic premise on which the public interest model is based, that regulation is originally in the 
interests of the general public, and seek to modify the model rather than overturn it. 
According to these theories, the public interest becomes perverted when, after a while, the regulator 
comes to identify itself too closely with the industry it is supposed to control. The industry is then 
able to influence the decision-malcing process to its advantage. There are three basic types of 
"influence" model: "instrumental". "structural", and "capture"10. Although Horwitz makes them 
distinct and gives them equal weight, capture is really the broadest notion and the other two often 
just serve to explain why agencies may become captured. 
7 Note Even such a relatively fierce critic of regulation as James. Q Wilson, spealdng of US laws which explicitly stated that an 
industry was to be regulated in the public mterestý admits: "we may, m hindsight, dismiss such language as vague or even 
meaningless, but it was not meaningless at the time such laws were passed. " If the law was to be used to make behaviour 
conform to general standards ofrightness, then "claboratejusfifications" would be needed to get support forsuch use. (J. Q. Wlson, 7hepolitics ofRegulation, New York Basic 
, 
1980, p 370 ) It is only more recently that the notion of public interest 
itselfbas come under critical smitiny 8 R. B. Horwitz op cit. p. 27 9 Richard A Posner, Yheories ofEconomic Regulation, Bell Jounial of Economics and Management Science 5/2 (Autumn 
1974), pp. 335-358 
10 R. B. Horwitz, op. cit. p. 9 
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The first type 
- 
instrumental 
- 
focuses on the role of individuals, and the second 
- 
structural 
- 
on the 
role of institutions in explaining why the regulatory function is thought to have failed. Instrumental 
influence occurs when agency officials and industry personnel are drawn from the same sociaL 
educational and working background, and share the same basic outlook on state 
- 
business relations. 
T'his is likely to be the case when regulators are chosen from within the regulated industry, as having 
the relevant expertise, and see things from an industry rather than a consumer perspective. The 
regulators and the regulated meet frequently and after a while a good working relationship descends 
into something too cosy for tough decisions to be made. A weakness of the instrumental approach is 
that it places too much emphasis on personal motivation and behaviour. Apart from the fact that 
many agency staff are not drawn from industry but are professional civil servants and do their job 
competently, purely individual characteristics would not be sufficient to explain the systematic 
regulatory faure of entire institutions' 1. 
The structural model analyses how institutions are put together and their relafions, %Nith each other, 
and with the state, in accounting for regulatory fflure. Factors which are outside the direct control of 
individual decision-makers within the agency limit and shape the options available to them. The 
political processes which determine the composition of agencies; their level of resources, which are 
often comparatively poor; the problem of information asymmetry, where the regulator depends 
largely on industry for the information and expert advice it needs in making decisions; the relative 
power, economic clout and political influence in general of the regulated industry and its access to 
the media may aH contribute towards regulatory failure at the structural level 12 
. 
Capture theory has a number of variants and has been very influential in the E,: alysis of regulatory 
breakdown. It asserts that for whatever eason an agency was set up, it will eventually be taken over 
or "captured" by the industry it is supposed to regulate. The best known treatment of capture theory 
is Marver Bernstein' s Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Bernstein conceives of the 
genesis and operation of a regulatory agency in terms of a fife-cycle with periods of gestation, youth, 
maturity and old age. At the beginning, the agency may have a dedicated and enthusiastic staff and 
wide public support, and during the first two phases the public interest is dominant. There is an 
11 ibid. p. 27 
12 ibid. p. 28 
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adversarial relationsHp with the industry and regulation is innovative and effective. But gradually the 
distance between the two parties decreases and regulation starts to rely too. much on precedent and 
routine. With the approach of old age bureaucracy rules and the regulatory function degenerates" 
As Horwitz stresses, Bernstein! s picture is rather too uniform in its presentation of the development 
of agencies, ignoring crucial differences in purpose and circumstances. It tends to overemphasise 
their "natural" cyclical behaviour, without explaining the precise reasons for the cause and effect 
processes Which result in the four stages. Bernstein does, however, allow for possible interruption of 
the cycle by some political upheaval which returns it to the beginning or abruptly introduces a new 
paradigm. Regulation is part of a wider political context and a sudden change in the political agenda 
interferes with the evolution of the cycle. Political power relations have their effects on regulatory 
14 practice 
Bernstein makes the important point that regulatory agencies are often trying to achieve conflicting 
policy objectives; on the one hand to facilitate and to promote, and on the other to control and to 
restrict's. He also notes the "formalism" inherent in institutional procedures. Personnel may become 
institutionalised (and so increasingly inflexible and bureaucratic) and the burgeoning amount of 'case 
laW contributes to conservatism in making the rules. Career officials obviously have a vested interest 
in maintaining the system, and are reluctant to make controversial or unpopular decisions which 
upset the status quo. They also have a natural tendency to expand regulatory activityý adding to the 
number of petty restrictions imposed for their own sake rather than any legitimate regulatory 
objective, and to oppose any attempt to scale down their activities 16 
. 
As Dyson has perceptively 
remarked, "they are unlikely to support radical deregulation" 17 
. 
13 Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1985, 
14 
pp. 74-102 
R. B. Horwitz, op cit p. 30 13 Marver Bernstein, op, cit. pp. 253 
. 
259 
16 ibid. pp. 86-95 
" Kenneth Dyson, The Politics of Regulation in Germanj4 Dartmouth: 1992, p. 22. Note- With respect to the UK 
commercial television regulator he was quite right Tbe Independent Broadcasting Authority sbaWy opposed the Tbatcher 
govermnents plans to hl)cmlise the broadcasting syst= which would result in a significant reduction of its fonnal regulatory 
po%Trs- 
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1.2.3 Conspiracy neory and its Variants. 
Horwitz! s third category, conspiracy theory, also takes a very negative view of the effectiveness of 
regulation. It goes flather than perverted public interest theory, though, in disputing the validity of 
the public interest justification even at the genetic stage. According to its main proponent, Gabriel 
Kolko, regulation is initiated from the very start as a result of a conspiracy between powerful 
business interests and the state. For Kolko and other conspiracy theorists, in the case of the public 
utilities a concept of the need to protect he public from the high prices and discrimination associated 
with private monopoly might once have existed, but this notion had soon been hiJacked by capitalist 
industrialists who used it to serve their own ends". 
In Kolko's view, the chaotic and unstable nature of the market has always been regarded by big 
business as much more of a threat to itself than to consumers, but attempts by businesses to decrease 
competition and rationalise operations by merger have not, historically, been particularly successfid'9. 
While consumers and their supporters in government might perceive certain producers of essential 
goods, or controllers of vital services as too big and powerfA from an industry perspective they 
were not big and powerful enough. Only government has sufficient power to introduce order into 
the market through its legislative capability. The tool of regulation was therefore actively sought by 
big business for its own protection, and its leading representatives have traditionally been close 
enough to the political machine to influence policy-making to their own advantage. 
Although it concentrates on the genesis rather than the operation of regulation, conspiracy theory 
correctly identifies regulation a new political institution designed to regularise the economyýo- But 
whether this institution always offers greater value as a system of protection tc. Lidustry than to the 
consumer is open to question. So is the theory's complete rýecfion of the public interest explanation 
of the origin of regulation. W10e industry may also benefit from state intervention, and this may be a 
factor in the setting up of particular agencies, it is too one-sided to suggest that this is the sole 
genetic cause. 
1g R. B. Howitz op. cit. P. 32, and Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation ofAme? ican History. 
1900-1916, New York: Free Press, 1963, p. 286 19 G. Kolko op. cit. pp. 4,5.55 20 PL B. Horwitz, op cit. p. 34 
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Building on Kolko's analysis, and the work of Anthony Downsýl free market economists of the 
Thicago' school, led by George Stigler, developed an "econornic capture-conspiracy" theory. They 
argue that regulation is a crucial mechanism by which industries try to control entry into the market 
and construct artificial cartels. It amounts to a form of government-sponsored producer protection 
which works by restricting competition and thereby reducing the threat to profits. Of the various 
regulatory measures that contribute to this end 
- 
direct subsidy, price-fixing, for example 
- 
control 
over entry is the most effective in preventing potential competitors from getting a share of the cake22. 
If outright monopoly cannot be achieved, then regulation at least provides the framework for 
effective cartel management, and agencies are both established and continue to operate to that end. 
Stigler sees regulation as an embodiment of the "rational egotism" strategy of public choice theory. 
The parties involved who stand to benefit most from regulation pursue it most intensely. This does 
not, however, tend to be the consumer who does not normally have the means or the level of 
organisation available to producers. 
Sam Peltzman and Richard Posner, again using the rational egotist model, argue that self-interest, 
either by industry, key bureaucrats or even by coalitions of industry and organised customer groups 
is the motivation for the economic capture of regulation. Contenders seek a redistribution of wealth 
or resources by regulation, and are able to "pay" for it to favour them, at the expense of others, by 
prornising political support. Only the highly organised will have the lobbying power to obtain the 
regulatory rewards. The disorganised, such as consumers, will not gain access to the policy formation 
proCeSS23. 
Economic capture-conspiracy theories are also mostly concerned with the g-. msis of regulatory 
legislation and agencies and not their operation. They ignore, as does most capture theory, the fact a 
regulatory agency may not always be in charge of a single industry representing ahomogeneous set 
21 Note., The central notion underlying most economic capture theory derives from the work of Anthony Downs 
.... 
Economic 
capture theory posits a government run by individuals wto try to maximise a private, rather than public, utility function. 
Public officials are seen not as bureaxicrats concerned with public matters, but rather as private individuals trying to 
maximise their own "utility" (staying in office, allocating more power to themselves) in much the same way that a firm 
maximises profit "In effect, regulation 
... 
is just another commodity which obeys the laws of the market" (IL B. Horwitz 
22 
Op. cit. p. 36) 
George I Stigler, The Yheory ofEconomic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2/1 
23 i 
(Spring 1971), pp. 3-21 
bid. pp. 22140 
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regulatory agency may not always be in charge of a single industry representing ahomogeneous set 
of interests. In the case of commercial broadcasting in Britain two major industries are affected by 
one regulatory body, (not to mention at least one sub-industryý'. These diffierent sets of interests are 
often at loggerheads with one another maldng capture a more complex issue. Conspiracy theories 
also downgrade the importance of the state as an actor, and as a positive force for social good, 
exaggerating the extent to which it can be co-opted as the vehicle of various interest groups. 
1.2.4 Organisational Theory. 
In contrast to conspiracy theory, the organisational pproach is not concerned with the origins of 
regulatory arrangements but looks at the operation of agencies, focusing on their behaviour as 
institutions. It recognises that these bodies also have a life of their own as serni-autonomous 
structures and follow internal organisational imperatives as much as any other. Tlis may mean that 
organisations "guard their autonomy, and are not influenced by any party 
... 
(or) it may mean that 
agencies, buffeted by a myriad of complex demands and conflicts, and possessing limited resources to 
deal with complexity", seek for safe and satisfactory rather than optimal outcomes 25 
. 
Professional 
staff in the regulatory agencies believe that any problem can be solved by more and better regulation, 
and seek to perpetuate their own activities in ways which make them regulation oriented, rather than 
consumer (or industry) oriented. Rules and regulations proliferate as an end in themselves and 
regardless of the costs involved in an ever-increasing bureaucracy. 
For Robert Chatov and Paul Janskow an important organisational imperative which dictates the 
behaviour of regulatory agencies is the need to lower levels of conflict. In day-to-day operation, 
agencies have to deal with many different, and often mutually exclusive, demands made on them by 
competing sets of intereste'. 11ey develop strategies for avoiding conflict and for reducing the 
complexity of their responsibilities. Such strategies usually involve constructing "consensus 
24 Mote. ý 11c commercial television authority regulates both the main television broadcasting industry and the 
advertising industry. Its decisions also bear on the independent elevision progmmme supply business whose interests 
have sometimes conflicted with the licensed broadcasters. The details of this conflict and the implications for capture 
theory that the complex regulatory structure of UK television are dealt with in Chapters 10 and II on the structure and 
25 
dynamics of television advertising regulation. 
2K 
13. Horwitz op. cit P. 39 6 Robert Chatov, Government Regulation: Process and Substantive Impacts, and Paul. L Joskow, Inflation and 
Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Proceii ofPublic Utility Price Regulation, Journal of Law and 
Economics 17/2 (October 1974), pp. 291-327 
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07 n Their goals 
. 
James. Q. Wilson also notes the tendency of government age cies to be "risk averse". 
desire for stability and autonomy and to be free from blame gives them a strong incentive to 
"proliferate rules to cover all possible contingencies 08 
. 
Aversion to risk and reluctance to confront 
controversial issues leads to the adopting of a "regulation as usual" attitude, which protects the both 
the agency and balance of Power in the regulated industry. Such a response is essentially a 
conservative and formalising one: existing structures and procedures are preferred to innovation and 
change is to be feared. This ties in with Bernsteires fife-cycle picture in its later stages.. 
A number of theorists from the right, such as Paul MacAvoy, Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, 
have used organisational theory to provide a counter balance to the anti-industry standpoint of 
capture-type critiques. They have pointed out that the mass of rules and restrictions imposed on 
industry, far from promoting consumer welfare, has actually worked against it. It has acted as a brake 
on profitability and growth whick in turn, has had a damaging effect not just on the regulated 
industry, but on the economy as a whole, slowing the rate of growth of the nation's GNP. By 
preventing business from functioning effectively, government regulation has neither rationalised the 
market nor increased efficiency, but has succeeded in doing just the oppositeP. It was this reasoning 
that was behind the deregulatory trends of the 1980s and 1990s. The dismantling of restrictive 
regulatory apparatuses was an important priority of governments, led by the US and the UK, who 
moved sharply to the right in the early 1980s. 
Although they are varied in their conclusions about the causes of regulatory failure, organisatiOnal 
approaches hare the conception that institutions have their own rationale and their behaviour cannot 
be explained solely in temis of their stated purposes and goals, or in terms o4L'exl, -. nal pressures from 
government, industry or consumer groups. 
27 R- B. Hor%itz op. cit. p. 40 28 1 Q. Wilson ((xt), op. cit. p 377 29 Eugene Bardach and Robert. A. Kagan Going hy the Book: The Problew ofRegulatory Unreasottableness, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1982, pp. 58-92, and Paul W. MacAvoy, The Regulafion-Induced Shortage ofNational 
Gas, Journal Of Economics 3GV (April 1971) pp. 167-199 
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1.2.5 Capitalist State Theory. 
Horwitz! s last category, capitalist state theory, focuses on regulation as structuralist Mar'Nists analyse 
it, i. e. as part of "a wider political theory of state intervention in the period of advanced capitalism"30 
. 
Regulatory agencies are seen as one of several types of state apparatus designed to safeguard the 
accumulation of capital, towards wlich the state is structurally biased, when the market fas to do 
the job. They are a means of social control which enables the state to maintain market order on behalf 
of industry, but which also makes it possible for it to distribute social benefits. According to 
structuralist Marxist theory, the state as an actor is bound by the constraint of capital accumulation, 
but also by a second major constraint, that of "legitimation". The democratic system obliges it to 
persuade the electorate to legitimise its activities in support of capital, and a healthy economy and 
growing prosperity is crucial to thO. Regulation is a mechanism whereby business can be "induced" 
to perform well, and social objectives can also be seen to be being pursued. 
Vincent Mosco, a political scientist who has written widely on regulation policy in 
telecommunications and broadcasting in the US, approaches the problem from this perspective. 
Discussing the new era of deregulation, he acknowledges the importance of economic analysis but 
emphasises that "deregulation is addifionally a political instrument, one that "unleashes" new 
02 instruments of social control 
. 
Mosco, identifies regulation as one of four main types of govemance 
in developed capitalist societies, the other three being private competition, expert boards and 
corporatism. 
Another political scientist, Stephen ElIdn, has erificised the way most theory of regulation over 
emphasises the economic aspects of regulation at the expense of the political. In EII&s opinion, 
much recent debate on regulation rests on a view of public policy-malcing as an exercise in the logic 
of efficient choice and in particular as an exercise in economisingý 3, using McKean's definition of 
economising: "all decision malcing persons or groups 
....... 
try to make the 'most' as they conceive 
M ibid. p. 43 31 ibicL pp. 4243 
32 VinCent MOSCO, Towards a Theory ofthe State and Telecommunication Policy. Journal of Conununication 38, 
1988, p. 120 
33 Stephen. L. Elkin, Regulation as a Political Question, Elsevier Science Publication B. V, 1985, p. 96 19 
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of the 'most' of whatever resources they have 04 
. 
Ms is an instnunental view of regulatory 
agencies as passive ntities, potentially substitutable for one another, since each one is merely a tool 
for fiAfilling certain separately defined goals. If the goal is to satisfy consumer preferences, 
agencies are judged according to whether they make any contribution to grand or ? areto! 
efficiency, i. e. "a situation where change in a distribution designed to make someone better off will 
make at least one person worse ofyi, 35 
. 
Economisers, within the more recent schools of Eberal, 
pluralist economic thinking favour markets over government as devices for achieving Pareto 
efficiency, and where markets fail ! rnarketlike! institutions should be set up rather than 
continuations of the old command and control systems of regulation. 
Efldn proposes, however, that under the political perspective, institutions are not mere passive 
instruments divorced from the political community, they are formative of areas of a natiorfs political 
, 
36 fife. So to view regulation politically is to "understand it as a problem in governing 
. 
"Governing", here, means "choosing among regulatory formats on the basis of an understanding of 
the connection between these institutional alternatives and the larger political regimeto37. In 
emphasising the political dimension Elkin focuses on the relationship between the citizen and 
the state. To judge between regulatory alternatives is to make judgments about the meaning of 
citizenship". The regulatory institutions, Eke any political institutions, are not just a neutral 
means to achieve certain objectives but the outcome themselves of wider decisions about the ldnd 
of society in wl-&h people wish to five. 
1.3 Four General Approaches to Regulation. 
In addition to Horwitz! s classification of theories, Kenneth Dyson has identified four main general 
approaches in the literature on regulation: institution-centred, culture-centred, coalition-centred and 
international-centred. These are meant to be seen as complementary to one another in the attempt to 
34 Ronald N. McKean, The Role ofAnalyfical Aidy, in Ltwis GanthrOP (ed. ), Administrative Process and 
Democratic Theory, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970, p. 253 
35 Stephen. L. Elkin, op cit. p. 96 
36 ibid. p. 97 
37 ibid. p. 97 
ibid. p. 105 
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build up a fiffler picture of the complex phenomenon of regulation in different countries. Two of 
these approaches also overlap with a number of Horwids theories. 
1.3.1 The Institution-centred Approach. 
It is clear, for instance, that an institutional approach is employed by those who put forward 
organisational theories of regulation, and by some "perverted" public interest models. This approach 
focuses on the technical and formal aspects of all the activities surrounding rule-malcing and 
interpreting by a highly professional class of specialists in an institutional setting. Whatever the reason 
for its genesis, and to an extent regardless ofthe external circumstances which influence its continued 
existence, the regulatory body develops a micro-culture of its own and establishes professional 
autonomy from the state, the regulated industries and other vested interests, albeit within certain 
structural constraints. 
1.3.2 Ile Culture-centred Approach. 
Dyson maintains that the type of institution a country develops i largely determined by its historical 
and cultural inheritance. Institutions embody aset of cultural, social and political norms that form the 
background to particular structures. These structures both reflect and, in turn, shape and reinforce 
the normative ideas that gave them legitimacy in the first plad9. 
Regulatory bodies are the agents of a whole network of multidirectional aspirations, expectations, 
obligations and responsibilities. A given society has a way of doing things, and an established pattern 
of behaviour in its political, social and economic fife of which public policy-making is a significant 
part. Cultural values and even personal style are very influential in creating and maintaining 
regulatory institutions. It is possible to speak of a particular country having a particular 'regulatory 
culture. The theories considered so far largely ignore the specifically cultural dimension of 
regulation, although they may make some reference to the influences social expectations may have in 
determining regulatory arrangements. Ilis study attempts to fill the gap by focusing on some of the 
cultural features peculiar to Britain which have contributed to the maldng of broadcasting and 
broadcast advertising regulation. 
" Kenneth Dyson, op cit pp. 8-9 21 
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1.3.3 The Coalition-centred Approach. 
The coalition-centred approach concentrates more on the political dynamics, i.e. on the power 
relations that operate not just between regulators and their irmediate contacts in industry and the 
relevant government department, but in a broader context. The formal nature of regulation represents 
its static, or at least more persisting, aspect. This is counterbalanced by the need for policy-makers, 
and especially policy implementers, to be continuaUy adjusting and adapting decisions to suit a variety 
of interests, public and private, within existing structural boundaries. According to Dyson, the 
outcomes of regulation "are not determined in advance. They are the product of the characteristics of 
complex policy networks and coalition activities which reflect the ability of policy actors to formulate 
and choose regulatory actions and to make use of ideas to guide the development of regulation"O. 
Public debate and the involvement of the media in providing a forum for competing sets of interests 
also add to the pressure on regulatory agencies as rule-bound institutions to allow flexibility in 
drawing up and interpreting the rules. 
Capture theories, including economic conspiracy ones, are coalition-centred being based on a 
pluralist view of the state. They see the formation of different alliances 
- 
agency 
bureaucratsfmdustrialists, legislators/regulators, businessmen/large customer groups and so on 
- 
as 
an important factor in obtaining the rewards of regulation, usually at the expense of the general 
public. Nowadays, however, consumers are more organised, occupy a much more powerful position 
in the policy network and are capable of forming effbctive partnerships in the pursuit of a consumer 
agendal'. 
1.3.4 The International-centred Approach. 
The effects of the international economy on national markets and regulation of those markets has 
been the focus of the international-centred approach. As the developed countries participate more 
closely in the world economy, their economic interdependence hasincreased. Nafional frontiers mean 
less and less to large multi-national companies conducting operations on a global scale. The costs of 
industrial research and development, especially in high-tech fields, are such that nations find joint 
40 ibid. pp. 2-3 
41 The political dynamics of television advertising rcgulation and the role of coalitions is explored in detail Chapter 10 
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ventures the only way of meeting thený2. Economically, the recent trend has been towards breaking 
down national trade barriers and expanding free trade areas, culminating in Europe with the move to 
the single European market. Politically, too, the European Community has moved towards greater 
integration, becoming the European Union, with pan-Union harmonisation of legislation in many 
areas high on the agenda. 
All this has far-reaching implications for regulation. The domestic regulation of individual Member 
States has been added to or superseded by EC directives. And while deregulation has sought o ease 
the burden of economic restrictions on business, it has been accompanied by a rise in socially inspired 
consumer protection legislation. Cultural measures, such as compulsory quotas of national 
programming production in broadcasting have also been introduced to counterbalance the 
integrationist agenda. As rules and regulations proliferate, reflecting the comple)dty of the 
pan-European situation, their implementation on the domestic front becomes potentially more 
difficult. There is a constant tension between the demands of the developed regulatory culture of a 
nation, with its e)dsting aims and methods, and the need to comply %ith international regulation 
which may have requirements incompatible with those aims and methods. 
None of the theories discussed so far have taken an explicitly international-centred approach. The 
empirical situations they analyse occur at a national, rather than an international, evel. Nevertheless, 
the intemationahsation of the economies of nation states, and the political implications of this, raise 
questions in the study of regulation which can be addressed by reference to these theories. 
Public interest arguments, for example, have been used in forming internationar; y agreed regulation 
of broadcasting and broadcast advertising in the EU and countries belonging to the Council of 
Europe. The concept of the "general interest" has been used by the European Court of Justice in its 
judgements on the legal scope of domestic broadcasting regulatiorL The various types of capture and 
conspiracy models of regulatory failure can be applied to trans-national regulation. The potential for 
industry to pervert the original intentions of trans-nationally agreed regulation, or conspire in its 
establishment are, arguably, even greater when so much more is at stake". 
42 ibid. pp. 5-7 
43 The international dimension of regulation is dealt mith mainlY in Chapter 13. 
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1.4 The Public Interest in Broadcasting. 
As the concept of the public interest is central to so much theory of regulation, and the notion is 
continually being invoked by makers of UK broadcasting regulation policy, including advertising 
control, a closer look is needed at what the concept might mean in the context of broadcasting. The 
problem has already been exTlored by Denis McQuail in his book, 'Me&a Perýfibrmance', I in the 
chapter entitled "7he Tublic Interest' in CommunicadoiL " He introduces a typology suggested by 
Held wMch classifies the three main variants of general public interest theory into preponderance 
theory, common interest theory, and unitary theory. 44 
The first refers to the majoritarian approach where the sum of individual interests is held to be 
paramount. The public interest is defined as the majority choice, or whatever maxiryfises individual 
preferences. If it is defined 
, 
in this way, however, the public interest can never be "demonstrably 
,, 
45 
contrary to the interest of a majority 
, 
or identified with a minority. Essentially a populist approach, 
the majoritarian way is strong on means of discovering what the public want 
- 
popular vote, indices of 
consumer demand etc. 
- 
but weak in that it is an extremely blunt instrument. It can lead to tyranny of 
the majority and ignores the possibility that the public interest may transcend the sum of individual 
preferences. 
Common interest theories are based on the ý: inds of individual interests all members of a 
community are presumed to have in common, e. g. security and defence, a monetary systern, and a 
system of governance. A basic national infrastructure of power, water, transport, 
telecommunications etc. may also be included in the list. This approach moves away from the 
simplistic notion that providing what the majority of people explicitly demonstra:; 
--, that they want 
at a given time necessarily constitutes acting in the public interest. 
A cormnon interest interpretation of the pubEc interest accepts that it is not almys served sirnplY 
by implementing the popular will as soon as it has been identified by majoritarian means. In 
British politics, for example, opinion polls consistently show a majority of people in favour of 
44 V. Held Yhe Public Interest and Individual interest New York- Basic Book, 1970 45 D. McQuail, AWia Performance. London: Sagc 1992, p. 23 46 V. Held. op. cit. P. 99 
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restitution of the death penalty, but this demand is regularly rýected by Parliament as not being in 
the public interest morewidely conceived. Even in a democracy, much decision-making in public 
policy, let alone in specialised areas such as monetary policy takes place at a level far removed 
from the general public. The concept of a policy-making class equipped with specialist 
knowledge and expertise that members of the public lack is an important one in this context. 
Problems with tHs theory can nevertheless arise when significant numbers of people object to 
what is presumed to be good for them, or challenge the right of policy-makers to make decisions 
on their behff 47. 
Unitary theories are those which espouse one absolute normative principle or standard of value to 
which everyone must aspire in their own eventual best interest. Individual preferences are 
submerged in the name of the general good Which is decided by the ruling elite on purely 
ideological grounds. Platonic, Hegelian, Marxist and Fascist philosophical systems belong to this 
category, as, arguably, do some recent libertarian economic theories which give an absolute value 
to the idea of the market 48. 
Clearly, no single category covers all mass communication/broadcasting issues. it is possible to think 
of examples which fit into each of these theorefical perspectives. Populist, consurner-driven media 
policies which advocate 'giving the public what it wants' are preponderance oriented. In television, 
for example, the public interest would be equated with what a majority of the public is interested in, 
resulting in a solely ratings-based programming policy'9. But this defmition relies on measuring 
public satisfaction through audience research and opinion polling, which, as McQuail has pointed 
out, are not only notoriously manipulable and hard to interpret but are time, and place-bound". 
Important broadcasting issues, such as technical standards, frequency allocations, methods of 
47 MC(ZUail op. cit p. 23 
48 ibid. p. 25 
4* Note: Held takes as an example ofpreponderanoe theory the argurnents used by the US television industry in resisting the 
Federal Corrinrunications Conirnissiods 1961 attempt to subject the network stations to regulation of programming content The 
Chairnian ofNBC, Robert. W. Sarnoft claimed that "the power to license stations does not give a govcr=cnt agency the 
responsibility of raising viewers! tastes or broadening their hiterests to confom to its own views of NAW those tastes and interests 
should be"; only the audience should decide what is in the public interest. He furd= explained that network televisionwas so 
constituted as to appeal "to the majaritywho, seek primarily entertainment and relmmfion", and, spurred on by advertisers 
ecOnornic interests, to captivate and woo audiences. (V Held op. cit. p. 89) British broadcasting policy has consistently avoided 
this kind of majoritarian conoept of the public intaest. 
so ibid. p. 24 
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finance, and control of advertising cannot be dealt with on this basis, nor can long term overall aims 
and strategies. The preponderance view of the public interest is antithetical to the public service ideal 
of broadcasting, which has range and diversity of programming, i. e. catering for a variety of tastes 
including minority ones, among its goals. These considerations fit more comfortably into the 
collectivist notion of a common interest which transcends individual preferences in the most 
accessible nd-products of the broadcasting industry 
- 
programmes. This approach gives more 
weight to specialist expertise and tradition than crude measures of public opinion. 
Two completely opposite unitary ideological positions falling within the last category have, at 
various times, both claimed to represent the public interest in the area of mass communications. In 
recent years the advocates of maximum market freedom in communications and total private 
ownership of the media, with no, or the bare minimum, of regulation have been influential". 
ffistofically, total public ownership of press, radio and television has been the preferred system in a 
number of countries. In the M the broadcast media were in public hands, but at arms length from 
the state, for the first thirty years of their existence. 
Although unitary theory is obviously not suitable as an overall account of the public interest in UK 
broadcasting policy, McQuail believes that there have nevertheless been strongly normative impulses 
behind much regulation, which was designed not to satisfy some immediate consumer demands but 
to serve various ultimate ideals or values, not all of them consistent with one another, such as 
freedom of expression and information; education of the public taste upwards towards some ideal 
standard; protection of children and the vulnerable; and promoting national language and culture". 
These might just as weH be taken as common interests, however, rather thar, ab. ccltute values. 
Rejecting both preponderance and unitary approaches to defining the public interest in broadcasting, 
and taking common interest theory as a starting point, McQuail proposes a compromise based on 
some ideas of Held 53 
. 
In Yhe Puhlic Interest mid In&Wdual Interests, Held suggests a way of 
51 MS. Fowlcr and D. L. Brenncr, AkfarketplaceApproach toBrvadcastRegulafion, in E. Wartcllact al. (cds-Mass 
Communication Review Yearbook, vol. 4. pp. 645-695. Bcvcrly Hills, CA: Sagc, 1982. Report of the Committee on 
Financing the BBC (Cbairnian: Profcssor Alan Pcacock) (Cmnd 9824) London: HMSO, 1986. and C. Vcljanovski, 
Freedom in Broadcasting, London: Institutc of Econornic Affairs, 1989. 
2 Dcnis MacQuail op. cit. p. 25 
53 ibid. p. 25 
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resolving the difficulty that the concept of a wider public benefit can be introduced to support almost 
any particular partial interest without any a priori means of deciding which version is justified. As 
McQuafl puts it, she proposes "thinking in terms of competing claims: public interest claims are 
normative assertions that something (e. g. an action or goal) is justifiable on grounds of wider 
benefits, within the terms of a given political system and framework of norms"54 
. 
For Held, "the 
meaningffil use of the term "public interest" presupposes the existence of a political system, however 
primitive or complex"". Bearing this in mind, a claim that a certain course of action is in the public 
interest is a claim that it ought to be done, i. e. that it is justifiable. But to assert hat a particular 
claim is justifiable, and ultimately to have it politically validated, is not to say that it is justified in a 
final sense, or that other claims are invalid 56 
. 
So, claims regarding the public interest in broadcasting, 
for example, merely need to be prima facie justifiable relative to the particular political and legal 
system which validates the claim. 
With reference to broadcasting, McQuail recommends treating "various statements of public interest 
concerning communications as a set of competing claims or proposals with a normative 
component, "57 leaving it to the political and legal systems to provide the framework for adjudicating 
conflicting claims. This may include the creation of regulatory bodies to work out the detailed 
interpretation of broad legislative structures dealing with broadcasting. Such bodies would have to 
bear in mind some fimdamental communication "goods" such as freedom of expression, access to 
communication media, education and information, promotion of cultural values and national identity, 
artistic endeavour and entertainment and so on, and decide on priorities among them. They would 
make the make day-to-day decisions on behalf of claimants with different, and possibly competing, 
interests in the broadcasting process. 
What is useful about McQuail's treatment of the public interest in communications is that it is able to 
deal with the complexity of the situation and sees this as something positive. Classical public interest 
theory of regulation has difficulty in explaining situations more complicated than those that can be 
characterised as a simple dichotomy of interests between producers and consumers. Regulatory 
m ibid. p. 26 55 V. Held op. cit. p. 168 
M ibid. p. 186 
57 Denis McQuail. op. cit. p. 26 
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failure and organisational theories take into account comple; Nity, but tend to perceive the numerous 
competing and conflicting demands made on regulatory bodies as entirely negative and detrimental 
to the regulatory function. I have chosen to use McQuairs common interest based version of public 
interest theory, not just because it is particalarly appropriate to the middle and late stages of 
broadcasting regulation in Britain, but also because it allows for some normative content, and British 
broadcasting and broadcast advertising regulation possesses a strongly normative tone. The 
numerous different policy documents issued over a seventy ear period contain very definite visions 
of how their authors believed broadcasting in this country ought to be 
. 
28 
j ne UrIgms of BrMsh Broa&asfing Regulation: Development of a Jfodej 
Chapter 2 
The Origins of British Broadcasting Regulation: 
Development of a Model. 
2.1 Introduction. 
Regular licensed broadcasting began in England in January 1923 as a commercial enterprise, but one 
whose operations were strictly limited under the terms of its license. The creation of a new and 
official broadcasting organisation at this time was the government's response to requests for it to 
sanction the use of the radio frequencies for entertainment. These requests came from the early 
Producers of radio equipment and from a growing band of amateur wireless enthusiasts, both of 
which were eager to benefit from the new technology' 
- 
Telegraphic communications and wireless telephony, strictly controlled during World War I, were 
the province of the Post Office, under the Telegraph Act of 1869 and the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 
19042. In planning the peacetime development of radio technology, the British government first made 
the crucial decision to reserve for itself a considerable degree of control on the grounds that it was 
not in the public interest to allow a potentially extremely powerful medium of communication to fall 
into the wrong hands. This was partly for reasons of national secuzity, the war had resulted in a 
period of international political instability. But a few more far-sighted observers had already realised 
that broadcasting possessed the potential to offer social and cultural benefit-, beyond the mere 
amusement of a smaU number of enthusiasts, and the competitive free market apPrOach fOUOwed bY 
the Americans was not considered an appropriate one for the development of this potential in Britain. 
1 Burton Paulu. British Television Broadcasting, University of Nfinnesota, 1956, pp. 8-9 
2 Note.. "The 1904 Act N%w the first of its lind in the world, laying down that no person should establish a'wireless 
telegraph station nor 'install or work any apparatus for wireless telegraphý without securing, as a necessary condition, a 
licence from the Postinaster-Gencral. Thusmas established the basis of British broadcasting regulation. " ( Stephen 
Hearst, Broadcasting Regulation in Britain in Jay. G. Blumler (ed. ) Television and the Public Interest, London : Sage, 
1992, p 61). 
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In fact, the course of events in the United States was an important factor in the British Government's 
decision to keep a close eye on the development of commercial radio services in this country. In, 
America, between the founding of the Radio Corporation of America as a private enterprise in 1919, 
and the end of 1924, hundreds of commercial radio stations had started up causing chaos on the 
airwaves. The scarcity of frequencies meant constant interference and great difficulty in getting good 
receptioný. The first broadcasting committee set up in the UK, the 1923 Sykes Committee, believed 
that "the regulation of the power and wavelength of each transmitting station must necessarily be 
undertaken by the Government, in order to avoid chaoS"4. 
As commercial enterprises, the American stations, led by AT&T were soon deriving income from 
"toll broadcasting" i. e. advertising and sponsorship, despite fierce opposition to this from such people 
as Herbert Hoover, at that time Secretary of the Department of Commerce, and David Sarnoff, first 
commercial manager of RCA and one of the great names in broadcasting history6. But hostility to 
advertising in Congress and elsewhere because it conflicted with the ideals of public service did not 
prevail against actual practice for the simple reason that alternative methods of fimce such as 
royalties on sets, or licensing (which were adopted in Britain) were unpopular with vested business 
interests and the public afike7. 
2.2 From Company to Corporation: The Experiment Begins. 
In the UI-C, determination to avoid the difficulties created by the American free-for-all led to the 
introduction of a radically different model for the operation of broadcasting services from the 
American one. The design eventually decided upon was partly a pragmatic solution to the financial 
3 Xote., TIte Postmaster-General gave his opinion of this situation in a reply to a Parliamentary Question in April 1922: "It 
would be impossible to have a large number of firms broadcasting. It would result only in the sort of chaos, only in a much 
more exaggerated forin, than that which arises in the United States, and which had compelled the United States, or the 
Department over which Mr. Hoover presides and which is responsible for broadcasting, to do what we are doing now at 
the begWning, that is, to lay down very drastic regulations indeed for the control of wireless broadcasting. ' (Hansard, 
Vol. 152, Col. 1869,3 April 1922 ) 
4 The Broadcasting Committee: Report, (Chairman: Sir Frederick Sykes), (Cmd. 195 1), London: HMSO, 1923, para 2 1, 
p. 12, (Sykes Report) 
5 Note., Hoover complained to broadcasters in a 1924 address that "if a speech by the President is to be used as meat in a 
sandwich of two patent medicine advertisements, there will be no radio lefL" (I. C. Young, How Willyou haveyour 
adver*5ing? Radio Broadcast, December, 1924,6, p 248) 
6 Vincent Mosco, Broadcasting in the United States, Ablex Publishing Corporation, New Jersey, 1979, p. 9 
7 Asa Briggs, History of the BBC: The First Fifly Years. Oxford University Press 1985, p 19 
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problems of the prototype privately owned broadcasting company, and partly the result of particular 
political and socio-cultural beliefs about the nature of the new medium and its implications for the 
nation. Apart from anti-Americanism, another important factor was the traditionally paternalistic 
attitude of the English governing classes, who believed that trusteeship of public interest in cultural 
matters should be left in the hands of the educated elite and not sacrificed to commercial interests'. 
But first, as an experimental means of providing a weekly programme "of telephony (speech and 
music) for the benefit of the Wireless Sociefies"9, the British Broadcasting Company was 
incorporated as a privately owned monopoly in Decerriber 1922 and received its licence on January 
18,1923. Its constitution was an anomaly in business terms; the Post Office had made it clear to all 
commercial interests who had expressed a wish to enter broadcasting that, in order to avoid 
it confusion, congestion, and mutual interference on the air", 10 it "prefeiTed co-operation to 
competition"". The arrangement it eventually imposed represented a forced marriage between a 
number Of firms who, outside their broadcasting function, were in competition with one another for 
the production of radio equipment. Although the Company, referred to as a "muddle Upto 12 by its 
first General Manager, John Reith 
, 
differed in some ways from, the Corporation, "it nevertheless 
13 influenced both the legal structures and the programming policies of its successor" 
I 100,000 of stock was issued, and any manufacturer could join by buying one or more shares and 
agreeing to abide by the conditions laid down by the Post Office and the companies who had 
negotiated with it. The six largest manufacturers were given control of the enterprise. In addition to 
the original stock, it was financed by royalties on the radio sets (British made only) sold by company 
members, and by part of the ten shiffing licence fee radio owners were obliged to purchase from the 
Post Office as the regulating authority". In return for its licence the company had to set up eight 
Note. 
- 
After disapproval of the American commercial system, "the second factor mfiich profoundly influenced Britain! s 
course was distrust of ahat British opinion-forming classes callcdcommcrcialisnf. Even the manufa turers of 
broadcasting equipment, ubo were shareholders in the British Broadcasting Company, expected their profits to come 
from the sale of receivers, not in any shape and form from the programmes". (Stephen Hearst op cit. p. 63) See also the 
discussion in Brian Young's The Paternal Tradition in British Broadcasting 1922-?; Edinburgh: Heriot-Watt, 1983. 
Asa Briggs, History of the BEC. - The First Fifty Fears, op cit p. 20 
10 Asa Briggs. The History ofBroadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol. I The Birth ofBroadcasting, London: Oxford 
University Press, p. 103. ( Briggs I 
11 ibid. p. 105 
12 Hansard, Vol. 152, Col 1869,3 April 1922 
13 Burton Paulu, British Broadcasting op cit. p. 9 
14 Asa Briggs, History of the BBC. - The First Fifty Fears, op cit p. 30 
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regional stations and provide "a programme of broadcast matter to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
Postmaster General" 15. Provision was also made for any department of the government to require the 
Company to transinit "communiques, weather reports or notices issued thereby as a part of any 
programme or programmes of broadcast matter"16. The Postmaster General could also require it to 
"refrain from broadcasting" any matter specified by him. 
So, from the startý the state retained the power to initiate and to veto broadcasts. Restrictions were 
placed on news coverage: the Company could only broadcast news material bought from news 
agencies uch as Reuters approved by the Postmaster General; and, crucially, on advertising: the 
Company could not "without the consent in writing of the Postmaster General receive money or 
other valuable consideration in respect of the transmission of messages by means of the licence 
apparatus, or send messages or music constituting broadcast matter provided or paid for by any 
person Other than the Company or person actually sending the message. "17 Under this scheme, even 
though the Company was intended to fitnction as a business, it was denied the ability to obtain an 
income from the most natural source, advertising, unlike its rival communication medium, print. The 
Company, however, interpreted the words of the licence as a prohibition on direct or 'spot' 
advertising but not on sponsorship, where an advertiser supplies a programme in return for a credit 
on the air. It took advantage of this vagueness and broadcast eight sponsored programmes in 1925, 
and one in 1926, the sponsors being various ]London newspapers 18. 
The British Broadcasting Company commenced business as a de facto, though never de jure, 
monopoly- The Post Office retained the option of licensing other broadcasting agencies; it simply 
chose not do SO until the advent of Independent Television in 1954. In the beginning, the decision 
was more one of apediency than ideology, having made the initial political decision to regulate 
broadcasting, the government considered it easier to regulate a single organisation than many. It was 
Wireless Broadcasting Licence: Copies of (1) Licence by the Postmaster-General to the British Broadcasting Company. 
Ltd., for the establishment of eight radio-telephonic stations and the transmission therefrom of broadcast matter for 
general reception; (2) Agreement, %ith respect to the broadcasting of news and general information (CmdL 1822), 1923, 
p. 2, (1923 Licence) 
16 ibid. p. 5 
17 ibid. p. 3. Note., Interestingly enough, vAiile several firms challenged the Post Offices reALW to allow 
news not previously published in the press to be broadcast, no-one disputed the ban on advertising. (Briggs L op. cit 
p. 106 ) 
18 Burton Paulu, Television and Radio in the United Kingdom, Macmillan 198 1, p. 24 
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only later that what had started out as a practical solution 
- 
monopoly, or 'unified control' 
- 
became 
an article of faith, although one that was by no means accepted by everyone. 
While the government saw a need for general control, it regarded it as impractical for the department 
exercising the technical functions of regulation, the Post Office, to involve itself in matters of detail 
such as programming. This was the business of the manufacturees co-operative it had set up, subject 
to the terms of its ficence. So the concept of the state regulating, but keeping its distance from 
internal matters of day-to-day operation came into being, forming one of the central planks of all 
subsequent broadcasting policy, including advertising control. 
Clearly, the decision to place the general conduct of broadcasting firmly within the sphere of state 
control and influence from the very outset was a vital one in shaping its future development. EquaUy 
important was the conception of broadcast programming first and foremost as a public service rather 
than a market commodity produced with the aim of making profits for broadcasting companies and 
advertisers. The public interest rationale was used from the beginning to justify a measure of state 
intervention. And once the intention to regulate in this way had been established, most of the other 
essential elements of broadcasting policy in the UK 
- 
the principle of monopoly, the restrictions on 
commercial methods of funding, and the compromise between retaining state power Over 
broadcasting and preserving the broadcaster's independence in matters programming and general 
administration 
- 
fell into place. 
Within a few months of going on air the Company was in trouble'9. The financial arrangements 
Proved inadequate 
- 
people simply built their own sets or avoided buying a license - smaller members 
felt at a disadvantage, and the Press, who were deeply suspicious of the pow-. rs of broadcasting, 
strongly opposed the eýdstence of a rival private monopoly. The Postmaster General's answer was to 
set up the first in a long line of broadcasting committees, chaired on this occasion by Major-General 
Sir Frederick Sykes. The seven man committee, which presented its Report to Parliament in August 
1923., addressed itself chiefly to the companys financial situation, but it also considered a number of 
19 Burton Paulu. British Broadcasting, op cit. p. ii 
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other important issues. Since it set the tone for much of the subsequent discussion on broadcasting 
and broadcast advertising in the UK it is worth looldng at in some detail. 
2.3 Advertising in the Sykes Committee Report 
One of the Committee! s terms of reference was that it should consider "the restrictions which may 
need to be placed on (broadcasting's) use or development"20. Correctly foreseeing the new mediuds 
"social and political possibilities as great as any technical achievement of our generation", the 
eventual universal demand for "this inexpensive service", and the establishment of "imperial and 
international services", the Report had this to say 
. 
...... We consider that the control of such a potential 
power over public opinion and the life of the nation ought to remain with the state, and that the 
operation of so important a national service ought not to be allowed to become an unrestricted 
commercial monopoly"21. 
Apart from the power of radio as a means of communication to be used both for good and for bad 
ends, national control was believed to be necessary from another angle: the wavebands used by each 
broadcasting station constituted a scarce, and therefore valuable, public resource. The tight to use 
them should only be granted after carefW consideration, and "subject o the saftuards necessary to 
protect the public interest in the fiftwe"22. This argument has been employed to jus* first 
monopoly, and then duopoly, in British broadcasting right up to the 1980's, when it began to be 
seriously undennined. by the widespread introduction of new technology vastly increasing spectrum 
avaflabifity. 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report deal with the broadcasting product 
- 
the ty-? e and content of 
broadcast matter. Its educational value is pointed out, and it is stressed that in respect of programmes 
"it is obviously of importance that a high standard should be maintained"23. The need to maintain 
programming standards has continued to dominate the argument for non-commercial public service 
20 Sykes Report op. cit. p. 5 
21 ibid. para 6, p. 6 22 ibidL para 7. p. 6 23 ibid. para 9, p. 7 34 
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broadcasting, first as the only appropriate model for the UY, and then as a necessary alternative to 
services funded by the private sector. 
The Comnittee provided definitions of direct and indirect advertising: An example of direct 
advertising is given as "a speech by a representative of a Motor Company extolling the virtues of his 
Company's cars. An example of indirect advertising (i. e. sponsorship) would be an announcement 
before a broadcast concert that it was given free through the generosity of a SpeCifledfIrMil24. 
The Report goes on to say that serious objections to any form of advertising on the air had been 
raised by the Press who feared that their dependence on this source of revenue made them vulnerable 
to competition by a powerful "quasi monopoly". The newspapers continued to reproduce this 
argument before all subsequent Conunittees of InquiM lobbying with particular intensity against he 
introduction of commercial television, which was awarded a monopoly of airtime for advertising. 
Events have proved the fears of the Press that broadcast advertising would take away a significant 
proportion of their revenue to be groundless, however. The huge growth of the advertising industry 
as a whole, stimulated by commercial television, has actually benefited the print media. 
The Committee considered three alternatives with regard to advertisements: 
(1) that they should be the main source of revenue; 
(2) that they should be banned completely,, 
(3) that they should be permitted as suppjemejgayfujj&ng. 
The conclusions it came to, based in part on a study of broadcasting inthe Uýnited States, Canada and 
Australia where commercial funding was permitted, closed the door firmly on direct advertising in 
the broadcasting system in the UK for the next thirty years. Since the arguments put forward by 
Sykes to support these conclusions form the bedrock of all subsequent opposition to broadcast 
advertising, were the basis for its regulation when eventually introduced, and were even supported 
by many advertisers themselves, the paragraph of the Report containing them is quoted below 
almost in fiffl. 
24 ibi(L para 40, p. 19 
35 
Yhe Origins of British Broadcasting Reguldiom Development of a Model 
"We attach great imporfmce to the maintenance of a high stwidrd of broadcast 
programmes.... and we think that advertisements would lower the standard Yhe broad=fing of 
advertisements on a large scale would tend to make the service unpopular, and thus to defeat its 
own eniA In newspaper advertising the small advertiser as well as the big gets his clivice, but this 
would not be the case in broackasfing. Yhe time which could be devoted to advenisingwould in any 
case be very Jimilect wig therefore, exceedfngly valuable; wd the operating authorines who would 
want revenue, would naturallyprefer the big advertiser who was ready to pay high, ýv, with the result 
that only he would get a chance of advertising. Yhis would be too high a privilege to give to a few 
big adveMsers at the fisk of lowering the general skm&ird of broadmsfing" 
The Committee, therefore, recommended that only indirect advertising in a limited form be allowed, 
i. e. "the gift of a concert" in return for broadcasting a "preliminary announcement giving the name of 
1126 the donor 
. 
Also to be permitted were the mentioning of the price of a piece of music to be 
broadcast together with the publisher's name. The introduction of a system of coded commercial 
information and prices broadcast for a few minutes per hour during business hours, intended for the 
use of subscribers to the service, was also recommended 27 
. 
In Us seminal passage, the Sykes Committee anticipated most of the major concerns of those 
involved in policy-making on broadcast advertising throughout he history of British broadcasting. It 
explores the relationship between advertising and broadcasting, emphasising the need to set and 
maintain the high programming standards expected of a public service, and assuming that 
dependence on advertising would lead to a decline in standards. It considers the question of how 
much advertising can be broadcast before it becomes self-defeating, which is sH. ' being debated by 
broadcasters, regulators, and especially advertisers to this day. Attention is drawn to the dangers of 
an organisafion being given a monopoly of a scarce resource which would be available for sale only 
in very limited quantities. Monopoly enables the operating agency to charge large sums of money for 
its airtime, favouring big advertisers who can afford to pay and discriminating against smaller 
25 ibid. para 4 1, p. 1 26 ibid. para 4 1, p. 19 27 Note: Sykes was ahead of his time. Ile technology for this information service was not fully develoPcd until the 
1970's, ufien the Ceefax and Oracle teletext services Commenced OPcratiOn On television. 
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companies, ereby threatening the principle of fair competition which benefits both producers and 
consumers alike. Measures to ensure that competition in the airtime sales market was fair to 
advertisers became an integral part of the regulatory framework for commercial broadcasting in later 
years. 
In the context of the period, the Sykes Committee! s arguments are for the most part legitimate ones. 
The possibility of a connection between advertising and low programming standards has been hotly 
debated, and few people nowadays would claim that any sort of commercial input necessarily 
threatens tandards. It has been for some time a question of degree. But the task of policy makers at 
the start of a new venture was to provide the right conditions for their chosen aim, that of ensuring 
good programming rather than maximum profits, to succeed. Experience in other countries has 
indeed shown that unregulated commercial broadcasting, particularly television, with no strong non- 
commercial public service alternative, does not produce quality programming. Interestingly, Sykes 
came to the conclusion that sponsorship, in the early days of the British Broadcasting Company, 
offered a less obtrusive, and thus more acceptable, way of financing broadcasting than direct 
advertising. But the more essential question of editorial freedom from the control of advertisers, a
central point of principle in later policy, was not discussed. The sponsorship option was nevertheless 
rarely exercised by either the Broadcasting Company or the BBC, even though it was given 
lukewarm support by subsequent committees until Beveridge". After that it was not to become 
available again for terrestrial broadcasting until the Broadcasting Act of 1990, nearly seventy ears 
later. 
Sykes remarks about the drawbacks of granting a single broadcaster, or a cartel of broadcasters, a 
monopoly of airtime were also to the point; the difficulties attached to -such a system became 
apparent as soon as the popularity of commercial television became thoroughly established in the 
1960s. Advertisers,, who had initially been delighted to have access to the television medium on any 
29 Mote. 
- 
The Crawfbrdý Selsdon, UlIsN%ster and Hanley Committees all regarded limited sponsorship as harmless, if not 
particularly desirable. Beveridge took a different view. "Sponsoring 
.... 
puts the control of broadcasting ultimately in the 
hands of the peoplewhosc interest is not broadcasting but the selling of some other goods or services 
.... 
if the people of 
any country want broadcasting for its oAm sake they must be prepared to pay for it as listeners or vicwers; they must not 
ask for it for nothing as an accompaniment of advertising some other commodity. *(Report of the Broadcasting Committee 
1949-- Appendix H 
. 
-Memoranda submitted to the Committee (Cmnd. 8117), Vol. 1, London: HMSO, 1951, p. 194. (Beveridge Il)) 
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terms, became increasingly resentful that the lack of competitive opportunities offered by the ITV 
Networles regional monopoly put them at a considerable disadvantage. This caused persistent 
problems for the regulator until the deregulating 1990 Broadcasting Act opened up competition in 
television airtime sales. 
In the section on 'Controlling Authorityý, the Sykes Committee, in fine Arith its view that while 
"ultimate control of broadcasting must.... rest with a Minister responsible to Parliament"29, its internal 
matters were too complex and technical to be dealt -Aith in detail by the Postmaster General or his 
department, recommended that the operations of the British Broadcasting Company be overseen by a 
Broadcasting Board set up by statute "to assist the Postmaster-General in the administration 
- 
technical, operational and general 
- 
of broadcasting, and to which the Postmaster-General should 
00 refer important matters concerning the control of broadcasting for advice 
This Board (forerunner of the British Broadcasting Corporation! s Board of Governors, and the 
model for the commercial television regulator when it eventually came into being) would deal with 
such questions as who should broadcasý how many stations there should be, how they should be 
financed, programming policy and some form of complaints procedure. it would have 12 unpaid 
members composed of representatives of various interested group2l. Sykes foresaw the time, 
however, when broadcasting became "so great a national responsibility as to demand the creation of 
a small paid body of experts to whom 
... 
its control should be entrusted 02 
.a suggestion soon taken up 
with the founding of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and again with the creation of the 
Independent Television Authority, a more classical regulatory body with responsibility for overseeing 
private business.. 
The first Board was duly set up in 1924, under the ChaimansEp of Sykes himselfý and met only a 
few times during that year. It was opposed by John Reitli, who considered it "a ghastly waste of 
29 Sykes Report para 2 1, p. 12 30 ibid. para 22, p. 12 31 Note. 
. 
Sykes suggested the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the County Councils'Association. the 
Association of Municipal Corporations, the Trades Union Congress, the Post office, the Wireless Societies, the operating Concerns, the Manufacturers, the press and the Entertaiment Industry. (ibid. para 23, p. 13) 32 ibid. para 24, p. 13 
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tune 03 
, 
and was abolished by the Post Office in 1925, when the next Committee of Inquiry, chaired 
by the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, was appointed to make finther recommendations for the 
34 
re-structuring of broadcasting 
2.4 Advertising in the Crawford Committee Report 
The Committees remit was "to advise as to the proper scope of the Broadcasting service and as to 
the management, control and finance thereof after the expiry of the existing license on 31 st 
December, 1926 05 
. 
After only two years of operation the potential for broadcasting to play a major 
role in national fife had become much more obvioUS36 
, 
and the need for some revision of the status of 
the British Broadcasting Company was recognised, not only by politicians, but by the Company 
itself General Manager John Reith told the Conunittee that the Company was, in effect, acting as a 
full public service and not as a commercial enterprise, and that this situation needed some formal 
expresSion37. 
The Crawford Committee accepted without debate that the monopoly should be continued, since "it 
is agreed that the United States system of free and uncontrolled transmission and reception, is 
unsuited to this country, and that broadcasting must accordingly remain a monopoly"" 
- 
It therefore 
recommended that broadcasting should be controlled by a single authority, and that "the 
broadcasting service should be conducted by a public corporation acting as trustee for the national 
interest, and that its status and duties should correspond with those of a public service""'. This body 
33 Caroline Heller. Broadcasting and Accountability, London: British Film Institute, 1978, (BFI Television 
Monograph 7), pl 7 
34 Nicholas Garnhani, Has Public Service Broadcasting Failed? in Proceedings of the 20th University of Manchester 
Broadcasting Symposium, Life Aj? er the Broadcasting Bill. Manchester Monographs, 1989, p. 19 35 Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1925, (Chairman: 7he Earl of Crawford and Ealcarres) 
36 
(Cmd. 2599) London: HMSO, 1926, para 1, p. 4. (Crawford Report) 
Arote. 
- 
Crawford, paragraph 3 stated: "Broadcasting has become so widespread, concerns so many people, and is fraught 
with such far-reaching possibilities, that the organisation laid down by the British Broadcasting Company no longer 
corresponds to the national requirements or responsibility. Notwithstanding the progress which we readily acknowledge, 
and to the credit of which the company is largely entitI4 we are impelled to the conclusion that no company or body 
constituted on trade lines for the profit, direct or indirect, of those composing it can be regarded as adequate in view of 
37 
the broader considerations now beginning to emerge". 
Burton Paulu. Television andRadio in the UK op cite p8 and J. C. W. ReidL Into the 9 ind Hodder and Stoughton, 1949 
pp. 102-103 
38 Crawford Report op cit. para 4, p. 5 39 ibid. para 20, p. 14 
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would enjoy freedom and fladbility, it would hold the license of the Post Office and be invested Yith 
fiffl authority to carry out the duties of a public service. 
In considering the composition of the Board of the Corporation, the Committee rýected the proposal 
that it should be composed of people representing various interests, such as music science, drama, 
education, finance, manufacturing etc., "since compromise and even conflict might ensue owing to 
division of allegiance"40. The Committee felt that members hould be independent persons, free of 
commitments, preferably "men and women of business acumen and experienced in affairs"41. Board 
members would have a duty to appoint a series of Advisory Committees to consider in detail 
particular aspects of the broadcasting service. 
Ultimate control would continue to rest with the government, but the Crawford Report made the 
first explicit statement of the need for a separation of powers between the state and the broadcasting 
agency, a need which has defined their relationship ever since. The Committee also made a statement 
on the style of regulation that it thought should be encouraged: "the progress of science and the 
harmonies of art will be hampered by too rigid rules and too constant a supervision by the State. 
Within well-defined limits the Conurýission should enjoy the fifflest liberty 
..... 
it would discourage 
enterprise and initiative 
.... 
were the authority subjected to too much control , 42 
. 
This liberal approach 
was instrumental in setting the general pattern for broadcasting regulation in the LTK, where, 
theorefically, a delicate balance is maintained between the demands of the state and the freedom of 
broadcasters and regulators to run their own affairs with the minimum of interference. 
Regarding finance, the Committee recommended the continuance of the license fee method, leaving 
the question of advertising to be considered by the Board of Governors in the normial course of their 
duties. Opinions both for and agai= the acceptance of broadcast commercials were, however, 
considered as evidenCe3 
. 
The Wireless Society believed that "a considerable income could be 
obtained from some Idnds of advertisement without lowering the tone of broadcasting. The listener is 
40 ibid. para 8, p. 7 41 ibid. Para 8, p. 7 42 ibid. para 16, p. 13 43 Asa Briggs, History of the BBC. 7le First Fifty Years, OP Cit P- 88 
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free to cut off the wireless, just as the newspaper reader may disregard the printed advertisements" 
The philosopher, Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, opposed the acceptance of advertising in 
order to preserve "an amateur spirit". John Reith, somewhat surprisingly, was not at this stage 
opposed to an injection of fimds from the private sector and was dissafisfied that at least the option 
to take advertising was not written into the Corporations 1927 Charter. He wrote at the time: 
"should not the BBC have liberty with regard to advertising as a supplementary source of revenue in 
case of need? #05 
. 
However, he took a stand against it later, particularly with reference to commercial competition to 
the BBC, pointing out the antipathy of the press to advertising on radio, and reiterating Sykes' 
position that only the richer firms would be able to afford it. Reith's resistance to direct advertising 
on the BBC, as its first and enormously influential Director General, was a major factor in keeping 
the broadcasting service as a whole advertising 
- 
free until the battle was finally lost in 1954. 
The Crawford Report formed the basis of the reconstitution of the British Broadcasting Company as 
a fiffly fledged public corporation, incorporated by Royal Charter and authOrised to broadcast 
through a License issued by the Postmaster General. Both Charter and License were renewable after 
a period of ten years. 
The fact that the BBC was empowered by Charter, and not by statute, was supposed to reassure the 
public that it was "not a creature of Parliament and connected with political activir/'. The Charter 
and License are, however, formidable instruments of state control, in principle at least. According to 
the Charter, the government retains the power to veto or initiate broadcasts, to dismiss the 
Governors (who legally constitute the BBC) at will, or to revoke the Charter. 
The License contains more detailed obligations and restrictions. The prohibition on receiving "money 
or any valuable consideration from any person"" in respect of transmissions, without the written 
44 ibid. p-88 
45 Asa Briggs L op. Cit p. 359 46 Asa Briggs, History of the BBC The First Fifty Years, OP Cit- P- 90 47 Wireless Broadcasting: Drafts of (1) Royal Charter 
..... 
for the incorporation of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation; and (2) Licence and Agreements 
.... 
between FLNL Postmaster General and 
.... 
the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (Cmd. 2756). 1926, para 3, p. 2. (1927 Charter and License. )
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consent of the Postmaster General remained, provided that this was not construed as precluding the 
BBC from receiving matter without payment, with or without acknowledgment, or receiving a 
"consideration" for broadcasting publishers! names and prices of material used 48 
. 
The License and 
Agreement must be approved by the House of Commons before it becomes operative and, Eke the 
Charter, it may be revoked 
- 
in this case by the Postmaster General 
- 
if the Corporation does not 
discharge its duties satisfactorily 
. 
Crawford's case for re-constituting the broadcasting system in the form of a public corporation rests 
on assumptions similar to those of Sykes. Broadcasting involves the national interest; American style 
uncontrolled transmission and reception is unsuited to the UK and so trusteeship of the national 
interest should be vested in the hands of an independent group of qualffied and experienced persons 
and not with the state or with private business (although such persons should have "business 
acumen"). 
2.5 Condusion. 
Of Horwitz! s five categories, outlined in Chapter 1, public interest theory seems to be the most 
applicable as a theory of the origin of British broadcasting regulation. There is a clear sense in which 
the broadcast medium 
- 
the radio spectrum 
- 
can be, and was, treated as common property, and the 
broadcast message contained in programmes as part of the nation! scultural and social infrastructure. 
The Sykes Committee Report explicitly refers to broadcasting as a "public utility"', and at a time of 
spectrum scarcity its 'natural monopoly' characteristics made it a suitable candidate for regulation and 
ultimately public ownership. 
The circumstances under Which the regulatory system for broadcasting was created in Britain 
nevertheless dfffer from those which gave rise to progressive public interest theory. The industry in 
question (broadcasting) originated at the same time as its regulatory arrangements, and so the state 
was in a position to influence its course of development from the start, rather than intervening in an 
Odsting relationship between producers and consumers and attempting to impose structures post 
48 ibid. para 3 (2), p. 3 49 Sykes ReporL op cit para 3, p. 4 
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hoc. In the UK, the public interest was used as a justification, not just for instituting regulation to 
oversee the broadcasting industry, but for taldng it out of private hands altogether. 
With respect to McQuail's' definition of the public interest as "competing claims with a normative 
component", he situation in the early years of broadcasting was not sufficiently complex for it to be 
relevant. The various different interested parties - radio equipment manufacturers, consumers of
radio, and people involved in programme production - all shared acommon objective in getting the 
government to authorise and arrange a broadcasting service of some sort or other, rather than 
nothing. There were no serious challenges to the decision that the public interest in broadcasting lay 
first in co-operation not competition, and then in public ownership and not private control. The only 
other possible public interest claim at the time 
- 
that it was in the interests of listeners that advertising 
should be allowed in sufficient quantity to provide routine rather emergency revenue - was ruled 
prima facie unjustifiable by the political system, and was not actually made by anyon6so. The 1951 
Beveridge Report, reflecting amuch more developed and diverse broadcasting situation, was the first 
document to consider arange of organised and forcefully articulated competing claims to represent 
the public interest, including the claim that broadcast advertising was in the public interest 51 
- 
The framework of norms within which the broadcasting and regulatory systems were starting to 
develop is nevertheless clearly visible in both the Sykes and the Crawford Reports. The opinions and 
recommendations of the two Committees rely on a number of assumptions about the nature, actual 
or potential, of broadcasting which are rooted in a particular set of values. The primary assumption 
was that broadcasting, with a unique role to play in the shaping of national fife, should not take the 
form of an unrestricted commercial monopoly. It was presumed that such a valuable public asset 
should remain in the hands of the public and not be handed over to vested interests, state or private, 
to use for their own ends. Behind the reluctance to give private business a hold over broadcasting lay 
a distaste for commercialism, and an attachment to the "amateur spirit" promoted by the public 
school system. These values deeply influenced the both the structure and style of British broadcasting 
and its regulation for the greater part of its historyý2 
. 
The connection made between the acceptance 
50 See: Note 17 51 See Chapter 4 
32 Note: Nicholas Garnham has described the set of attitudes, %tich were so potent a force from the very beginning in 
moulding public service broadcasting, and by extension advertising regulation, as representing "the anti-enfixj=eurial 
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of broadcast advertising and the deterioration of programme standards is a natural consequence of
the anti- commercial stance taken by makers of regulation policy. The notion of "fair play" was also 
part of the same ethos and one of Sykes! most influential arguments against allowing direct 
advertising on radio was that it would be unfair to smaller advertisers who would not be able to 
afford such an expensive medium. Regulation of commercial television has always included 
provisions directed at preventing the programme companies from discriminating unfairly between 
advertisers. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation as a regulatory institution very clearly played a constitutive 
role in the political life of the LJK from its inception 53 
, 
and those responsible for its structure were 
consciously aware that broadcasting regulation had a formative and not merely an instrumental 
fUnCtion 54. Political and social questions concerning the relationship between the citizen and the state 
were at the forefront of the decision-maldng process. In choosing the particular egulatory format for 
broadcasting that they did, the government and its advisors opted for a system with as much 
independence from both the political and private business spheres as they believed possible at the 
time. Their choice successfiffly determined, for the last seven decades, the relationship between the 
citizen and the state politically, with respect o the democratic right to freedom of expression via the 
broadcast medium, and socially by defining and promoting the social purpose of the service. With the 
arrival of commercial television, regulation of advertising mediated relations between the 
government, the general public and commercial undertalcings by means of statutory Consumer 
protection measures. Broadcasting regulation has always been very much concerned with 
governance and "the End of society in which people wish to live". 
cultural values of the British intelligentsia". (Nicholas Garnham. op cit. p. 19); Burton Paulu records that "the upper 
classes ( who, of course, were in a numerical minority ) opposed 
... 
commercial broadcasting". (Burton Paulu, Television 
and Radio in the United JUngdon; op. cit pp. 15-16) 1lie same author reveals that an analysis of the membership of the 
Board of Governors of the BBC between 1927 and 1955 indicates that "they tended to be people who had attended such 
53 schools as 
Rugby, Eton and Harrow, and then had gone on to Oxford or Cambridge". (ibid. p. 133) 
Note: Stephen Elkin! s view of regulatory bodies as constitutive of areas of a nation! s political life, rather than merely 
54 
fulfilling a passive functional role, has been outlined in Chapter I 
Note: The significance of the BBC as a regulatory institution is explicitly recognised in the 1936 Ullswatcr Committee. 
Paragraph 30 states that "as the BBC is one of a munbcr of new and recently created forms of public institution standing 
between Government departments on the one hand and commercial undertakings on the other, its practice may have some 
influence in each of these directions and be looked upon as a pattern for future institutions". 
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Another feature characteristic of the public interest approach is the use of "expert boards" to 
implement regulation. The Board of Governors of the BBC was set up with the intention that it 
should represent non-partisan, scientific expertise vested in a body which is continually in session". 
Statutorily appointed specialist advisory committees, (independent "expert boards" par excellence), 
covering such areas as education, religion, health and advertising, have always been an important part 
of the regulatory arrangements for broadcasting in the UK 
The decision by regulation policy-makers to rýect advertising as a method of finance and insist on 
the license fee only, overmling the opinion of the Wireless Society, was based on common interest 
considerations; the anticipated long term benefit to the service was given greater weight than the 
immediate desires of consumers. 
As the situation described so far represents the origination phase of both regulatory system and 
industry, regulatory failure theories, such as capture, are obviously not relevant at this stage. The 
only point at which a critique such as conspiracy theory night have been applicable was when the 
original request was made by radio equipment manufacturers for the government to authorise a 
service, which they knew would entail some form of regulation. But they did not ask for a 
monopoly-, the Post Office itselý when "confronted with 24 applicants for licenses, persuaded them 
to go away and form a single company in order to avoid the unpleasant task of choosing between 
them"56. The monopoly granted to the British Broadcasting Company certainly protected its 
individual members from the unwelcome effects of all-out competition, but other regulatory 
restrictions soon made their business unviable. This can hardly be counted a great success for the 
manufacturers. What they received from regulation was neither an effective monopoly, mainly due to 
the prohibition on advertising, nor even a proper cartel, but a hybrid institution Y-ý; ch lasted less than 
four years before being dismantled. 
55 Robert B. Homitz, Yhe Irony ofRegulation Reform: The Deregulation ofAmerican Telecommunication, New York 
OxTord University Press 1989, p. 26 
Burton Paulu, Television and the Radio in the United Kingdom, op cit. p. 14 
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Chapter 3 
1927 
- 
1947: A Period of Consolidation. 
3.1 Introduction. 
Over the next twenty years, the broadcasting system developed and expanded. The BBC as an 
organisation grew hugely both in size and in reputation. During this period, three more Committees 
of Inquiry made their contribution to broadcasting policy, and each had advertising on its agenda. 
Committee attitudes to commercial funding, apart from firnited sponsorship, remained on the whole 
negative, with some qualifications. Technical advances, however, particularly the invention of 
television, started to raise a number of questions about how regulation ight be adapted to take into 
account he changing situation. 
3.2 Advertising in the Selsdon. Committee Report. 
An experimental television service was first introduced in 1932 from Broadcasting House, using a 
low definition system developed by James Baird. By 1934, technical improvements in television 
transmission elsewhere in the world, and the realisation that television would definitely form an 
important part of the future of broadcasting prompted the British government to set up another 
committee, chaired by Lord Selsdon, to "consider the development of television and to advise the 
PoM=er General on the relative merits of the several systems and the conditir-ins under which any 
public service of Television should be provided"'. 
The Selsdon Report was largely concerned with techrýcal matters, but it also had to look at 
regulatory options and ways of financing television. The Committee concluded that as far as 
regulafion of television was concerned, in view of "the close relationship which must exist between 
sound and television broakaSting"2, the BBC should also be entrusted with television. The 
'Report offhe Television Committee 1934 (Chairtnan: Lord Selsdon) (Cmnd 4793), London: HMSO, 1935, 
section 1, para 1, p. 4 (Selsdon Report) 2 ibid. para 39, p. 12 
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alternative of allowing a television service to grow up under private enterprise until it was sufficiently 
developed to be taken over by a public authority had also been considered, but the Conunittee had 
decided against it. This was, firstly, because "it would involve a departure from the principle of 
having only a single authority broadcasting a public sound service on the air 0, and secondly, because 
of certain pracfical difficulties surTounding the granting of licences. 
By this time, then, it had become virtually a. -domatic to policy-makers that all forms of broadcasting 
were best run as a public service, controlled by a single non-commercial organisation. According to 
Selsdon, even if private enterprise had been allowed an initial role in the development of a television 
service, following the pattern of radio, the service would need to be adopted by a public authority as 
soon as possible. And once again, the decision that the state should control broadcasting of whatever 
kind as trustee for the public interest rather than leaving it to the marketplace brought with it 
problems of implementation. The amount of work involved in regulation, which includes licensing 
decisions, technical considerations, copyright and patent matters, programming production, 
advertising control if relevant, much of it quite specialised, made it unsuitable for a government 
department to take on. Besides, in a liberal democracy, apart from ensuring the overall quality of the 
service, or the application of excepfional circumstances such a national emergency, what people see 
on their screens or hear on the air is not the business of the state. 
The British government's olution with television, as with sound broadcasting, was partly a matter of 
convenience. Any commercial input to the system, let alone complete dominance by the private 
sector, would be more costly and far more diflicult to regulate. This practical insight has been 
amply confirmed, by the experience of commercial television regulation since its inception. A great 
deal of time and effort has had to go into devising and adapting regulatory structures with enough 
power and flexibility to dealwith all the potentially hanrdW effects of market forccs in television. 
The Selsdon Report, having recommended placing the infant television service under the wing of the 
BBC, considered "seUing time for advertisements" as a means of finance. A distinction was made, 
foHowing Sykes, between direct advertisements and sponsored programmes. The former were again 
rejected, but the Committee saw "no reason why the provision concerning sponsored programmes in 
3 ibicL para 40, p. 12 
4 ibidL para 40, p. 12 
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the e)dsting licence should not be applied also to the television service"5 
. 
This idea was opposed by 
the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, who hoped that there would be no "forms of advertising by 
means of what are known as sponsored programmes". John Reith, however, was still in favour of 
retaining the option. He told the Committee that he had "no objection in principle to the sponsor 
system, and that (the BBC) do in fact do something near to that, and might do it in the future 0. 
Gerald Cock, the BBC's new Director of Television, also envisaged the new service as having, in the 
short term, to take "provided" or "sponsored" programmes, with brief acknowledgements at the 
beginning and end, but with no "selling of time on the USA or Luxembourg model. " He felt that 
suppliers of ladies! hats, dresses and jewellery, and motor car and aeroplane manufacturers would be 
interested "in mutual co-operation without strings". Briggs records that there was strong opposition 
to this inside the BBC because sponsoring was bad in principle and reasons of economy should not 
be used to justify ie. 
Finally, the Selsdon Committee recommended that an Advisory Committee should be set up to "plan 
and guide the initiation and early development of the television service"'O. 
As the BBC's Charter and Licence were due for renewal on Ist January 1937, the government 
appointed a fourth Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Ullswater, to review "the constitution, 
control, and finance of the broadcasting service in this country and advise generally on the conditions 
under which the service, including broadcasting to the Empire, television broadcasting, and the 
system of wireless exchanges, hould be conducted after 31 st December 193 6" 11. 
3.3 Advertising in the URswater Committee Report. 
The longest and most wide-ranging investigation to date, the Ullswater Committee recognised the 
achievements of the Corporation and broadly recommended maintaining the status quo. Its Report 
5 ibid. para 65, p 21 
Memorandum of the Newspaper Proprietors! Association, Asa Briggs Vol. H p. 587 
7 Evidence of Sir John Reith, 30 Nov. 1934. (ibid. p 589). Xote: As an example of limited sponsoring, Briggs cites the 
occasion in 1936 when new car models were driven slowly along beside BBC Television headquarters at Alexandra 
Palace followed by a camera. Even this provoked protests. (ibid. p. 600) 
ibid. pp. 599-600 
ibid. p. 600 
10 Selsdon Report op. cit. para 74 (4), p. 25 
11 Report ofthe Broadcasting Committee, 1935, (Chairman: Viscount Ullswater) (Cmnd 509 1) 
London: I-IMSO, 1936, para 1, p. 5 (LWswatcr Report) 
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contained some firm opinions about advertising. The Committee advised that the ban on direct 
advertising be retained, giving as the reason members! amdety "that the intellectual and ethical 
integrity which the broadcasting system in this country has attained should be preserved 02 
.A clearer 
statement of the view that this form of advertising represents a threat to the ethos of public service 
broadcasting would be hard to find. For the first time, the problematic nature of the relationship 
between the editorial content of programmes and their source of finance is referred to in a policy 
document, albeit implicitly. The Committee was evidently aware that the intellectual and ethical 
integrity of the system as a whole depended on the fact that individual programmes remained 
editorially independent of external commercial interests. 
It was stiH spot advertising and not sponsorship, which unlike spot advertising establishes a direct 
interest by an advertiser in a particular programme, that was seen as potentiafly damaging to the 
service, Sponsorship of the restricted Sykes variety continued to be seen as harmless because, as 
UHswater noted, "discreet judgement" had been shown in its use 13 
. 
In aU probability, at that stage, 
policy-makers were more concemed about the potentially hannful effects of surrendering the entire 
system to operation by commercial criteria. But Ullswater, while reconunending the continuance of 
the power to use sponsorship 14 
, 
hoped that "any increase in its use ( would ) be limited to the initial 
stages of Television broadcasting. There is an obvious danger that if Television should become more 
and more a usual accompaniment to sound broadcasting, sponsored items might come to occupy a 
considerable part of the BBC programmes"15. The Report, however, goes on to recommend that 
Clause 3, sub-clause (2) of the Licence 
- 
permission to receive a consideration in return for 
broadcasting names of publishers and prices of broadcast matter 
- 
should be omitted in the new 
Licence. 
This strong warning about the dangers of increased dependence on revenue from commercial 
sources, or at least the temptation to obtain a significant number of programmes free, reflects not 
only disquiet about the degrading effects of advertising on standards of service, but also an 
awareness that television was a potentially far more expensive medium than sound broadcasting and 
correspondingly posed greater funding problems. In fact, Noel Ashbridge, Chief Engineer of the 
12 ibid. para 109, p. 33 
13 ibid 
' 
para I 11, p. 34 
14 Note: Three members of the Committee did not "agree that the admission of "sponsored" items 
..... 
(was) either 
is 
necessary or desirable", and proposed instead that the costs of television should be met out of public funds. ( ibid. p 48) 
ibid. para I 11, p. 34 
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BBC (and so, perhaps, more in tune with the financial realities of the new medium than the creative 
establishment) had submitted a memorandum to the Selsdon Committee warning of possible serious 
financial difficulties, which could only be resolved by relying on sponsorship. He classified television 
as a lwmq service, initially at least, Which had never been the case with sound broadcasting. 
Neither Selsdon nor Ullswater dealt adequately with the question of finance, as Asa Briggs has 
pointed OUt16, leaving the matter still unsettled by 1939 when war broke out. According to Briggs, 
there is some evidence that if the war had not intervened, in spite of the negative reactions of the 
Committees of Inquiry, commercial television might have arrived sooner. Sir John Cadman, who 
became Chairman of the Television Advisory Committee in 1939 after Selsdon's death, was a keen 
supporter of advertising via this medium. So, not surprisingly, was the Treasury who could not 
understand why the BBC was so unwilling to take advantage of this extra source of revenue. Gerald 
Cock, the BBCs first Director of Television, was equally determined that the Corporation should not 
17 go down this path, which he considered would be a "disaster" 
The Ullswater Committee also considered the problem of commercial broadcasts from abroad. They 
decided that the practice of excluding advertisements from broadcast programmes was to the 
advantage of listeners, and deplored the fact that the policy of retaining a unified control of 
broadcasting had been undermined in recent years by "the transmission of advertisements in English 
from certain stations abroad, which are not subject to the influence of the British authorities except 
by way of international agreement and negotiation"18. They added that steps were being taken by the 
Post Office and the Foreign Office to prevent the beaming of programmes in English which include 
advertisements, and to which "objection had been taken" 19. 
The chief objectors were, of course, the BBC who were extremely annoyed ab 
, 
,, 
ut the activities of 
these stations 
- 
Radios Luxembourg and Normandy". These were commercial stations which 
devoted a good part of their output to English language programmes containing advertisements paid 
for by British firms. The Corporation was not only opposed to commercial broadcasting in its4 but 
Asa Briggs, History of Ih e BBC, The First Fifty Years. Word University Press 1985, p 168 
ibid. p. 168 
Ulls, "ztcr Report op cit para 113, p. 34 19 ibid. para 114, p. 35 
20 Note. 
- 
Ile BBC complained again to the Beveridge Committee that "broadcasts in English from Luxembourg do not in 
any way represent the people or government of Luxembourg, they represent advertisers responsible to no-one but 
themselves". (Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1949. - Appendix H: Memoranda Submitted to the Committee (Cmnd 8117) London: HMSO, 195 1, p. 106 (Beveridge II) 
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resented any competing influences on its programming policy. The strong emphasis under the Reith 
regime on serious and educational programmes, however, and the bias against broadcasting used for 
amusement interest only, did not satisfy the appetite of some sections of the listening public for 
lighter material. This was clear from the number of people who tuned in to Radios Normandy and 
Luxembourg, abandoning the BBC. They were especially popular on Sundays as the "Reith Sunday" 
did not start until 10.15 a. m. and offered nothing in the way of fight entertainmene'. 
The commercial stations were able to take advantage of this demand and their popularity with 
audiences uggests that the advertisements were not entirely unwelcomeP. On the contrary, the fact 
that by 1938 approximately 300 companies considered themselves justified in spending 11,700,000 
on promoting their products through the commercial stations shows that a reasonable amount of 
advertising did not alienate a significant minority of people in Bfitain23. And if as many as 300 firms 
found radio airtime within their budgets then the old Sykes argument, that only a small number of 
very large enterprises would be able to afford it, was gradually becoming less relevant o sound 
broadcasting, which was relatively inexpensive in comparison with television. Some of these 
advertisers were in the forefront of the campaign to break the BBC monopoly after the war and 
submitted evidence to the 1949 Beveridge Committee to support their case. 
Apart from the foreign commercial stations, another source of irritation to the BBC were the relay 
exchanges, which were a system of receiving and distributing broadcast programmes to subscribers 
over a local wire network, run by private companies. Although these exchanges were closely 
regulated, not permitted to originate programmes, and required by their licences to transmit a 
substantial majority of BBC programmes, there was still scope for them to transmit some foreign 
commercial programmes which contained advertising. The Ullswater Committee reported the 
Corporatiods anxiety that the balance of its programming might be upset and tYat the system might 
increasingly be "used to disseminate advertisements". A recommendation that the exchanges should 
be taken over by the Post Office and their programming provided by the BBC was not followed, 
however, and the BBC eventually accepted them when commercial television became a much more 
serious rival. 
21 Ronald H. Coase 
' 
British Broadcasting: A Study in AfonOPOIY, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 
pp. 102 
- 
103 
22 Note: Radio Luxembourg claimed to have 4,000,000 listeners by 1949. (Beveridge Il op cit p. 568) 
23 Burtm Paulu 
, 
British Broadcasting University of Minnesota, 1956, p. 29 
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It is also interesting to note that among Ullswater's recommendations was one wlich would transfer 
"responsibility for the cultural side of broadcasting 
..... 
to a Cabinet Mnister in the House of 
Commons, preferably a senior member of the Government 1124 
. 
Although responsibility for overall 
policy was moved to the Home Office in 1974, this sensible plan was only really put into effect some 
smty years later by the appointment in 1992 of a Minister for National Heritage who includes 
broadcasting in his department. 
In spite of the UHswater Committee's qua. Hed support for discreet sponsorship, the government 
decided that the BBC's new Charter, effective from the beginning of 1937, should prohibit this 
activity. The Postmaster-General, in a note to Reith on March 15 1937, indicated that this prohibition 
was intended to cover any programmes provided by commercial organisation? ', thereby removing 
even the limited oPportunity of a small degree of commercial funding for British broadcasting. 
While BBC sound broadcasting went from strength to strength during the war, the television service 
was suspended in 1939. By 1943, however, television was back on the agenda and another 
committee was set up to consider how the service should be structured when it was eventually 
resumed. Chaired by Lord Hankey, it was required to prepare plans for the expansion of services, for 
research and development, and encouragement of the export trade. 
3.4 Advertising in the Hankey Committee Report. 
In recommending that research begin as soon as possible into improving the television service, the 
Committee rejected two possible extremes: a unified research effort by all interested firms combined 
to form ajoint Research Association, and free competition between large firmsý'. instead it proposed 
"the adoption of a middle course under which television research would be co-ordinated, Whilst 
individual effort would receive all possible ncouragement 47 
. 
So a compromise was once again the favoured option: collaboration was deemed to be important, 
even in the market place, but competition ought not to be hampered either. The Committee decided 
24 UUswatcr Report op cit. para, 53, p. 19 
25BurtonPaulu, Television and Radio in the United Kingdom. MacmiHan1981, p. 49 
26 Repoil ofthe Television Committee 1943 (Chairman: Lord Hankey) London: HMSO, 1945, para 4 1, p. 12 
alankey Report) 
27 ibid. para 42, p. 12 
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that co-ordination of research should be carried out "under government auspices by a body which 
would command the full, confidence of the industry 
..... 
We suggest that the task should be entrusted 
to the Television Advisory Committee"". This duplicates the original approach to the formation of 
the British Broadcasting Company, which was also set up as a collaborative venture by commercial 
concerns, overseen, albeit not very effectively, by a government-appointed Board. Sin-@ar advice was 
given to those connected with developing the television export trade: "responsibility must he with the 
industry which should, however, keep in close touch with the Advisory Committee 
.... 
as the normal 
channel for communication with I-Es Majesty's Government"29 
. 
The question of advertising arose briefly in the Hankey Report's section on finance, where it was 
recognised that the problem of whether sponsored programmes hould be allowed "raises issues 
wider than purely financial ones"30 
. 
It avoided going into these wider issues in more depth, merely 
remarldng that since in its early stages television would only have a limited audience it would in any 
case be unlikely to attract much revenue in this way from commercial interests. No conclusion was 
reached about the advisability of permitting sponsorship in television. 
The Report also mentioned the difficulties associated with the intemational standardisation f 
television technology. It anticipated the technical possibility of transfronfier television, predicting with 
some prescience that the main problem were likely to be political, rather than technical3l 
. 
The 
continuing unresolved debate over global hannonisation of technical standards and European 
transnational regulation and have confirmed this prediction. 
The Television Advisory Committee was reformed in 1945 and the BBC's television service was 
resumed in June 1947. 
5 Conclusion. 
During the period from 1927 tiH 1947, a pattern of broadcasting regulation pecubar to the UK began 
to emerge. Regulation policy was still resolutely anti-commercial, but technological factors such as 
improved reception from stations abroad (e. g. Radios Luxembourg and Normandy), the expansion of 
28 ibid. para 43, p. 12 29 ibid. para 55, p. 13 30 ibid. para 70, p. 17 31 ibid. para 59, p. 14 
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relay services which were able to evade advertising restrictions and, most importantly, the 
development of television were beginning to challenge this approach. Broadcasting is an area where 
technological advances have tended to provide as significant an external force for change in 
regulation as movement on the political front. In the 1930s and 40s, however, the pace of technical 
development was comparatively slow and regulation policy equally slow to respond. The Second 
World War, the ultimate political upheaval, also contributed to the delay. 
That the public interest lay in maintaining the status quo as far as possible was assumed rather than 
debated. Since process regulation of the broadcasting structures, i. e. regulation in the shape of a non- 
commercial public corporation supported by advisory committees, was believed to have provided 
the optimum conditions for a quality product, no need was seen to modify these structures, except 
as a temporary solution to the problem of financing the research and development of television. The 
activities of private enterprise in this field were tolerated, as they were thought to be unavoidable, but 
commercial firms were not trusted to perform unsupervised. Reliance on the "expert boards" 
method of safeguarding the public interest in broadcasting was well established by this time and it has 
never lost its appeal. Committees of the so-called 'great and good 32 
, 
appointed mostly on an 
honorary basis, are a popular feature of the British democratic process and have played an active pan 
3 in the formation and implementation of regulation policyý 
. 
Because the system was still not commercially funded, economic theories of regulatory failure which 
claim that regulation is used by private business for its own ends are not yet relevant. Capture, as a 
general tendency of any regulatory operation, nevertheless did occur, as Caroline Heller has noted. 
Spealcing of the Crawford Reporfs recommendation on advisory committees he writes: "this had 
proposed advisory bodies capable of initiating research and experiment on their own account and 
with direct access to the board of Govemors, an idea viewed with understandab; -, ý foreboding by the 
broadcasters. In the final result the advisory bodies which came slowly into being after 1926 were 
firmly the creatures of the Secretariat: rather than the board of govemors. " The BBC management 
32 Mote. 
- 
This method of policy-making has not always been universally approved. With respect to the broadcasting 
advisory committees, W. A. Robson criticises "the debilitating tendency to overload them with ex officio notables". (W. A- Robson (ed. ), Public Enterprise, Allen and Uaiwin 1963) 33 Note: The Beveridge Committee reported that "watching the BBC's conduct generally or spccifically are some 
thirty advisory council's or committees" (Beveridge I op. cit. p. 3). The current commercial television regulator has to 
make do with a mcre ten. 
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swiftly "killed off the idea of external criticism from advisory bodies while co-opting the form for its 
own ambassadorial purposes"34 
. 
Instrumental, structural, and organisational perspectives are also useful in explaining the direction 
that broadcasting regulation took. Instrumentally, it would be hard to underestimate the impact of 
John Reiths personality on the philosophy and style of operation of the BBC, and consequently on
broadcasting regulation as a whole. His role in the life of British broadcasting has been summed up 
by Stephen Hearst, former special advisor to the Director General: "no other individual throughout 
this century was ever again to play so dominant and creative apart in shaping broadcasting policy. 
There might have been a host of other regulatory provisions on the statute book but for him. He set 
the tone, he initiated virtually every ethical or moral debate, and his name is still being evoked sixty 
years later when the purposes and aims of broadcasting are being detailed 05 
. 
His austere view of the 
public service ideal, dedication to the highest cultural standards of programming, antipathy to 
commercial funding of broadcasting (apart from limited sponsorship), support for monopoly and 
authoritarian style of management permeated the institution and left a permanent mark on 
broadcasting in the UK. 
Although he had resigned as Director General of the BBC in 1938, he served as Minister of 
Information during the War and remained close to communications policy-makers at the Political 
level, many of whom shared his views. These views were also widely held in the upper echelons of 
the BBC, both in management and on the creative side. Most members of the policy network came 
from similar public school/Oxbridge backgrounds 
- 
the Committees of Inquiry were usually chaired 
by peers of the realm 
- 
and had in common the values and outlook on fife of their social classý6- 
The personal characteristics of key players in the development of broadcasting pcý, dcy in Britain for its 
first quarter century therefore had a much stronger determining influence on both the genesis and 
34 Caroline HcHcr, Broadcasting andAccountability, London: British Film Institute, 1978 (BFI Television 
35 
Monograph), p. 17 
egu ain in Jay. G. Blumler (ed. ) Television and the Public Interest. Stephen Hearst, Broadcasting R lation in Brit 
London: Sage, 1992, p. 65 
36 Xote. 
- 
See note 53, Chapter 2. There is clear evidence of this in the Ullswater Report, although the 
Committee were attempting to prove the opposite. In paragraph 33 the Committee statedL "one point that was put 
before us in evidence was a suspicion that in appointments undue preference was given to candidates with 
Oxford or Cambridge degrees. That, however, is disproved by the following analysis of monthly paid non- 
engineering staff: With no degree, 204; graduates of Oxford, 76; graduates of Cambridge, 40; other universities, 
75; total, 395". The fact that nearly a third of BBC personnel were from Oxbridge would appear to confirm rather 
than dispel the suspicion! 
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operation of regulation than in the cases of regulation of private business examined by Horwitz. 
Private sector industries bring their own pre-deternfmed structural features with them to the 
regulatory set-up, along with an already established pattern of independent relations with the state. 
The constraints on individuals being able to mould a regulatory institution in their own image are 
much greater. The relationship between the Board of Governors and the BBC management was, of 
course, not intended to be adversarial, but this relationship, to a significant extent, set the pattern for 
subsequent relations between the ITA and the television and advertising industries. 
While, as Horwitz has emphasised, instmmental critique alone is not enough to account for 
deficiencies in regulation, the circumstances of the creation of the BBC, and with it the creation of 
the regulatory structure of broadcasting in the UK, were very different from those analysed by 
American regulation theorists. The decision to exclude a commercial component and structure 
broadcasting as a govemment appointed public authority, fonnally independent of the state but 
dependent on it for general policy, made it a unitary enterprise. histrumental critique of the classical 
model, i. e. the regulatory agency completely detached from industry, has regulators and industry 
chiefs sharing background and outlook, which would tend to inhibit tough regulation, but 
nevertheless limited in what they can do by the structural constraints imposed by their formal 
relations with one another and the state. But in British broadcasting the early regulatory structure 
was largely self-referential. The Board of Govemors regulated merely by ensuring that the terms and 
conditions of the Char-ter and License were complied with. Even if the structure was decided initially 
by the state, the state, which also had a regulating function, soon came to identify itself extremely 
closely with the broadcasting system, and with those responsible for its (self) regulation"'. 
Bernstein considers "the single most important characteristic of regulation by commission (is) the 
failure to grasp the need for political support and leadership for the success of regulation in the public 
interest 08. In the pre-commercial phase of British Broadcasting, however, the public authority as 
regulator, and the political leadership were extremely close in terms of their thinldng. They shared a 
common perception of the aims and objectives of public service broadcasting and how it should be 
structured, even though the BBC was fornmIly independent of the political system. 
37 Note: A description of the three different paradigms of broadcasting regulation, together %%ith an explanatory diagram, 
can be found in Chapter 10. 
Marvcr Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985, p. 101 
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After the creation of a more classical semi-detached regulatory body, the Independent Television 
Authority, to oversee the commercial sector, this body also remained close to the political 
39 
establishment and received on-going support and guidance. It only became "isolated". when a new 
Thatcherite agenda took over in the 1980s which was much less sympathetic to the traditional view 
of the regulatory body as guarantor of the public interest in broadcasting. The government withdrew 
support from the MA and eventually replaced it with a body more in tune with its own ideology. 
Failure to grasp the need for political support has never been a cause for regulatory failure in British 
broadcasting, and, for the most part, such support has always been forthcoming. 
In the 1940s, after twenty years of operation, organisational factors had begun to affect the 
efficiency of the broadcasting system, which contributed to the movement for regulatory change, The 
increase in the BBC's size and bureaucracy and the over-centralisation of its management inhibited 
innovation and creativity. Writing in the Beveridge Report at the end of the decade, Selwyn Lloyd 
W commented that in 1935 the BBC had 2,500 employees; by 1949 it had 12,000. In Lloyd's view, 
as the activities of an organisation grow, there is an inevitable tendency towards overstaffing, 
centralisation and bureaucracy. Those in authority become far removed from the rank and Me. He 
claimed that he did not intend this as a criticism of the BBC in particular, it was the unavoidable 
result of the centralised control of a large and varied organisation. The fault lay with monopoly itself 
which was bound to lead to complacency and rigidityo. 
In Bemstein! s fife cycle terminology, by the 1940s the BBC was approaching the period of middle 
age. Because there was no external industry for the governing body to attempt to maintain an 
adversarial relationship vith, and the independent advisory bodies did not offer as much constructive 
independent critique of Corporation policy and performance as perhaps they should have doneý', the 
BBC was open to criticism for being too elitist and out of touch with viewere. Tlis perception 
resulted, towards the end of the decade, in calls for a change in process regulation to allow for a 
more diverse and responsive broadcasting service. 
39 Note: Brinton (1962) has claimed that is 'Isolation from presidential leadership and control 
.... 
lack of 
continuous or effective legislative guidance 
... 
as well as the evident apprehension of courts" that has led to the 
failures of the Federal Cormnunication Commission (FCC) in America. (A. V. X. Brinton- 7he Regulation of 
Broadcasting by the FCC. A case study in ReguLation by Independent Commission ", Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Harvard University. 1962) 
40 Beveridge L op. cit p. 202 41 See: Chapter 3, page 10 42 Note. Readers of The Listener, %Nbich had a circulation of 151,350 in 1949, complained the they found ` Its arts 
programmes too avante garde and its talks too specialised". (Asa Briggs, History ofthe BBC, The First Fifiy Years.. 
op. cit p. 252) 
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The advent of television also expanded the international dimension of broadcasting regulation. The 
government was not able to ignore the economic need to encourage development of the new 
technology so that Britain could maintain and increase its share of international markets. It 
nonetheless tiff wished to exercise some control in flis area by retaining the non-commercial public 
corporation as the most appropriate form of regulation for television as well as for sound 
broadcasting. 
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Chapter 4 
The Beveridge Committee: Movement for Change. 
1 Introduction 
Expansion of the television service following its resumption in 1946 was slow and by 1949 
dissatisfaction was growing with the performance of the BBC in Parliament, among radio and 
television equipment manufacturers, and even among some Corporation employees. It was becoming 
increasingly obvious that it lacked the resources to provide nation-wide television coverage within a 
reasonable timescale, a problem exacerbated partly by its cumbersome management s ructures, and 
partly by the lack of enthusiasm for television at the top of the Corporation'. 
The Labour government under Clement Attlee, which in 1946 had extended the Corporatiods 
Charter and Licence for only five years instead of the usual ten, resorted to the traditional method of 
sorting out the nations broadcasting difliculties and appointed a sixth Committee of Inquiry, under 
the chairmanship of Lord Beveridge. Its brief was to undertake a far-reaching review of the existing 
arrangements for broadcasting, sound and vision, and to recommend changes if necessary2. The 
Report has been examined here in depth because it contains such an excellent and comprehensive 
survey of all the arguments urrounding the introduction of advertising on television, and records in 
detail the views on the potential impact of advertising on the airwaves of almost every interest group 
with a stake in the UK broadcasting service, and of many individuals as weH. 
Note: According to Burfim Paulu, "during the first deca& ofthe post-war service, there vmre frequent charges that the BBC was 
esseMially a radio-onented organisation, whosc leadership lacked interest in television". Although shortages of funds, materials and 
Power delayed the development of television, the BBC "must shoulder sane of the blame'. (Burton Paulu, Telepuion andRadio in 
A-* Uldted Kingdom, Iondom Macmillari, 198 1, p. p. 55,56. ý Sir Gerald Beadle, Mrctcr of Television fimn 1956 - 61, wrote in 1963: " Both before, and several years after the war there was a very sftx)ng feeling amongst the successive heads of the television 
service 
... 
that television was not being taken seriously enough by the BBC". (Gerald Beadle, Teletision :A Gifical RMew Laidow- 
2 
Allen and Unwft4 1963, p. 40). RePW of the Broadcasting Committoe- 1949, (Chahman: Lord Beveridge) (Crand 8116), Laidon: 
IDv4SO. 1951, P. I (Beveridge I) 
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4.2 Advertising in Beveridge Committee Report. 
The Committee deliberated for eighteen months, receiving a much wider range of evidence, both 
written and oral, than ever before. It finally delivered a report greatly exceeding any previous one in 
length and detail. It represents awatershed in the history of British broadcasting and paved the way, 
despite its cautious support for the status quo, for the destruction of the entrenched concept of 
"unified control". It stands at the end of an era, and while its official conclusions are conservative and 
in line with the traditions of the past, it nevertheless gave public expression to many of the forces 
which would soon succeed in radically transforming the face of broadcasting inBritain. 
The issue which dominated the debate was whether the BBC should retain its absolute monopoly 
when its licence was renewed or, if not, what form any competition should take. The Committee 
disagreed with the Corporatiods view that it was self-evident that an effective public service must be 
run as a monopoly, and considered seriously all the serious challenges to that view. A variety of 
altematives were put forward quite a few of which advocated some degree of commercial funding. 
The proposals put forward by those in favour of breaking the monopoly through the medium of 
advertising-financed competition, and their reasons for wanting this, reveal where demand was 
building up for the introduction of market forces into the protected world of broadcasting. The 
arguments used to support the principle of commercial competition re-surfaced in various forms 
during later attacks on the duopoly of BBC and ITV which replaced the BBC's monopoly in 1955, 
and were used again in the most recent debates on the deregulation of broadcasting in the 1980s. 
Practically all the most interesting and persuasive points are to be found in Volume Two of 
Beveridge, the Memoranda of Evidence. It is not surprising that some of the most eloquent 
opponents of the BBCs monopoly power came from the commercial sphere, and from those BBC 
employees who wanted to extend the market for their services. These voices, though forceful, did 
not, however, constitute a mass movement. The campaign for commercial television did not really 
get under way until after a new Conservative government was elected in October 195 1. The main 
points of view expressed in the Beveridge Report are surnmarised below. 
The actors union, Equity, although anxious not to follow too closely the American model, proposed 
a "station earmarked for sponsored programmes 
..... 
subject to necessary safeguards 0. Such a station 
3 RCPMt of t1le Broad=ting COMMttCe 
, 
1q4q: AMndixH: Mcmorvnda Submitted to the Ccmmittce (Omd 8117) 
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would offer a genuine alternative to listeners and protect artists from the BBC's abuse of its 
monopoly powers. 
The safeguards uggested were: 
1) payment ofapercentage of the adverdsing revenue to the Postmaster Generalfor 
improvement of broa*aFfing services; 
2) resviction of cre&is to a mere mention of the sponsor: vname; 
3) entertainmentprogrammes only to he broadcast 
Number (1) is interesting because it is in effect a version of the levy system imposed on the ITV 
contractors to pay for regulation in the form of the Independent Television Authority, the first 
regulatory body for commercial television. Number (3) rests on the frequently made assumption that 
commercial broadcasting is necessarily linked to the provision of fight entertainment to the exclusion 
of other possibilities. 
Equity claimed that in the field of popular entertainment the listener's opinion would be decisive, and 
that unlike the BBC the "commercial station must satisfy its audience to survive"". It dismissed the 
aesthetic argument, saying that we are surrounded by advertisements in our daily fife, some of them 
offensive, the impact of which we cannot escape; but anyone who objects to advertising on the air 
can simply switch off the radio or switch over to another station. This point was first made by the 
original Wireless Society in addressing the Sykes Committee, and again by its successor the Listeners 
Association to Beveridge, but those responsible for television advertising regulation policy have 
always been aware that the situation is, in reality, not so simple. The fact that television commercials 
appear without warning in the home, or "just happen", as one experienced professional advertising 
regulator puts its, means that not all viewers are able to switch off or over in rime to avoid seeing 
what they do not wish to see, or do not wish their children, for example, to see. This characteristic 
of television advertising has always been cited as a reason for regulating it differently from print 
advertising. 
Laidon: HNSO, 195 1, p. 500 (Beveridge 11) 4 bid. P. 500 
5 Interview %Nith Yvcme Minwood 
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The Radio Industry Council felt that the extension of television was the most finportant problem 
facing broadcasting at that time, and that the excessive centralisation of the BBC meant that it did not 
give a high enough priority to this task. Referring to the Hankey Report of 1943, it agreed that in the 
early days of television sponsorship would not have been an attractive proposition owing to the 
limited audience, but now the time had come when commercial organisations would be willing to 
sponsor. It therefore recommended the introduction of competitive commercial stations which would 
"induce higher standards both technically and in programme qualityt#6 since the sponsor would 
demand the highest standards possible and the BBC would be forced to give equal satisfaction. 
The Radio Industry Council, however, believed that reports of bad taste in American broadcast 
advertismg were exaggerated, and that fears that it would be displayed in Britain were groundless. It 
added the rider that "to avoid the broadcast of any undesirable matter, suitable safeguards can be 
introduced, such as the setting up of a British Board of Television Censors"7 
. 
The Radio and Television Retailers Association agreed with this position. It advocated an 
independent sponsored broadcasting system, Aith a "suitable form of control of advertising 
.... 
Such 
competition would make for higher quality programmes and would provide listeners with a wider 
choice"' 
- 
The advertisement content of programmes, however, should be limited. 
Radio Luxembourg Advertising Ltd., as might be expected, came out strongly in favOur Of 
commercial radio for reasons that included the fact that "radio advertising is more econornical in 
terms of manpower and materials than almost any other national advertising medium"'; and that "the 
operation of an effective cheap advertising medium is one of the prerequisites of low distribution 
costs"'O. These purely economic arguments contradict the assessment of the Sykes Committee 
which stressed the potentially prohibitive costs of broadcast advertising. Padio Luxembourgs 
Memorandum ends with the broader philosophical point that if the monopolistic powers of the BBC 
were to be used agd= the company it would not only damage the interests of British manufacturers, 
but would constitute "an unwarranted interference with the personal freedom of millions of people 
6 Beveridge H op. cit. p. 523 
7 Beveridge 11 op. cit p. 523. Note. -Some might feel that this threat has finaDy been carried out vith the creation of the 
Broadcasting Standards Couxil under the I 99o Broadcasting Act. 
ibid. p. 573 
ibid. p. 568 
10 ibid. p. 568 
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... 
who are regular listeners to the programmes"" of Radio Luxembourg. The argument is presented 
here in terms of infringement of individual iberty, rather than inflingement of "commercial speech". 
The latter became a popular rallying cry of the advertising industry in its attempts to counteract he 
influence of the consumer lobby on EC legislation during the late 1970's and early 1980s. 
Memoranda submitted by several large advertisers take the same fine as Radio Luxembourg 
Advertising Ltd.. Horlicks, Uffflever and Rowntree jointly asked that "the economic claim for 
commercial broadcasting should be considered equally with the "social" and "cultural" claim for 
maintaining a non-advertWng service"12 
. 
They recommended a dual system of the BBC, financed in 
much the same way, and another broadcasting agency supported by the sale of airthe. They hoped 
that television would also be opened up to advertising, and questioned whether the nation, 
"depending for its e)dstence on efficiency" 13 
, 
could afford to ignore commercial broadcasting. 
Thomas Hedley and Co., soap and detergent manufacturers, crificised the Incorporated Society of 
British Advertisers, of which they were members, for not putting the case for commercial 
broadcasting strongly enough. The ISBA had claimed in its Memorandum that the opinions of those 
firms who had bothered to answer its questionnaire on the desirability of introducing commercial 
broadcasting (only 382 out of 1330) were divided almost equally for and against. The absence of a 
decisive majority of its members in favour of broadcast advertising made the ISBA reluctant at that 
stage to Support it14. 
Thomas Hedley rebutted the four main arguments relied on by the Sykes Committee in rejecting 
direct advertising, on which the ISBA had based its questionnaire. The Hedley Memorandum: 
1) included ata from the United States to show that in the long run there would be no adverse 
effect on the advertising revenue of newspapers, and forecast that "sponsored broadcasting 
would result in an improvement in advertising facilities in the form of rate reductions or better 
services, or both"15; 
11 ibid. p. 569. Nole. - On Radio Luxembourg, a "sponsored programme" meant sponsorship. in the fullest sense of 
advertiser 
- 
fimded or produced, not merely payment for front and end credits on a programme produced in house or by 
12 
an independent producer. (ibid. p. 568) 
ibid. p. 559 13 IbiCL P. 559 14 See: Chapter 4, p. 65 15 Beveridge II op. cit p. 556 
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2) pointed out that sponsored broadcasting would have to compete vAth the BBC for listeners 
and so the standard of their programmes would not be allowed to fall below those of their 
competitor 16 ; 
3) advocated that "spot announcements and regional programmes hould be available (which) 
would give small advertisers facilities comparable with those afforded by the buying of small 
spaces in the national and local press"17 ; 
4) denied that advertising would tend to make the service unpopular standards would not fall and 
the popularity of Radio Luxembourg among British audiences was proof that "the British 
public willingly listen to commercial radio to get the standard of radio entertainment they 
desire"" 
. 
On the question of control the company envisaged that "sponsored broadcasting would be controlled 
by a publicly owned corporation"'9 which would prevent its misuse. Its submission concluded that 
commercial broadcasting would be of real benefit to advertisers and, more than that, by increasing 
trade and lowering prices it would raise living standards and contribute to social and economic 
progress, benefiting the country as a wholeýo. Any potential disadvantages would be avoided by 
running it as a public corporation. This solution was, of course, the one eventually adopted by the 
government in setting up Independent Television in the 1954 Television Act. 
Ile Beveridge Committee was the first of the Committees of Inquiry to invite the Advertising 
Industry to submit evidence through its representative organisations, the Incorporated Society of 
British Advertisers and the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising. Individual companies in 
manufacturing had been consulted in the past but the views of advertising agencies and advertisers 
on a wider scale had not been sought. This is probably because the majority, (apart from those who 
were involved in advertising on Radio Luxembourg), had not shown much interest in pressing for 
change in the broadcasting arrangements until after the War. In 1946, the IPA had sent a deputation 
16 
- p. 556 17 ibid. p. 556 18 ibi& p. 556 19 ibict p. 556 20 ibi(i p. 557 
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to the Post Office to discuss the question of broadcast advertisinel, which marked the hesitant 
beginnings of a lobby from the advertising industry for its introduction. This lobby had gathered only 
a small momentum by the time Beveridge started sitting. 
The evidence submitted by the ISBA consists largely of an analysis of 382 answers to a questionnaire 
sent out to 1,330 manufacturers of consumer goods, i. e. potential users of the broadcasting medium, 
to find out whether or not they would welcome the opportunity to advertise on the air. 
In answer to the first question: "does your company consider that steps should be taken 
to 
... 
introduce commercial broadcasting in one form or another in this country T'2ý 201 replied in the 
affirmative and 181 in the negative, giving only a small majority in favour. Of these, 8 preferred 
advertising on the BBC, 57 wanted the provision of separate wavelengths for commercial 
broadcasting, controlled by the BBC, and a clear majority favoured one or more privately owned 
advertising supported stations. 
The ISBA also asked its members how they regarded the four main objections to commercial 
broadcasting made by the Sykes Conunittee. A large majority 
- 
246 to 56 
- 
disagreed that 
newspapers would be adversely affected; a smaller one 
- 
192 to 133 
- 
that advertisements would 
lower standards; and 215 against 109 disagreed that advertisements would make the service 
unpopular. On the claim that only big advertisers would be able to afford the high cost opinion was 
evenly divided 
- 
140 agreed and 139 did not. 
Fear on the part of a number of advertisers of unfair competition and distortion of the market in all 
probability contributed to the unexpectedly conservative attitude to the idea of commercial 
broadcasting among ISBA members. But it is surprising that so many belin-J that commercials 
would actually have a negative effectý lowering standards and making the service unpopular. The 
ISBA evidence suggests that there was no significant demand at that stage from providers of 
consumer goods and services for the introduction of the proposed new medium of advertising, as the 
Post Office itself noted in its Memorandum to Beveridge. It reported that, with sole exception of the 
21 ibid. p. 257 
22 ibd. p. 550 
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IPA! s deputation to the Poonaster-General in 1946, "there has been no demand from any 
responsible quarter in this country for commercial broadcastS"23 
The evidence of the IPA presented a different picture. This is perhaps only to be expected since, 
unlike an advertiser, an agency worldng on a commission basis can only benefit from the expansion 
of opportunities for advertising. The IPA! s Memorandum, consequently, was extremely positive and 
constructive on the subject of advertising. It put forward a very strong case for commercial 
broadcasting in the form of "an additional programme under the control of the BBC on which time 
may be purchased for commercial programmes"24. The IPA made the following points (given in 
summary) in favour of a BBC controlled (and therefore non-competitive) advertising funded channel: 
1) Advertising is essential to the natiorfs industry wMch operates in a competitive nvironment, 
and so an increase in facilities would be beneficial to industry as a Whole. 
2) The new television industry urgently needs funds for technological development and an 
expanded market for sets: the BBC's finances are inadequate for this task and it is moving too 
slowly in organising coverage nation-wide. 
3) The experience of other Commonwealth countries did not suggest that an alternative 
commercial programme resulted in the lowering of standards, or "a vulgarisation of the 
national way of fife 9#25 
. 
Sweeping condemnation of the American system was based on 
prejudice and ignorance. 
4) Advertisers depend on the goodwill of the public. "An advertising programme must not offend 
the taste of those to whom it is addressed, and must reach a high level of enteitzinment in 
order to achieve its objective"26. 
5) As in the case of Radio Luxembourg, strict rules could be laid down regarding the types of 
programme to be broadcast; individual vetting of each programme; provision of a balanced 
23 ibid. p. 257 
24 ibi(L C P. 
_A6 25, biCL P. 542 
26 ibil p. 545 
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schedule, control of the types of products and services advertised, and of the nature and 
content of items; and the amount of advertising to be included. In this connection, it noted 
that recently "the advertising profession 
..... 
has voluntarily taken successful steps to raise the 
ethical standards in this country"27 
The IPA! s submission was well reasoned and all the proposals put forward in (5) were, in fact, 
incorporated into the regulatory arrangements for ITV under the 1954 Television Act. 
As well as consulting commercial concerns, which had a vested interest in sponsored broadcasting, 
the Beveridge Committee sought the opinions of a wide range of other groups and individuals from 
the world of politics and elsewhere under the heading of "disinterested outsiders". These were also 
divided into supporters and opponents of commercial broadcasting. 
The Liberal Research Group, Eke most other Parliamentary groups outside the Labour movement, 
was opposed to the monopoly as a restriction on freedom of exTression in general and recommended 
its break-up. It was against a full scale commercial system on the American model, but proposed a 
separate competing Television Corporation to be run as a public service and financed in Part by 
sponsorship. On the question of control, there should be "strict safeguards protecting the public 
against the possible excesses of broadcast advertising f128 
. 
The Television Authority would have 
control of all output, but "would be permitted to finance a stated proportion of programme time - 
perhaps entertainment programmes only 
- 
by negotiating appropriate advertising sponsorship"29 
. 
Sponsorship would be limited to opening and closing credits only, "not 'puffe in the commercial 
senset"', which ruled out spot advertising. 
In contrast to the Liberals, the Fabian Society, a broad left grouping which oppood monopoly on the 
grounds that it represented too great a concentration of power in the sphere of communications, also 
opposed commercial broadcasting because "the domination of broadcasting by advertisers would 
tend to result in the favouring of mass appeal programmes, chiefly of entertainment, to the detriment 
of aU others 
Ol 
27 1 p. 545 
28 N(L p. 382 
29 ibict p. 384 
30 ibil p. 384 
31 ibidL p. 317 
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The Labour Party was in favour of maint6iing the constitution of the BBC intact, and opposed 
sponsored radio as "undesirable in the public interest' ', 
- 
mainly for the well trodden reason that 
broadcasting standards would be driven down by the need for mass audience 22. 
The voice of the general public was represented by the Listeners Association who, like its 
predecessor the Wireless Society, claimed to be in favour of commercial broadcasting. It preferred 
that commercial stations hould operate independently of the BBCs services, particularly in the case 
of television. This would be good for the British broadcasting industry which was currently at a 
disadvantage compared with that of other nations, and would offer an alternative market for the 
talents of writers, artists and technicians. The Association added that "regulations could be framed to 
safeguard against the more undesirable effects of broadcasting in other countries 03 
, 
and if people did 
not like the sponsored programmes they could tune in to the 'Independent" BBC. There is an 
implicit, but significant, recognition i  this last remark that sponsorship would remove some element 
of independence from the commercial stations as regards programming which a non-commercially 
funded BBC would retain. 
The BBC's establishment vigorously fought the idea of commercial competition, or any challenge to 
its status. Its main defence of monopoly was that competition of any Idnd would leave serious quality 
programming "at the mercy of Greshams Law" 
- 
the good driving out the bad 
- 
and would result 
in an inevitable lowering of standardS34. Unlike any other contributors, they actually provided a 
definition of standards: "the purpose, taste, cultural aims, range, and the general sense Of 
responsibility of the broadcasting service as a whole which sum up very neatly the public 
service ideal that had been the driving force behind the Corporations programming policy since the 
beghing. 
32 ibid. p. 
. 
345 
33 ibid. p. 
. 
305 
34 ibid. p. 197 
35 ibid. p. 197 
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4.3 "Sponsored Broadcasting": Beveridge's Assessment 
Eventually, despite the excellent cases made out in favour of some form of commercial competition 
to the BBC, the BBC won the day. The Beveridge Report rejected "any suggestion that 
Broadcasting in Britain should become financially dependent on sponsoring by which it meant any 
Icind of advertising 06 
. 
It also, somewhat reluctantly, endorsed the Corporation's fight to remain 
Britain's sole broadcasting agenCY37 
. 
The reasons for Beveridge's majority r6ection of sponsored 
broadcasting can be summarised as follows: 
1) It destroys the social purpose of broadcasting, introduces an ulterior motive into broadcast 
programmes and is "an abdication of broadcasting for its own sake 08 ; 
2) it lowers the level of public taste by competition for audience numbers only and fas to cater for 
minority and special needs; 
3) it cannot be effectively regulated in the public interest; 
4) it is not wanted by the majority of adverfisersý9, or by the majority of the public, and is opposed 
by most informed opinion; 
5) it is not needed as a means of financing British Radio4o. 
The Committee considered television as a "special issue", but came to the conclusion that all the 
arguments used against sponsoring applied equally well to sound broadcasting and television, It was 
of the opinion that although proponents of sponsoring were impressed by the "multiplicity" Of 
programmes available in America as a result of this practice, this was an illusion: "with sponsoring 
multiplicity would produce not variety but mediocre monotony""'. This is precisely the argument 
that was used by opponents of deregulation of broadcasting in the 1980s, and even those who regard 
the huge increase in channels arising from the new media as desirable are aware that more channels 
does not necessarily mean more choice, just more of the same. As Beveridge put it forty years 
earlier, multiplying programmes will "simply spread out (the) supply of channels the more thinly"42 
. 
36 Beveridge I op. cit p. 49 
37 ibid. p. 207 
38 ibid. p. 215 
39 Note: Beveridge remarks: "advertising agents arc naturally enough enthusiastic proponents of sponsored radio. But 
%,. ith the advertisers themselves it is a different story". (ibid. p. 217) 40 ibid. p. 214 
41 ibid. p. 218 
42 Ibid. p. 219 
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The United States was once again taken as a general example for what should not be done in Britain. 
But although the Report's conclusions did not favour broadcast advertising, direct or indirect, the 
Chairman, together with two other Committee members, included in it a Note which appears to leave 
the door open for a very limited form of commercial input to some potential broadcasting stations of 
the future. The Note stated that, while its authors were not proposing anything along the lines of the 
United States broadcasting system for the UY, they saw no reason, since "advertising to bring buyers 
and sellers together was universally accepted as a necessary business activity", why a public service 
broadcasting agency should not "set aside named specific hours containing advertising, provided it 
retained complete control over its manner and content' A3 
. 
The Beveridge Report also contained an ultimately influential Minority Report by Selwyn Lloyd 
M. P., dissenting from its conclusions. Lloyd was firmly convinced that there were "evils inherent in 
monopoly" which could not be avoided, and proposed a that new regulatory Corrunission for 
broadcasting should be set up with power to allot frequencies and award ficences". In radio, several 
Companies should be formed to run national programmes on commercial lines which would accept 
sponsored programmes. A commercial Television Corporation should also be set up, with others to 
follow when frequencies became available. 
Lloyd rejected the BBC's arguments against commercial broadcasting. He did not accept that 
broadcasting would lose its social purpose because businesses who provide goods and services to the 
public are also fiffillffig a social purpose, and goods would not be sold on air, or ideas propagated, 
unless an audience could be attracted. He did not believe that the American system was wholly bad 
and felt that strict control would ensure that advertisements did not "sully" the air as the BBC had 
claimed they would. 
The controlling body suggested by Selwyn Lloyd had many of the features eventually incorporated 
into the Independent Television Authority in 1954, such as "limitation or prohibition of 
advertisement of certain goods, rules against interrupting an item otherwise than at a recognised. 
43 Note: Ile authors give their reason for this as "the governing fact about United States broadcasting 
agencies is not that they have some advertising revenue but that they have no other revenue, the listeners and 
viewers pay no fee for the privilege of reception. We 
.... 
reject for Britain such a service %%I&h, puts the financial 
control of broadcasting in the hands of people who sell goods and services. " (ibid. p. 226) 4' ibid. p. 202 
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interval, rules governing the time to be allowed for the advertisement and the periods for a number of 
'spot' advertisements, and rules for the protection of the small advertiser". He also believed that it 
would be possible for British advertisers "to co-operate in the formulation of rules and standards 
which would mitigate the force of most of the objections to advertisements on the air t45 
. 
Selwyn 
Lloyd was to become one of the main Parliamentary forces behind the introduction of commercial 
television in 1954, and his vision, outlined in the Minority Report, helped to shape the regulatory 
structures for the new channel. 
Some of the reasons given by Beveridge for rejecting commercial broadcasting are open to debate. 
Evidence from the Listeners Association proved that at least one section of the listening and viewing 
public were in favour of it. Perhaps too much weight was given to the "informed opinion" that did 
not want a commercial alternative. There were people from inside broadcasting, such as Norman 
CoRins, Controller of BBC Television from 1947-1950, who were fervent supporters and played a 
key role in its introduction'. And if broadcasting is to serve a social purpose then freedom of choice 
and responsiveness to popular needs must also be important considerations. There was room for the 
idea of public service to be expanded to include at an increase in "popular" programming if that was 
47 demonstrably what a significant minority of the public wanted 
Nevertheless, Beveridge did not have an easyjob. The arguments given in evidence about the effects 
of advertising on standards of service are contradictory. Most opponents of broadcast advertising 
asserted that commercialism attacks standards by appealing to the lowest common denominator, or 
at least make a necessary connection between advertising and a predominance of fight entertainment; 
yet the Fabians objected that commercial stations "monopolise the best broadcasters, writers and 
producers 1148 
, 
and some advertising supporters maintained that competition would not only increase 
choice but actually raise standards. Those who claim that commercial competition is not in the public 
mterest because the airwaves would be doninated by "popular entertainment" have to adnit that tWs 
45 ibiCL p. 207 46 Bernard Sendall, Indepivdmt Wes4sion in BfiWin, Vol. 1, Undon: Macmillan ITV, 1982, p. 14 47 Note: Twenty years after the introduction of commercial television its role in comparison with that of the BBC 
was summed up by the rrCA in its evidence to the Annan Committee: *Tlie concept of rIV as the people's 
television and the BBC as establishment television is stiH current If there is truth in it today, the reason 
... 
is that 
ITV has a more popular touch" ( independent Television Companies Association, ITVEvidence to the Annan 
Committee, A submission by the Independent Television Companies to the Annan Committee on the Future of Broadcasting. March 1975, p. a. 36, p. 17). Two years later the HCA wrote: 7W represents ale broader appeal of 
Populism"(ITCA, The Anuan Report- An rIV View p 9) Beveridge I op. cit. p. 318 
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would only be the case if there was a large public demand for it. The majoritarian approach to 
Programming is at least logically consistent. 
4.4 Conclusion. 
The Beveridge Report, with its extremely detailed analysis of the potential impact of advertising on 
the broadcasting service, and the possible regulatory responses that might lessen the negative aspects 
of this impact, shows that the system in the UK had by this time developed to an extent where the 
public interest can usefidly be viewed as a collection of competing claims, each with a normative 
component. The claim that a commercial alternative to the BBC was in the public interest was prima 
facie justifiable on a number of grounds which are valid in terms of the UKs political system. 
Arguments presented to the Committee in support of this claim were based on the extension of the 
democratic right to free choice, and on considerations fundamental to a capitalist state which 
depends on the success of industry and the market to raise living standards and contribute to social 
and economic progress. As Horlicks, Unilever and Rowntree had asserted, the economic claim for 
broadcasting had as much validity as the social and cultural claims. 
The counter-claim that it was in the public interest to preserve a system of unified control Of 
broadcasting, i.e. a monopoly, was also justifiable within the political fimnework of the UK The 
defence of monopoly in Beveridge rested on the principle that competition of any Idnd, but especially 
commercial competition, would fragment the service and make it impossible for broadcasters to ftM 
the public service aims of range, quality and diversity. This would not be in the interests of the public 
as viewers and listeners. The belief that the cultural institutions that are part of a nation's heritage 
(of which broadcasting is one) deserve to be protected from the harmful effects of market forces 
underpins this argument. Although the UK operates a market economy, the political system still 
allows for legislation to regulate aspects of the market potentially damaging to the natiods heritage. 
"Anti-market" planning, conservation and pollution laws are enacted to preserve the environment, 
and state subsidy of the arts is also an admission that the market cannot adequately cater for the 
preservation and promotion of so-called "vulnerable values "49 in society. 
49 With refemwe to vulnerable values m broa&wting see the dLwussion i  Jay G Blumler (ed. ) Tdeýýon and dw Public Intowt 
Laidon: Sage, 1992 
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The claim that the public interest lay in brealdng the monopoly without having to subject 
broadcasting to commercial influences was also, on the face of it, justifiable. Monopoly ownership of 
the most powerful communications medium is a potential threat to the democratic principle of 
freedom of expression; but some crucial aspects of broadcasting 
- 
news and. current affairs coverage, 
for example 
- 
are especiaHy vulnerable to interference in their editorial content by advertisers, Which 
also poses a threat to freedom of expression. A second or even third non-commercial public 
corporation would have avoided both these dangers. Ironically, the freedom of expression argument 
was hijacked (not very successfiflly) by the advertising industry itself in the late 1970s, when it began 
to campaign against EC consumer protection regulation directed at advertising". 
As the Beveridge Corrunittee only had an advisory role, its adjudication between these competing 
claims was provisional. It was up to the government of the day to make the final decision and enact 
the appropriate legislation. The Report, however, does contain a wide spectrum of opinion about the 
state of British broadcasting and its regulation. These ranged from complete satisfaction with the 
arrangements, to the strongly held view that the e)dsting system was f1kiling a significant proportion 
of consumers, and was against he interests of other important sectors of society. Whatever the 
merits of the various arguments, there was certainly a reasonable case to answer that the "unified 
control" model for broadcasting regulation, while justified for the initial period of development, had 
outlived its usefulness and should be replaced with something more in fine with changing economic 
and technological circumstances, and with consumer preferences. 
" Note TWs episcxic is disassed in deta in Chaptcr 13 
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Chapter 5 
Commercial Television: The Early Years. 
5.1 Introduction. 
Ile monumental report produced by the Beveridge Committee was published in January 1951, but 
the Labour Government which had commissioned it, although in broad agreement with its 
recommendations, was slow to respond. The BBC's Charter and Licence were not due to expire until 
December of that year, and despite the dissatisfaction i  many quarters with its monopoly, and the 
undeniable demand for some End of broadcast advertising from a minority of Beveridge's, 
contributors, no major changes were envisaged. A White Paper was issued in July which, while 
accepting most of Beveridge's proposals, provided a forum for the increasing number of frustrated 
anti 
- 
monopolists to make their voices heard. 
Events overtook the White Paper, however, when a General Election was called in October and a 
Conservative Govemment returned to power. The composition of this new govemment was a crucial 
factor in the rapid volte face in broadcasting policy which then took place. The new intake of Tory 
MP's included a large number of enthusiastic free marketeers, many from the world of business, who 
were committed to subjecting what they regarded as a bureaucratic and arrogant BBC to the 
beneficial effects of competition. Some of these had links with the Radio Industry and one active 
campaigner, John Rodgers, was a director of J. Walter Thompson, the intemational advertising 
agency. But, as Bemard Sendall has stressed, most of the proponents of commercial broadcasting 
had no vested interest in its introduction and were simply ideologically sympathetic'. 
Change in the political system, therefore, was instrumental in breaking the regulatory cycle and 
generating a new paradigm for broadcasting regulation. The new paradigm, however, as history 
shows, turned out to be not so very different from the old. Not only was the new structure based on 
the odsting modeF, but the background of attitudes and expectations which influenced how 
1 Bernard Sendall, Independent Television in Britain, Vol. 1, London: Nfacmillan HV, 1982, p 10 
2 Note In n=y respects the n1leS laid do,, Xn f; or independent telcvmon were simply specifications of norms ext-apolated from BBC 
practice, plus additional nfles laid doAn for adverfisuig". (Dennis McQuail, Media Performance, Laden: - Sage, 1992, p 57) 
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regulation was done remained much the same. It is significant that most supporters of commercial 
broadcasting in Beveridge accepted the need for some form of regulation of advertising, usually 
advocating quite strict regimes in order to Prevent abuses and avoid causing offence to viewers. And 
even those who claimed that the dangers of the American system had been exaggerated 
acknowledged that things would have to be done diffierently over here. 
5.2 The First White Paper and the Begminig of the Great Debate. 
The innovators faced considerable opposition within their own party from traditional patrician 
Tories, such as Lord Halifax, Lord Salisbury, Lord Hailsharn and Winston Churchill, which meant 
that the campaign to end the monopoly had to be conducted first and foremost within the party of 
government. The primary task was to convince ahesitant leadership to adopt a radical transforming 
broadcasting policy3. 
After extending the BBC's Charter for a fiuther six months, a White Paper issued in May 1952, 
Broackasting. 
- 
Memorandum on the Report of Broadcasfing Committee, 1949, gave the first sign 
that a breakwith traditional policy was being considered. Paragraph 7 stated that: "in the expanding 
field of television provision should be made to permit some element of competitiod' as soon as the 
capital resources became available. Paragraph 9 spoke of the need for safeguards, and for a 
"controlling body" to regulate the conduct of the stations. No explicit mention was made of 
advertising, direct or indirect, but it was evident that the government had in mind some form of 
commercial competition. 
The parliamentary debates on the future of broadcasting grew increasingly intense, with interested 
parties outside Parliament fining up for or against the proposed revolution. The fact that the BBC 
was to be left intact, with a continuing monopoly of radio services, and funded as before solely from 
licence fees did not pacify its supporters. They were unable to conceive of commercial competition as 
anything but an attack on the Corporation and a threat to, if not the complete destruction of, public 
service broadcastinpý. 
3 Benlard ScadA Indepaident TelMsion in Britzrin, Vol. 1, op cit p. 10 
I sCUSSIonS f these debates Can I)e f Full di. 4 See. ound in Burton Paulu Televivon andRadio in the United Mngdotn, London: 
Mamnilin, 1981, p. 43; and Burton Paulu, British Broadcasting in Transition, University of Mmesota, 1961, p. 30; Asa Briggs. 
ibid. p. 25 iftypars, 
Oxford University Press 1985, p 279; and Bernard Sendall Independe? 't Televul0n, Vol- 1 Hillory of die BBC. - Theflrst R 
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There seems to have been, even at this stage 
- 
and despite the careful distinction made by Sykes 
- 
some confusion over the difference between sponsored programmes, fimded by wholly or in part 
advertisers, and "spot" advertisements transmitted during breaks in programmes. Although 
Beveridge had striven to provide clear definitions and explanations, most contributors to the Report 
had used the term "sponsored broadcasting" in the most vague and general way. And while in earlier 
reports from Sykes onwards, lirnited sponsorship rather than direct or "spot" advertising had been the 
more acceptable option, sponsorship had by this time come to be closely identified with all that was 
bad about American commercial broadcasting. Lord De La Warr, for example, Postmaster General 
and one of the arzhitects of the government's pro-competition policy, was still speaking in May 1952 
of "our distaste for commercial sponsorship"5 
. 
In April 1953, however, the IPA and the ISBAjointly produced a memorandum entitled Tekvision: 
the Viewer wd the Advertiser, which set out clearly and in a positive fight the various ways in which 
advertising could be introduced on television without imitating American methods too closely. In 
August the following year, after being presented with this persuasive document, De La Warre was 
able to refute the notion that the financing of programmes made by broadcasters other than the BBC 
could only be achieved by the American system of sponsorship. 
In their pamphlet, the advertising industry trade associations made the following comments. "It 
appears to have been widely assumed that advertisers and advertising agencies would seek in due 
course to obtain control of the organisation and presentation of programmes. Although this 
assumption has received publicity, this Society and this Institute, representative of advertisers and 
advertising agencies throughout the country, wish to make it known that it is not correct 
.... 
We 
therefore advocate that a competitive network, if it is to challenge the BBC effectively, have the 
power in its own hands to direct programmes 
..... 
It would accept advertisements for insertion in a 
variety of ways, the ways being negotiated with the advertiser. Thus, the competitive service we 
visualise would not be 'sponsored . 
..... 
The programme content would be free in the same way as a 
newspaper editorial is free from (advertisers') direct influence"". 
5 Bernard Sendall, Independmt Teletwon in Britain, Vol. 1, op cit. p. 15 6 Television : ne I'lefter and theAdverdser, A Memorandum on Competitive Television. and Draft Suggestion for the Pxgulation of 
Progmmmes, Submittedjointly by the ISBA and the IPA to RM Postmaster General, April 1953, p. 1 
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This short pamphlet made a vital contribution towards resolving the government's dilemma Over how 
the new station should be financed. It reassured policy-makers that the advertising industry in Britain 
had no wish to emulate American commercial television, and would be satisfied with uncontroversial 
and easy to regulate forms of direct advertising. Consequently, the cherished editorial freedom of 
broadcasters raised in the public service tradition would not be at risk, and Earl De La WarTe could 
declare with confidence in the summer of 1953: "there is a world of difference between accepting 
advertisements and sponsoring. The press accepts advertisements but they remain responsible for 
their own news and editorial columns. The cinema shows advertisements but their programmes are 
not sponsored by advertisers. The Government has nude it clear that they envisage asystem whereby 
0 
the station and m., t the advertiser is responsible for the programmes 
. 
Parts of this speech found their 
way almost verbatim into the November Wifite Paper, wlich set out in detail the goverriment's 
proposals for the new system. Tifis VAite Paper marks a complete reversal of previous official 
attitudes to the methods of funding broadcasting by advertising. 
The EPA and the ISBA were quick to take advantage of the new mood. They produced another 
pamphlet, Open Letter to the Postmaster General, in which they praised De La Warr for making it 
"quite clear that sponsorship is not synonymous with advertising, and any future attack on 
competitive television which is based on the idea of sponsorship would be knowingly rnisdirected". 
They also rather optimistically put in a plea for television to be treated in the same way as the press - 
%ith no special, (i. e. statutory), controlling authority, and no fiwther "administrative or legislative 
restrictions"'. So, from a position of neutrality at the time of Beveridge, the advertisers' trade 
association had moved rapidly to join with agencies in support of the campaign for commercial 
television, at a stage when the political will was manifestly already there to make it happen. 
In TeIeWsion: the Viewer and the Advertiser, advertisers and agencies et out a number of their own 
proposals for regulation of the new station. They suggested that the station should be responsible for 
enforcing the rules, avoiding any mention of the controlling body referred to in the first VvUte Paper. 
The implied preference of the IPA and ISBA for a My self-regulatory system was made explicit in 
their Open Letter to the Postmaster-General, in which they claimed that "there is no necessity to 
impose more administrative restrictions on competitive television than on newspapers or any other 
7 Bemard SendalL Independmi Teleywon in Bmahl, VoL 1, op cit p 22 1 Bemard Scndall VoL 1, op ciL p. 22 
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medium". According to Sendall, this was a "miýudgement", as a price had to be paid for securing 
enough support in parliament for commercial televisior?. 
Telei4sidn: Yhe Viewer cvzd the Adveitser began its Est of proposed requirements for advertising 
control with the declaration that "all those concerned with the preparation, presentation and 
transrnission of competitive programmes within the United Kingdom shall recognise that the basic 
responsibility of the Station/Company shall be to serve and advance the public interest"'O. 
Advertisers were evidently awdous to be seen to be committed to supporting the public interest 
justification for regulation of competitive television services. This commitment is backed up by the 
requirement that, in order to provide the highest quality of programme to the public, advertisers and 
agencies hould recognise the broadcasters! right to reffise to accept any script or scenario that they 
believed was "detrimental to the public interest" 11. 
The pamphlet's General Regulations stated that the broadcaster should not accept advertising or 
programme material which introduces, among other things, "anything which is obscene, indecent, 
profane or of doubffW propriety, or that is disrespecdW to the Royal Family or Heads of State; 
nudity, or costumes permitting indecent exposure; dances which employ lewd or indecent 
movements; drunkenness or narcotic addiction as desirable or prevalent factors in the British way of 
fife"12. 
The advertising industry made it quite clear in this document that it was prepared to co-operate in an 
extremely strict regime of control in order to avoid accusations that advertising funded television 
would lead to a decline in standards. In fact, advertisers of the mid-1950s have a great deal in 
common with Mrs Mary WNtehouse, founder and first President of the National Viewers and 
Listeners Association, and active campaigner against rudeness on the air since the 1960s. No 
respectable purchaser of airtime in the early days of commercial television could have imagined his 
successors paying premium prices to place their ads in or around, say, Spitting image, The Singing 
Detective, or almost any contemporary sfice-of-fife documentary on the British condition. Nor would 
he have been very happy for his agency to submit for copy clearance a Cadbury's Flake or a 
Wonderbra commercial. The fact that every one of the standards of decency advocated in the 
9 ibidL p. 22 
loTeleWsion 
: 7le Rewr and theAdvertiser op cit p. 5 1 'ibid. p. 5 12 ibid. p. 6 
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pamphlet has now been either abandoned or relaxed beyond recognition, shows how far the notion of 
what is acceptable on television has advanced (or regressed, depending on your perspective) since 
the more innocent days of the birth of ITV. 
YeJeWsion: Yhe Viewer and the Adveitser also contained a section on Special Advertising 
Regulations to deal with controversial areas. The proposals cover medical products and treatments; 
advertisements likely to misrepresent, mislead or deceive, and certain categories of advertisement 
Which should be banned 
- 
forms of speculative finance, matr 
' 
imonial agencies, fortune tellers, 
undertakers and betting tips. There are also suggestions for special rules for children's advertising, 
which has since ýecome a heavily regulated area. Most of these proposals were incorporated either 
into the 1954 Television Act itselC or into the statutory Code 
- 
Pfinciples for TeIeWsion 
AdvenWng 
- 
drawn up by the Independent Television Authority's first Advertising Advisory 
Conunittee. The provisions of the Act and the Code arc nevertheless considerably more wide- 
reaching and detailed than the advertising industiys proposals. 
The debate between opponents and supporters of commercial television, meanwMe, raged on. The 
former, under the aegis of the National Television Council, led by the Labour NT Christopher 
Mayhew, continued to argue that standards would inevitably degenerate, that advertisers would exert 
too much influence, that ninority interests and sparsely populated areas would not be adequately 
served. The latter fought back with the Popular Television Association, which concentrated on the 
evils of monopoly and gave reassurances that advertising in Britain would not sink to the depths that 
it often did across the Atlantic. The supporters received help from Conservative Central Office since 
the bulk of the Conservative Party was becoming increasingly convinced of the rightness of the 
commercial cause. 
The Labour party leader, Clement Attlee, also helped to harden Conservative resolve by promising to 
repeal any legislation introduced for the purpose of setting up commercial television if Labour were 
returned to power. This had the effect of making what had been largely a matter of individual 
preference, uniting people with very Merent polifics, into a party political issue 13 
. 
When the 
Television Bill came to be voted on, instead of a free vote on which the Government night have been 
13 Bemard ScrJaU VoL 1, op cit p. 25 
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defeated by a coalition of ant? s, a three 
- 
line whip was imposed to ensure the passage of this 
controversial legislation. 
The basic economic point 
- 
noted as long ago as the Selsdon Committee and a source of concern 
ever since 
- 
that to provide an adequate television service nation-wide would be very expensive and 
would put an intolerable strain on the licence fee method, was an important consideratiom The costs 
of developing television were much higher than radio and, unlike the Labour Party, a Conservative 
government committed to robust free market economic policies was not willing to use public money 
to finance it when the private sector was able to do the job. So by the time the second White Paper, 
Braadcýng. 
' A., emorandm on TeIeWsion Policy, was presented to Parliament by the Postmaster 
General in November 1953, the Govenment had come round to a firm decision that commercial 
television was desirable, and should be introduced without delay. The White Paper provided a 
detailed fi-amework for the implementation of that decisiom 
On the question of monopoly, it expressed a diametrically opposite view from all previous 
government policy statements on broadcasting regulation. Paragraph 3 declared that "As television 
has great and increasing power in influencing m&s minds, the Government believes that its control 
should not remain in the hands of a single authority... Moreover, competition should be in the best 
interests of viewers, writers, artists and technicians" 14 
. 
The monopolists had been defeated and the 
central assumption on which broadcasting policy had been based almost since the beginning had been 
overturned. 
The practical structure envisaged to translate the new philosophy into action, however, remained the 
same: the public corporation. This body would act as regulator, with strong controlling powers, by 
actually owning and operating the transmitting stations and other fixed assets. it would hire its 
facilities to privately financed companies who would provide programmes and draw revenue from 
advertisements. The government believed that such an arrangement would have the advantage of 
offering adequate scope for the participation of private enterprise and at the same time would ensure 
effective control. 15. Combining the regulatory agency with ownership of the transmitting facilities 
was a convenient method of safeguarding standards, (clearly still at the heart of things), as a 
y 14 Broadea5fing.. MMoMndUM on TdeVWOJ7 POIC 15 ibid. para 7, p. 5, 
(Cmd. 9005), 1953, para 3, p. 4 (Novcmber 1953, WWte Papcr) 
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programme provider's contract could be terminated for lack of compliance with any regulatory rules 
without great loss of capital investment in fixed assets. 
The Corporation would have the right to vet scripts and schedules in advance, forbid certain classes 
of broadcast matter, and regulate advertisements. On the specifics of advertising control the regulator 
would agree with the Postmaster General on the conditions to be imposed, such as "types of 
advertising and classes of advertisement to be excluded and the distinction to be made between what 
is presented as advertisement and what is normal programme"16 
. 
The White Paper stressed that representative advertising bodies had been consulted on this point and 
had confirmed that it was not the case that if advertisers could not sponsor, i. e. provide or control the 
programmes which carried their messages, they would not be willing to use the medium of television. 
They had assured the Government that the separation of advertisements from programmes inherent 
in spot advertising would not endanger the financial prospects of the new television service. This 
principle served as the cornerstone of advertising regulation policy in the UK and the separation of 
promotional message from programme content is still stringently enforced, even after the relaxation 
of the rules on sponsorship under the Broadcasting Act of 1990. It is also one of the key rules 
contained in the 1989 EC Broadcasting Directive on Trw*onfier Television and the Council of 
Europe's Convention on Transfronfier TeIeWsion of the same year. 
On advertising, the government took the view that the fewer the rules and the less day-to-day 
interference the better. Doubtless some in the advertising industry felt that the degree of control 
planned was still too great, and would hinder their efforts and those of the programme companies to 
make television popular and profitable. On the other side, the opponents of commercial broadcasting 
were outraged at the total dependence of programme providers on advertising revenue. In spite of 
the strength of opposition, the proposals in the Memorandum were approved by Parliament and in 
March 1954 a Bill based on these proposals was published which, with some amendments, passed 
into law as the Television Act on 30th July. 
16 ibiii pma 9, p. 5 
81 
Commercial Tekvision: 7he BWy Years 
5.3 The Television Act 1954. 
In the words of the Memorandum on YeIeWsion, the Act represented the "typically British 
approach" of compromise: it provided for private enterprise under public control. The new 
corporation, dedicated to public service ideals of broadcasting and with strong interventionist 
powers, yet operating within a limited free market framework, was to be called the Independent 
Television Authority. Its constitution was closely modelled on the BBCs: its members would be 
appointed by the Crown and the super-regulatory ole of the Post Office was confirmed. 
The rrA! s initiall duty was to award contracts to a number of regional and London-based applicants, 
and, having awarded them, to ensure that they fiffilled their contractual obligations. The companies 
would be responsible for providing the programnies but the Authority retained the right to provide its 
own if it thought the schedules ubmitted were not sufficiently balanced. It also had to ensure that a 
proper level of competition was maintained between the companies in the supply of programmes. 
Section 3 of the Act contained some quite detailed programme requirements. Nothing could be 
broadcast which might offend against "good taste or decency" or lead to crime or disorder; 
programmes had to "maintain a proper balance in their subject matter and a high general standard of 
quality"; news had to be accurate and impartial; a suitable proportion of programming had to be of 
British origin and performance 17 
. 
As Burton Paulu has pointed out, this put a much greater explicit 
burden on the ITA than the BBC, who in its Ucence is required merely "efficiently to send" its 
broadcast matter". The injection of advertisers' money into the system was obviously stiff seen as a 
threat in principle to the public service ideal, which had to be contained by tough regulation19 
. 
With regard to advertising in particular, the Act first of all disqualified anyone with any financial or 
other interest in any advertising agency from being a member of the regulating Authority. Such 
individuals or corporate bodies were also disqualified. from applying for franchisesP. It prohibited 
any prize or gift, in an advertisement or not, from being offered in any programme w1fich was 
17 The Television Ad 1954,2 and 3 Eliz 2 LIL 55,19m, sections 3 
'a Ekaton Paulm Bfifish Broadcasting op cit p 53 
vision Act 54 was 19 Note: Stephen Hearst states that "the old mistrust ofcommcrcialism ensured that the Independent Tele of 19 drafted %ith great rigatr. The pmws of regulation given to a ne%ly creaW Independent Television Authority were extensive- 
Nothing of the sort was ever vouchsafed to America! s Federal Conununications CommissiW. (Stephen Hearst BrOadca-vfing 
20 
ReguLation i  BMan in Jay. 0. Mailer (ed. ) TdevWon and thePublic Interest Imdon: Sage, 1992. p 67 
The Television Act 1954 op. cit. Sections I and 5 
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available only to persons receiving that programme. No "valuable inducements" could be used by any 
Of the Contractors to attract audiences, which might be construed as unfair competitioný'. 
Secfioii 4 of the Act stated that orders for advertisements could be received from advertising agents 
or direct from advertisers, but neither the Authority nor the programme contractors were pernitted 
to act as an advertising agent. The Authority had to secure compliance with the Second Schedule, 
which sets out more detailed rules for advertisements. The Postmaster General could make 
regulations by amending or adding to the Schedule, and had to be consulted from time to time as to 
"the classes and descriptions of goods or services which must not be advertised and the methods of 
advertising whiv!, rrrist not be ernployed"22. 
Secfion 3 (6) contained a very clear and unambiguous prohibition of anything which might be 
construed as indirect advertising. It did not mention the word "sponsorship", probably to avoid any 
possibility of misinterpretation, but excluded from any broadcast matter that which, "whether in an 
advertisement or not.... states, suggests or implies, or could reasonably be taken to state, suggest or 
imply, that any part of any programme broadcast by the Authority which is not an advertisement has 
been supplied or suggested by any advertiser, and, except as an advertisement nothing shall be 
included in any programme broadcast by the Authority which could reasonably have been supposed 
to have been included therein in return for payment or other valuable consideration to the programme 
contractor or the Authority". 
There were, however, some permissible exceptions to this comprehensive Est of unacceptable 
promotional activities: publicity for charitable purposes (which required the Authority's prior 
approvalp; reviews of curTent publications or productions; acknowledgements of copyright matters 
or announcements about five performances. These activities were assumed to be innocuous enough 
and were counted as legitimate matters of public information. 
Also not prohibited, Secdon 4 (6) (c) were "factual portrayals of doings, happenings, places or 
things, being items which in the opinion of the Authority are proper for inclusion for reason of their 
intrinsic interest or instructiveness and do not comprise an undue element of advertisement". So, 
21 ibid. Section 3 (3) 
22 ibid. Section 4 (5) 
23 Note., This is not the sarne as advertising by individual charities 
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although "product Placement" 
- 
buying the right to place products strategically in programmes for 
advertising purposes 
- 
was strictly forbidden, the natural occurrence of certain well known brands in 
the course of portraying daffy life or recording events of interest to the public was recognisý as 
inevitable. 
In addition, Secdon 4 (6) (e) made it clear that the ITA should not ban "the inclusion of any 
advertisement in any programme broadcast by the Authority by reason only of the fact that it is 
related in subject-matter to any part of that programme which is not an advertisement". This clause 
gave some latitude to the broadcaster, when allocating airtime, to ignore co-incidental similarities 
between advert: 
--ý, ng and programme content. To be effective, television advertising has to take into 
account not only audience size, but audience type. Programmes representing a particular lifestyle may 
attract a class of consumer an advertiser wants to target. Sports programmes, for example, provide a 
natural environment for certain ldnds of health products. Provided there can be no confusion of 
message with actual programme, the Act did not rule out the appropriate matching of commercials to 
programmes even when there are similarities in subject-matter. 
The authors of the 1954 Act were determined to overcome fears that, despite its protestations to the 
contrary, the advertising industry would stiff be able to exercise too much control over programming. 
One of the most persistent claim of the opponents of change was that even with the best of 
intentions, commercial imperatives would eventually overTide public service ideals to the detriment of 
British broadcasting as a whole. Sponsorship and product placement open up the possibility of direct 
interference by advertisers in programme content, inflinging the principle of separation and 
threatening editorial independence and the integrity of the programmes. 
Rule 1, of the Television Act's Rules as to AdveMsements, in the Second Schedule, was designed to 
make the objective of editorial independence absolutely transparent. It stated that "the advertisements 
must be clearly distinguishable as such and recognisably separate from the rest of the programme". 
This tenet fies at the heart of British policy on broadcast advertising and has persisted undiluted 
throughout all subsequent Broadcasting Acts. 
84 
Commercial Tekvision: 7he Early Years 
The other rules set out in the Second Schedule dealt %ith the timing of advertisements, the methods 
of pricing, the prohibited classes 
- 
anything of a political or religious nature, for example, or relating 
to an industrial dispute 24 and provision for local advertisements. 
Rule 2- "T'he amount of time given to advertisements in the programmes hall not be so great as to 
detract from the value of the programmes as a medium of entertainment, instruction and 
information, " 
- 
is not %ithout interest. This definition of the value of programmes demonstrates a 
reversal of priorities from John Reith's, who saw the aim of the broadcast medium as to inform first, 
to educate second, and to entertain last. Intentional or not, it marked a return to the emphasis of 
David Sarnoflý one of the founding fathers of American commercial radio, who, in the 1920s, first 
expressed the idea that "broadcasting represents ajob of entertaining, informing and educating the 
nation, and should therefore be distinctly regarded as a public service"25. So, appropriately enough, 
the inaugurators of the new commercial television system in Britain officially reinstated entertainment 
as its first priority. 
Rule 2, while ostensibly dealing with a question of principle 
- 
protection of viewers from the 
devaluing of programmes as a means of communication 
- 
also contained an implicit reminder to 
advertisers on a practical level that the devaluation of programmes by excessive advertising would 
also bring down the value of airtime as a means of selling their products. 
Rule 3 of the Second Schedule dealt with the placement of advertisements, tating that they must not 
be "inserted otherwise than at the beginning or the end of the programme or in natural breaks 
therein". These were not legally defined, nor have they ever been, but remained discretionary. The 
Authority had to agree with the Postmaster General (whose word was fuW in case of disagreement) 
as to: "a) the interval which must elapse between any two periods given over to advertisements; b) 
the classes of broadcasts (particularly the broadcast of religious services) in which advertisements 
may not be inserted, and the interval which must elapse between any such broadcast and any 
previous or subsequent period given over to advertisements". 
This represents quite a tough attitude towards the timing and distribution of advertisements, with the 
Postmaster General wielding considerable powers, and a fence erected around certain classes of 
24 Not. 
-. -. 
For the fuU W see Appendix 1 25 Asa Briggs, 7he History ojrthe BBC The Rýst R)? y Years. OP cit P 18 
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programmes to protect them from the contaminating influence of commercials. But space was left for 
the Authority to negotiate with the Post Office, and the decision to allow advertising in natural 
breaks within prograrnmes was liberal by comparison with other European systems, whether My 
public service or mixed. Even after deregulation in Europe in the 1980's the British government had 
to lobby hard to persuade the drafters of the EC BroackcLsting Directive and the Council of 
European Convention on Transftonfier Television to permit this measure of freedom to advertisers 
under the proposed new community-wide broadcasting regulations. 
Rule 4 prolubited "unreasomble dixfimination either against or in favour of any puticular 
advertiser. " Thiis provision paralleled eidsting competition legislation and has remained unchanged in 
all later Acts. The competition aspect of television regulation has also been subject since 1973 to the 
authority of the Office of Fair Trading. 
The Third Schedule contained provisions enabling the Authority to obtain from the programme 
contractors scripts and details of advertisements in advance in order to ensure that they complied 
with the rules. Ms system of supervision, known as pre-vetting, has only just been abolished 
Mowing the 1990 Broadcasting Act. 
The Act also required the ITA to appoint an Advisory Committee "representative of organisations, 
authorities and persons concerned with standards of conduct in the advertising of goods and 
services", to give advice on the exclusion of misleading advertisements and the general principles to 
be followed, and to draw up a code of condUCt26 
. 
The AdveTdsing Advisory Comnýittee has been, 
and still is, the most important consultative body in the drawing up of product regulation of television 
advertising. 
The mould-breaking 1954 Television Act took British broadcasting from monopoly to duopoly, if 
not exactly overnight, then more rapidly than had been expected. In the period between the first 
meeting of the newly constituted Independent Television Authority on 4th August 1954 and the 
" opening night" of the new service on 22 September 1955, the detailed working-out of the provisions 
of the Act took place. A structure for ITV was determined which was to continue virtually unaltered 
for the next thirty five years. 
26 Television Act 1954, op. cit. Section 8 (2) (b) 
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5.4 Trial and Error: The ITA Begins Operations. 
One of the first things the Authority did, in accordance with its statutory duties, was to appoint an 
Advertising Advisory Conmittee. This held its first meeting on 14th of January 1955. Its chairman, 
Robert Bevan, was an ciperienced advertising man who was considered to be well qualified to Raise 
between the industry and the Regulator. The Committee included representatives of the Advertising 
Association, the IPA and the ISBA to speak for the advertising industry-, the Ministry of Health, the 
British Medical Association, the British Dental Association, the Pharmaceutical Society, the British 
Code of Standards Committee, and the Retail Trading Standards Association were also represented. 
This gave the AAC, according to one commentator, a "well balanced mi; xaure of professional and 
consumer interests"27. Within a few years, however, the next Committee of Inquiry into 
broadcasting would take a very different view. 
By June 1955, the ITA, following the recommendations of the Advertising Advisory Committee and 
in consultation with the Postmaster General, had produced a booklet entitled: PrinciPles for 
YeIeWsion, 4&erfising, which represented "a general code of television advertising conduct". Many 
of the requirements of this code can be traced to the IPA/ISBA pamphlet YeIeWsion: Yhe Viewer 
ivid the Adverdser. The Authority was statutorily obliged to secure the compliance of its licensees 
'with the rules contained in the Code. 
Ile Pfinciples is a clear and succinct statement of the minimum standards of conduct expected from 
advertisers when promoting their products on the air. The foreword stressed, however, that 
paragraph 2 "expressly reserves the right of the programme contractors and the Authority to impose 
stricter standards of advertising conduct than those laid down in the Pfinciples"11. 
Since it was mostly concerned with controlling the content of advertisements, the Code falls mainly 
into the category of product regulation. Prohibition of "disparaging references"29 which unfairly 
compare one particular advertiser's product or service to those of his competitors, to the extent that 
the notion of unfair competition is invoked, can be considered as process regulation. 
21 BaWrd Sendal, VoL 1. op ciL P. i oi 28 bl&-pcndcnt Television Authaity: Pý*ýpjesfor Television AdverMing June 1955, p. 3 (IM Principles. 1955) 29 ibid. (rule 6), p. 5 
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It began with a preamble which declared that "the general principle which will govern. all television 
advertising is that it should be legal, clean, honest and truthful"'O. Ilis governing principle is taken 
from the International Chamber of Commerce's Code of Advertising Practice, first issued in 1937, 
exchanging only the ICC Codes "decent" for "clean". The ITA also adapted some other provisions 
of the ICC Code for use in regulating British commercial television.. The ITA Code went on to 
claim that while this advice was applicable to all types of advertising media in Britain, "television, 
because of its greater intimacy within the home, gives rise to problems which do not necessarily 
occur in other media and it is essential to maintain a consistently high quality of television 
advertising"31. 
Secfion 2 of the preamble required the detailed principles set out in the Code to be applied "in the 
spirit as well as the letter" 
Secfion 3 provided a definition: "The word "advertisement" has the meaning implicit in the Television 
Act, i. e., 'any item of publicity inserted in the programmes broadcast by the Authority in 
consideration of payment to a programme contractor or to the Authority". This clearly defines 
advertising as direct or "spot" advertising only. 
Secfions 4 wzd 5 dealt with legal requirements: "advertisements must comply in every respect with 
the law, common or statute"; with regard to false or misleading advertisements: "no 
advertisement 
.... 
shaU contain any spoken or visual presentation of the product or service advertised, 
or statement of its price, which directly or by implication misleads". In particular, the Code-wamed 
against making special claims that cannot be proved; excessive use of scientific and technical terms 
and misleading use of statistics; and imitations that are likely to mislead. 
Secfions 7 and 8 dealt with testimonials and guarantees, wlich had to be used responsibly 
Documentary evidence with respect to testfinonials was required, and the detailed temis of 
guarantees must be avaRable to the programme contractors for inspection. 
30 ibid. p. 4 
31 ibid. p. 4 
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Section 9 required that the conditions of entry for competitions 
- 
those pernitted under the 1954 Act 
and the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Act 
- 
be cleady stated. 
Finally, Secdon 10, the most detailed, regulated advertising in childrerfs programmes. In general, no 
product or service could be advertised, or method used, which might result in physical, mental or 
moral harm to children; and no method of advertising could be used which "takes advantage of the 
natural credulity and sense of loyalty of children". 
Sub 
- 
clartses (a) 
- 
0) of this section contained more specific warnings against: encouraging children 
to enter strange places, converse with strangers or do anytHng dangerous; making them feel that 
they are failing in some way, or are ir&dor, if they do not own the product advertised; advertising 
for cHdren to join a club that has not been thorougWy vetted by the programme contractor, and 
encouraging them to make a nuisance of themselves in the interests of any advertised product or 
service. 
Appendix I of the Principles for TeleWsion Mvertsing is entitled Specific Classes of 
Advertisements and Methods of Advertising. Unacceptable products and services included: money - 
lending, matrimonial agencies, fortune telling, undertaking, slimming aids, contraceptives and cures 
for smoking and alcoholism. Advertisements for mail order goods, financial services, homework 
schemes, and schemes involving hire purchase and instructional courses were dealt with under this 
heading, and betting (including poots) advertisements were banned, subject to review after six 
months. 
Medical advertising, the only area to be specifically mentioned in the Act wHch required the 
Advertising Advisory Committee to include suitably qualified experts on medical matters, was taken 
care of in Appendix 2. This consisted of Yhe Bfilish Code of Stoukrds in Relation to the 
Advertising of Me&dnes and Treatments, a guide previously drawn up to assist those involved in 
this area of advertising in non-broadcast media, and recommended asa model in the ISBA/EPA 
Pamphlet. It is extremely detailed and comprehensive since "the harm to the individual that may result 
02 from exaggerated, misleading orunwarranted claims justifies the adoption of a very high standard . 
32 rrA: Pr*tdples, 1955, op. CiL p. 10 
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It is somewhat surprising that, apart from the ban on claims to cure or "extirpate" tobacco or alcohol 
related allments, no restrictions were placed on alcohol and tobacco advertising, even in relation to 
childrerfs programmes. Perhaps it is this significant ornission that inspired Bernard Sendall to refer to 
this first code as "a boldly liberal one "33 
, 
although in other respects the regulation is very stringent. 
Pfinciples for TeIeWsion AdWitsing has been updated numerous times since its first publication, 
changing its title in 1964 to Yhe Code of AdvenWng Stan&v-ds wd Pracfices. It has not altered in 
essence, but has accumulated successively larger amounts of detailed regulation, particularly in 
respect of cHdr&s and financial advertising. The original 1955 code, for example, has only 8 pages, 
excluding Appendix 2 on medical advertising, while the rrC's most recent offering has been 
expanded to two separate documents (an additional one dealing with sponsorship) containing a total 
of 43 pages. 
Shortly after the first meeting of the Advertising Advisory Committee, the ITV companies formed an 
Advertisement Committee to deal with the practical side of running a television service dependent on 
advertising revenue for its income. Their initial attention was given to the system of charges to 
advertisers for airtime. The Act had left the fixing of rates entirely up to the companies; the regulator 
need be interested only in the "detail, form and manner of their publication. " Following the American 
practice, a variety of discounts including "series" discounts and volume discounts were offered in 
Order to attract a regular and long-term income". In July, the Advertisement Committee formed a 
small Copy Worldng Party, forerunner of the Independent Television Companies Association's Copy 
Clearance Secretariat, to scrutinise the content of all advertisements prior to transn-dssion. During 
this early period, the ITA did not involve itself routinely in pre-vetting but allowed the Companies to 
make their own decisions on the acceptability of commercials. The two parties nevertheless liased 
closely with one another. 
Also under consideration at this time were the rules governing the process of advertising on 
television. The Postmaster General, Charles 11ill, approved the ITXs proposals for controlling the 
amount and distribution of advertising time. The Authority had decided on restricting the overall 
amount of time devoted to commercials to a daily average of no more than ten percent - six minutes - 
per hour. The ITA explained its reasons for choosing this figure in its Annual Report for 1955: 
"American eVerience indicates that "spot" advertising time beyond 10 per cent is apt to defeat its 
33 Bernard Scndall VOL 1, op ciL p.. 32 34 Brian HCnry, op. Cit. P. 34 
90 
Commercid Tekvision: 7he Farly Years 
own object because of adverse public reactiom On the other hand the Authority, without actual 
experience of how the new system would work in this country, had to be careful not to fix the 
amount of advertising so low as to endanger the commercial prospects of the system 01 
. 
At this 
stage, however, there was no inner quota restricting the amount of advertising in each individual 
clock hour. As a result, the peak evening period often contained considerably more than the six 
minute hourly average. 
Not included in this six minute quota were the forms of'Promotion known as "advertising magazines" 
- 
shoppers" guides and advertising documentaries 
- 
which might last for approximately a quarter of 
an hour. They b., -A of course, to be clearly signalled as such to avoid any possibility of confusion in 
the minds of viewers, and they could not be shown between 7 p. nL and 10.30 p. m. The Authority 
acknowledged that "if they ceased to appeal to the viewer of their own merits they would cease to be 
profitable to the contractor and the advertise ? 6". In retrospect, it is rather surprising that this form of 
advertising was permitted at all as it appears to blur the distinction between promotion and 
programme in a quite unacceptable way. The Authority was evidently attempting to treat shoppers 
guides as extended advertisements rather than as programmes. 
The number of periods devoted to commercials were not permitted to exceed six per hour, 
commercials could only be broadcast between programmes or in "natural breaks" in programmes (as 
specified in the Actý although what constitutes a natural break has always been a matter of common 
sense not law); and there had to be a minimum interval between commercial breaks, i. e. no break was 
allowed in programmes of less than twenty minutes, but those of less than half an hour could have 
advertising inserted if it appeared MtUral37. Certain classes of programme 
- 
religious broadcasts, 
anything connected with the Royal Fanfdy, important state occasions 
- 
had to be insulated from 
advertising by an interval of at least two minute2s. Schools broadcasts, when they were started by 
ITV in 1957, were also subject to this rule in order to prevent advertisers exploiting captive 
audiences of children. 
35 Independent Telcvmon Authority (rrA) Annual Report and Accounts, for the period 4 August 1954 - 31 March 1955, 
London: Her Majesty's Stationary OT=, I st No,, =iba 1955, p. 8 36 ibid. p. 9 
37 Note: By the 1980s this rule had been tightened to exclude documentaries, plays and childr&s programmes of less thm hdf an 
hour. 
38 rrA- Annual Reports and Accounts 1955-56, London. - Ha Majesty's Stationery Office, Ist August 1956, p. 19 
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Although the shoppers' guides did not survive the pilkington Report of 1962, the decisions on the 
amount and distribution of advertising time have stood the test of time. These rules, apart from some 
minor modifications, remained unaltered until the deregulating 1990 Broadcasting Act. Even now, in 
1995, the current regulatory body, the Independent Television Commission, has extended the 
average daily quota permissible on ITV 
- 
as opposed to Satellite and Cable networks which have a 
more relaxed regulatory regime 
- 
by a mere one minute. 
Towards the end of 1955, after a few months of operation, the question arose of whether "the 
occasional practice of employing the comperes of entertainment programmes to present "five" 
advertisements Wring natural breaks in these programmes" ran the risk of implying that a 
programme had been suggested by an advertiser, which was prohibited under the 1954 Act39. 
Although the Authority was satisfied that no influence had actually been exerted on the programmes 
concerned, it felt that in the early days of Independent Television there must be no possible cause for 
misunderstanding and ruled that the practice be abandoned for the time being. In 1957, the ITA 
agreed to its reintroduction, provided at least thirty minutes separated a "celebrity" advertisement and 
the programme in which he or she appeared'. 
The regulator was more worried by this time about advertisers wishing to use popular television 
characters or prograrnme themes in their commercials. Again, in order to avoid any possible 
confusion over programme and advertising contentý or any impression of sponsorship, the Authority 
ruled that, subject to certain conditions which made it quite clear that advertisers were not 
responsible for the characters or themes, such commercials could be shown, but only on different 
days from the programmes to which they referred4l. These judgements reveal how seriously the 
statutory prohibitions on sponsorship were taken; it had to be borne in mind that even the mere 
impression of advertiser involvement in programming was forbidden under the Act. Apart from the 
anomaly of shoppers' guides, the rigorous separation of any promotional message from programme 
content was strictly enforced right from the beginning. 
Betting advertising was another issue on which the ITA showed its muscle. Associated Rediflusion 
lobbied hard for the ban on betting advertising to be fifted to complement its planned outdoor 
39 IN(L P. 21 
40 ibid. p. II 
41 ibidL p. II 
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broadcast racing coverage. The Advertising Advisory Committee nevertheless stood by its original 
nfling which has only recently been relaXed42. 
By 1957, with demand for advertising, after a shaky startý at last reaching a level that guaranteed the 
security of the companies, the work of the Copy Clearance Committee had become more 
complex A full-time staff was appointed to Haise with agencies, advertisers and production 
companies on regulation matters. In trying to resolve the confusion over process regulation, the 
Television Programme Contractors Association also drew up a list of programmes, classified by 
type, suggesting the distnibution, number and length of the commercial breaks in each. From the 
compardes pow. t of view, not only strict "clock hour"- based timing according to the ITA! s ruling had 
to be taken into account but the nature of the programmes urrounding the brea&'. The tensions 
generated by the conflicting demands of compiling a competitive schedule attractive to advertisers, 
and at the same time complying with a ffirly restrictive process regulation, have not diminished over 
time. Eventually, the criteria produced by the TPCA formed the basis of the ITA! s new guide dealing 
with process issues, AdvertsingMiles andPracfices, issued in 1958. 
By this time, both the companies and the Authority had become awdous that too much advertising 
was being concentrated into the evening hours. ne ITA Annual Report for 1958-9 states that at the 
beginning of 1958 an agreement was reachedwith the programme companies that any one clock 
hour should have a maximum of eight minutes. A review at the end of the year revealed that 
"particular programine patterns could lead to an over concentration of advertising in Particular 
hours. " Further modifications were made to prevent this happening and a table of showing a 
representative sample of figures was included to demonstrate how the rules limiting 11spotif 
advertising operated in practice. 
42 Brian Hcmy (ed. ) op cit. p. 59 43 Brian Henry op cit. p. 60 44 rrA Annual Reports and Accounts I95g-59, Laidom. Her NbjesVs stationery office, 9th November 1959, p. 11 
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Figure S. 1: Adverdsing Minutage 19S8-59 
Average over 
Whole day 
Average between 
7 and 10 p. m 
January, 1958 4mins. 8secs. 6mins II secs. 
febniW, 1958 4mias. 56secs. 7mins. Usecs. 
July, 1958 3mins. 56secs. 5mins. 50secs. 
November, 1958 4mins. 52secs. 7mins. 29secs. 
Jan=- ry, 1959 3mins. 47secs. 6mins. 7secs. 
Febriary; 1959 4mins. 27secs. 7mins. l6secs. 
Source: ITA: Annual Report andAccounts 1958-59 
By 1960, the maximum hourly amount had been reduced to seven minutes. Two events influenced 
tlýs decision. In 1959, Herbert Morrison NT led an attempt to introduce a Television ( Limitation of 
Advertising ) Bill in Parliament which would have forced an inflemble statutory limit of six minutes 
per hour, with no averaging. The attempt fafled, but during the fbHowing year a Research Services 
survey commissioned by the ITA recorded an increased level of public dissatisfaction with the 
exposure of TV advertising. More than two thirds of the respondents were unhappy with advertising 
in 1960, compared with only half in 195745. 
Other early problems with the process side of regulation arose in comection with possible breaches 
of the "unreasonable discrimination" clause in the Television Act, and with the practice of something 
resembling airtime broking, which was not acceptable under the Act, creeping on to the scene. 
Complaints about the former 
-"discrimination either against or in favour of any particular advertiser" 
- 
could be justified as a result of both lack of demand for advertising, and over demand; the shortfall 
in orders in 1956 had turned into a heavy demand by 1958. 
In the first instance, frantic competition for scarce revenue tempted sales executives to grant 
exceptionally favouiable deals to major advedisers who were prepared to provide long term 
45 Anthmy PrawlL An Audwt*y View 2, in Brian H=y (edL) BrItfsh Tdvwon Adwasing op cit pp. 300 - 301 
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guarantees of income. Bearing this in mind, the chairman of the T? CA! S Advertisement Comnittee 
insisted on strict adherence to the official rate cards, and although some manoeuvring undoubtedly 
did take place it was not enough to provoke the attention of the ITA. In the second instance, by 
1958, when the power and effectiveness of promoting goods on television had become all too 
apparent, some agencies were trying to establish "spot fimchises" for a few major clients, extending 
over a long period of time and placed in or around high rated programmes. In addition, these big 
advertisers were willing to pay premiums beyond the going rate to secure these spots. So not only 
was there a danger of favouritism again, but of an appearance of sponsorship if the same advertiser 
became too closely associated with a certain programme over a long period of time. 
With regard to the attempts at broking, because bookings for airtime could now be made two years 
in advance, agencies also reserved popular spots on a speculative basis. Some "attempted to retain 
these valuable spots even when the original advertiser relinquished them, and the contractors issued 
dire warnings about "airtime broldng"46. The problem was partly eased by reducing the scope for 
booldngs, and extending the canceUation periods. 
In 1957, the ITA was presented with a number of proposed advertising campaigns which it decided 
could not be shown under the provisions of the Act relating to the prohibition of advertising "by or 
on behalf of any body the objects of which are wholly or mainly of a political nature", or "which is 
directed towards any political end". It interpreted this provision very strictly to include what it called 
"opinion" advertising, ruling that "a company or industry which feels that its activities are in some 
way threatened by pending legislation or by proposals contained in the programme of a political 
party, may not insert any advertising designed to affect public opinion about that legislation or those 
proposalS,, 47 
. 
But if non-political bodies were not allowed to advertise for political ends, political 
bodies were not permitted to advertise at all, even for non-political ends such as for staff or 
accommodation. 
The Authority interpreted the word "political" in the context of the Second Schedule as applying to 
anything related to the government or organisation of the community (national or local), and a 
" political end" as "the purpose of affecting in some respect, whether by altering or maintaining it, the 
46 Brim H=y (e&) op. cit. p. 62 47 ITA: Amual Ftepoits =d Accmnts 1957-58, LmdorL Her Nkicstys Stationcry Office, 29th October 1958, p. 15 
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48 
manner in which the community is governed or organiSed" 
. 
in considering whether or not an 
advertisement was meant to affect public opinion in this way, the regulator had to consider the 
"actual intention" of the body wishing to advertise, as the intention might be apparent not just from 
the proposed advertisement, but from other evidence such as accompanying publicity statements etc. 
The question had first arisen in 1956, when the industrialist Sir Bernard Docker had bought drtime 
to win public support for his battle for the chairmanship of the Daimler Car Company. The Chairman 
of food manufacturers I Lyons and Co. had also taken out a two minute commercial in which he 
explained and praised the company's management aims and practices. The Lyons advertisement 
could have been taken as an "invitation to invest", banned under the rules on financial advertisine. 
Brian Henry comments that "opinion advertising! 
.... 
was to present many problems of definition and 
interpretation over the next twenty years"50 
. 
Four years later, the ITA was involved in a controversial decision not to accept advertisements for 
the Daily Worker newspaper on the grounds that it was the official organ of the British Communist 
Party. The Authority ruled that to broadcast a commercial for the Daily Worker would not only 
break Paragraph 6 of the Second Schedule of the Television Act, but also Section 3 (1) (g) which 
stated that "no matter designed to serve the interests of any political party" could be transmitted 
except as part of a balanced discussion or in a party political broadcast. The ITA! s interpretation of 
the Act in this case was confirmed by legal opinion5 1. More recently, the gay press has been refused 
permission to advertise on television because the regulator regarded gay magazines as having the aim 
of forming public opinion. A challenge to the British government's policy of prohibiting paid political 
advertising on television on the basis that such a prohibition infiinged the tight to freedom of 
information guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights was nevertheless r0ected 
by the European Commission of Human RightS52. 
4g ibid. p. 16 
49 Brian Henry (ed. ) op. cit p. 65 
ibid. p. 66. Note: 'Me regulator has sometimes had to make difficult decisions regarding the definition of religious advertising as 
MMIL Peter Woodhouse, IBA I lead ofAdvertising Control fi-om 1974-1981, recounts that an advertismaent for the New English 
Bible had to be refused as religious advertising, but a serialised aicyclopaedia on, %itchcraft and rnagic was accepted, which 
51 
many dwught'%w anomalous. ( P. Woodlwuse in B. Henry (ed. ) op. cit p. 375 ) 
rrA: Annual Report 1960-61, op cit p 40. Note: lbe Daily Worker complained to the PilkingtOn, Committee that the ban was 
an mfiingcment ofdemocratic rights. The papees Editor pointed cid that the Daily Herald had been allo%W to advertise on 
tclcvL%on even though its Articles ofAssociation bound it to carry out political policy laid domn by Iabour Party Confcrences, and 
s0hadthc DailyExprcss %hich opcnlyeqrcssed a ubole sedcs of( Conservative Party) political aims to, %hich it was dedicated. 
52 
(Daily Worker Reporter, ALUngton Cmwduee he=., Our CaseforAd on TdeýWon, Daily Worker 16 / 08/ 196 1. ) 
Note., See Chapter 13, p. 299 
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The ITA Annual Report for 1958-9 contained an outline of how the Copy Clearance procedures 
handled control of advertising standards. The day-to-day acceptance of advertising was in the hands 
of the programme companies, as stipulated by the Television Act, and virtually all this work began in 
the centralised script and copy acceptance department of the Independent Television Companies 
Association (ITCA) 53 
. 
Agencies sent scripts to this department where they were given a preliminary 
grading of "acceptable" or "doubffhl". They were then sent to the individual companies for each to 
make its own judgement. In case of disagreement, the normal procedure was for the problem to be 
discussed by the Copy Sub-Comrnittee of the ITCA and the decisions of this body were then 
"reported to the fiffl Advertisement Committee of the Association, so that by this means a growing 
collection of pnxedents and case law (was) built up"". Where there was any doubt about the 
application of the PiMciples of TelevisionAaWiWsihg, the companies consulted the Authority which 
consulted the Advertising Advisory Committee if necessary. ". The Report went on to say that in 
view of the rapid expansion of the system and the increase in the volume of work the ITA had 
decided to appoint an officer who would be able "to devote all his time to problems of advertising 
policy and control and to Ease with the companies and the ITCA on advertising matters"56. This post 
was filled in April 1959 by Archibald Graham. 
The extent to which the licensees regulated themselves in the early days is apparent from this brief 
description. The Authority only became involved if problems arose, but did not routinely vet all 
scripts prior to transmission as it was obliged to do after the 1964 Television Act. This lack of "hands 
on" regulation was heavily criticised in the next Committee of Inquiry into broadcasting. The 
Advertising Advisory Committee, however, was regularly consulted. Among the issues the 
Conunittee considered in the first few years of operation were claims made in toothpaste 
commercials, where it ordered certain commercials to be withdrawn or modified, the advertising of 
"sedatives, relaxants, hypnotics or stimulants", which it banned57 
. 
and slimming treatments. After 
Note The Television Programme Cm&ac&s Association (MA) changed its name to the Independent Television Coinpames 
Association (ITCA) in 1958. 
ibid. p. 14 
ibid. p. IS 
ibid. p. 15 
Note Forty years later, in December 1994, an advertisement for Britvic crangejuice was "dramatically saaPPer by the 
broadcaster houm before it was due to go on. air, merely because it used the voice of a celebrated h)pnotist and contained 
"mystic* scenes Watchdog groups had owiplained that it could pit viewers in a trance. A series of commercials for another 
hypnotists quit-smoking aW relaxation videos had been banned the previousweek by the cunvnt regulator, the Independent 
Televi%onCommission. (paul Byrne DrjnkFjp7n Scmpj TV'Trance"Ad Daily Nfl= 2nd Dec. 1994, p. 5) 
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consultation with the Poshnaster-General, the ban on advertising of slinuning products was lifted 
provided they did not lead to hannfW effects". 
Changes in ITA policy continued to be made during the next few years before the publication of the 
latest of the government commissioned reports into broadcasting 
- 
the Pilkington 
- 
in 1962. The 
creation, in 1959, of the separate post of Controller of Advertising, and the appointment of three 
specialists in medicine, pharrnacology and chernistry to advise the ITCA! s Copy Clearance 
Committee marked the gradual expansion of the Authority's qualified fiffl-time staff The number of 
freelance consultants employed grew as the demands of advertising regulation became more 
complex 
5.5 Conclusion. 
The relatively short period up to the passing of the Television Act represents an origination phase in 
the regulatory cycle. Broadcasting regulation in the UK for the first time took on some of the 
defining characteristics of classical regulation of private business, though by no means all. Once 
ag* public interest theory, especially the conflicting claim version, has the most explanatory value 
in analysing the form that regulation took. 
The political system was responsible for weighing the various claims on behalf of the public interest 
through the democratic process. And having decided on a suitable compromise, which expanded the 
notion of public interest to include the claim of manufacturers, the advertising industry, audiences 
and those working in broadcasting". Puliament settled on a particular legal framework for 
regulating the new service: a public authority with statutory control over the two participating 
industries 
- 
television and advertising 
- 
and the ability to delegate a certain amount of responsibility 
for control of advertising content to one of the regulated parties, who would operate the enforcement 
procedures it elf 
m MA. Annual Reports and Accounts 1958-9 op. cit. pp. 15 
- 
16 
59 Note. In thc, %ords of the Afanonmdwn on Metisiow - Competition should be in the best interests of vicw=s. AT! tcrs, artistes 
and technicians. There will also be an increasing and urgent demand for filmed television progranux= throughout ffie %vorld, and 
competition at home should induce vitality and help Britain to produce prograramcs for overseas markets7 ( November 1953 Whitc Paper, op. cit. para. 3, p. 1) 
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Although two industries were now involved in the regulation equation as the subjects of regulatory 
control, since one was not in existence at the time that policy was decided, and the other explicitly 
opposed the kind of detailed statutory regulation proposed by the government, economic 
capturelconspiracy theories are still irrelevant as an exTlanation of the genesis of commercial 
television regulation. As David Plowright, former Chairman of Granada Television, has emphasised, 
"the decision to limit broadcasting in this country was made by Parliament. The ITV companies only 
came into existence once the rules had been drawn up and the first round of franchises awarded. 
They found a system already in place which ensured that normal commercial practice could not apply 
and that the basic pattern of marketing was adapted to the particular circumstances of restricted 
competition"60. So, while it can be argued, and in due course was, that restricted competition, and 
particularly control of entry to the broadcasting market, was to the companies! advantage, it was not 
of their making. 
The weight of thirty years of broadcasting tradition is also visible in the regulatory arrangements for 
the commercial service. The television companies were given stringent public service requirements in 
programming, and strict control of advertising, including the amount and distribution, was considered 
to be an essential part of the public service ideal. Even a new generation of political leaders with 
noticeably more pro-entrepreneurial cultural values was anxious to ensure that advertising money did 
not undermine the high standard of service previous policies had encouraged. Although the ITA was 
intended to be independent from the state in running its internal affairs with the co-operation of the 
regulated parties, the theoretical powers of the government over the content of programming and 
advertising were extensive. Legislation provided for regular consultations with the relevant 
government departments and ministers (chiefly the Postmaster-General), and mechanisms such as the 
Committees of Inquiry and the Home Affairs Broadcasting Committee in Parliament enabled the 
state to maintain a watching brief over the regulatoes activities, and act as a source of guidance if 
necessary. 
Ile composition of the new regulatory Authority in tenns of its member's backgrounds was, as 
Paulu. has noted, remarkably similar to that of the BBC, "despite the anticipation that they would 
tend to be younger, and less representative of the Establishment"'51. Member's age averaged around 
60 David PlOwTiA Survival andSucceis I in Proceeding oftlie 20di University ofNfanchcster SymposiurnLifeAfter 
Broadcaifing M14 Manchester Monagaph, 1989, p. 4 1. 61 Burton Paulm TelevWon andRadio in the United Kingdorm Laidom- Nt%xnillan, 198 1, p. 133 
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siXtY, and they came predominantly from public school and Oxbridge backgrounds. The new 
regulator could therefore be expected to bring to policy-making on commercial television much the 
same socio-cultural attitudes as were dominant in non-commercial broadcasting. This did not suggest 
that a rapid descent down the American path of solely ratings-oriented programming was very likely. 
The commitment of the government, the advertising industry and the regulator to the pubfic service 
ideal was very strong but fears that somehow a dangerous genie had been let out of the bottle were 
reflected in the sheer quantity of the statutory regulatory arrangements for commercial television, 
which greatly exceeded in complexity anything the BBC had to complyAith. 
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Chapter 6 
Advertising Regulation: The First Critique. 
1 Introduction. 
Despite the efforts of the ITA! s Controller of Advertising and the Independent Television Companies 
Associatiods C-6 oy Clearance stafý after five years of operation criticism of the way the Authority 
was handling advertising control was beginning to build. Members of Parliament across all parties, 
but particularly in the Labour Party, complained that the amount of advertising on television was still 
too much, to the extent that its intrusiveness detracted from viewers' enjoyment, and the ITA! s own 
research suggested that viewers were indeed becoming alienated. Five Labour Ws attempted 
unsuccessfiffly to introduce a Television (Limitation of Advertising) Bill in June 1959, aimed at 
imposing a legal limit on advertising time of 10% per hour with no averages. There was also rising 
concern over the content of advertisements, many of which appeared to be hiffinging the spirit of the 
Code, if not the letter. 
The government herefore felt it necessary to order a thorough review of how regulation of 
commercial television was worldng. It appointed a new Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Sir Harry 
Pilldngton, which started to take evidence in 1960. By the time of its publication two years later, the 
Pilkington Committee had received so many submissions that the memoranda Med two volumes and 
more than 1200 pages. Space devoted directly to issues raised by advertising was relatively little, but 
the discussions in the Committee's Report had a strong impact on regulation policy. 
6.2 Advertising in the Pilkington Committee Report. 
The ITA submitted several papers on control of advertising in Which it reiterated its commitment to 
the principle of "complete and manifest distinction between the programmes and the advertisements". 
The Authority emphasised that it was this principle that distinguished British Independent Television 
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from all other self-supporting systems of the world', and described how it was put into practice, 
along with other methods of safeguarding standards of conduct in television advertising. It explained 
that ultimate responsibility for this safeguarding still lay with the Advertising Advisory Committee, 
who prepared the compulsory code of conduct, but the "main instrument of day-to-day control" was 
the Copy Committee of the Independent Television Companies Association. The Copy Committee 
had become a central "clearing house" for the pre-vetting of up to 6000 scripts per year in 1958, and 
since 1960 the ITCA had also been operating a daily closed-circuit pre-viewing of all finished 
commercialsý. 
The ITA unde; standably presented its achievements in the controversial area of advertising 
regulation in a very positive fight. It angrily refuted charges made by the Advertising Inquiry Council, 
a non-party-political voluntary organisation founded in 1958 to protect consumer interests, that the 
AAC contained too many representatives of the advertising industry, while neither the Inquiry 
Council nor either of the present consumer associations were represented on it3 
. 
The ITA! s defence, 
that only three of the Committee's members represented advertising interests, and the remaining eight 
had the consumer's interests primarily at heart, did not in the end convince Pilkington and changes 
were recommended in the AACs composition to make it more balanced. A fiuther suggestion by the 
Inquiry Council that "a Broadcast Advertising Council with a statutory obligation to watch over the 
advertising material 
.... 
from the consumer's point of view" should be established4 was not taken up. 
The ITA also mounted a vigorous counter-attack against the British Medical Association which had 
fiercely criticised the standard of medical advertising, calling for a total ban on the advertising on 
television of all over-the-counter medicines. The Authority pronounced it "deplorable that, having 
seen no grounds over the years for adverse criticism of television medical advertisements through the 
channel afforded by its representation on the Advertising Advisory Committee, the BMA should 
have been so sweepingly disparaging in its published Memorandum to the Committee"5- It accused 
the BMA of adopting "special standards of judgement" which it had not seen fit to apply in its 
dealings with the AAQ in order to pressure Pilkington into supporting the removal of proprietary 
1 Repo? f of1he Committee on Bruadwsling 1960. - Volume L Appendix E: Alemonznda Submitted to the COMMiltm 
2 
Papers 1-102 (CirAmL 1819-11 p. 432. (Pilkhigton n) 
Report ofte Conimilree on Broadaisfing 1960 Volume ff. Appendix E. Memonvida submitted to the 
Commium Papers 103-275 (Cmnd. 1819A p. 739. (EUkhVm M) 3 Pilkington I op. ciL p. 446 4 ibi(L p. 446 5 ibid. p. 447 
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medicines from the lig of acceptable classes of advertisements. While admitting that the system of 
control had suffered from the "imperfection" that not all of the scripts for over-the- counter drugs 
commercials had been submitted for checIdng by the Copy Panel's independent consultant, the ITA 
concluded that the powerful nature of the existing controls, based on the "exacting and mandatory 
... 
code of standards 
- 
Piinciples for TeIeWsion AdverWsing 
- 
precluded any need for "a 
discriminatory ban on proprietary medicines in television alone". 
The ITA! s position was supported by the Proprietary Association of Great Britain who also found 
the BNWs attitude inconsistent. In its memorandum, the Proprietary Association complained that, 
without warnLnýý, the BMA had suddenly found reason to assert that the extent to which television 
advertising encouraged "self-medication" was "contrary to the public interest and wholly 
undesirable"; that the requirements of the Code had been "subtly evaded"; and to propose that yet 
another comrnittee, "with doctors in the majority", should be set up to view all medical 
advertisements if a complete prohibition of this class could not be achieved. The Proprietary 
Association, like the ITA, pointed out that the BMA had "misunderstood" the role of its 
representative on the Advertising Advisory Committee, who had the right to raise there any 
objections the BMA might have. It claimed that "adequate machinery for the proper control of 
television advertisements exists and is exercised"P and accused the doctors! trade association of 
prýudice and ignorance of advertisini. Apparently, it was the BMA's failure to go through the 
proper channels or to use the consultative procedures careffilly put together by the regulator and its 
advisors which caused almost as much annoyance as the criticisms themselves. Unilateral action by 
one party was seen as undermining the attempt to solve regulatory problems by negotiation and 
compromise, 
These disagreements, together with much of the other evidence submitted, show that opinions on 
the nature of television advertising were as divided as ever. Some concentrated on its harmful effects 
and the likelihood of worse things to come if much stronger egulation were not enforced. Others 
either argued in favour of the status quo, or pressed for a relaxation of the restrictions and more 
competition. But, generally spealdng, the same sets of interests stiff occupied much the same 
positions as they had at the time of the Beveridge Report, adjusting only to the fact that commercial 
I ibi& pp. 450 
- 
451 
7 POdngton III Op. cit pp. 988 
- 
989 
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television, for good or ill, was there to stay. The first half dozen years of operation did not bring 
about any significant changes in attitudes. 
For example, Christopher Mayhew, MP, who had led the campaign against the introduction of 
commercial TV, opened his paper with an attack on "excessive advertising" and the "abuse of natural 
breaks". He also complained of the "excessive power of the programme companies in general and of 
the networking committee in particular"'. To remedy these defects he recommended limiting the 
maximum of advertising in any one hour to five or six minutes; amending Schedule Two of the 1954 
Act so as to restrict all commercials to the beginnings and ends of programmes; and giving the 
Authority a pm-mrful say in the network committee. To reduce the power of the companies, break 
their monopoly of advertising, and decentralise control of British television he proposed a third 
public service corporation. 
The Co-operative Movement, which had also opposed the 1954 Act, questioned whether the 
principles and rules governing broadcast advertising were being complied with in the spirit as well as 
in the letter. They, too, were concerned about the harmful effects of the monopoly of advertising 
revenue njoyed by the programme companies and proposed a third non-adverfising funded channel 
since they felt that more commercial competition would have a "deleterious" effect on standards. In 
addition, they wanted a supervisory council similar in function to the Press Council9. 
The Trades Union Congress, representing the broad left, did not see any reason in the fight of 
experience to change its view that commercial television would seek "the lowest common 
denominator in demand and hinder the raising of broadcasting standards". It considered that the ITA 
was failing in its duties to subordinate the demands of advertisers to the main function of television, 
to "entertain, inforin and educate the viewers". They complained of the excessive amount of 
advertising time in a single hour, and of the intrusiveness of showing commercials in breaks rather 
than in the intervals between programmeslo. 
Ile Viewed and Listeners' Association, Which as the Listeners' Association had spoken out before 
Previous committees in favour of some commercial alternative to the BBC in order to provide more 
: N& pp. 1135 
to 
ibid. p. 1194 
ibid. pp. 1256 
- 
1257 
104 
Adýadsing Regulation: The Fwst Critique 
choice, had changed its stance. After some years of actual exposure to advertising on television, the 
broadcasting consumers! representative body found itself in agreement with Christopher Mayhew 
that the situation had gone too far, and that the "misuse of advertising" needed rectifying. Like the 
Advertising Inquiry Council, the Viewers and Listeners Association recommended the appointment 
of a permanent "Broadcasting Consumers Council" to protect the interests of consumers; a single 
independent consumer body for all broadcasting is still being demanded by consumer organisations 
todayll. 
On the other side, the National Broadcasting Development Cominittee, successors to the Popular 
Television AssG. iation, were dissatisfied with ITVs monopoly, arguing that "the way to end a 
commercial monopoly is to introduce a further measure of commercial competition". A number of 
Conservative W's, in fine with the free market ideology that had been so powerful a force behind the 
introduction of commercial television in the first place, also pressed for a third channel to be 
supported by advertising revenue 12 
. 
Those with a vested interest in the extension of commercial television 
- 
large manufacturers and the 
advertising industrys trade associations 
- 
also aired their views in the section of the Report devoted 
to advertising. The Beecham Group and Thomas Hedley and Co., who had pressed their case before 
the Beveridge Committee to be allowed to promote their products through the broadcast medium, 
argued this time for an expansion of commercial opportunities to prevent the contractors from 
exploiting their monopoly and charging exorbitant rates for airtime 13 
. 
The ISBA, only lukewarm at 
the time of Beveridge, expressed the view that "television advertising performs a useful service that is 
often welcomed". It suggested extending the present commercial service to further channels but did 
not favour sponsorship as a means of financing these channelS14 
. 
The IPA complained of the 
monopolistic situation which had led to unacceptably high costs, and recommended both increased 
15 broadcasting hours and a third station. It agreed, %ith the ISBA in rejecting sponsorship, however 
Among those who actually worked in broadcasting, the Musiciar& Union repeated their opposition 
to any form of commercial broadcasting, and called, somewhat optimistically, for the discontinuation 
11 ibi(i p. 1264 
12 ibid. A 1222 
13 
-bi(I P. 1 974 
14 ibidL p. 979 15 ibicL p. 985 
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of the ITA and its service". The Actorsunion, Equity, did not favour such a drastic solution, but still 
did not wish to wend the power either of the BBC or the of ITA They accepted the need for some 
competition and proposed, as had many other contributors, a pay-as-you-view, or subscription, 
ChaMe117. 
The views exTressed in the Pilldngton Comrnittee amounted, on the whole, to more of the same. 
Attitudes towards advertisings present reality were still rooted in the past, and most arguments 
concerning the advantages or disadvantages of commercial funding for British broadcasting, sound 
or television, had been rehearsed before previous committees. Nevertheless, Independent Television, 
to all but the Musicians! Union, was an established fact, if not a universally approved one, and the 
debate had to be adjusted accordingly. For one side, the problem was now how to keep its 
paymasters under fighter control, and for the other, it was how to increase their scope and 
opportunities. 
The one noticeable xception was the press, one of the most powerful voices of the anti-commercial 
broadcasting lobby since the 1920's, whose interests had been protected and deferred to by all the 
special broadcasting committees. Having been unable to beat the system, some press organisations 
had joined it as shareholders in the network companies, and others had turned down the oppoftunityý 
giving them less reason to complainla. Their routine protests are therefore conspicuously absent 
from the Pilkington Report. 
It was the task of the Pilkington Committee to draw conclusions from the huge pile of evidence 
submitted to it and to take broadcasting policy-making in the UK a step finIher with its 
recommendations. Commercial television in Britain had only been in operation for seven years by the 
time the Report was presented and was still in the experimental phase. It was based on a two-tier 
system under which the ITA transmitted the programmes produced by the contractors, together with 
the advertisements which had financed them. Pilkington considered that this two-tier constitution 
unduly favoured the programme companies, and left the Authority with a control over network 
16 ibid. p. 796 17 ibid. p. 786 
'a Note., After the establishment of the ITA. "mort of the principal programme comp=es were partly ouned by 
WkWapers, and Vith the advent of commercial radio in 1972, their involvement was increased. In 1959, even the Guardian 
became a stockholder m Anglia TV*. (Burum PaujjL Tdevision andRadio in the United Kingdom, London: Macmillan. 1981, 
p. 60) 
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arrangements, programming and advertising that was "iHusory and negligible" 19. It recommended a 
radical re-structuring wfich would give the ITA considerably more powers. 
Specifically with regard to advertising, the Committee was deeply critical. It held that the two 
purposes of Independent Television 
- 
to provide both public service broadcasting and a service to 
advertisers 
- 
were fundamentally incompatible. It considered the first to be the main objective, and 
the second as "incidental", i. e. necessary only in so far as it served the first. But under the existing 
system the commercial product, the saleable product of the programme contractors, was not the 
programmes but advertising time, and the financial rewards derived from making the product as 
attractive as pozible. As commercial concerns the companies were likely to treat the sale of airtime 
as their main objective to the detriment of programming standards. As long as the constitution of 
Independent Television dictated that the network companies hould be in charge both of programme 
production and airtime sales, just to increase the regulatory powers of the ITA would not be enough 
to redress the balanc4? 0. 
Pilldngton rejected the assurances given by the ITA in its paper that the situation was on the whole 
satisfactory and that it neither needed nor desired any extension of its powers. in order to "remove 
from programming production the commercial incentive always to aim at maximum audiences and 
maximum advertising revenue" the Committee recommended the following systematic hanges: 
j) Yhe A uthofify loplan the progrmnmitig. 
fi) Yhe A uthority to sell advertising fime. 
W) Progrwnme compwijes toproduce and sell to the A uthorityprogramme itemsfor inchislon in 
the prograznme planned by the Authority. 
iv) Yhe, 4uthofi(g after makingprOWSIonfor reserves, lopay any stoplus revenue to the 
Excheque. 
-21. 
WhHe the Conunittee was stiU sitfing, the ChanceHor of the Exchequer announced, in 1961, that it 
would impose a 10% tax on television advertising revenue 
- 
the Television Advertisement Duty. THs 
was the first of a series of unwelcome attempts by the Treasury to cream off some of the increasingly 
19 Report ofthe Committee on Broadcasting 1960 ( Chafimam- Sir Hany Pilkington) (Cmnd 1753) London: IBBO, 1962 para 567, 
2 
p. 167, (PiUdngton 1) 
20 
ibid. pm 569, p. 167 1 ibid. pams 579-579, pp. 169 
- 
170 
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large profits made by the programme contractors. Needless to say it provoked an outcrY, particularly 
from the agencies whose commission would be chargeable only on actual airtime rate not including 
TAD, reducing overnight their gross margins. Since a siniflar tax was not extended to advertising in 
the press a considerable proportion of advertising revenue sAitched away from television to the 
presS22. 
'nie Pilldngton Report is evidence that even after a relatively short period into its operation, 
regulation of advertising, both process and product, was fairly widely perceived to have failed in a 
number of ways. The Committee itself did not accept the regulatoes ubmission that everything was 
satisfactory-, 
-. -',, e judgement that oversight was "illusory and negligible" was a severe one. From 
Pillcington's point of view, the regulatory Authority had allowed the contractors too much freedom to 
regulate themselves through the copy clearance system which had led to laxness in enforcing the 
rules. But this was not just the fault of the ITA, the system itself was deficient. Although the ITA had 
argued that a firm commitment, within the eýxisting structure, to the principle of maintaining 
separation of programme content from advertising was enough to guarantee standards, Pffldngton 
believed that only by radically altering the structure of the regulatory system would the "fundamental 
incompatibility" of the two purposes of independent television be reduced. Removing the television 
companies' right to sell airtime and vesting it with the regulating Authority 
-a public body - would 
remove the temptation for the companies to put profits from airtime sales above the production of 
quality programmes. 
6.3 Some Repercussions of the Pifldngton Report 
The ITA had, with some reason, been shocked by the BMA! s sudden attack on its competence, not 
to mention the proposed total ban on the advertising on television of proprietary medicines freely 
available over the counter and freely advertised in other media. It took steps to deflect Ruther 
criticism in 1961, even before the Report had been published, by ordering a thorough review of 
scripts and visuals for 184 medical products. Claims which overstressed the effectiveness of self- 
medication were not allowed, and the practice of using celebrities to promote products was 
discontinued. 
22 Brim Henry (c&) British Tdes&ort AdvaMing, Lmdon: Century Benbas, 1986, p. 85 
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By 1962, however, it was becoming clear that more radical decisions would have to be made to limit 
the advertising of tobacco products. The ITA Annual Report for the year 1961-1962 noted that, 
following the Royal College of Physicians announcement in March 1961 of the links between 
cigarette sm&ing and lung cancer and diseases of the respiratory tract, the Authority would review 
the advertising of cigarettes in consultation with the Advertising Advisory Committee. Tobacco 
manufacturers, at the same time, decided to cease advertising tobacco products before 9 p. m., when 
many children were watchine. In June 1962, the Authority announced that certain types of appeal 
would be unacceptable in future: excessive mphasis on the pleasures of smoldng: exTloiting the 
heroes of the yrung in commercials, or appealing to "pride or general manliness", and the use of 
faslionable social settings, or "romantic situations and young people in love" to promote smokine 4 
These rules, along with several others designed to reduce the attractiveness of cigarette smoldng, 
were included in the Code of Practice. 
The 1962-63 Report stated that "the tobacco manufacturers and their agencies co-operated wiflingly 
in the application of the new code "25 
, 
and around 80 commercials had been either modified or 
withdrawn and replaced. It concluded with some satisfaction that the manufacturers had 
subsequently decided to carry into other media the rules drawn up by the Authority for television 
advertising. 
With regard to childrerfs advertising, the same Report declared that although the rules contained in 
the Principlesfor Adýerfising had always been applied stringently, it would nevertheless, with the 
approval of the AAC, expand the Principles to include a new appendix containing further 
"interpretative rules". Advertising maga2ines had also been under threat, since it could be argued that 
they breached the spirit of the rule that advertising matter and programming should be kept clearly 
separate. They represented a curious hybrid, simultaneously both a commercial and a programme. 
The ITA restricted their numbers in 1962 and tried to find a formula which made their advertising 
purpose clearer. This was not enough for the Pilldngton Committee, however, which recommended 
their discontinuation and an order to this effect was made by the Postmaster General in March 1963. 
23 ITA: Annual Report mid Accounts 1962-63, Imlm- Her Nbjesty Stationary Office, 30th oflWy 1963, p. 35 
24 ibid. p. 35 25 ibid. p. 35 
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On aniount and distribution, the 1962-63 Report included a small table to illustrate how had policy 
had developed since 1955. 
"Subject to the overriding limit of spot advertising an hour over the day, the maximum amount of 
advertising in any one clock hour has been reduced over the years as follows: 
rigure6l: AdýerdsingMlnutageHSS-63 
1955-57 No Emits 
1958 8 minutes 
September 1960 7 1/2 minutes 
September 1960, and to date I- 
-I 
7 minutes 
-I 
Source: ITA: Annual Report andAccounti 1962-63 
In practice, over the year 1962-63 as a whole, an average of 4.5 minutes of spot advertising per hour 
was transmitted on each station. The average between 7 and 10 p. m. was 6.2 minutes"26 
. 
Advertising had been distributed in an average of three intervals an hour between programmes or in 
natural breaks within programmes, with very little divergence from the average, since the 
considerable reduction of 20% in the number of natural breaks made in the winter of 1960. The 
following paragraph taken from the Report gives a revealing insight into the kinds of considerations 
the regulator had to take into account, and the manoeuvres necessary to obtain a reasonable 
compromise. 
"Of the intervals used for advertising 55 per cent were between programmes, and very few of those 
that occupied "natural breaks" were of a kind that inight be expected to cause irritation. 
Nevertheless, by continued attention to the techniques of transition from programmes to advertising 
intervals; by experimentation with methods of extending the length of advertising intervals and so 
making possible a slight reduction in their number, by changing the order of advertisements where 
justified to avoid the more obvious clashes between advertising and programme moods; and, on the 
26 ibid. P. 34 
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Authority's part, by allowing occasionally a little flexibility in the application of the spot advertising 
if clock hour maximum" so that an interval could be used on one side of the strildng hour rather than 
another 
- 
the Authority and the programme companies ought to achieve on balance the smoothest 
possible presentation of programmes and advertisements"27. 
Intervals of advertising were normally 2.5-3 minutes long which was regarded as "as much as it is 
reasonable to broadcast "28 
. 
Again flexibility was the key. Programme companies were allowed to 
experiment with selling a period of more than three minutes to a single advertiser "whose product 
rnight justify prolonged demonstration", or a series of advertisements could be grouped together 
around a theme nad &ýs night excuse a longer than average interval. 
These extracts show the extent to which the Authority was involved in the details of timing 
regulation even before the consolidated Television Act 1964 gave it an increased mandate to do so. 
They also give an idea of the way in which non-legally defined limits on timing allowed for greater 
flexibility of interpretation. There was still some room for the regulator and the companies to 
experiment. Shortly after publication of the Pilldngton Report in July 1962 the government produced 
a VVUte Paper. This exploratory document initiated a period of debate before any final decisions 
about the fi=e of British broadcasting were made. it rejected the Committee! s recommendation to 
change the constitution of the ITA and proposed the introduction of a third channel in colour which 
should go to the BBC. 
On advertising, it accepted the success of the hourly average of six minutes and did not recommend 
that the amount should be regulated by law. It agreed with Pilkington that admags should be 
abolished and that subliminal advertising should be specifically prohibited; called for discussion with 
the Authority on the problems of natural breaks and advertising in children's' programmes; and 
considered granting statutory powers to the Copy Clearance Committecýs medical consultants29. 
A second White Paper in December developed these ideas fi=her and announced that the ITA was 
"30 to be given "more formal and direct control over advertising 
. 
The AAC must also include some 
27 ibid. p. 34 
28 ibid. p. 34 
2-9 Broadcasting. Memorandum on the Report ofthe Committee on Broadcasting. 1960, (Cwnd. 177011962, p. 9 
30 
(Aly 1962 White PaM) 
Broadwsling: FurdierManorandwn on the Report ofifie Camduee on Broadcasting, 1960. (Cmnd. 1893). 1962, p. 8 
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consumer representation from the general public. The government had not been convinced by the 
advertising industry lobby that there was either sufficient public demand or potential revenue to 
support a second commercial station and ruled it out for the time being. 
6.4 The Television Act 1964: Further Controls on Advertising. 
When the Television Act was finally consolidated in March 1964, it carried over most of the previous 
provisions on advertising, supplemented by some of the proposals contained in the PiUdngton 
Report and its own consultative documents". 
The wording of the 1964 Act with regard to advertisements contains some significant changes from 
the its predecessor. 
Section 8 (1) provided that: It shall be the duty of the Authority 
- 
(a) to d-aw tip, andfrom time to time review, a code governing standards andpractice it, 
advertising widprescribing the adverAsing mid methods of advetlWng to be prohibited, or 
prohibited in pcv*cular circumstances, and 
(b) to secure that the provisions of the code are complied with as rega-ds the adverfisements 
included in the programmes broad= by the A uthority. 
This removed the obligation from the Advertising Advisory Committee actually to produce the Code 
itself, as it had done with the Pfinciplesfor Television, 4dveilWng. Direct control was shifted to the 
Authority. The Committee, which from then on had to include representation of the public as 
consumers, was only charged with a duty to keep the Code under review and submit 
recommendations for alterations when necessary. It would no longer actually draw up the rules as it 
had done previously. Its advice ceased to be binding, removing its formal powers to make major 
decisions about the standards of conduct affecting television advertising. The 1954 Act had left the 
terms of reference of the AAC's task deliberately vague "so as to avoid hamstringing the Authority in 
advance with a number of detailed rules "32. But now that the ITA had worked out its own modus 
31 
(DmCmbff 1962 White Paper) 
Note-'Tlie revised RWcs as to Advertisments (Schedule 2) arc given as Appendix 3 and as the new Code OfAdvcrtisý Standards and Practice as Appcndix 4. 32 AntlXXW pr g agneM op. cit. p. 308 
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OPerandi with the television companies it made more sense that both initiative and ultimate authority 
with respect to drawing up detailed statutory rules should reside udth it and not the AAC 
The Act required the Authority to satisfy itself that the chairman of the Committee has "no fi=cial 
or other interest in any advertising agency "33 nor any other "financial or other interest in advertising 
as is in the opinion of the Authority Rely to prejudice his opinion as chairman "34. Tbs ruled out 
anyone like Robert Bevan, the AACs first chairman, who was also chairman of S. R Benson, the 
adverdsing agency 
Ile Act also req-iired the appointment of a Medical Advisory Panel which the Authority had to 
consult before . drawing up the Code referred to in Secfion 8. The Medical Panel's advice, unlike the 
AAC's, would be mandatory, a measure of the influence of the medical establishment and the 
seriousness with which medical advertising viewed by policy-makers. Advertising for proprietary 
medicines would still be permitted, however. 
The powers of the ITA over amount and distribution were clarified and extended in Seefiot? 8 
(Subsections (3) and (4)). The Authority could give directions to a programme contractor egarding 
the amount of time to be given to advertisements in any one hour or period, the minimum intervals 
between commercial breaks, the number of breaks, and the exclusion of advertisements from 
specified broadcasts. 
By these measures the government sought to address the concerns expressed in the Pilkington 
Report, which had a much more immediate and direct influence on broadcasting policy than 
Beveridge had had. It could be argued that it was not an entirely positive influence. The Committee 
seems to have paid more attention to the critics of television advertising, and taken an unjustifiably 
gloomy view of the amount of misleading or harmful commercials hown. However, the decisions to 
include consumer representation on the AAC and to cancel the legally binding nature of the 
Committee's advice were undoubtedly sound. Abolishing admags, which were popular, seems a bit 
harsh, but it was not easy to reconcile them with the principle of distinguishing clearly between 
programme and advertising. The generally disapproving tone of the Report's references to advertising 
33 Television Act 1964, Fliz. 2, Cb. 21,1964, Section 9(4) (a) M ibi4l Section 9(4) (a) 
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led to a more interventionist approach by the ITA, and reduced the chances of further commercial 
competition in the foreseeable future. It was to take another twenty years before the idea became an 
acceptable policy option. 
The ITA! s Report for 1963-1964 welcomed the "clarification" of its powers over the amount and 
distribution of advertisini', although it had originally claimed that it did not need any extension of 
its powers. The Authority announced that it would keep to a six minutes per hour daily average and a 
seven minute maximum, but was prepared to be flexible in exceptional circumstances when the 
fourteen minutes pennitted in two adjoining clock hours might be split unevenly. 
Coverage of Royal ceremonies, religious and schools broadcasts still had to be insulated from 
commercials by a two-minute interval. The Religious Advisory Committee, however, proposed the 
de-insulation of late night religious broadcasts on the grounds that "the impact of religious 
Programmes might be diminished by their seeming to be set apart from other programmes or 
epilogues was to be implemented on the programmeS"36. This implies at least some 
acknowledgement of the attractive, as opposed to the intrusive, aspect of advertisements which can 
help to retain viewere interest until the next programme. Natural break rulings were complex, but 
aimed at limiting commercial breaks to an average of three an hour during a week's broadcasting. 
The rule prohibiting breaks in news bulletins, including combined national and local news bulletins, 
remained37. 
The new composition of the AAC was announced: four members concerned VAth the consurner's 
general interest in advertising, four members with professional interests in the standard of medical 
and alfied advertising, and four members of the advertising industry. The newly formed Medical 
Advisory Panel comprised members from the twelve professional medical organisations fisted by the 
Postmaster General including the main medical, surgical, dental, pharmaceutical and veterinary 
associations of England and Scotland. Their advice would be sought on the claims made and the 
methods of presentation used in television advertisements, giving the sanction of the law to the 
35 HAAnnual Report and Accomts 1963 
-64, Laidom Her NbiestY's 
Stationary Office, 30th Ady 1964, P. 46 
36 ibi(i p. 48 
37 M& p. 47 
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e)dsting practice under which they had acted independently for the programme companies on a non- 
statutory basisý'. 
Fulfilling its duty under the recent legislation, the ITA itself drew up a new code drawing on the old 
Pfinciples of Television Advenising which had served it well as a basis for control. Almost all its 
provisions were included in the new Code, with some additions implementing the requirements of the 
most recent legislation. The ITA also had consultations "about advertising standards in general with 
those concerned with the self-disciplining activities of the Advertising Standards Authority and the 
v#39 Code of Advertising Practice Committee 
, 
the two bodies responsible flor standards in non 
broadcast adverr,.. ing. 
The ASA had recently been set up by the advertising industry to police itself in the hope of avoiding 
an increase in statutory regulation. It worked in conjunction with another voluntary body, the British 
Code of Advertising Practice Committee, and together they had produced a Code of Practice which 
owed a great deal to the Pfinciples of TeIeWsion Aaý, erjWng. 13ased on these joint consultations, the 
ITA produced a new Code in June 1964 enfifled yhe Independent yelewsion Code of Advertising 
Stwxýrds and Praclice. Yhe Bfidsh Code of SAmdards Relating to the AaWrWsing of Me&cines 
cuzd Treatments, which television shared with the print media, was once more included. 
The very fact that there had been such an upsurge of self regulatory activity in advertising, driven by 
the need to control television advertising, tends to disprove the theory that commercial television 
would automatically lead to a decline in general standards, and the corruption of public fife. In the 
event, advertising on television had brought the industry into focus as never before, and raised its 
awareness of the need for better self-policing as an alternative to more legislation. 
In order to apply the stringent new controls over the executive decisions relating to the acceptance of 
advertisements, the ITXs Advertising Control Office, as well as the Copy Clearance Conmittee, 
started to receive copies of proposed scripts of all but the most minor local ads, and to review all 
finished films. Ile Authority was easily able to adapt the eýdsting machinery to cope with the 
increased ay-to-day involvement with copy clearance required by the 1964 Act. To fonimlise this 
ibi(L p. 50 
39 ibi(i p. 51 
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arrangement aJoint Advertisement Control Committee was set up composed of specialist staff of the 
Authority and the contractors, under the chairmanship of the ITA! s Head of Advertising Control. 
6.5 1964-1972: Regulation as Usual. 
Throughout the rest of the 1960's, Independent Television continued to develop but the framework 
for advertising control provided for in the 1964 Act did not undergo any flirther significant changes. 
The one major upheaval was the final banning by the Labour government, elected in 1964, of a 
cigarette advertising on television. This measure was announced by the Postmaster General in 
Parliament in Yi, 
--xch 1965 and took effect on August Ist. It represents one of the few occasions 
when the state took advantage of its legal powers to intervene directly in the regulation of a specific 
class of advertisements. 
The ITA! s 1965-1966 Report reveals that in that year its Advertising Control Office received a total 
of 7,700 pre-production scripts for inspection, an annual figure which remained relatively stable 
over many yearsý. About 8% of non-medical scripts had to be amended to bring them into fine with 
the Code compared with about 16% of semi-medical and 30% of medical scripts. This shows the 
high priority the Authority gave to ensuring the compliance of this class of advertisements with the 
rules. 
That only 1% of finished films needed editing before approval was granted demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the revised pre-transmission vetting procedures carried out jointly by the ITA and the 
Copy Clearance Secretariat. With regard to the Advertising Advisory Committee, the Report pointed 
out that as a result of the increased powers of direct action accorded the ITA in 1964 the AAC had 
"fewer problems to resolve and does not need to meet as regularly as in former years. " Its value as a 
forum for the discussion of matters of general principle was nevertheless till recognised4l. 
In 1968, the year of the renewal of the ITV companies' contracts, the ITA had to take on board two 
new pieces of general legislation concerned with advertising standards in all media: the Trade 
Descriptions (No. 2) Bill, and the Medicines Bill. The Annual Report for that year states that "there 
40 rrA- Annual Report and Accounts 1965-1966, Londom- Her bobjesty Stationazy Office, 16th Novanber 1966, p. 50. 
Note: It has recenfly increased to aMrxfinately 12,000. 41 ibid. p. 53 
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were consultations with the Ministries concerned to ensure that the provisions of the Television Act 
1964 were taken into account in the drafting of these Bills and that the Authority's position as 
regards television advertising, which is that of an official instrument of consumer protection, would 
not be weakened "42 
. 
It was clearly important that the regulation of television advertising should not 
be considered in isolation from independent consumer protection legislation and that there should 
be maximum harmony between special rules for television and the law of the land. 
. 
In addition to its interaction upwards with state as the level of authority above, the ITA also recorded 
the results of its interaction outwards with the viewing public. Although it received very few letters 
about advertising 
- 
only sixty in 1968 out of fifteen minion homes receiving ITV 
- 
the regulator 
claimed that there was Oa very lively interest in television advertising matters at the many public 
meetings addressed by the Authority's senior Headquarters taff and Regional officers"43 
. 
The 
Television Act, the Code of Practice and the machinery for its implementation were explained during 
these meetings, and public comment invited. In this way the Authority was able to keep in touch with 
people's feelings about the effectiveness of regulation. It was satisfied that viewers were, on the 
whole, now more content with the amount and distribution of advertising, and were happy to have it 
as an alternative to paying an increased licence fee for television services. This impression was 
confirmed by a national survey conunissioned in 1970, where eight out of ten people said that they 
preferTed advertising to a higher licence fee. 44% claimed to enjoy all advertising, while only 17% 
disliked it. TUs is a considerable improvement on the 1960 figures, but it is quite possible that 
growing familiarity with commercials on television had lessened their negative impact. 
Yhe Code of AdveiWsing Stwxkrds and Practice was updated at that time in order to take account 
of the two new Bills, and to harmonise with the self-regulatory Code, Yhe British Code Of 
Adverfising Practice. The revised version was appended to the Annual Report. 
By 1971, the ITCA was busy maldng plans for the increase in broadcasting hours recommended by 
the Prices and Incomes Board. The Association, together with the ITA, was also preparing for the 
second commercial channel which all parties with a stake in commercial television had been pressing 
for some time. Various possibilifies were investigated: a service provided by a new set of contractors 
42 ibid. p. 53 43 ibid. p. 57 
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to compete with the c? dsting channel, an option favoured by the ISBA, a general service independent 
of both BBC and ITV, and a fourth specialised channel. 
The ISBA also lobbied for an extension of broadcasting hours and the removal of the exchequer levy. 
The levy had replaced the Television Advertisement Duty in 1963, when a two-part system of rentals 
for the contractors been set up. The second stage of the rental consisted of a direct charge on net 
advertising receipts in excess of 11,500,000. The exchequer would take up to 45% of a net 
turnover of 17,500,000 or more. This system proved fairly onerous over the years, and remained 
the source of much irritation to the companies. In effect, it penalised profitability and acted as a 
disincentive to k-ceping costs down". This aspect of process regulation has caused difficulties 
throughout he fife of Independent Television in the UK, and company accountants have been kept 
busy devising ways of keeping money out of the hands of the Treasury. In the event, all planning 
turned out to have been in vain; the government postponed the additional service and removed all 
restrictions on broadcasting hours instead. 
6.6 Conclusion. 
There are a number of ways in which the events of the first two decades of operation of the 
Independent Television Authority, as an agency dedicated to the regulation of private business in the 
UK, confonn to some of the theoretical perspectives discussed previously. There are, nevertheless, 
ways in which the empirical circumstances does not fit, and a particular theory either does not explain 
what happened or needs some modification. 
For example, although progressive public interest theory and regulatory failure theories are helpK 
they presuppose that a regulatory agency "concentrates its attentions on a single industry or group of 
closely related industries", as specialisation helps it to discover what the public interest is in a given 
arees. In the case of commercial television in the M however, the agency is responsible for 
regulating two different industries who are related only as seller is related to buyer within a pre- 
determined regulatory structure. They are not naturally related in terms of goods or services on offer 
to the public, or in terms of aims and objectives. These objectives are, as PMdngton pointed out, 
'" Brian Henry (ed. ) op cit. p. 99 45 Nfarver Bernstein, Regulating Bmilham by Indqmndmt Comm4siom Princeton: Princetcn University Press. 1985 
, 
p. 15 7 
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incompatible according to the terms under which the regulatory agency was set up. To regulate in 
favour of one industry is likely to disadvantage the other. The regulator, therefore, not only has to 
find a way of reconciling industry and consumer demands, but opposing industry demands as well. 
Regulation of Independent Television in this country, however, is mainly directed at promoting the 
ability of television companies to provide a quality service, and thereby "serving and advancing the 
public interest"46 before the interests of advertisers. The advertising industry, which had adopted a 
firm public interest stance with respect to programming at the genetic stage of regulation, found 
that, in practice, regulation left them with second class statuS47 
. 
Although at the beginning the claim 
of advertisers that their participation in television represented the public interest was judged to be 
justifiable, the regulatory system still gave far more weight to the claims of programme producers 
and consumers. 
So the television regulator suffers not just from the difficulty noted by Bernstein that its general 
objectives of promoting and restricting are sometimes in conflict, but also from having to regulate 
two separate industries whose agendas are obliged to be entirely different as a specific requirement of 
regulation policy. The television Authority has to decide where the public interest fies in two distinct 
areas, programming and advertising, which are only related within the given regulatory structure; and 
it can fail to do justice not only to viewers and listeners, but to one or another industry as well. 
Although McQuail's definition of the public interest can be applied in the context Of advertising 
er ei ed ailur regulation, it is more relevant to the process ide. The various olutions to the Pcvfe of the 
regulatory structure which were considered by the Pilkington Committee can be taken as competing 
claims to represent the public interest. Alternatives to the status quo of duopoly, which envisaged 
either non-advertising funded additional services, or more commercial competition, were prima facie 
justifiable within the political and legal system. 
In the case of product regulation of advertising, since it is more concerned with protecting the 
viewing public as consumers of the goods and services promoted on television than as consumers of 
4' Television : Me Plemw and theAdvý*ser, A Memorandum on Competitive Television and Draft Suggestion for the 
47 
Regulation of Rogrammes, Submitted Jointly by the ISBA and the IPA to RM Postmaster General, April 1953, p. 5 
As the ISBA complained. " as there is a strictly limited ainount of airtane available for adverftsin& the rrV companies have been 
able to impose term mid conditions of busincsswhich are very much in their favour 
..... 
Ibis has resulted in high profits which the 
Government of the day has found necessary to control by means of a levy on advertismg revenue. " (ISBA/IPA- Television 76. - The 
ERVPA riew, Incorporated Society ofBritish Advertisers, Institute of Phzictitioners in Advertisin& November 1972, p. 13) 
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programmes there are fewer competing claims. It makes more sense, therefore, to view the public 
interest in the traditional way as the protection of potentially vulnerable consumers from the activities 
of powerfid producers, who may be tempted to abuse their right of access to the broadcast medium. 
There is only one possible competing claim: that consumers have a right to information and too much 
regulation interferes with advertisers' ability to give this information. This claim was not actually 
made on any scale by advertisers until the late 1970s and early 1980s, and will be dealt with in 
more detail in Chapters 12 and 13. 
Capture theory also has something to say about advertising regulation. Pilldngton and other critics 
believed that capture had occurred as an effect of the practical operation of regulation. In their 
opinion, the regulator was excessively sympathetic to the difficulties of the programme contractors, 
and the copy clearance mechanism had permitted contractors to influence the way in which 
enforcement of the rules was carried out. The Advertising Advisory Committee, as a consumer 
protection mechanism was too heavily weighted in favour of the advertising industry, to the extent 
of having an advertising executive as its chairman, and its advice was mandatory. This structural bias 
in favour of both the regulated industries helped to account for the feeling that the public interest in 
the area of advertising control had been perverted. 
Stigler's version of capture theory, which sees regulation as facilitating cartel management by the 
regulated industry, can be applied to the empirical facts of the operation of the regulatory system, 
even if it had been initiated by the state and not by industry. The system had been designed 
intentionally to allow the television companies to operate as a cartel protected by strict controls on 
market entry, but clearly the repercussions of this system had not been fidly anticipated. After their 
initial problems in getting enough advertising revenue, the network companies became so profitable 
that Lord Thomson was prompted to make his much quoted comment that they had been given "a 
license to print money". Pilkington was unhappy that the regulatory system set up under the original 
Television Act gave so much power to the programme contractors, but felt that the solution was not 
to ease controls on market entry and provide more competition, but to provide a more powerfid 
regulatory structure. 
Perceptions of regulatory failure are nevertheless bound to be to some extent subjective. Even if 
many people had expressed reservations about the principle of a broadcasting duopoly with one 
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partner having a monopoly of airtime for commercial purposes, it is quite possible to argue that, in 
the particular case of broadcasting, this type of regulatory structure constituted not a failure, but a 
necessity. For precisely the same reasons that the broadcasting system as a cultural institution, 
embodied in the BBC, had been insulated from the market, its extension, in the form of Independent 
Television, also had to be protected to some degree. The overriding purpose of regulation was to 
provide the fight conditions for public service broadcasting to continue to flourish, and if the price 
turned out to be a powerful cartel with monopoly rights to a valuable commodity it was a price 
worth paying. This is the view the government ook in rejecting calls for more commercial 
competition at that stage, merely increasing instead the powers of the ITA with respect to 
adverfising. 
During its first two decades, the ITA gradually developed its own mode of doing regulation based on 
certain familiar aspects of British culture. The search for pragmatic rather ideological solutions and 
the impulse to reach them by consensus decision-maldng and compromise rather than an adversarial 
approach are part of the British tradition 49 
.A dislike of extremes, the emphasis on fairness and the 
'ýnannying" role of public institutions are all reflected in the behaviour of the commercial television 
regulator. It is interesting that what organisational critiques of regulation tend to see as a sign of 
regulatory fAure, i. e. the impulse to compromise and form "consensus networks" in order to 
mininuse conflict, has always been viewed as one of the strengths of the UK system, particularly in 
the area of advertising control. Although there is a fine beyond which compromise turn May into 
unnecessary concession, the regulating Authority for commercial television has always believed that 
Obtaining a consensus is essential to the decision-making process. 
48N t. 0 e. It has been pointed out to me by Howard Turnba tbd the legal and political systems in the UK am adversarial. VVhile this 
is entirely tnw from a formal point of view, I have been tying in this study to explore some of theways in which infonnal 
attitudes and values m1lua= the actions of those involved in regulation, both in creating fornml strmftm, and in operating 
v. ithin them in red life. 
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Chapter 7 
The ITA Becomes the IBA. 
7.1 Introduction. 
In 1972, following the government's decision to permit commercial sound broadcasting at local level, 
the ITA was given the additional responsibility of regulating the new Independent Local Radio 
system, an alteration in broadcasting regulation that eventually became law on 23 May, 1974. T'his 
necessitated a change of name and the ITA was re-fifled the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
(IBA). The new regulatory function did not have any direct bearing on television adverfising control, 
but as the IBA intended to use the existing copy clearance framework for vetting scripts for radio 
advertisements this meant expanding it appropriately. 
The Authority took the view that because radio is a more low-key and less threatening medium than 
television 
- 
advertisements would only be broadcast to relatively small local audiences, and radio's 
role as the centre of family entertainment in the home had long since been taken over by television - 
vetting procedures need not be as strict as those for television. There was also "a special need for 
speed and flexibility in dealing Aith the requirements of radio advertisers"' 
. 
The MA therefore left 
the sound broadcasters with a greater degree of freedom to clear scripts at local level rather referring 
everything to the central Clearance Secretariat. These arrangements for ILR would be used as a 
model by the 1984 Hunt Committee in proposing more: fle)dble regulation of Cable television, when 
political and technological changes once again provided the driving force for ?- paradigm shift in 
broadcasting regulation. The period up to and including the 1980 Broadcasting Act, however, was 
still dominated by the second paradigm 
- 
duopoly 
- 
even though a ffirther commercial channel and 
a commercial breakfast service were inaugurated during that time, and, by the end of it, the 
phenomenon of Thatcherism had arrived on the nation's political scene. 
'Independent Broadcasting Authority (MA): Annual Reporl andAccounts 1973-74, London: Home Office, 
31 st March 1974, p. 38 
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7.2 The Run-up to the Annan Committee. 
1972 also saw a major confrontaflon between ITV and the government following the publication of 
the Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalised Industries' Report into the workings of the 
commercial television Authority. The Select Committee believed that although the Authority was 
technically competent and conscientious, in general 'it was too rnuch influenced by the needs of the 
companies which (were) its agents, too cautious in testing new forms of programmes and in 
affording greater public access to the medium and to industry"2. The extent to which advertisers 
influenced events was also criticised, and the Report recommended that the provisions of the 1964 
Act on natural breaks should be more strictly observed; that discussion programmes hould be 
broadcast during which consumers would have the chance to test products on air and answer the 
claim of advertisers; and that advertising should be 'bunched" into blocks of up to thirty minutes, as 
practised in Germany, Switzerland, Holland and Italy, and other ways of spacing advertisements 
considered so as to reduce the pressure for maxirnal audiences?. These suggestions reflected the rise 
in power and influence of the consumer movement in the 1970s, both in the UK and Europe, as a 
result of which the advertising world found itself faced with a much more vocal and organised 
opposition than before. 
An advertising working party was formed by the programme contractors, the IPA and the ISBA to 
fight these proposals Which they felt would seriously damage the health of ITV. In a discussion 
document issued by the worldng party, they pointed out that the term "natural break" had never been 
legally defined so as to leave a degree of fle)dbility to directors of programming, and the regulating 
authority had, in any case, been reducing their number and length since 1955. In answer to the 
Suggestion that the "block" system of advertising should be adopted, the group argued that in those 
countries where it was in operation the stations did not depend solely on advertising revenue but 
received a share of the licence fee as a supplement to their income. In addition, permitting only one 
thirty minute block per night would reduce the amount of advertising by one third, an intolerable 
situations. 
2 SecondReportfmm the SeJect Committee on NationalisedIndusMes together with minutes ofprocenchngs ofthe Committee, 
minutes ofe4dmcg appow4wes and inder (Saision 1971-72-- HC 465) London: HWO, 1972, para 170, p. bdx 3 ibid. paras, 79,81,92, p. xxxviii 
4 Note., An account of these developments is given in Chapter 13. 5 Brian Henry (edL), British Television AdverWsing, London: Century Benhas, 1986, pp. 146-147 
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With respect to allowing consumers to debate specific claims on air the representatives of the 
television companies and the advertising industry felt that "products were best tested (and reported 
on) in print, and drew attention to the fact that the Government had just decided to appoint a 
Mnister for Consumer Affairs who was probably in a much better position than the broadcasters to 
make a decision on the most effective means of protecting the shopper"6 
. 
Fortunately for them, the 
NIinister responsible agreed and the SCNrs recommendations were shelved for the time being, 
Towards the end of the year, the IBA issued a new edition of the Code to include the rules on 
advertising on radio, and to update the television guidelines, taking into account cases on which 
decisions had been made since the last edition. Rules on preventing even an appearance of 
sponsorship were clarifia The Authority was particularly concerned about the use of "a small 
number of regular broadcasters", or well known television characters in commercials, which might 
suggest hat Independent Television as such was seeming to support the case of one advertiser or 
another through the use of these personalities. The companies received a warning about this practice 
and ITN newscasters were forbidden to appear in commercials at alf 
-A considerable body of case 
law had meanwhile been accumulating which made the task of those responsible for enforcing 
regulation easier, but perhaps made the system less open to innovation from an advertising point of 
view. 
In 1973, the MA put forward finiher proposals for the additional commercial channel, which was 
once more under consideration by the government. The regulator conceived of it as a complementary 
rather than a competitive service which would cater for minority and specialist interests. 
Complementary scheduling could only be done, however, if ITV were to operate a joint programme 
planning system with the fourth channel. Scope was also envisaged for the statior to be supplied with 
programmes by the regional companies or independent producers. The Authority disagreed on this 
issue with the IPA and ISBA who were concerned that if the new channel were operated by odsting 
contractors, even with an increased role for the MA, their stranglehold on airtime would become 
even greater. To avoid this, advertising interests argued for competifive advertising on ITV 2. The 
IPA also advocated that some advertising time should be sold by BBC 19. 
6 ibid. p. 147 
7 IBA: Annual Report and Accounts 1973-74, op cit. p. 39 
' ibid. p. 9 
9 Second Report on SCNC, 1972, op. cit para 78, p. )DoMfi 
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The ITCA! s plan was that a separate company would be formed, with the contractors as 
shareholders. Scheduling would be organised along the EBA! s recommended lines, but with a large 
proportion of independently produced material. Since it was unlikely that the channel would be 
self-financing it would be subsidised by ITV 1, both directly, from advertising revenue, and indirectly 
from "surplus studio production resources"10. 
Again the government delayed making a decision. In March 1974, after fifty years of regulation, the 
regulatory responsibilities for broadcasting were removed from the Postmaster-General and 
transferred to the Home Office. Within a short time the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, had appointed 
another broadcasting conunittee. Headed by Lord Annan, its brief was to consider the future of 
broadcasting and "to propose what constitutionaL organisational and finazicial arrangements should 
apply to the conduct of all these services" 11. 
In the smne year, the EBA Act became law, consolidating the Television Act 1964 and the Sound 
Broadcasting Act 1972. The wording of the provisions on advertising in Sections 8 and 9 is 
unchanged from the 1964 Act, apart from the substitution of "the Minister" for "the 
Posftnaster-General" in Section 8 Subsection 9, Mowing the transfer of responsibility for 
broadcasting to the Home Office. 
7.3 Advertising in the Annan Committee Report. 
The Report of the Aman Committee was finaHy published in March 1977, having taken written and 
oral evidence from approximately 750 organisations and individuals. 
The EBA! s and the ITCA! s memoranda were published in 1975 as separate booklets. While the two 
were broadly in agreement on many issues, the ITCA had some quite active criticisms to make of its 
regulator. According to the programme companies' Association, the composition of the Authority 
was not sufficiently representative of the viewing public; those of "the great and the good" who could 
10 Proposals submitted by the Independent Television companies to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: 
July 1973, p2 
Report ofthe Committee on the Future ofBroadcasting, (Chairman: Lord Annan) (Cmnd 6753), London: HMSO, 1977, 
p. 3 (Annan Report 1) 
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spare the time to serve on it were mostly "elderly" and they interpreted their duties in too 
authoritarian a manner 12 
. 
The ITCA complained, for example, that the ITA took "too detailed an 
interest in the minutiae of scheduling and programming", and that "the voluminous canon of 
restrictions" they imposed acted as a brake on programming 13. It also reported that the pre-vetting 
procedures were unsatisfactory to some companies. These were the first open signs that the 
contractors were beginning to feel somewhat restricted under the weight of regulation. Their 
criticisms did not entirely accord with the version of events put forward publicly by the Authority. 
The I]BA! s own evidence to the Conmittee gives no hint of any differences of opinion, and its Annual 
Reports preferTed to stress the harmonious relations between itself and the regulated parties. 
The ITCA! s memorandum reveals the extent to which the machinery for advertising control had 
developed in professionalism and complexity since the early days. The companies not only had to 
comply with the periodically updated EBA Code, but were obliged to "satisfy Acts of Parliament and 
ministerial orders covering many areas of advertising, including lotteries, medicines, hire purchase 
and the labelling of food" 
-a long and growing HSt14 
. 
By this time, the Copy Clearance Secretariat 
consisted not only of the Copy Committee of five company sales directors, but also of a permanent 
staff of nineteen who were responsible for negotiating with advertisers and their agencies over the 
interpretation of the Code. The expansion of operations was necessary because, in the words of the 
ITCA, "observarice of the steadily growing complexity of the rules is obtained only by scrutiny of 
every advertisement individually"". This work was had to be continually monitored by the I13A to 
ensure that the rules were not being misinterpreted.. 
The ITCA maintained that having the companies act as a "buffer" between the marketing men of the 
advertising industry and the civil servants of the regulatory authority helped pre-. -, mt conflict. There 
was certainly plenty of work for the Copy Clearance stff to do. In 1973, over 10,000 scripts were 
vetted and 6,000 films checked, and the ITCA were able to tell the Annan Committee that the Office 
of Fair Trading had recently expressed its approval of the way in which the Copy Committee 
performed its task The Companies Association also submitted to Annan its proposals for a 
12 Independent Television Companies Association, 17VEvidence to the Annan Committee, A submission by the 
13 
Independent Television Companies to the Annan Committee on the Future of Broadcasting, March 1975, p23 
ibidL p. 24 
14 ibidL p. 122 
15 ibid. p. 122 
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complementary rather than a flifly competitive commercial channel unchanged from its 1973 
submission to the Post Office. 
The IBNs memorandum devotes only half a dozen pages out of 95 to advertising, plus a short 
appendix consisting of arguments against any form of general broadcasting complaints council, or 
consumer council. It is neither as lively nor as challenging as the companiee paper. It merely covered 
the usual ground, describing the procedures for controlling the content of individual commercials and 
the rules for regulating their amount and distribution. 
On the product side, the Authority claimed to have discovered little evidence of anxiety on the part 
of the public about the content of advertising. It arrived at this conclusion through correspondence 
'with the public and through its many formal and informal contacts with viewers. Further evidence 
came from the low level of complaints from the public 
- 
only 90 letters or telephone calls during the 
four month period from January to June 1974 16 The EBA denied that this was due to the low level 
of public awareness of its existence, and drew attention to its practice of making brief television and 
17 radio announcements about its regulatory role and about the Code of Practice 
. 
On the process 
side, the Authority again rejected the suggestion that commercials hould be bunched into long 
blocks of up to half an hour, on the lines of some European systems, rather than placed at regular 
intervals. It believed that "by extending the lengths of some blocks of advertising between 
Programmes to 3.5 minutes and increasing the proportion of these longer breaks, it has carried the 
grouping of advertisements and reduction in the number of advertising intervals to the Emits of good 
practice in the presentation of Programmes and advertisements"' 8. 
Although the Annan Committee accepted the argument that block advertising v-35 inappropriate for 
the UK system of commercial broadcasting, the IBA evidently felt that Parliament needed fiu-ther 
persuasion. It repeated its case before the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, which had 
16 Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA): Evidence to the Committee on lite Future ofBroadcasting under the 
chairMaWhip OfLordAnnan, September 1974, p. 22 17 Note. * In spite of this claim, the regulating Authority (now the ITC ) has to this day had problems with public 
awareness Of its regulatory function. 111c non-broadcast advertising self-regulatory body, the Advertising Standards 
Authority, has a higher profile and still receives many complaints directed at television or radio commercials. 18 MA:, VOre Channels 
-More Choices?, The Cable Broadcasting Debate. Implications of the proposals of the Hunt Inquiry, The View of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, November 1982, p. 25 
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favoured the idea earlier, claiming that the present system of distribution worked well and that the 
Authority received few complaints about it". 
The Annan Report represents a shift in attitudes towards commercial broadcasting in general and 
broadcast advertising in particular. At last the pervasive air of disapproval seems to have evaporated, 
and the Corrunittee was able to state that it had received "very little opposition to advertising as a 
means of financing broadcasting, though some organisations, including the TUC, were opposed to 
fimher extensions of commercial broadcasting 00. It maintained that advertising had for many years 
been under sustained attack as an undesirable type of propaganda which creates anti-social wants and 
degrades the use of the English language, pointing to the 1964 Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into Advertising, under the Chairmanship of Lord Reith, as the most comprehensive indictment of 
advertising made so far2l. As an antidote to this view, the Committee re-stated the arguments made 
to it by supporters of advertising, who claimed that it is "an essential fink in the chain of distribution 
which makes it possible to achieve high volume sales leading to lower costs. It encourages 
innovation and improvement of products because it can create sales for new products quickly, thus 
making investment in research, development and new plant worthwhile"22. Annan viewed the 
arguments for and against advertising "as being about the kind of society we five into23 
. 
If 
competition is to be purged from the social system, then in "totalitarian logic", so must advertising, 
otherwise, in a market economy it must simply be "curbed by law and by regulation". It saw this 
curbing of advertisers as the main function of the IBA, and believed that "for the most part it carries 
out this function effectively"24 
. 
T'his positive verdict on the effectiveness of the commercial television regulator represents a 
remarkable change in attitudes towards television advertising on the part of th-. establishment. For 
whatever eason 
- 
increased familiarity on the part of viewers, more effective regulation by the I13A, 
a rise in the sophistication of commercials themselves -- both the policy-making elite and the viewing 
public at large had come to terms with the idea of advertising on television. Since it was more or less 
safisfied with the status quo, Annan did not take up the idea, first proposed by Pilkington, that the 
19 Tenth Reportfrom the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, together with theproceedings of the Committee, 
minutes of evidence 
...... 
andappendices (Session 1977-78: HC 637-1.637-11) London: IHMSO, 1978, p. 77 20 Annan Repolt I Op. Cit. P. 163 2' ibid. p. 163 
1 ibid. p. 163 
23 ibid. p. 163 
24 ibid. p. 163 
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EBA should be responsible for selling airtime. In the Committees view, the Authority would not be 
able "to match the marketing efforts and expertise of the eager beavers in commercial companies 
who knew their regions intimately"" 
The Committee took a practical view of the vexed question of natural breaks. It thought hat if 
programmes were produced so as to have plenty of natural breaks this would be too obvious; they 
would be like "shoddy garments in which the stitching is all too visible "26 
. 
But if natural breaks were 
eliminated, programmes would just be made shorter in order to fit in enough advertising. In other 
words, natural breaks must remain atural and not be artificially created, and it was up to the IBA to 
use its common sense and aesthetic judgement in this respect. Serious documentaries, for example, 
such as The World at War should, like the current affairs programme World in Action, be screened 
without commercial breaks. 
The Annan Report was also liberal in its attitude to the amount of advertising permitted and took 
heed of the evidence given by the ISBA and the IPA, both of whom considered the system of spot 
advertising highly satisfactory. The ISBA did not want any overall increase in airtime "because it
might prove to be unacceptable to viewers as well as counterproducfive for advertisers as too much 
advertising would make each individual commercial less effective"27 
. 
As it had done in the past, the 
ISBA adopted a conservative approach towards the quantity of advertising to be screened. 
Nevertheless, the Committee felt that although a daily average of six minutes was still about right, the 
limit of seven minutes in any one clock hour need not be rigidly adhered to. Occasionally up to ten 
minutes would be acceptable if this was judged to be appropriate. 
It did express concern, however, about a number of aspects of television adv--rfising which it felt 
should be regulated more tightly. Evidence from America showed that childrens memory and 
appreciation of programmes were damaged by interruptions for commercials. Moreover, advertising 
aimed at persuading children or their parents to part with their money could "encourage a degree of 
covetousness at a stage when children are unable to exercise sufficient discretion in assessing the 
merits of such an attitude to life"29. And while a minority of the Committee felt it was not worth 
25 ibid. p. 164 
26 ibid. p. 165 
27 ibid- p. 167 
29 ibid. p. 167 
21 ibid. P. 166 
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sacrificing the L15 million revenue represented by such advertising, a majority recommended a
complete ban on commercials during programmes pecially made for children. Tlis recommendation 
was not ultimately followed and the misting rules on advertising during children's programmes 
remained in force. 
Creeping sponsorship was another problem area. The IBA had recently issued guidelines on "indirect 
advertising" 
- 
sponsored events, track side banners, advertising hoardings, and the use of TV 
personalities in commercials 
- 
but according to Annan, these new rules were still not effective enough 
in dealing with "clandestine advertising". An instance of this was when pop music programmes were 
packaged by producers in collaboration with record companies. Record companies could then seem 
to be buying time on the air to expose their products. The Committee disliked the possibility that the 
public night be "misled into watching programmes which in effect were elaborate advertisements for 
30 commercial interests" 
In general, control of the content of advertisements through the mechanism of the Copy Clearance 
Secretariat, working in conjunction with the E3A! s own specialist stA was given the seal Of 
approval. Annan was not impressed with the IPA and the ISBA! s complaint that the regulator was 
"very tough" and sometimes "too legalistic", and recorded that advertising industry representatives 
"had failed to bring tears to our eyes"' I. 
Eventually, the Annan Committee recommended only two minor changes to the system of 
advertising control. Its major proposals concerned the establishment of a fourth television channel, 
which it suggested should be run by an open Broadcasting Authority acting more like a publisher 
than the IBA.. Regulation of the channel should encourage innovative prograr-ining comrnissioned 
from a variety of independent sources, and it should be financed by block advertising, various forms 
of sponsored programmes and grants from educational bodies. In some ways tlis blueprint was more 
radical than the one finally decided on by the Thatcher government in 1980. 
ibid. P. 169 
31 ibid. P. 169 
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The Report also recommended the setting up of a Broadcasting Complaints Commission "to 
consider complaints against all the Broadcasting Authorities of misrepresentation r unjust or unfair 
treatment in broadcast programmes"32 
. 
While the Annan Report was in preparation, the EBA went on maldng adjustments to its regulations. 
The revised 1975 Code ruled that advertisements for children's toys must include an indication of 
price. The manufacturers had objected that this might lead to higher prices in the shops, but the IBA 
insisted on an experimental period of two years. In 1977, this rule became established until a slight 
relaxation was permitted in the late 1980s. 
In 1977, the fifth edition of the Code was issued and amended, after consultation with the Home 
Secretary, to permit advertising by Member Firms of the Stock Exchange. Following the hope 
expressed by the Annan Comrnittee that the Authority would relax its restrictions on advertising by 
charities, a Working Party was set up in 1977 to look at ways of doing this. Its report, published in 
September 1978, advised that recognised charities should be allowed greater freedom to advertise 
subject to shictly defined conditions. After further consultations the IBA accepted this adViC633. The 
proposed liberalisation was subsequently vetoed by the Home Secretary in 1979, on the grounds that 
it would be difficult "to amend the MA Act 1973 to allow religious charities to advertise their 
welfare activities without entirely lifting the ban on advertising by religious bodies", for which there 
was not a sufficient case at that time". In order to avoid discrimination all charities had to wait 
another ten years before enjoying the privilege of advertising on television. 
Afler considering the Annan Report in depth, the ruling Labour government issued a White paper in 
1978. It accepted Annans recommendations for the setting up of a fourth channel to be run by an 
Open Broadcasting Authority, authorised. by the appropriate legislation, and envisaged extending the 
MA Act untfl the 1990s. 
32 ibid. p. 474 
33 IBA: Annual Report and Accounts 1978-79, Londorr Home Office, 31 st March 1979, p. 47 
34 113A; Annual RePort andAccounts 1979-80, London: Home Office, 31stMarch 1980, p. 49 
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7.4 A Change of Government: A Shift in Policy. 
In 1979, a General Election on May 3rd removed the Labour Government which had appointed the 
Annan Committee and produced the latest White Paper on broadcasting policy. A Conservative 
administration under Margaret Thatcher was returned to power which reversed Labour's plans, and 
broadcasting started to take a change ofdirection which, in a little over a decade, would result in the 
most horoughgoing overhaul of the system since its inception. 
This did not take place in isolation but as part of a radical programme of political action designed to 
effect long term and irreversible social and economic change. Heavy state intervention in the 
economy, hallmark of previous Lzbour administrations, was to be reduced. Wage controls and price 
control agencies, such as the Price Cominission, which had forced the contractors to keep the rate 
card prices of airtime down were to be abolished. The new government intended to promote a 
vigorous free enterprise culture by privafising the nationalised industries and scaling down the extent 
of state regulation of private business. 
At the beginning, however, the Prime Minister directed her reforms at other areas of industry and 
broadcasting was treated to a fairly mild dose of market medicine. Thatcherism,, ýNith its insistence on 
allowing market forces rather than the state or the regulators to determirie the success or failure of 
commercial enterprises, was still in its exTerimental stage. As broadcasting was not an immediate 
priority it was not subjected to radical re-structuring until end of the 1980s. In a speech given to the 
Royal Television Society in September 1979, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, outlined the 
government's ideas for an additional channel. He made it clear that "the main source of funds for the 
Fourth Channel will be spot advertising, though block advertising and sponsorship may be permitted. 
This would not be competitive advertising, however, as such competition would jr,, evitably result in a 
move towards single-minded concentration on ma, -drnising the audience for programmes with 
adverse consequences for both of the commercial channels". Ile IBA, and not an Open 
Broadcasting Authority, would be responsible for regulation. 
The Home Office's cautious approach was echoed by the MA when they produced their own 
proposals hortly afterwards. It recommended "a Fourth Channel company with its own Board of 
Directors which, exercising considerable independence though ultimately responsible to the authority, 
would undertake the operational control of the Fourth Channel 
..... 
the Fourth Channel should be run 
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as a service complementary to, but different from, rrVtl35 
. 
Existing companies would have a place 
on the Board, but not a dominant one. The company would act as a publisher, commissioning and 
acquiring programmes (a substantial number from sources other than the ITV companies) but not 
producing them. "Innovation and experiment would be encouraged"36. Finance for the Channel 
would come from the ITV contractors who would sell and receive payment for the advertising time, 
paying a subscription to the EBA to meet the agreed budget if there should be a shortfall. 
The EBA Annual Report for the years 1979 
- 
1980, where the proposals are summarised, 
acknowledges that "there were a number of interests which expressed themselves forcefiffly in favour 
of advertising on the existing service and on the Fourth Channel being sold in competition with one 
another. The Authority recognised the reasons for this argument but was satisfied that viewers 
would be best served by an arrangement which offered no temptation constantly to pursue large 
37 audiences and so to narTow the range of programmes" 
The IPA and ISBA, the principal interests that had lobbied for competitive not complementary 
advertising on Channel Four, were disappointed by what they perceived as an effccfivc continuation 
of the ITV companies monopoly. The logic that equated increased commercial competition for 
airtime with falling standards and the betrayal of public service broadcasting was, however, stiff a 
powerfid influence on policy-makers in the broadcasting field". 
The advertising industry was not without genuine grounds for complaint, however. In a paper 
submitted to the I13A in October 1979 the ISBA detailed a number of abuses of monopoly power on 
the part of the companies which they alleged had been going on since 1968: the operation of the 
ITCA Cancellation Committee; deliberate restriction of airtime; inadequate -r-eans of checldng 
whether the correct commercials had actually been broadcast; price differentials in commercials of 
less than thirty seconds; and lack of consultation before changes in sales policy". Despite the 
35 ibid. p. 7 
M ibid. P. 8 
37 ibid. p. 8 
Note: For example, in a published summary of its evidence to the Annan Committee, the standing Conference on 
Broadcasting, whose members comprised leading academics, representatives from the spheres of broadcasting, the press, 
Politics and religion, and independent social welfare groups, stated unambiguously. "commercialism tends to "clude 
experiment and novelty and to encourage a reliance on established formats with proven profit potential and no 
development costs. - (The SCOB Papers: Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Evidence to the Committee on the Future 
3 
of Broadcasting, The Standing Conference on Broadcasting: London: January 1976 p. 4) 9 Brian Henry (ed. ), British Television Advertising, London: Century Bcnhas, 1986, pp. 196-197 
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contractors' argument that these were commercial matters which were best dealt with on an 
individual company basis without interference from the regulator, the ISBA urged that a committee 
be set up where a wide range of problems not necessarily within the statutory remit of the IBA, 
could be discussed before the Authority. 
The 113A was unwilling to antagonise advertisers and agencies on whose co-operation it relied in 
carrying out its regulatory duties, and promised to consider prohibiting making the sale of airtime on 
ITV conditional on buying airtime on Channel Four, and banning the linking of discounts between 
the two channels. It also recommended that each company publish separate rate cards for ITV and 
Channel Four and agreed that an Advertising Liaison Committee should be formed to provide a 
forum where MA officials and representatives of the ITCA, the IPA and the ISBA could discuss 
matters of common interest with a view to improving commercial relationships. 
7.5 The Broadcasting Act 1980 
ill ruary if After a period of discussion, a BroadcastingB was published in Feb 1980. It extended the Ie 
of the MA until 1996, legalised the proposed structure of the Channel Four company as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the Authority, and established the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, a 
survival of the Annan Report. The three member Committee would investigate complaints of "unjust 
or unfair treatment" and "unwarranted hiffingement of privacy" in both ITV and BBC programmes, 
but had no brief to deal with advertisements. 
The Act, which passed into law in November 1980, is longer and more detailed than any previous 
Acts, but much of it is devoted to a restatement of the structure of the IBA, and the arrangements for 
Channel Four. No less than six pages are given over to the organisation of the Broadcasting 
Complaints Commission. 
The general provisions on advertising remain unchanged, but sponsorship would be permitted on 
Channel Four in some exceptional circumstances. The majority of specific provisions for Channel 
Four refer to process regulation and follow the plan set out in the VVhite Paper. Schedule 2 contains 
the nine Rules as to Advertisements carried over from previous Acts. An additional Section (14) 
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deals with teletext services4o which had become increasingly popular with viewers seeý: ing various 
Icinds of specialised. information. ITVs Oracle service provided it with a useful extra source of 
advertising revenue, but a number of complaints had been made to the EBA about individual 
advertisements. The Authority was therefore required to draw up and review a code " giving 
guidance in such matters concerning standards and practice for teletext transmissions (including 
advertisements y4l. 
The Advertising Liaison Committee held its first meeting in June 1980, chaired by Lord Thomson of 
Monifieth, who took over from Lady Plowden as chairman of the EBA in the following year. The 
Committee! s brief was to consider "matters of principle relating to commercial relationships which 
were raised by the participating bodies"". It proved an extremely usefid means of facilitating 
negotiations between advertisers, agencies and contractors, with the regulator acting as an 
intermediary, and as adjudicator in any disputes. The Conunittee met four times a year and the 
resulting improvement in communications helped to reduce the level of conflict between buyers and 
Sellers. A closer involvement in the business dealings of its regulatees made it easier for the MA to 
ensure that the "no unreasonable discrimination" clause, contained in every broadcasting Act since 
1954, was being implemented in practice. 
New contracts were announced to run from January Ist 1982 and the new commercial breakfast TV 
franclise was awarded to TV AM to commence in 1983. 
7.6 Conclusion. 
The decade between the ITA becoming the IBA in 1973, and the commence=, it of the new ITV 
contracts in January 1982 was relatively calm. In fife cycle terms the regulator was entering middle 
age. Organisationally, this meant that the Authority had grown in size and complexity, particularly 
with respect to its system of advertising control, with the inevitable increase in bureaucracy that such 
an expansion brings. Nevertheless. 
' 
writing in 1981, Burton Paulu makes the point that "IBA staff 
40 Note: Cecfax was launched for the BBC in 1974, and oracle for ITV in 198 1. 
is bri C ere D an half pa es; 41 BroadcasfingAcf 1980 (CIL 64) London: HMSO, Section 15 (D. Note. ' The teletext code e am t" da 9 
Part A covers all trazismissions and part B advertisements As a specialist service its provisions are less stringent than the ITV code (advertisements for undertakers and for betting %wre allovmcL for example, under certain conditions ) but sponsorship of
transmissions, or even an impression of sponsorship, %us not permitted. 421BA: Annual Report and Accounts 1981-1982, London: Home Office, 31 st March 1982, p. 57 
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procedures are less elaborate and less formalised than those of the BBC. The MA is a newer and 
smaller organisation'143 
. 
It still did not compare with large US regulatory agencies, such as the 
Federal Communications Commission, which were the basis for the American critiques of regulatory 
decay and decline. 
This perception of smallness was shared by the ITCA. Descnibing the monthly meetings of the 
Authorit. Vs Standing Consultative Committee attended by the chief executives of the fifteen ITV 
companies, an ITCA document stated that "as an industry, Independent Television is relatively 
small (but at these monthly meetings) the twenty or so people who control it 
.... 
reach, by consensus 
and compromise, decisions Which may not always be advantageous to individual companies or a 
group of companies 
- 
or to the Authority for that matter 
- 
but which all accept as correct for ITV, its 
viewers and society"". This description, made for the benefit of the Annan Committee, represents an 
ideal picture of how regulation in Britain ought to be done. Both regulator and regulated show that 
they are aware that there e)dst wider considerations beyond their immediate goals -a classic 
common interest position 
- 
and claim to pursue their individual goals in a collaborative rather than an 
adversarial way. 
This ideal was not always achieved in practice, however. The ITV companies! complaint, also to the 
Annan Committee, that the Authority involved itself too much in the details of interpreting the Code, 
and was imposing a "voluminous canon of restrictions" on advertising, revealed another side to their 
relations. The advertising industry was not entirely happy eitherwith the "legalistic" approach of the 
EBA- From the point of view of advertisers and agencies, the EBA as an institution was becoming 
more infle)dble and increasingly regulation-minded in the carrying out of its regulatory duties. An 
IPA/ISBA paper on the reallocation of broadcasting resources after 1976 refý,.,; to the inefficiency 
of the ITV structure as a whole. Its authors believed that there were too many programme 
contractors, with many smaller regional companies urviving only because they were heavily 
subsidised, and suggested that "the industry's over-capacity and wastefid use of resources" should 
be eliminated by "rationalising" the network45. 
43BurtonPauluv Television andRadio in the UnitedKingdmn, London: Macmillan, 1981, p. 145 44 ibid. p. 146 
45 ISBA/IPA: Television 76: 71e ISBAIIPA View, Incorporated Society of British Advertisers, Institute of Practitioners in 
Advertising, November 1972, pp. 15-16 
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The fact that organisational critiques of the television regulator could be made with some 
justification after two decades of operation indicates that, despite the SCNI's criticism that the IBA 
was too much influenced by the needs of the companies, capture, in the sense of the regulated 
parties having control over the regulator to an extent that seriously undermined its consumer 
protection function had not taken place. 4". On the contrary, the regulated industries were both 
beginning to feel that the system was now tending to work in favour of purely regulatory objectives, 
such as regionalism and 'ýisk aversion! 'in advertising control. Besides, as has been mentioned earlier, 
the fact that the regulator was responsible for overseeing two different industries whose interests 
often conflicted, made capture a more complex phenomenon than merely a case of regulatory bias 
towards industry at the expense of the consumer. 
Under the tripartite system of regulation of British commercial television, where one of the regulated 
parties is also responsible for the enforcement of regulation, it, too, is in danger of becoming 
"regulation-minded". The advertising industry had been complaining for a long time to the IBA 
about the television companies' "abuses" of their privileged position, which it believed the Authority 
did not take seriously enough.. Advertisers and agencies often found the way in which the ITCA 
enforced standards of advertising content through the Copy Clearance Secretariat as great a source 
of frustration as the activities of the 113A. They felt that the system put them at the mercy of not just 
one but two sets of enthusiastic regulators. According to Brian Henry, the Advertising Liaison 
Committee was intended as a way of overcoming "years of acrimony and misunderstanding" between 
buyers and sellere'. 
The decade of 1970s also witnessed the rise of more distinct coalitions of interests, whose greater 
degree of organisation helped them to carve out a role for themselves in tlý field of broadcast 
advertising regulation. The organised consumer movement, in particular, had gained in confidence 
and influence, and the European Commission was in the process of instituting a wide-reaching 
consumer protection programme aimed, among other things, at more stringent advertising controls, 
particularly with respect to television. The public specifically as consumers of broadcasting had the 
46 Note: 11'rolifcrating rules and regulations and interpreting them strictly does not automatically mean that consumers' 
interests are being served better. Such activity may cover up the fact that more profound changes need to be made in 
order to remove bias towards industry at the structural level. At this stage, however, policyý-makers did not see any need 
for the systern. as a whole to be radically re-structured either to tighten regulation, or to provide more competition apart 
from Channel 4. 
41 Brian Henry (ed. ) op cit. p. 213 
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National Viewers and Listeners Association, with its charismatic, if not universally popular, 
President, Mary Whitehouse, and a number of other representative organisations who did not 
hesitate to make their displeasure known if the regulator appeared to be neglecting its duties in 
advertising or programming. Advertising and television themselves were becoming high profile and 
glamorous industries, whose cultural importance was enhanced by the proliferation of fashionable 
academic media studies courses. By the early 1980s, the UK broadcasting scene had become 
infinitely more sophisticated and complex. But the next ten years were to bring in even more diversity 
with the gradual development and spread of the new electronic media, which posed a fresh challenge 
for regulation. 
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Chapter 8 
The New Media: All Change for British Broadcasting? 
8.1 Introduction. 
The 1980s represented a turning point in British broadcasting because, for the first time, regulation 
started to take a back seat as a matter of principle. The prevailing Tbatcherite ideology was 
uncompromisingly free-market and pro-entrepreneurial. The rise of the political right in the United 
States and Britain brought with it an entirely Merent set of attitudes towards state ownership of 
industry and regulation of private business. These attitudes, which were hostile to state intervention 
in the market, started the deregulation ban rolling in the advanced industrial econornies of the West 
and Japan. 
Consequently, perceptions of what constituted the success or failure of regulation underwent a 
complete reversal. It was the view of the Thatcher government, supported by a number of influential 
right-wing economists', that regulation had failed to achieve anything worthwhile, not because there 
was not enough of it, or because it was not being pursued vigorously enough to safeguard the public 
interest, but because there was too much. Regulation was the problem not the solution. The plethora 
of restrictions and obligations imposed on it by regulators was preventing private business from 
functioning efficiently and was causing the economy as a whole to suffer as a result. 
This viewpoint entails a quite different concept of the public interest. The interests of producers and 
the interests of consumers are no longer seen as hostile to one another. On the contrary, according to 
Thatcherite philosophy, the more successfid producers are the more the public will benefit, as both 
groups share an interest in the overall performance of the economy. As economic growth and 
Prosperity increases, wealth created by private enterprise will be spread throughout society in a 
See: Alan Peacock, The Regulation Game, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Report ofthe Committee on Financing the BBC (Chairman: Professor Alan Peacock) (Crund 9824) London: W&O, 1986. Irwin Stcltzer, Regulatory Methods: A 
Casefor 'Hands Across the Atlantic' in Cento Ve1janovski (ed. ), Regulators and the Alarket Institute of Economic 
Affairs(IEA), 1991, pp. 59-77. &; ýý Vdjanovski, Freedom in Broadcasting. London: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
1989. M. S. Fowler and D. L. Brenner A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, in E. Wartella et al (eds. ) 
Communication Review Yearbook, Vol. 4, pp. 645-695. Beverly I-lills, CA- Sage 
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"trickle down" effect from top to bottom. The public interest is closely identified with the interests of 
commerce. Ths concept has something in common vvith the broader notion of "national interest" 
used by supporters of commercial television at the time of the Beveridge Report. 
For the Conservative government of the 1980s, the needs of the buying public would be taken care 
of by promoting competition and choice, and competition could only be fostered by an active 
programme of privafisation and the freeing of commercial activity from the burden of regulation. By 
the time deregulation policy had become firmly established in the second half of the decade, the 
government, unlike all previous ones, no longer regarded broadcasting as a special case deserving of 
protection from market forces. Commercial broadcasting, in particular, became a target for market 
reforms. Duopoly of system and monopoly of advertising sales would no longer be tolerated. 
In addition to the political changes, telecommunications technology was threatening to run ahead of 
regulation in a way that had never happened before. The new electronic media of Cable and Direct 
Broadcast Satellite, with their technical capability of carrying many more channels than had 
previously been possible, and of transmitting programmes across national frontiers, undermined the 
old "scarce resource" argument for regulation of the radio frequencies2. They also made a unified 
regulatory regime for commercial broadcasting potentially unworkable at a practical level, rather than 
the most convenient arrangement as it had always been until then. Regulation of the new media, if 
any, would have to be approached quite differently. 
8.2 Cable and Satellite in the LTK: Implications for Advertising Control. 
Cable and Satellite services in the UK began on an exTerimental basis in the early 1980s. Direct 
Broadcast Satellite systems were still very much in their infancy and Britain j-. pended to a large 
extent on development of the relevant technology being carried out in Europe. As the government 
intended to award the first available DBS channels to the BBC, Cable offered more immediately 
attractive opportunities to advertisers?. 
2 jCreMy TUnstaU, Communication Deregulation, Oxford. Basic BlackweU, 1986. and S. Papathanassopoulos, 77te 
Deregulation of Television and Policiesfor NewMedia Development unpublished Ph. D dissertation, City University, 
1989 
3 jereMy TUnStaU' Communication Deregulation, Oxford: Basic BlackweU, 1986. 
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The government's Information Technology Panel produced a report in 1982 on the organisation of 
Cable services, recommending that entertainment and interactive channels should be provided 
financed by private enterprise and regulated by an authority with minimum statutory powers. The 
Panel was of the opinion that "advertising interests clearly stand to gain from the introduction of 
cable systems, since these would provide a new advertising medium for smaller and more specialised 
firms 94 
. 
The Report went on to say the advertising industry believed that breaking the ITV 
contractors' monopoly by establishing competing cable systems could well result in a fall in 
advertising rates. 
The Panel also considered the likely effects that such an opening up of competition would have. It 
would benefit the adverfising industry by widening the choice of media for TV advertising, and far 
more firms would be able to afford the cheaper ates for smaller local and regional cable networks, 
but this would reduce audiences for ITV, reducing at the same time revenue from airtime. Any fall in 
revenue could, however, have the negative result of "a cut in programme expenditure and 
consequently a decline in the range and quality of output"'. In this new area, policy-makers once 
again had to consider the same basic question that has been so endlessly debated in connection with 
British broadcasting poHcy since the very beginning: does competition result in a better service or a 
worse one? The Information Technology Panel, focusing this time on commercial television, merely 
restated the problem without providing any answers. 
It is nevertheless a significant document because it contains the first signs of a radical break with 
e)dsdng UK broadcasting policy, particularly with the long established feature of the "avoidance of 
competition between channels for the same source of finance 
...... 
This policy would be difficult to 
,, 
6 
sustain as the number of channels increases 
. 
Without going into detail, the Panel recommended, 
subject to investigation of the implications for finance and regulation, a differfnt set of regulatory 
arrangements for Cable systems, including a new statutory body as broadcasting authoriti. It also 
recommended the government to urge Cable operators and programme providers to set up an 
e&ctive means of self-regulation along the lines of those used by the advertising and newspaper 
industriee. 
4 Information Technology Advisory Panel (ITAP), Report on Cable Systems, London: HMSO, 1982, para 7.9, p. 44 (ITAP Report) 
5 ibid. para 6.8, p. 37 6 ibid. para 6.8, p. 37 
7 ibid. para S. 11, p. 50 
8 ibid. para 6. iv, p. 9 
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S. 3 Advertising in the Hunt Committee Report. 
To investigate in more depth the issues raised by the ITAP Report the government appointed the 
usual Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Hunt of Tarnworth. Considering how far-reaching the 
implications of Cable and Satellite television were, both for broadcasting in particular and for the 
British economy as a whole, the small (three-member) Hunt Comn-dttee had a very short time 
- 
less 
than seven months 
- 
in which to complete its report. The document, a mere 42 pages long, was 
published in September 1982. The terms of reference are nevertheless familiar: how to secure the 
benefits, in this instance, of Cable and Satellite technology, "but in a way consistent with the wider 
public interest, in particular with public service broadcasting"9. 
Although the Hunt Report is relatively briet it represents a milestone in British broadcasting policy 
because it recognised unequivocally the need for a completely different paradigm of broadcasting 
regulation. At this stage, however, the new model was intended to operate alongside the existing 
one, not to replace it. In considering how this new paradigm should be implemented, the Committee 
examined and rýected the thesis implied in the ITAP Report that Cable television should be seen as 
just another branch of publishing which could be regulated, with respect to product regulation at 
least, in a similar way. In doing so, it employed traditional and well established arguments used by 
numerous policy-makers before it. Firstly, most people stiff regarded the viewing of programmes in 
the home, often as a family, as a different activity from going out to buy a book or a magazine which 
is a private activity, and secondly, "film with all its associated techniques of close-up and special 
effects is a uniquely powerful instrument"10. Accordingly, Hunt advised that Cable should have 
certain liberal ground rules; self-regulation alone would not be generally acceptable, and some 
degree of "oversight" (as distinct from regulation which implies imposing detailed rules) should be 
applied". Hunt agreed with the ITAP panel that a new statutory body and not 113A should have 
responsibility for oversight. 
Ile Report devotes some four pages specifically to advertising, starting with the acknowledgement 
that advertising on Cable raised issues at the heart of the Committee! s terms of reference which was 
to concern itself with safeguarding public service broadcasting. It reiterated the point made by ITAP 
Report on the Inquiry into Cable Expansion and Broadcasting Policy (Chaiman: Lord Himt of Tamworth) (C=d 8679) 
LOnd0n: IMSO, 1982, para 1, pI (Hunt Rcport) 10 ibid. para IIP. 4 
" ibid. para 12 P. 4 
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that independent public service broadcasting was entirely dependent on advertising revenue and 
rnight suffer if resources were diverted to rival services in direct competition for the same resources. 
A deterioration in ITV progranuning rnight have a knock-on effect on the BBC12. In spite of this 
risk, Hunt nevertheless came down firrnly in favour of advertising on Cable and Satellite, as the 
Committee did not believe that Cable expansion would be possible financed solely by rental and 
subscription 13 
. 
I. On the economics of Cable, Hunt s irivestigation contained two somewhat dubious assumptions. The 
14 
first was that a rise in Gross National Product automaticafly entails a rise in advertising expenditure 
. 
In fact, the relationship is more complex and the ratio of ad-spend to GNP may fall as weIl as rise in 
times of recession". The second, encouraged in part by the IPA! s extremely optimistic figures, was 
16 
that the new media would necessarily bring in enough "new" money to make them self-financing 
. 
The huge initial capital investment costs were largely ignored. Presumably the Committee agreed 
with ITAP that the Cable market would be sufficiently attractive to private business not to 
17 
necessitate the use of public fiinds to help it become established 
With respect to regulation of advertising, the Hunt Conunittee took the view that Cable television 
should have no restrictions on the amount of the advertising it took, bearing in mirid that if it was too 
intrusive this would counter-productive. Cable could offer different types of concentrated specialist 
advertising which were not acceptable for public service broadcasters because protecting the viewer 
from excessive advertising was part of the concept of public service broadcasting. The Report 
envisaged longer and more informative Idnd of advertising such as home shopping programmes or 
even whole channels devoted to home shopping or to classified advertising" 
. 
The Committee did, however, recommend the observance of a code of practice p-jverning the nature 
of advertising on Cable, based on the existing IBA Code suitably modified; standards regarding 
prohibited products or methods should not be different from those applying to ITV. Significantly, 
12 ibid. para 36 p. 12 13 ibid. para 35 p. 12 14 ibid. para 38 p. 12 15, Vole: In fairness to Hunt, however, it should be mentioned that the 1986 Peacock Committee %lzs also convinced that 
"the data suggests a fairly close relationship between advertising expenditure and the level of gross national product or 
consumer exTenditure", affected occasionally by cyclical movements. (Repoil offhe Commiuee on Financing the BBC (Chairman: Professor Alan Peacock) (Crnnd 9824) London: HMSO, 1986, para 284 
16 ibid. paras 41 
- 
44, pp. 13 
- 
14 
17 ITAP Report, para 5.6, p. 33 
18 ibid. para 48, p. 15 
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though, for the first time since Hankey, the report of an official Committee of Inquiry, rather than a 
special interest lobby, favoured including scope for sponsorship in television. This would be subject 
to clearly defined rules; the principle of separating advertising message from programme content 
should be preserved". Perhaps even more significantly, in a complete break with the past of 
television regulation, it was recognised. that the range of advertising on Cable would "preclude the 
extemal pre-vetting of advertisements 
.... 
and that a mechanism for dealing retrospectively with 
complaints of breaches of the code of practice (would) be sufficient"20. 
So, rather than the Peacock Report, it is Hunt's document 
- 
rarely cited in connection with 
advertising regulation, but only with regard to its shortcomings on Cable economics" 
- 
which is the 
source of an influential new set of ideas on the role of advertising in television, affecting both process 
and product regulation. The concept of "fight" regulation for television, which later became a cliche, 
was given its first detailed formulation by Hunt. The depamze from established practice 
recommended by Hunt for Cable and Satellite systems only would in less than a decade find its way 
into mainstream regulation of the whole commercial sector. 
In response to the Hunt Report, the MA rapidly produced a pamphlet of its own, More Chamlels - 
More Choice? l which challenged many of the Committee's conclusions. On finance, 
it stressed that 
while advertising might increase it was not inexhaustible. Competition between broadcasting 
companies and Cable operators for a limited amount of revenue would, in any case, result in 
powerful pressure for the public service system to maxirnise audiences at expense of range and 
quality. Having no limit on the amount of advertising on Cable would put public service providers, 
with their numerous public service obligations, at a considerable competitive disadvantage. Channels 
wholly or largely dedicated to advertising might be acceptable, but not unfirnited advertising on 
general Cable servicesP. 
On regulatory arrangements, the IBA argued that "programming, advertising and other standards et 
for Cable systems hould appro)dmate to those required of the present broadcasting services"23. It 
19 ibid. para 49, p. 16 20 ibid. para 49, p. 16 21 Note.. While Pilkington, Annan and even Peacock, who was chiefly concerned with the BBC, are widely quoted on 
advertising regulation policy, this historically important aspect Of the Hunt Report is seldom mentioned. 22 MA- More Channels 
- 
More Choices?. The Cable Broadcasting Debate. hriplications of the proposals of the Hunt Inquiry, 
The View of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, November 1982, para 22-25, p. 5 (EBA: More Channels - Afore 
Choices? ) 
2-1 ibid. para 32, p. 6 
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insisted that the Cable authority must have "real teeth 
..... 
and its supervision cannot merely be 
reactive. " On the contrary it must actively monitor and review the situation to prevent "shutting of 
stable doors after the horses had bolted j24 
. 
The EBA concluded by proposing itself as the regulating 
Authority for Cable, citing its experience and expertise as reasons why it was best qualified for the 
job. If Cable franchising were to be added to its existing responsibilities the Authority might need to 
be expanded, but this would still be "the quickest, most practical and most economical means of 
creating the necessary supervisory structure". 
S. 4 The Government's Plans for the New Media. 
The government took a finther seven months after publication of the Hunt Report to issue, in April 
1983, a White Paper entitled Yhe Development of Cable Syslems and Services. It represents a 
compromise between the more liberal measures advocated by Hunt and the plea of the IBA that 
programme services should not be weakened by unregulated competition for advertising between 
ITV, HR and the Cable operators. 
The VvUte Paper agreed with Hunt that a new statutory body (the Cable Authority) should be 
responsible for Cable franchising, not the IBA. Once it had awarded the franchises, this body would 
use "a fight regulatory touch and adopt a reactive rather than a proactive style toN 
. 
This would be the 
general approach to advertising control which would operate, in the main, analogously to 
Independent Local Radio. The Cable Authority would have its own statutory code of practice 
modelled on the IBA code and containing a "common core" of advertising provisionS27 
. 
But since 
much of Cable advertising would be locally based, copy clearance woWd be handled by the stations 
at local level. The 1BA/ITCA Joint Advertising Control Committee would be expanded to include 
Cable representatives for consultations and guidance on clearing more widely distributed 
advertisements or in sensitive casesý'. 
Although the government was not in favour of fiiU self-regulation using the ASA/BCAP codes and 
machinery (which the ISBA had lobbied the Hunt Committee to recommend), classified advertising 
24 ibid. Para 34, p. 6 25 ibid. Para 35, p. 7 
26 The Development ofCable Systems, (Cmnd. 8866), Londow. IBM, 1983, Para 143 p. 59 (1983 White Paper) 27 ibid. Para 100, P. 44 
28 ibid. Para 102, p. 45 
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and other categories which closely resembled print advertising would be allowed a greater degree of 
self-regulation even than ELR- The ASA! s experience and Code of Practice should be drawn on in 
dealing with this area". Sponsorship, with appropriate safeguards, would be permitted. 
Ile IBA! s claim, supported by ITV and ELR, that unlimited advertising on Cable would be unfair 
was accepted. The government agreed that the high quality of independent television had been 
achieved because the amount of advertising had not detracted from enjoyment of the programmes. It 
made the point that by careful regulation it had been possible to include more advertising on 
television in Britain than on any other major European public service system. The VVhite Paper 
concluded that "abandoning all restrictions on the permissible amount of advertising would inevitably 
alter the nature of independent broadcasting 
.... 
for the worse"30 
. 
The Cable Authority should 
therefore ensure that "advertising on cable television and sound services comparable to those of the 
IBA and ELR does not exceed the maxima (overall and in any one hour) for the time set by the 
IBAý1. 
As a start to the enterprise, the government envisaged a pilot scheme of ten to twelve licences, 
awarded on an exTerimental basis, to cover up to 100,000 homes until the Cable Authority was 
appointed to oversee the next stage of the expansion of Cable services. 
The Authority was constituted under the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984. It contains aoy single 
Section on advertisements., Section 12., Which required the Authority to draw up, periodically review, 
and enforce a Code of Standards and Practice in advertising, including, in particular, the sponsoring 
of programmes. Like the ITV regulator, the Cable Authority would be able to prohibit certain 
advertisements, classes of advertisements and methods of advertising; it would not be able to accept 
advertising directed towards a political end or relating to an industrial dispute, "rithout the permission 
of the Secretary of State. On the amount of time given to advertisements the Act stated that it should 
not exceed 
- 
29 ibid. para 100, p. 44 
30 ibid. para 96, p. 43 
31 ibid. para 97, p. 43 
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(a) in the case of so much of a licensed diffiLsion service as appews to the Authority, after 
consultation with the MA, calculated to appeal to the tastes and interests which are generally 
cateredfor by IIV, the madmum atnount of time which could be so given if that service were 77,32 
- 
T'his is a compromise designed to appease the IBA and the ITV network companies who had 
opposed unlimited advertising on Cable. By allowing the Cable Authority to place restrictions on the 
amount of advertising in and around programming of a similar nature to what was being offered by 
ITV, i. e. programming which was likely provide competition for ITV audiences, but not elsewhere, 
the government hoped to satisfy the public service broadcasters and at the same time leave room for 
Cable operators to experiment with alternative services which might include a large advertising 
element. 
On the 4 May 1984, the fight-wing Adam Smith Institute published the Ornega, Report which 
mounted a vigorous challenge to traditional thinIdng on funding for broadcasting in the UK. It 
contained a strong critique of orthodox public service broadcasting as embodied in the BBC, which it 
perceived as arrogant, elitist and increasingly out of touch with the mass of viewers. It advocated a 
move away from the licence fee, which it regarded as an imposition and unresponsive to the demands 
of the viewing and listening public, towards a much fteer and more diverse use of advertising 
(including sponsorship) as means of finance for both ITV and BBC. 
The Institute went much further than the Hunt Report by recommending the relaxation of rules 
prohibiting certain classes of advertising and arguing for the IBA to be replaced with a more 
"commercially aware' body33 
. 
This was at a time when the MA was busy expanding the rules 
governing financial advertising, strengthening the rules relating to alcohol, and refusing altogether to 
accept, amongst others, the category of female sanitary protection for advertising on ITV. And 
having recently issued, in 1982, the pamphIet Guidelines on Progrmnmes Funded bY NOn- 
Broadcasters, which clarified and tightened up the ndes governing the small number Of cases where 
sponsored programmes were broadCaSt34, by 1984 the regulator still only felt able to try a small 
experimental relaxation. Tbs cautious step permitted something which had not been allowed before: 
32 Cable and Broadcasting Act l9g4, (Ch. 46) jandom. IR&O, 1 9g4, Part I Section 12 (3) (a) 
33 Brian Henry (ed. ), British Television Adverlising, London : Century Bcnhas, 1986. p. 227 
34 Note*. Ile restatement of the prohibition on sponsorship in the ]BA Annual Report 1982 points out that "exceptional 
allowance is made for charitable appeals, various publications or entertainments, COmmerCiallY-financed documentaries 
or other programmes of intrinsic interest to the public, provided that they do not comprise an undue element of 
advertisement". (IBAL Annual Reports and Accounts 1982, London: Home Office, p. 19 1) 
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advertising by fanders of programmes and sponsors of events in and around the programmes and 
events in which they had an interest, "provided there is no link in content or style with the 
programme 05 
. 
So while the Adam Smith Institute was recommending wholesale deregulation of 
advertising, the IBA was either adding to the rules, or liberalising at a very measured pace. 
The Adam Smith Institute! s Report, which found support within the advertising industry, reflected a 
new mood in government. Thatcherism. had gained strength and ideological cogency and was 
determined to take on broadcasting, which it regarded as one of the last bastions of combined 
establishment and Trade Urfion power. Its most immediate target, however, was not the commercial 
sector but the BBC and its mode of finance. A Committee, chaired by noted free market economist 
Professor Alan Peacock, was appointed in March 1985 to consider whether the Corporation might in 
future be funded, in part at least, by advertising or sponsorship. 
8.5 Advertising in the Peacock Committee Report 
Since a major part of its brief was to review the funding arrangements of the BBC, and "to assess the 
effects of the introduction of advertising or sponsorship on the BBC's Home ServiceS06, the 
Peacock Committee had to look carefully into the theory and practice of fimcing broadcasting 
services by advertising as exemplified by ITV and Channel Four. Apart from the new political 
emphasis on the benefits of the free market, technological developments were in the process of 
changing the broadcasting scene and its economics irTevocably. Spectrum scarcity, which had 
dictated so much of broadcasting policy in the UK since its inception, would soon become irTelevant 
as a constraint. The revolution in technology which gave rise to the new media and the expanding 
world of multiple channels and multiple choice, meant that some of the old reasons for tight 
regulation of broadcasting, particularly on the process ide, no longer applied. 
The Peacock Report was published in 1986, after a year of defiberafions on a huge number of 
submissions: 843 memoranda of evidence from individuals and organisations, including a number of 
specially commissioned pieces of research. It broke with the tradition of previous Committees of 
Inquiry, stretching back to the Crawford Committee of 1926, by recommending that the BBC should 
35 IBA: Annual Report and Accounts 1985, London: Home Office p. 149 
36 Report ofthe Committee on Financing the BBC, (Chainnan: Professor Alan Peacock), (Cnind 9824) 
London: HMSO, 1986, p. I (Peacock Report) 
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eventually be wholly financed by a method other than the licence fee. Peacock's blueprint for the 
complete restructuring of British broadcasting was, in fact, much more radical than that eventually 
adopted by the Conservative government in its 1989 White Paper, Broa*ayfing in the 90s. ' 
Competition, Choice and Quality. Peacock's central conception, echoing the Adam Smith Institute 
Report, was consumer sovereignty. Power should be shifled away from the broadcasting elite, 
represented by the "comfortable duopoly" of BBC and ITV, to the "robust" consumer. On this view, 
regulation was now protecting producers more than consumers, not because of any form of capture 
but because the regulatory system did not pennit a proper market in broadcasting which would 
empower consumers to make real choices for themselves. 
As with earlier inquiries, the nature of public service broadcasting once more came under scrutiny. 
Peacock recapitulated the main argument of the Annan Committee that "if the BBC and the 
independent sector were to compete for advertising revenue then both would feel obliged to cater for 
37 
mass audiences and this would lead to a decrease in the range and quality of programmes on offer" 
. 
Peacocles own emphasis on television and radio services bringing as much "enjoyment and pleasure 
to as many viewers and listeners as possible, while at the same time fidfilling some public service 
obligation" is none the less a move away from the traditional Reithian view of public service 
broadcasting. 
In considering consumer preferences, the Committee declared its commitment to the actual users of 
the broadcasting services, stating that although the opinions of the various official consumer groups 
were valuable they did not represent an consumers. Accordingly, it had gone to great lengths to get 
the views of members of the public "directly and not just through umbrella organisations"" 
- 
This 
somewhat distrustfW attitude towards official consumer organisations, two of whom are represented 
on the AAC, is characteristic of the business lobby, and reflects a not entirely fair view of the 
organised consumer movement as hostile to advertisinj 9. 
In order to get as broad a picture as possible of what viewers themselves wanted, Peacock not only 
invited submissions from individuals, but commissioned a market survey by National Opinion Poll to 
discover people's attitudes to advertising on the BBC. An analysis of its results given in Chapter 9 of 
37 ibid. p. 2 
3g ibid. p. 5 
39 Note. See Rein Rijkens and Gordon Miracle (1986) European Regulation ofAdverd-ying, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 
P. 92. The Professional consumer eprescntatives whom I intcrviewed, Diana Whitworth of the NCC and Sue Bloomfield 
of CA, stated very fmnly that they were in principle in favour of advertising and welcomed it on television. 
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the Report reveal that about 60% of respondents were in favour of advertising on the BBC provided 
that this would not reduce programme, quality. 691/6 thought that advertising would not in fact lower 
standards. A BBC survey also concluded that approximately two thirds of consumers preferred a 
"free" service fitnded by advertising, to the licence fee. But even such a champion of consumer rights 
as Peacock had to admit that "measuring the effects of a change in broadcasting finance on the 
welfare of the viewers and listeners is beset with many difficulties j140 
. 
For example, consumers' interests would not be served if, as a result of extending advertising to the 
BBC, the smaHer of the ITV regional companies came close to bankruptcy, and the BBC itself was 
obliged to "tailor" its programming to suit the advertisers. Public opinion may not be sufficiently weH 
informed about the economics of broadcasting to judge whether increasing the overaU amount of 
available airtime would disrupt the system to the detriment of programming range and quality. 
Clearly, even a convinced majoritarian. Eke Peacock recognised the limitations of the preponderance 
approach when applied to broadcasting and the Report takes a more common interest-oriented 
stance on the validity of consumers' opinions on the financing of television. There was considerable 
evidence to suggest that a deterioration of the service would in fact take place; studies had shown 
that even limited advertising on the BBC would put the smafler ITV companies into loss and reduce 
profitability in the others, with an inevitable downgrading of services. 
One study conducted by Leeds University into the effects on programme range and quality of both 
full and limited competitive advertising on the BBC had some influence on the Committee. Pointing 
to international experience as a lesson, the study concluded that "competition for advertising on any 
scale would be quite destructive of programme range and a threat to many facets Of programme 
941 in a quality 
. 
This conclusion was based on reports on the economics of broadcasting systems 
number of other countries. 
The Leeds team found that in America the total dependence of the three networks on competitive 
advertising has resulted in advertisers claiming "rights" to maximum audiences. But to make audience 
volume the highest priority works against diversity and risk-taking in programming. The option of 
limited advertising might be more attractive, but only if it did not diminish the licence fee and could 
be suitably regulated. Against this, both the American example and instances from Europe (Italy and 
40 Peacock Report op, cit. p. 10 1 41 ibict p. 199 
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Gerniany were cited) showed that it could be "difficult to make controls on advertising stick 
(whether on amount, content or placement)". In addition, mixed funding tends to be insecure causing 
producers to be over conscious of the ratings42 
The Committee took this evidence on board in r6ecting the ISBA! s argument for the progressive 
introduction of advertising on the BBC. The ISBA envisaged a gradual increase spread over a ten 
year period, after which the Corporation would be funded entirely by this method. Peacock, 
however, decided that this scheme would quickly lead to a narrowing of range. Competitive 
pressures would force a revision of programme strategies in order to maximise audiences. In the 
opinion of the Conunittee, the ISBA had underestimated "the likely consequences of growing 
competition for advertisement revenue and the probability that regulation would become virtually 
impossible to enforce v143 
. 
The IPA, which usually favoured any extension of broadcast advertising opportunities, appear to 
have been less ambitious in this instance, producing a proposal for "limited" advertising to 
supplement the BBC's revenue from the licence fee. As with the Hunt Committee, its research came 
up with much more optimistic figures on the likely expansion of advertising demand and expenditure 
in the next decade than some other studies. Peacock interpreted "limited" advertising both as spot 
advertising ot say, one minute per hour, and as two or three four-minute blocks per day on the 
Franco-German model. This concept was also rýected as difficult to maintain at this low level; block 
advertising was still seen as unattractive to advertisers. 
Interestingly enough, a BBC commissioned survey of the "Campaign" Est of the top spenders of 
1994 revealed only a small majority in favour of advertising on the BBC 
- 
58% 
- 
INith 35% opposed 
to it altogether. THs survey also showed that "top advertisers did not expect tV -, Tend enough extra 
on advertising to meet more than a small part of the costs of running the BBC as well as ITV". This 
was in spite of their forecast that competition would decrease the cost of airtime by 15%44. So, in 
contrast to the enthusiasm of their trade association, nearly forty years on from the Beveridge Report 
those actually responsible for finding the cash for expensive television advertising campaigns are still 
adopting a conservative approach to any extension of their opportunities to spend money ( or even to 
save money through cheaper airtime). 
'u ibict p. 201 
43 ibid. p. 83 
44 ibicL p. 190 
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The effects of broadcasting policy on other media, particularly the press, were also taken into 
account. The Newspaper Society commissioned two pieces of research both of which produced 
pessimistic forecasts of the extent of the drop in advertising revenue for publishers if funds were to be 
re-directed to the BBC. One referred to the potential effects on profitability and viability as 
"catastrophiC@145. Press fears about competition from broadcast advertising had proved exaggerated 
in the past and Peacock took the more relaxed view that there would be a limited adverse ffect on 
print media revenues. As regards other media, Cable and DBS services funded by subscription 
charges and not by advertising might benefit, but advertising supported services would experience 
increased competition which would be reflected in lower programme standards. 
The implications for regulation also influenced the Committee against the introduction of advertising 
on the BBC while the present systern of broadcasting was retaine& Peacock, as a convinced free 
marketeer, had quite a different perception of the role of regulation in the broadcasting sygem from 
any of the previous committees. He firmly believed that both process and product regulation could 
only be justified: 
"as a means of stimulating the effects of a genuine consumer ma7kef, in all its 
range and veriely, against the &storfions inherent ma duopolyfinanced by 
adverfising and the ficencefee. 
fi) as a way of introducing minority, high quality or experimental work, which 
might not be commercially viable in afully developed market "46. 
The Committee, in its concluding section, recommended the establishment of a Public Service 
Broadcasting Council to take care of the second requirement, fimded by a variety of sources, More 
importantly, "development of a ffill broadcasting market, incorporating direct consumer payment as 
47 ri 
an option" should be encouraged 
. 
The direct consumer payment option, in the form of subsc ption, 
was to be the solution to the problem of funding the BBC. When all these measures were finally in 
place "the justification for the general restrictions imposed in the first century of broadcasting to 
reflect both the scarcity of the spectrum and the novelty of the medium will Aither aWay"48 
45 ibid. p. 191 
46 ibid. p. 149 
47 ibid. p. 149 
48 ibid. p. 149 
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On the way to this ideally self-regulating broadcasting market, Peacock envisaged that the current 
tight regulation would be progressively loosened. The first step would be to reduce the vetting 
functions carried out by the EBA to the level of the much less strict Cable Authority. Ultimately, all 
pre-vetting, or "pre-publication censorship", would be abolished, leaving the control of broadcasting, 
Eke the print media, to the law of the land covering obscenity, defamation, libel, sedition and other 
abuses of free speech49. 
This libertarian agenda runs in direct contrast o the entire history of regulation policy 
- 
making by 
committee. The successive committees before Peacock had always pursued protectionist policies; 
they saw the broadcasting process and its product together as forming a uniquely influential medium 
of communication requiring special conditions and restrictions to ensure that the "vulnerable" social 
and cultural benefits it was able to provide were not undermined. Quality broadcasting and the crude 
laws of the marketplace were regarded as antithetical to one another. And if television in particular 
were to be used for commercial purposes, the consumer would also be in need of protection from 
manipulative advertisers pushing their goods and services over the air. 
Peacock intended to reverse this whole tradition. For him, both broadcasting and the consumer 
should be thought of not as vulnerable but as robust and mature enough to derive positive benefit 
from the dynamics of market exchange. Sufficient diversity of supply would stimulate demand, which 
would in turn generate a better product through competition. According to this view, market 
mechanisms are, on the whole, much more sensitive to consumer preferences than any amount Of 
regulation. 
The Report has almost nothing to say about product regulation of television advertising. The 
Committees brief was to investigate the ways in which advertising and sponsorship are able to 
provide revenue for a broadcasting system and the effects they might have on programming. All the 
Committee! s concluding remarks therefore deal with the implicafions of advertising for funding, 
programming and scheduling, and not YAth rules governing the content of commercials. The brief 
comments on the difficulty of controlling advertising in a fully competitive system such as that of the 
United States refer more to the negative impact it has on the surrounding programming than to its 
inherent Potential to mislead, damage or offend. Presumably, the suggestion that broadcasting could 
be left to the law of the land applies to advertising control as well as programming, and misting 
49 ibid. p. 150 
153 
The New Media: AU Changefor British Brodcasting? 
legislation would be adequate o cover the content of television commercials, once the market had 
developed. Tlis could be 
-backed up by some sort of self-regulatory arrangements, as in 
non-broadcast advertising. 
8.6 The VMte Paper: Broadcasfing in the 90s. 9 Compe0on, Choke and 
Quality. 
The government's reaction to the Peacock Report, Broad=sfing in the '90s: Competition, Choice 
wd Quality, was presented as a VvUte Paper to Parliament in November 1988. It acknowledged its 
debt both to Peacock and to the Home Affairs Committee's long Report on the 1987-88 session, Yhe 
Future of Broackasfing. In line with Peacocles thinking, the document commenced by claiming to 
50 
,, Piace the viewer and listener at the centre of broadcasting policy" 
The VVThite Paper also agreed with Peacock that rapid technological change required a corresponding 
change in the framework for broadcasting in Britain. With more frequencies available, and a 
proliferation of delivery systems giving greater scope, "viewer choice, rather than regulatory 
imposition, can and should be relied on to secure the programmes Which viewers want"51. The 
caveat is added that "rules will still be needed to safeguard programme standards on such matters as 
taste and decency and to ensure that the unique power of the broadcast media is not abused"". The 
concrete recommendations of the White Paper, however, show that the government had a much less 
relaxed attitude towards product regulation than the Peacock Committee. Although a radical 
deregulation of the existing process arrangements was planned, a whole new regulatory quango with 
statutory powers, the Broadcasting Standards Council, was to be set up with "Overarching" 
supervisory powers over both programme and advertising content. 
in summarising its approach, the government made it quite clear that broadcasting policy must, as 
far as possible, be made to fit in with its overall deregulation policy. Anti-competitive practices - 
barriers to entry and distortion of the market - had to be eliminated. There would be "less regulation 
(removing restrictions which are outmoded or unnecessary) and better regulation (lighter, more 
flemble, more efficiently administered) 03. The Paper nevertheless rýected Peacock's 
"Broadcasting in the gos. 
- 
competition, choice and Quality. (Cm. 517), London HMSO 1988, p1 (1988 te Paper) 51 ibid. p. 5 52 ibid. p. 5 53 ibid. p. 6 
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recommendation of a subscription system for the BBC which would be left in peace for the time 
being. The great shake-up was reserved for ITV in order to break up the "comfortable duopoly" and 
establish amuch more open marketwithin the independent sector. 
In spite of what some of the leading advertisers had said in response to the BBC's survey, the ISBA 
had adopted a very strong position in its evidence both to the Peacock Committee and the Home 
Affairs Committee. It argued forcefidly for a much looser structure in the commercial sector giving 
advertisers a much wider range of options. Its chairman, Kenneth Wes, explained to the Home 
Affairs Committee that "advertisers want a combination or a mix of volume coverage and targeted 
coverage. Increasingly targeting is becoming much more important,, 54 
. 
This meant a greater diversity 
of channels geographically, to serve local advertisers! needs, and the use of split airtime franchises to 
target specific audiences. 
The VVThite Paper also acknowledged the need for more competition in the sale of airtime. It 
proposed the creation of a fifth terrestrial channel; separate right hours licences; allowing Channel 
Four to sell its own airtime; and the expansion of Satellite and Cable services to provide more 
competition opportunities. As recommended by Peacock, Channel 3 (as the new ITV regime was to 
be called) franchises would be offered for competitive tender, and, as recommended by the Home 
Affairs Committee, a single agency would be set up to regulate all independent sector television 
services. This body would be known as the Independent Television Commission. It would regulate 
with a much "fighter touch" than the IBA and would not have the IBA! s responsibilities for prior 
clearance of programmes and approval of scheduling. It would, however, have consumer protection 
obligations as before with regard to both advertising and programming. These included control of the 
content of advertisements, and some positive programme requirements designed to limit "the ability 
of broadcasters to sell audiences to advertisers in such a way that the range and diversity of 
programmes would be curtailed"". 
The White Paper was greeted by a storm of protest from the broadcasting world. There were 
widespread fears that the days of producer-led, innovative, quality programming were numbered, and 
that independent television in Britain had in effect been surrendered to the advertisers and the money 
men. Many felt that the ideals of public service broadcasting which had served the country well for 
li ?v ej ev en and i ej Home Affairs Committee. Third Report. 7he Future of Broadcas ng. VOIUMe 2: 1 finut of id ce append c 
5S 
(Session 1987 
- 
88: HC 262-4 p. 159 
1998 White paper op. cit. p. 21 
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nearly seventy ears would not long survive the new era of competition in the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
the government prevailed and after a great deal of impassioned ebate, much of it focused on the 
controversial proposals for auctioning off the Channel 3 franchises to the highest bidder, a new 
Broadcasting Act was finally passed in 1990, to take statutory effect from January I st 1993. It 
incorporated most of the principles et out in the White Paper. 
8.7 The Broadcasting Act 1990. 
This Act is by far the most detailed piece of legislation ever framed to deal with the broadcasting 
system in the UK and only a brief summary of its main provisions can be given here. The structure 
and functions of the new regulatory body Independent Television Commission, especially its duties 
v, ith regard to the regulation of advertising, will be discussed in more depth in the next two chapters. 
The ITC was to put into practice the new system of awarding the franchises for Channel 3, which 
were to commence operations on January Ist 1993. At an appropriate time after that applications 
would be invited to run a fifth commercial channel. The principle of auctioning off the franchises to 
the highest bidder, on strict commercial lines, was diluted after intense lobbying from a variety of 
interests across the spectrum of broadcasting. The adoption of a "quality hurdle" 
- 
fairly stringent 
positive programming requirements 
- 
ensured that applicants retained a strong public service element 
in their programme planý'. This was backed up by an "exceptional circumstances" clause under which 
the Commission is entitled to reject the highest bid in favour of a lesser one if the latter proposes a 
service the quality of which was either "exceptionally high", or "substantially higher" than the highest 
bid". Applications could also be refused if it was suspected that "the relevant source of funds is such 
that it would not be in the public interest for the licence to be awarded"5 8. Broadcasting was 
evidently still considered too sensitive a field to be left wholly open to comrnerc: 
-ý! forces. 
Several Sections of the Act are devoted to the organisation and complaints procedures of a new 
monitoring body, the Broadcasting Standards Coun4 designed to report on the portrayal of 
"violence and sexual conduct 
..... 
and standards of taste and decency" in all sound and television 
m Broadcasting Act 1990 London: HMSO, 1990, Section 16, Subsection 2 
57 ibid. Section 17. Subsection 4 
m ibid. Section 17, Subsection 5 
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programmes. Advertising is not specifically mentioned, but the government later made it clear that 
the monitoring of commercials would be part of its remit. 
The Broadcasting Complaints Commission was retained with the same remit as before. Channel 4 
was to be reconstituted as a Corporation licensed to provide a public service with a distinctive 
character of its own. It would be responsible for its own advertising revenue by selling its airtime, but 
the Channel 3 franchisees must make up any shortfall below 14% of total the television revenues for 
any one year. 
Secfion 8 deals with general provisions as to advertisements, and Secfion 9 with control of 
advertisements. The wording of both is very similar to that of previous Acts, with the exception of 
the specific obligation for the regulator to appoint an Advertising Advisory Committee and a Medical 
Advisory Panel. This was abolished and the much looser notion of "appropriate consultation" is used 
instead. After such consultation, the ITC must stiff draw up and periodically review a code dealing 
with the closes of advertising permitted and its amount and distribution. The AAC thus lost its 
statutory status after nearly forty years, as did the marginally more recent Medical Advisory Panel. 
The Office of Fair Trading was given an acdve role in supervising the networking arrangements for 
Channel 3. It had to ensure that they are not anti-competifive and that access to the network is free 
and does not discriminate against independent producers. 
S. 8 Conclusion. 
The history of broadcasting in the UK reveals the degree to which the state has been responsible for 
the genesis of regulation, i. e. for the decision to have it at all, and for the initia! determinabon of its 
form, It has also been the prime mover in bringing about changes to this form, either by extending or 
reducing the scope of the regulatory agency. Although Mar. Nist critique has lost most of its 
fashionable appeal in recent years, for obvious reasons, it is still possible to argue, as Horwitz does, 
that capitalist state theory has the advairitage of situating the process of regulation within much wider 
structures of power and constraint. It focuses on the state as the most powerfW actor in a capitalist 
democracy. According to a structuralist Marxist critique, however, even though the actions of the 
state and state "managers,, are crucial, they are constrained by the opposing needs to "accumulate" 
and to "legitimate". In other words, "the state must safeguard the conditions for continued economic 
157 
The New Media :A It Ch angefor British Brodcasting? 
growth and performance, and at the same time meet dernocrafic demands relating to equity and due 
process"59. 
Horwitz himself has some reservations about the application of this polifico-economic model to the 
empirical history of regulation and deregulation in a given area, taking as his example 
telecommunications. He makes two particular criticisms. The first is that "it is difficult to impute 
.% 
hi diff motives and/or interests to abstractions like "the state" w ch is made up of erent apparatuses 
sometimes with conflicting agendas 
...... 
Likei&rise "capital" implies a structured unity which in large 
pan does not exist except on a very few issueS,, 60 
. 
The second is that the emphasis on the constraints 
placed on state activity by the need both to promote accumulation of capital, and to legitimate such 
accumulation before the electorate, ignores the interest of the state, or of state agencies, in preserving 
themselves. This fact is better explained by organisation theories. 61 
VVhile Horwitz! s first criticism may be valid with regard to the American situation where the vastness, 
complexity and heterogeneity of the political system make it difficult to abstract from it a general set 
of motives or interests applicable to all state-originated concrete regulatory arrangements. In the M 
however, it does make sense, for the purpose of analysis, to speak of a single political entity whose 
actions at any one time result in some particular form of regulation, and whose reasons for taking 
such actions are not hard to identify. If "the state" is taken to mean simply Parliament, or more 
narrowly, the government of the day, it is not particularly difficult to trace its motives as an actor in 
the specific arena of broadcasting and advertising regulation where the scale of activity for most of 
the time has been comparatively small and intimate. And if "capital" is interpreted simply as what is 
necessary for "continued economic growth and performance" in a free market economy, then the 
empirical history of broadcasting and advertising regulation very clearly shows the state organising 
regulation within the parameters of "accumulation of capital", and of "legifirnitont' understood as 
satisfying a variety of democratic demands within the UK political and legal SyStern62. 
59 Robert B. Horwitz, The irony ofRegulation Reform: The Deregulation ofAmerican Telecommunication, New York' 
Oxford University Press 1989 p. 44 60 ibid. p. 44 
'61 ibid. p. 44 
62 HOffiuann-Riem, discussing broadcasting supervisory bodies, raises the question of ", whether the main task of supervision 
Les more in the area of political legitimation and less in influencing the conduct of broadcasters. " He states that "it cannot 
be ruled out that the 
.... 
state legislatures were primarily interested in the effect of supervisory instruments in conferring 
Political legitimacy, thereby seeking to satisfy the public with the requirements prescribed in them". Hoffmarm-Riem 
refers in this instmee to Germany, but the point he is making is a general one and is equally applicable to the UK 
legislature. (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Ricm, Defending Pulnerable Palues: Regulatory Measures and Enforcement 
Dilemmas, in Jay G. Blun-dcr (ed. ) Television and the Public Interest, London: Sage, 1992, p 198) 
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What is unique about British broadcasting regulation, of course, Which diflerentiates it from the 
classical model of regulation of private business, formed in the context of a more committedly 
capitalist political economy, is the extent to which democratic demands have been favoured at the 
expense of the accumulation of capitaL Democratic demands in broadcasting were defined primarily 
as the right of the people to share in the communicational "goods" 
- 
freedom of expression, 
promotion of national language and culture, entertainment, information and education etc. 
- 
offered 
by the service, rather than the right to redistribution of wealth or other tangible social benefits, but 
the principle remains the same. In other words, unlike in the United States, the social purpose of 
broadcasting took precedence over economic/industrial purposes, except when a market-oriented 
government became convinced that the balance needed to be redressed, as in the 1950s and 1980s. 
After an initial attempt to balance the two constraints on the British Broadcasting Company had 
proved unsatisfactory, accumulation of capital by developing a commercial broadcasting industry 
along US fines was r6ected in favour of fiffilling what, at the time, was seen as more pressing social 
needs. The constraint of accumulation evertheless obliged the state from time to time to make 
regulatory adjustments. The development of television technology and the expansion of broadcasting 
in the 1930s and 40s forced the government to pay more attention to the industrial potential of 
broadcasting, resulting eventually in re-regulatory measures to promote the commercial television 
industry. Similarly, economic considerations were influential in making room for Independent Local 
Radio in the 1970s, and most recently in dismantling much of the regulatory apparatus in order to 
develop the huge capital accumulation potential of the new media. 
But legitimation, i. e. the attempt to satisfy the public by a system of broadcasting regulation 
designed to promote social and cultural benefits, was, until recently, the more powerful of the two 
constraints. It was only with the arrival on the scene of a strongly free market-oriented government 
dedicated to reinstating accumulation of capital as an overriding policy objective that the e3dsting 
supervisory system began to be viewed critically as evidence that the balance had been tipped too far 
in favour of legitimation. Thatcherism in fact went considerably further than this in its belief that state 
intervention in any area of the economy was not the way to achieve legitimacy for the political 
159 
The New Meifia: AU Changefor British Brodcasting? 
Whether, as Mosco believes, deregulation is ultimately "a powerffil instniment of social control ot64 
or a better way of serving the public interest through competition and choice, it is important to locate 
this activity in the larger political context. 
Although political theory helps to shed fight on both regulation and deregulation, Horwitz is light 
that it misses certain crucial facts about how regulation has actually worked in practice which can be 
better explained by an organisational approach. This takes into account the desire for autonomy 
both on the part of the state, which reserves the right to ultimate control over the actions of 
regulatory agencies, and the agency itself which, once properly established, tends to resist 
interference from the state, setting up its own agenda in parallel with its official remit. In its analysis 
of regulatory fAure, the Tbatcher government took the same position as MacAvoy, Bardach, 
Kaganý' and others who claim that regulatory agencies in time become self-serving and more 
concerned with preserving and extending their domains than efficient and effective regulation. In 
their view, the bureaucracy and red tape inevitably accompanying regulatory activity has a disastrous 
effect on industry and ultimately on consumers. 
James. Q. Wilson has summed this tendency up: "They are in the. regulation business, and regulate 
they will, with or without a rationale. If the agencies have been 'captured' by anybody, it is Probably 
by their staffs who have mastered the arcane details of rate setting and license granting""'. It is not 
hard to recognise at least a something of this attitude in the 113A, and by the 1980s there were many 
who accused it of precisely Us failing, License granting seemed to follow obscure criteria and was 
conducted behind closed doors with little or no explanation given for decisions made. And although 
the details of advertising rate setting were the province of the television companies, the Authority 
was responsible for approving the form and manner of their publication, the ýrzaneness of which, 
along with the companies' rates policy as a whole, had for years been a source of grievance with the 
advertising industry. 
The EBA/ITCA copy clearance procedures had also become exceedingly complex, and while the 
television companies blamed the ever-expanding Code of Practice and the IBA! s too close 
monitoring of the system, advertisers and agencies blarned the companies for excessive zeal in 
64 See: Chapter 1, p. 19 6' Robert 13. Homitz, op. cit. p. 3 9. See Chapter I P. IS 
" J. Q. Wilson, MeDeadHand ofRegulation. The Public Interest, Fall 1971, p. 48 
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applying the rules. The Authority's self-promotion as the right body to undertake yet more 
regulatory functions, such as responsibility for the fourth channel and for overseeing Cable and 
Satellite, its reluctance to share regulatory. fimcfions with any other body which might dilute its 
authozity, and its opposition to deregulation are all examples of the behavioural features associated 
with organisational critique. 
The constitutional independence of the regulatory agency has always been a double edged sword. 
The laudable aim in broadcasting of freeing the agency from state interference and control in its 
internal matters has resulted in both the public corporations developing their own institutional 
characters and operating methods which have not always served broadcasting in the best possible 
way. Although, as has already been pointed out, the connection between the state and the 
broadcasting authority in the UK is in some respects close, in practice there is stifl a very considerable 
degree of autonomy. 
The consequences of this autonomy can be judged in two different ways. 11ey can be seen as 
fuffilling the predictions of capture theory as formulated by Bernstein and Stigler, i. e. capture by 
industry. Bernstein himself believes that: "Independence from the political strength and support of 
the president provides for the maximum exposure of the regulatory commission to the most 
effectively organised parties in interest 
...... 
Forced to reach a worldng agreement with the regulated 
parties, a commission develops a passive outlookwith respect to the nature of the public interest. It 
gradually permits the private parties to defme the public interest for it, and its own search gives way 
to indolence and passiVity"67. So independence from the state can lead to dependence on industry. 
Alternatively, they can be viewed in the opposite way as demonstrating the in-built tenden fr CY 0 
regulators to become "regulation-minded" and, in effect, worldng against he regulated parties and 
obstructing the state's intentions. 
No-one could seriously accuse the MA of indolence or passivity. It was its tireless activity in the 
pursuit of regulation that provoked much of the criticisid'. For the Conservative government, since 
the premise on which regulation is based is mostly false, merely arranging for the regulator to be 
more independent or less from the political system would not have been much use. Autonomy 
"" Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 157 68 In 1981. Marketing Week said of the televisionwatchdog that it was difficult "to conceive of a body that was more 
scrupulous, even downright pcmickety, in the discharge of its duties. " (AdverWsing must guard its uutchdog. Marketing Week, 26 / 061198 1). Some other representative comments about the MA's behaviour f om an industry point of view 
are quoted in Chapter 10 
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needed to be restored, not to the regulator, but to industry in order to given it more say in defining 
the public interest rather than leaving this task to the regulator and to the politicians. The advertising 
and television industries had to be emancipated from regulatory restrictions by a drastic reduction in 
the overall power and scope of the regulatory agency. So capture theories (apart from self-capture 
which is, strictly spealdng, a variant of organisational theory) do not have a great deal to say about 
deregulationý". 
From a cultural angle, the deregulation policies represent a profound change in mood in British 
society, which the Thatcher phenomenon both reflected and inspired. By the end of the 1970s, the 
traditional socialist vision had lost its appeal. Statism and red tape in general, and militant trade 
unionism in particular, were becoming increasingly resented, even by working class Labour 
supporters. A more individualistic view of citizenship was replacing the old collectivist pattern. In 
broadcasting, before it, the move away from a monolithic public service system towards a more 
varied and "personalised" service was simply an idea whose time had come, together with the 
technology to realise it. Alan Peacock was correct, to an Went at least, in claiming that both the 
broadcasting system and the consumer had grown up enough to permit more diversity 
- 
The legacy of the early regulators and broadcasters, especially John Reith, had always ensured that 
the broadcasting service was treated as a luxury product and a privilege; something of the highest 
quality which the mass of people must be educated to appreciate and which was worth paying a price 
for, ". The licence fee still operates as a Idnd of cultural national insurance; through compulsory 
contributions towards its cost, everyone is able to receive the benefits of a first class broadcasting 
system with an enduring reputation for excellence. What broadcasting policy of the late 1980s and 
1990s has made quite clear, however, is that although this "insurance" will continue for some time, it 
, will not be guaranteed for ever. The concept of broadcasting as a privileg-, and the notion of 
vulnerable values are under threat. Broadcasting is seen more and more as a commodity not so 
different from the goods and services provided by advertisers. In television, as the commercial sector 
69 Note., This depends to a certain extent on the perspective from which it is viewed. Ile consumer representatives on the 
AAC, for example, have allcged pro-industry bias and capture in advertising regulation in the period up to deregulation, 
and are concerned that deregulation %Nill weight the scales even more heavily against the consumer in the area of 
advertising control. Their views will be dealt with in Chapter 13 
70 Note: In his memoirs Into the Wind, Reith wrote that from the outset the BBC's responsibility "was to carry into the 
greatest number of homes everything that -ams best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour and 
achievement; and to avoid whatever was or might be hurtful. In earliest years, accused of setting out to give the public 
not what it wanted but what the BBC thought it should have, the answer was that few knew what they wanted, fewer 
what they needed. In any event itwas better to overestimate than to underestimate". (J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1949, p. 101). This, incidentally, is an excellent justification for a common interest rather than a 
majOritarian approach to broadcasting. 
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expands, competition may force ITV to lessen its commitment to the public service ideal in order to 
keep market share, now that the regulatory system makes it possible for the new media to ignore this 
ideal altogether. 
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Chapter 9 
The Broadcasting Act 1990: Continuity and Change 
9.1 Introduction. 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act, which dismantled the duopoly and opened up the broadcasting market 
in the UK was not quite such a radical document as bad originally been envisaged. Fierce opposition 
from a wide range of interests persuaded the government to modify some of its proposals on process 
regulation, in particular the plans to dispose of the ITV franchises by putting them out to competitive 
tender. The Act retained a central role for both process and product regulation and devotes 
considerable space to outlining the constitution and duties of the new agency with overall 
responsibility for commercial television in the UK. This body 
- 
the third in fine since 1954 
- 
is in 
effect a restructured version of its predecessor, the IBA- Since one of the main changes instituted 
under the 1990 Act was to remove the functions of broadcasting from the regulator, the old name, 
Independent Broadcasting Authorityý was no longer appropriate and the new regulator was 
re-christened the Independent Television Commission. 
Because most of the provisions contained in the Act were not due to come into effect until January 
1993., a transitional period up to this date followed its becoming law in December 1990. Until 1993, 
when it took statutory form, officially replacing the previous Authority, the ITC operated in shadow 
form, and because much of their work and membership overlapped the IBA and shadow ITC held 
joint meetings during tlis time. 
The provisions of the 1990 Broadcasting Act were designed to introduce a different regulatory 
regime Which would operate with the much "fighter touch" first recommended by the Hunt 
Committee for Cable television and later urged by Peacock. Several major fiberalising measures 
opened up the television system to competition and gave a much greater degree of authority to the 
commercial sector to make its own decisions. These moves were in fine with the general deregulation 
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policies of the 1980's which intended that responsibility for private business decision-maldng should, 
as far as possible, rest with business and not with regulatory agencies. 
9.2 Changes Instituted Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act. 
The main changes in relation to commercial television effected by the 1990 Act, which repealed the 
broadcasting legislation of 1981 and 1984, were: 
i) The creation of two new regulatory bodies, the Independent Television Commission and the 
Radio Authority, to replace the 1BA and the Cable Authority. The ITC would be responsible for 
licensing and regulating all commercial television services ( including terrestrial, Satellite and 
Cable) except for S4C in Wales. 
ii) The removal of the broadcasting function from the regulator and its relocation vAth the 
individual icensees. 
iii) The replacement of the previous contract-based regulatory system by a licensing 
system, each licence being subject certain conditions with penalties for non- 
compliance. Licences were to be awarded by competitive tender to the highest bidder 
after a quality threshold and a sustainability test had been passed, except in "exceptional 
circumstances". Complex restrictions on ownerslip also applied. 
The second measure transformed the Authority into "a more classical regulatory 
.... 
and licensing 
body" according to Frank Willis, ITC Director of Advertising and Sponsorship'. 17his means that the 
regulator no longer has responsibility for broadcasting programmes and advertisements, and is 
therefore not obliged to view any broadcast matter, including advertisements, prior to transmission. 
The individual icensees, either as producer-broadcasters or as publisher-broadcasters, arenow solely 
responsible for ensuring compliance urith regulation governing programmes and advertisements 
before they go on the air. 
Interview with Frank Willis. 
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The third relieved the Authority of the need to decide the criteria for awarding contracts, a process 
which had come in for much criticism in the past. Now, the only valid criteria, after the "quality 
hurdle" in programming has been passed and ownership conditions have been met, are commercial 
ones: the size of an applicant's bid and the acceptability of the business plan. 
These moves entail a big shift away from the hands-on policy reflected in earlier legislation and 
carried out by previous authorities, but the ITC AM has quite a number of statutory obligations. 
There is also a completely new statutory "advisory" body, the Broadcasting Standards Council, 
which actuaffy increases the number of agencies involved in the oversight of television. 
Two other statutory agencies have a role in the system: the Department of Trade and Industry's 
Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Finally, there are the non- 
governmental interested parties such as the ITV Network Centre which operates the machinery for 
self-regulation, the advertising industrys trade associations and the consumer groups. All these 
different groups come together to form an important part of the broadcasting and broadcast 
advertising policy network, in-put from them shapes the day-to-day operation of regulatory activity 
in the UK. A brief summary of the constitution and functions of these bodies is given in this chapter 
before going on to a more detailed discussion of their activities in chapter 11. 
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9.3 The Statutory Authority and the Advisory Bodies. 
9.3.1 ne Independent Television ConmAssion. 
Members. 
The Act states in Part I Section I that the Commission shaH consist of 
a) a chairman and a deputy chairmin appointed by the Secrelwy of Sidfe; 
and 
b) such number of other members appointed by the Secretwy of State, not 
being less than eight nor more Avi ten, as he mayfrom time to time 
determine. 
The board of the Authority consists of a chairman, presently ý& George Russell CBE, a deputy 
chairman, and eight members. 
Schedule I of the Act gives more directions on the composition of the board. A person is disqualified 
from being a member if he is a governor or employee of the BBC or is a member or employee of the 
Channel Four Television Corporation, Broadcasting Complaints Commission or Broadcasting 
Standards Council. Nor may the membership include more than one person who is either a member 
or an employee of Welsh Authority. Three members, other than the chairman and the deputy 
chairman, must be people who appear to the Secretary of the State to be suited to make the interest 
of the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively their special care. Appointments are made 
for a maximum period of five years. ITC members are disqualified from sitting in the House of 
Commons and the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
In appointing the members, the government maintained a degree of confinui,, y vith the previous 
regulator. The first chairman of the ITC is the former chairman of the EBA and some other members 
have also been carried over. In a period of upheaval, 'Wide oiperience both of regulation and of the 
broadcasting scene was seen as a necessary stabilising element. 
Function. 
The Broadcasting Act requires the Commission "to ensure that a wide range of services is available 
throughout the United Kingdom 
... 
(and) to ensure fair and effective competition in the provision of 
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such services and services connected with them! 2. It must also ensure that the services are of "high 
quality and offer a wide range of programmes calculated to appeal to a variety of tastes and 
interests"'. The strictures on competition "shall not be constructed as affecting the discharge by the 
Director General of Fair Trading, the Secretary of State or the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
of any of his or their functions in connection urith competifioný. 
The Act also contains general provisions with regard to the awarding of licences, licensed services, 
and advertisements, which are the responsibility of the ITC. 
The general provisions as to advertisements (Secfion 8) contain several restrictions carTied over from 
Schedule I of the 1981 Act. Advertisements on behalf of political parties or directed towards 
political ends are still prohibited. So is unreasonable discrimination either against or in favour of any 
particular advertiser. The Commission may not act as an advertising agency. There is a new 
prohibition on the inclusion, without the Commission's permission, of programmes ponsored by 
persons whose products or services are prohibited from being advertised under Secfion 9 which deals 
with the code of conduct. 
Unlike in previous Acts, religious advertising is not forbidden and the detailed restrfýfions on 
sponsorslip or any appearance of advertiser supplied or suggested programming have been dropped. 
There is no separate Schedule devoted to Rules as to Advertisements. 
With regard to control of advertisements, he Commission isrequired 
(Section 9) 
a) a)? er the appropriate consuftafion, to d-aw up, andfrom fime to time review a 
code 
i) goveming stwdards tvdpracfice in adverlising and in the 
sponsofing of progrwnmes, md 
2 Broadcasting Act 1990, Chapter 4, London: HMSO, Part I Section 1, Subsection 2 
3 ibidL Part 1, Section 1, Subsection 2 
4 ibidL Section 9 
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ii) prescribing the advaWsements and methods ofadve? lWng wd 
sponsorship to he prohibited, or to be prohibited in pa? tcular 
circumstwices; and 
h) to do all that they can to secure that the provisions of the code are observed in the 
provision of the licensed services. 77ze Commission may make different provision in 
the codefor different kinds of licensed services. [MTN]] 
"The appropriate consultation" is defined as consultafionAith 
- 
a) the Radio A uthority 
h) everyperson who is the holder ofa licence under Part I 
c) such ho&es orpersons appeming to the Commission to represent 
each of the following, nwnely., 
i) viewers 
' ii) advertsers 
W) professional organisations qualified to give achwe in 
relation to the advertising ofpcotcularproducts, as the 
Commission think fit. and 
d) such bodies orpersons who are concernedwith standards of conduct in 
advertising as the Commission think fit 
Viewers opinions are solicited from the Voice of the Listener, the National Consumer Council, the 
Consumers Association, and the ITC's own Viewers Consultative Councils and Central Religious 
Advisory Conmittee; advertisers! and agencies' views are sought through their trade associations. 
Many relevant professional organisations are consulted, e. g. the British Medizal Association for 
medical advertising and the AA and the RAC for motor advertising. Those concerned with standards 
of conduct include the Advertising Standards Authority, the British Code Of Advertising Practice 
Committee, the Office of Fair Trading, and the Securities' Investment Board and the Self Regulatory 
Organisations for the financial appendix to the Codeý. 
5 Note: This information was provided during a interview with Frank Willis. 
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Sectioti 9 also allows the ITC to go beyond the requirements imposed by the code in discharging its 
general responsibilities in respect of advertisements and methods of advertising and sponsorship, and 
in securing compliance with code. It may give directions to licence holders 
- 
a) with respect to the claws anddesaiptions ofadverdsements and 
methods of advertising and sponsorship to be excludecl or to be miuded 
inpwlicular circumsfimces, or 
b) with regard to the exclusion ofa pcvtcular advertisement, or its 
exclasion inpaHicukrr circumsimice& 
It may also give directions regarding the timing of advertisements, the minimum interval that should 
elapse between periods given over to advertisements and the exclusion of advertisements from a 
specified part of a licensed service. These powers over the process aspect of regulation are carried 
over from previous acts. 
The Commission is also an administrative authority for the purposes of the Control of Misleading 
AdWrlisements Regulations ( 1988 ) and has a duty under the regulations to set up a complaints 
procedure. It must investigate all complaints about television advertising and take action to redress 
the situation if necessary. There is a scale of penalties for non-compliance with directions, the chief 
sanction being the banning of an advertisement. If a company fags to obey a withdrawal order it can 
be fined up to 3% of its annual revenue, up to 5% for a second offence, and ultimately may have its 
licence revoked. 
With respect to advertising control, then, the basic function of the regulatory authority is threefold: 
i) It sets standards through the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice 
and the Code of Programme Sponsorship. 
ii) It enforces compliance through a combination of pre-transmission 
clearance requirements, retrospective action and penalties for 
non-compliance. 
iii) It deals with all complaints received about advertising through an 
established complaints procedure. 
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So, although the 1990 Broadcasting Act still provides a fairly solid framework for the regulation of 
television advertising, it contains significantly fewer statutory requirements than previous acts. Ile 
regulatory agency must continue to draw up and keep under review a Code of Practice but, deprived 
of its broadcasting role, it can act only retrospectively in the case of breaches to the Codes. It is no 
longer mandatory to appoint advisory committees, such as the Advertising Advisory Committee and 
the Medical Panel, but merely to engage in "appropriate consultation". In the event, the ITC has, up 
to now, chosen to retain the committee system with relatively minor changes. 
9.3.2 Specialist Advisory Committees on Television Advertising. 
FoHowing precedent, the ITC has appointed two specialist advisory 
committees to assist in the task of drawing up the Codes of Practice. 
i) YheAdverfisingAdvisory Commiuee. 
ji) 7heMe&calAdWsoryPwieL 
(i) The Advertising Advisory Committee. 
Members. 
The Committee has a Chairman appointed by the Commission, currently Professor Cob 
Seymour-Ure of the University of Kent. I-Es predecessor was also an academic, Professor Geoffrey 
Stephenson of the same University. From 1964 until 1992 the Chairman was required by law to be 
independent of all advertising interests. The 1990 Act did not spell out this requirement but the ITC, 
playing it safe, has made it clear that he is still "independent, having neither industry nor consumer 
group affiliations" 
. 
In addition, the Committee comprises nominees of consumer, medical and advertising organisations, 
representatives of terTestrial and Satellite broadcasters, and some members appointed on an 
individual basis. The majority have no connection with advertising interests. 
Frank Willis Television Advertising Control: the new IX system, Consumcr Affairs, Marcb/APrd 199 1, 
p. 23-26 
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On the non-advertising side, members include representatives of the National Consumer Council, the 
Consumers' Association and the British Medical Associafion. It has also recently invited the Chief 
Trading Standards Officer for Cumbria and a Minister of Religion involved in youth work in 
Londods black community to join. From the advertising world, the Chairman of the BCAP 
Committee, the main standards-setting body in the wholly self-regulatory system run by the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), is a member, along with representatives of the advertising 
industry, both agencies and advertisers. According to former chairman Geoffirey Stephenson, the 
7 Committee now has a more varied professional representation and has become less London based 
. 
Function. 
The AAC is not a decision making body but "the main forum for discussion of the rules relating to 
advertising standardsO. Its role is to debate the various issues presented to it by the ITC, who will 
have conducted prior consultations with interested parties, and to assess research. To assist it in this 
task, it looks at reports of complaints from viewers and reviews of existing literature on the effects of 
television advertising on audiences. It then passes on its advice to the board of the ITC. The 
Commission is not obliged to follow this advice, but rarely rýects it. Frank Willis denies that its role 
has been downgraded in practice following the 1990 Act. As he explained when interviewed, 
"although the AAC is not any more a statutory body we wish to maintain it because it is very 
important that the standards we enforce do represent an acceptable consensus of reasonable thinking 
people in the UK"". 
ii) The Medical Advisory Panel. 
Members. 
The Medical Advisory Panel is made up of distinguished consultants in general medicine, 
pharmacology, chemistry, dentistry, veterinary science, nutrition, paediatrics, gynaecology, 
derTnatology and other associated specialist fields. The Commission appoints the panel after 
consultationswith professional organisations and with the agreement of the Minister of State. 
7 Professor Geofrrey Stephenson Sound Advice, Spectrum: Quarterly Magazine of the Independent Television Commission. 
Summer 1992, p. 10 8 ITC: Annual Repon andAccounts 1992, p. 36 9 Interview with Frank Willis 
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Function 
To give advice both on the provisions of the Code bearing on medical and related advertising, and 
on the presentation of individual advertisements where a health claim is made. 
9.3.3 The Broadcasting Standards Counci! 
Members. 
The Council has eight members appointed by the Secretary of State at the Department of National 
Heritage. According to its Director, Colin Shaw, they are intended to represent lay opinion ( i. e. that 
of the average viewer or listener) rather than that of professional broadcasters or members of the 
advertising industry. 
Funcfion. 
The Broadcasting Standards Council's constitution and duties are dealt with in detail in Sections 
152-161 of the 1990 Broadcasting Act. Its rernit is to monitor the portrayal of sex and violence and 
investigate the question of taste and decency in television and radio programmes and in broadcast 
advertising. It deals with complaints from the public about these matters and can initiate complaints 
of its own. 
Its powers, although statutory, are limited. As Colin Shaw explained to me, it is not strictly speaking 
a regulatory body but an advisory body. Like the ITC, it has a duty to draw up and, from time to 
time, review a code of practice. If a complaint about a particular commercial is received the Council 
can require the broadcaster concerned to provide it with a recording of the offending item. It must 
then decide whether or not to uphold the complaint and has the power to compe-I its findings to be 
published, either in print or on the air, at the expense of the broadcaster. It has the resources to 
commission research into matters relevant to its remit. 
Shaw went on to emphasise that the majority of the Council's work is concerned with programming 
and not advertising, since he regards the ITCs control procedures as more than adequate and the 
BSC actually receives few complaints about television commercials. Areas where it might become 
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involved include gender stereotyping, the inappropriate use of sex to stimulate Weslo and the 
portrayal of disabled people in advertisements". 
9.4 Government Departments and Agencies. 
9.4.1 The Department of National Heritage 
The Department of National Heritage was created by the Prime Minister in 1992 to gather under one 
roof a number of functions previously scattered among several government departments. It took over 
broadcasting from the Home Office and also oversees the arts, film, historic buildings, sport and 
tourism. The remit of the new department was described by John Major in May 1992 as having 
responsibility for "many of the central areas of our national life which enhance its quality or 
12 contribute significantly to its national identity" 
. 
As broadcasting has always been regarded as one 
of the most important of these areas it seems appropriate that responsibility for it should have been 
given to this specialist department rather than remaining with the Home Office. 
The Secretary of State for Naflonal Heritage represents the apex of the pyrarnýd of broadcasting 
regulation: it is to him that the ITC must refer for guidance in problematic areas of advertising 
control. He may accept or reject proposals put to him by the ITC or deliver his own directions. The 
department is responsible for general broadcasting policy. 
9.4.2 The Office of Fair Trading 
The Office of Fair Trading is a regulatory agency with duties under the Fair Trading Act 1973, 
receiving funding and political direction from the Department of Trade and Imiustry. Its purpose is 
to "keep under review commercial activities in the UK and protect the consumer from unfair 
13 practices" 
. 
It has had its powers extended by several additional pieces of legislation since its 
inception and now covers restrictive trade practices, resale prices, anti-competitive practices. It 
BSC Code ofPracfice 1989, London: Broadcasting Standards Practice, p. 43 
ibid. p. 45 12 Barrie NbcDonald, Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. A guide to information sources, London: Mansell 
Publishing Limited. p. 71 13 ibid. P. 74 
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operates the Control of Misleabig Advertisements Regulations 1988, wlich implement EC 
Directive 841450 on Mislea&ngAdvenising and, as such, it is an important consumer protection 
mechanism. 
The Office's role in the regulation of television advertising is, in theory, confined to the process 
aspect since it deals only with relevant competition issues. Its publication, Mislea&ng 
Adverfisements. the Powers of the Director General of Fair Trading, states quite clearly that his 
powers do not cover the content of advertisements carried on commercial TV, Cable and Satellite 
services or on commercial radio. The authorities with duties in this area are the ITC and the Radio 
Authority. The OFT responds to complaints made to it by any of the commercial participants in 
broadcasting, advertising and related industries 
- 
licensees, independent producers, advertisers, 
agencies etc. 
- 
about alleged unfair competition or dubious trade practices. The ITC do, however, 
refer to the Office on a consultative basis when drawing up the codes which are concerned chiefly 
with advertising content. 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act gives the OFT responsibility for approving the networking 
arrangements for the new Channel Three, worked out jointly by the ITC and the rIV contractors in 
consultation with the OFT 14 
. 
The function of the OFT under Schedule 4 is to ensure that the 
network is able to compete effectively with other television programme services in the UK. The ITV 
networicing arrangements must pass the "competition test", i. e. they must not have the effect of 
"restricting, distorting or preventing competition in connection with any business activity in the 
IX715. 
In December 1992, the arrangements hammered out after much argument and (lebate, and approved 
and published by the ITC, were r6ected by the OFr on the grounds that they did not pass the 
competition test. The ITC and the Channel 3 licensees, referred the matter to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission. In April 1993, an MMC Report ordered a number of modifications to the 
scheme, the most important of which was to allow independent producers to submit programme 
proposals directly to the Network Centre. In September, the revised arrangements, =enflY in 
14 Broadcasting Act 1990, Scction39Schedulc4. 
13 ibicL Section 39, Schedule 4 
175 
The BroadcasdngAct 1990. Continuity and Change 
operation, were published after receiving ITC approval. The MMC also recommended the Authority 
to monitor, analyse and report on the operation of the networking arrangenlentS. 
9.4.3 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission is a body with statutory powers to investigate proposed 
mergers, alleged monopoly situations and any form of anti-competitive practice. It is funded by the 
Department of Trade and Industry but is independent of the government. Cases are referred it by the 
OFT; it then reports whether it believes there has been, or might be, an abuse of the market and 
recornmends appropriate measures. The Commission is mentioned in the Broadcasting Act 1990 in 
connection with its competition regulation function, and with the Channel 3 networking 
arrangements. It was responsible for some of the amendments relating to competition ecessary for 
the ITCATV Network Centre's scheme to be accepted by the OFT. 
9.5 Bodies Involved in Self-Regulation of Television Advertising. 
9.5.1 The ffVNetworIk Centre. 
Members. 
The Fifteen Channel Three Companies. 
The Channel Three Network comprises 15 companies; there are 14 regions corresponding to loosely 
defined cultural, political and geographical communities, one of which (London) is divided into a 
weekday and a weekend service". 
Fundion. 
Set up under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the ITV Network Centre is "a body outside the day-to-day 
A7 
control of the television companies yet integral to ITV's federal structur&' 
. 
It operates alongside 
the ITVA which continues in its role as the ITV companies trade association 
. 
The Network Centre 
16 Note : lbe largest region 
- 
London 
- 
covers nearlY five million homes; the smallest - the Channel Islands - some 50-000 
The five companies erving the largest regions - the two London cmnpanies, one for the Midlands (centred on 
Birmingham), one for the North West of England (centred on Manchester) and one for Yorkshire (ccntred on Leeds) - 
have been given responsibility for most of the production for the network. (Jonathan Davies. M UK Special Report. 
17 
Knowledge Research, 199 1, p. 39 ) 
The Network Centre Review, 1994, p. 5 
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has sole responsibility for commissioning new programmes for the network, either from independent 
producers or from in-house production resources owned by the television companies themselves. 
GCV- For license compliance reasons aH programmes have to be contracted through an ITV company, 
even those supplied by independent producers, who have direct access to the Network Centre". 's It 
is governed by the ITV Council, which is made up of the Chief Executives of the companies and is 
responsible for joint policy on industry-wide matters, including marketing and advertising copy 
clearance. 
As self-regulation has now been given much greater emphasis within the statutory framework, the 
Network Centre plays a central role in the implementation of current policy particularly with respect 
to the statutory Codes ofAdverfising Standards and Practice and Sponsorship. Since 1993, it has had 
sole responsibility for pre-transmission clearance of television commercials which it carries out by 
means of the Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre, though it may ask the regulator for advice. It 
is in daily contact with the advertising industry and provides an advisory service on the meaning and 
interpretation of the Code for those involved in the making of commercials. 
The ITV Network Centre, like its predecessors, is also a member of the Code of Advertising Practice 
(CAP) Committee which administers the British Code of Advertising practice. This general code is a 
voluntary method of maintaining standards in non-broadcast advertising, drawn up and supported by 
advertisers, agencies and the media. The Centre is therefore able to connect voluntary regulation of 
all other forms of advertising with the specific requirements of the statutory codes affecting broadcast 
advertising; both Idnds of code are referred to in clearing copy. 
9.5.2 Ile Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre. 
Fundion 
BACC is the chief mechanism by which the Network Centre fiffis its duty to ensure compliance 
with the codes. It has two levels of authority. At the top is the Copy Clearance Conunittee, made up 
of six sales and marketing directors from the ITV companies, Channel 4 and BskyB, which meets 
monthly. It provides an "appeals court" function in the case of disputes. Routine daily clearance is 
18 ibi(I p. 5 
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of six sales and marketing directors from the ITV companies, Channel 4 and BskyB, which meets 
monthly. It provides an "appeals court" function in the case of disputes. Routine daily clearance is 
conducted by the Copy Secretariat which is composed of three groups, each consisting of five people 
experienced in advertising, who check pre-production scripts and provide advice. Agencies and 
advertisers have free access to the Secretariat to discuss problems and may contact Conunittee 
members at any time. 
BACC has two principle fimctions: the examination and discussion of pre-production scripts and the 
pre-transmission clearance of fmished television advertisements. With the exception of a minority of 
local advertisements Which may be cleared by the broadcaster concerned, all fmished advertisements 
must be viewed and given clearance by BACC prior to transrnission. Although the submission of pre- 
production scripts is not compulsory, the vast majority of advertisers do this. It is therefore unusual 
for a finished commercial to be rýected and only a small proportion need amending before being 
cleared for transmission. In 1993, for television, BACC dealt with around 18,000 scripts and 12,000 
finished advertisements". 
BACC now has an expanded constituency to include Satellite and Cable stations. In its decision- 
maldrig process the Clearance Centre relies on the experdse of a large mimber of specialist advisors. 
9.5.3 ne Advertising Liaison Group. 
The old Advertising Liaison Conunittee continued to exist in its original form until 1992. The ITC 
then carried out a review of its consultative arrangements for the purely commercial spects of the 
broadcaster-advertiser relationship. It decided to replace the ALC with "a broader forum on which, 
in addition to the ITV companies, other categories of ITC licensees wouldl-e represented. " its 
purpose is loosely defined as "an exchange of views" between the interested parties on issues of 
general concern comected with television advertising and sponsorship". 
19 Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre. Rcgulation ofBroadcastAdverMing in the UK, GCD 14106/94 
20 ITC: AMUal Report and AcCoUntS 1992, Op. Cit p. 38 
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9.5.4 The Advertising Association. 
The Advertising Association is the chief trade organisation for all participants in the business of 
advertising. It represents British advertising interests both in the UK and worldwide and contributes 
to the voluntary system of self-regulation for all non-broadcast advertising operated by the 
Advertising Standards Authority and the British Code of Advertising Practice Conmittee. 
9.5.5 The Advertising Standards Authority and the Code of Advertising Practice 
(CAP) Committee. 
These two bodies together constitute the machinery for self-regulation of non-broadcast advertising. 
Although not directly involved in the control of television commercials, they nevertheless work in co- 
operation with the ITCs Advertising Control Office and the ITV Network Centre to ensure 
maximum consistency between the rules governing broadcast advertising those dealing with all other 
forms, Ile CAP Committee Chairman is a member of the Advertising Advisory Committee. 
9.5.6 The Incorporated Society of British Advertisem 
Members. 
More than 1000 UK companies, including most major advertisers. 
Function. 
The ISBA is an organisation which represents the interests of advertisers in the UK with respect to 
all media. It has been an important player in television advertising regulation since 1954. Both before 
and after deregulation of broadcasting in Britain (for which it lobbied forcefiffly) it has worked 
closely with the regulating authority in the area of general policy, and in the drawing up of the codes 
of practice through its presence on the Advertising Advisory Committee. it alse has a close working 
relationship with the commercial stations and the BACC who must regulate advertisements paid for 
by its members. 
Among the 6m of the ISBA as outfined in its 1993 Amual report are: 
1) To promote the freedom of speech and commercial commiuication, and to defend 
the advertisers' freedom to advertise and promote goods and services in aU media. 
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2) To ensure that British advertising is legal, honest, decent and truthful 
through active support for the Code of Practice, governing all forals of 
commercial communication, as agreed by the Society. 
It flulhers these potentially conflicting aims in the field of television advertising through its Radio, 
Television and Screen Advertising Committee. 
As weH as membership of the AAC, the Society is represented on the CAP Committee, on the 
Advertising Standards Authority, in the Advertising Association and the Advertising Liaison Group. 
9.5.7 The Institute of Practitioners in Advertisinp, 
Members. 
Most major advertising agencies. Its member-companies handle over 80% of all advertising placed 
by UK agencies. 
Funedon. 
The IPA is the industry body and professional institute which represents the interests of advertising 
agencies in their relationswith advertisers and the media. Like the ISBA it has been involved in both 
the formation of broadcasting regulation policy and in the practical operation of regulation since the 
inception of commercial television. It belongs to the AAC, the CAP Committee, the Advertising 
Standards Authority, the Advertising Association and the Advertising Liaison Group. 
9.5.8 The National Consumer Council 
Members 
The Council has nineteen government-appointed members who also forn. th--- Committees of the 
regional councils of Scotland and Wales. The chairman of the separately constituted Consumer 
Council for Northern Ireland is also a member. 
Funcdon. 
The National Consumer Council was set up by government in 1975 to give a strong, independent 
voice to consumers in the United Kingdorn. Although the Department of Trade and Industry funds 
the Council and appoints its members the Council has no statutory powers. It does not deal directly 
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with individual consumer queries, nor does it test consumer products 
- 
these jobs are done by 
coHeague organisations. 
It is concerned with access to goods, services and information; with choice in making purchasing 
decisions; with safL-ty issues and with systems of redress following complaints and disputes. It 
formulates policies to further and safeguard consumers' interests, based on appropriate information- 
getting and research, and takes action to promote these policies and ensure their implementation. It
works in conjunction with other consumer groups in pursuing its objectives". 
Monitoring advertising standards in all media is an important part of its work and it has been able to 
give advice to the regulatory authority for commercial television through membership of the 
Advertising Advisory Committee since 1964. It has therefore been involved both in drawing up and 
revising the codes and in day-to-day debates on standards and practice. It is concerned chiefly with 
preventing misleading advertising from being shown on air, and with ensuring that commercials are 
prepared responsibly without being "so framed as to abuse the trust of the consumer or exploit his 
lack of experience or knowledge"22 
. 
9.5.9 Tle Consumers' Association 
Members 
The Consumers' Association has around 800,000 members, either subscribers to its four "VVhich? " 
magazines, or ordinary members. It is governed by a Council of elected members and does not 
permit "principals from trade or industry" to sit on the governing council23. 
Funcdon 
The organisation has two arms: the Association of Consumer Research, a registered charity, and 
Consumers! Association Ltd., which publishes the research and conducts campaigns on behalf of 
consumers. It has a staff of 480 and its own testing laboratory where comparative r search on a 
wide range of products is carTied out and where claims made by advertisers are investigated. The 
21 NCC. 
* StrateV Plan 1991; NCC. Annual Report 1992 22 MCC. Advertising: Legislate or Penuade?. 4 Consumer Statement. 23 Consumers' Association: 71eAssociationfor ConsumerResearch: Consumers'Association Limited. p. l. 
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aims and objectives of CA are broacHy similar to those of the NCC but it is financially wholly 
independent. It does not accept money either from government, or trade and industry, nor does it 
pernýt adverfising in any of fts pubfications 
. 
It lobbies parliament and producers of goods and services for a better deal for consumers, and has 
been responsible for several Acts of Parliament which have improved the consurner's position. Like 
the NCC, it has been actively involved in the debates on broadcasting policy, particularly in the area 
of advertising control, and has a representative on the Advertising Advisory Committee. 
9.6 Conclusion 
This brief summary shows that while there has been considerable re-structuring and a few name 
changes 
, 
the chief players in advertising control remain the same. The fundamental functional 
difference in the regulator/broadcaster r lationship has not meant a big alteration in the general 
scheme of product regulation. Process regulation has been more drastically altered with the opening 
up of competition, the liberalising of restrictions on market entry and the introduction of the auction 
system all of which disrupted the established patterns of commercial television. The repercussions of
this shake-up in the markets have yet to make themselves felt, however, apart from the loss of three 
television companies, including the popular and successful Thames Television and TV AM. It is 
nevertheless widely believed that these changes in the macro-environment of television economics 
will eventually filter through to the specific task of maintaining standards on the content side of 
advertising. 
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Chapter 10 
The Dynamics of Regulatory Activity: Control and Resistance. 
10.1 Introduction. 
Despite four years of upheaval in the television market following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the 
various different bodies described in the previous chapters till have certain clearly defined functions 
within the system, even if some of those functions have changed, altering the nature of their relations. 
All the parties involved in regulation of commercial television in the UK have been arvdous to avoid 
abrupt changes in practice even though far-reaching changes in policy have been made. The emphasis 
has been on maintaining continuity and proceeding with caution, reflecting the essentially 
conservative nature of British broadcasting regulation. 
The regulatory scene is nevertheless far from static. The various different participants in advertising 
regulation come together to form a complex and shifting network of relationships within a power 
structure that is broadly hierarchical. The chief dynamic of these relationships arises from the 
opposing forces of control and resistance. It is the duty of the regulator to control the behaviour of 
the advertising and commercial television industries. The industries in turn resist, not so much the 
principle of control which they accept, but any particular controlling actions they consider 
unreasonable, unfair or unnecessarily damaging to their interests. The regulator is in a parallel 
relationship with the state which wields the ultimate authority. Within the hierarchy of authority the 
positions of the main players are fairly flexible, although they must remain within the boundaries set 
by the forinal regulatory structures. DifIerent sets of interests interact together in a variety of 
alliances and oppositions, each one manoeuvring to defend its own territory and to ffirther its own 
objectives. 
While the relationship of regulator versus industry is the central one, the secondary connections the 
different parties make on a more temporary basis are an important factor in the development of 
Policy. The regulator and the television companies may join forces against the advertisers and the 
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government; the advertisers and the regulator may combine to control certain activities of the 
television companies; consumers may lobby Parliament for consumer protection measures affecting 
television advertising which neither the regulator nor industry wants. The involvement of other 
participants 
- 
independent producers, for example 
- 
'with a stake in the outcome of regulatory 
decisions further complicates the background against which decisions are made. The different interest 
groups must negotiate their share of favourable regulation and try to limit the damage. It is a 
bargaining process entered into by all sides, the results of which must not distort the overall balance 
of advantage and disadvantage too greatly. 
Although the pla- yers have an objective status based on a set of functions which are externally defined 
- 
their institutional remits 
- 
this does not prevent them frOM having rather different internal 
perceptions of what these fimctions are, and of their own and others' effectiveness in exercising them. 
How the intentions and objectives of others are perceived also varies depending on the player's 
position in the network. 
Consumers, for instance, tend to be more critical of the system in general than advertisers, whom 
they see as relatively more powerful and oflen over ready to use that power against the interests of 
mi ect consumers. They sometimes ee the Advertising Advisory Com ttee as ineff ive in curbing some 
promotional practices which are unacceptable from their point of view. Advertisers have criticised 
the regulator for being too close to the television companies to be able to ensure a fair deal and too 
anxious to placate a small but vocal minority of consumers. These subjective opinions of the 
regulation game are also important in understanding how it works. Additionally, regulation of the 
kind used in television advertising, which relies to great extent on codes of practice, must allow space 
for interpretation of the codes; and any act of interpretation includes a strongly subjective lement'. 
Tlis chapter exanines how all these organisations relate to one another in the actual practice of 
advertising regulation. I have relied on in-depth interviews with leading figures responsible for 
television advertising policy to discover how each of them views the purposes of regulation, and its 
effectiveness, from the perspective ofhis or her own particular interest group. 
1 See: Chapter 12 p. 253 
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10.2 The Operation of Television Advertising Regulation: A Definition and 
Some lHustrations. 
The ITC's Director of Advertising and Sponsorship, Frank Wilfis, gave me the following definition of 
broadcast advertising regulation in the LJK "self-regulation within a statutory framework ,2. The 
1990 Broadcasting Act and the ITC itself make up the bulk of this framework, the ITC being the 
body legally constituted under the Act to implement regulation. Government agencies uch as the 
OFT and the MMC are also a part of this fi-amework, as is independent legislation relating to 
consumer, competition and advertising issues. The Broadcasting Standards Council, too, provides a 
marginal element of the statutory framework. 
The "self' mentioned in the definition requires rather more careful idenfification. It is usually taken 
to refer primarily to the commercial television industry comprising the ITC's licensees 
- 
ITWý 
Channel 4 and the Cable and Satellite companies 
- 
who now have sole responsibility for broadcasting 
advertisements and for making sure that they comply with the statutory codes. At a secondary level, 
the advertising agencies and their clients are part of the process of self-regulation because they too 
must ensure that their commercials do not violate the statutory codes drawn up by the regulator. To 
assist them in this task, non-statutory guidelines are made available to them by the ITV Network 
Centre's Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre. They may also refer to the voluntary system Of 
maintaining standards of practice in non-broadcast advertising operated by the Advertising 
Standards Authority and the British Code of Advertising Practice Comrifttee, which has its Own 
codes. The activity of self-regulation, then, is the interpretation o& and compliance With, a set of 
rules, mandatory at the primary level and advisory at the secondary level. 
The voluntary machinery for regulating non-broadcast media differs from the hybrid system that 
oversees television and radio in that it possesses nolegal teeth to force those who contravene the 
codes to change their behaviour. If advertisers persistently breach the ndes, complainants must take 
action through the courts. This is usually done through the Office of Fair Trading, which has powers 
to seek injunctions to stop publication of misleading or potentially damaging advertising, and to 
institute court proceedings under the relevant legislation. The ASA, a classical self-regulatory 
institution and a creature of the advertising industry, does not have any punitive powers other than 
2 IntaMew with Fmnk Willis. 
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adverse publicity, suspension of trading privileges or appeals to publishers to refuse advertising space 
to persistent offenders3. 
Once more, it is worth emphasising the point that the hybrid system represented by the ITC is a 
logical consequence of the view that broadcast advertising, especially television advertising, is 
qualitatively different from other varieties. Its immediacy and invasive nature have always been taken 
to justify much more interventionist regulation than print advertising. This historically influential view 
is still strongly held in government and among policy makers elsewhere, despite the recent emergence 
of a liberalising ideology. But since the earliest days, the need for convenience from the government's 
point of view hes been a significant factor in determining the practical arrangements for advertising 
control. I 
in the case of television advertising, although the quantity of non-broadcast advertising dwarfs the 
amount broadcast on television (some 25 million ads are published annually in the press and through 
direct mail etc. in the UK, while the number of commercials appearing on television has remained 
stable for several years at around 10-12,000) there is still far too much work for any existing 
government agency, such as the OFT, to handle. The solution has been a compromise. The 
regulatory agency, with its specialist department of advertising control, puts together codes of 
practice which are not themselves law, but are statutorily enforceable by means of legal sanctions- 
One of the regulated industries itself provides the apparatus of enforcement. Under the new 
Broadcasting Act, the regulator maintains a greater distance from those who are responsible for 
producing, policing and finally broadcasting the commercials than the previous Authority, which 
means an increased role for self-regulation. This mixed system may not be perfect, and the emphasis 
may shift from time to the, but it appears to suit the particular circumstances of broadcasting in the 
UK very welI4. 
All the participants in the process whom I interviewed agreed that the combination of self-regulation 
and statutory back-up is, in principle, the right way to go about safeguarding standards in television 
3,4dVerliSing Under Controk A Guide to the ASA, pp. 2-3 
'Note: Lord Thomson of Monifieth, spealemg as Chairman of theAdvertising Standards Authority, in answer to his own 
queston as to whether the mixture between state regulation and self-regulation was right for Britain, stwsed that "the 
important principle to preserve is that the system should remain a genuine mixture" in order to complement the mixed 
economy it serves. aord Thomson of Monifieth, FC, Ae United Kingdom Voluntary Control System rn Advatising 
Control under United Kingdom and the European Community Law, 28th-29th September 1978, Business School Conference, 
The City University, pp. 31-32 
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advertising, It has the advantages of flexNfity and speed of response, makes reaching a consensus 
easer, and provides a clear and wen-jefined set of parameters. T1w role of the rrc as an 
Intermediate l vel of authority between the consumer, or any adverfiw or agency who felt they had 
CaU* for complaint, and the legal system is appreciated. There is great refuctance to involve the 
courts which is both costly and time consuming'. This is why there was concerted opposition to the 
various moves by the European Comritwion in the 1970's and 80's to extend the law fiirther into 
advertising control. Most people questioned thought that apinwimately the right balance had been 
struck between the two modes of operation, but the frontiers might somewnes need adjusting this 
way or that. 
10.3 Fotw Diagrammatic Representations. 
As has already been mentioned, during its seventy year history broadcasting regulation has followed 
three different paradigms which are represented in Figure 10.1. 
Figure 10.1: 77te divw pmadfpm of UK broadcasdng regulafim 
The rTC believes dst "the chief admuAW of code-bmd rysUm of reguldw Ls aw dwy can ann for higher sWn&* dmn, fir 
euw0e, mtmjjW law". ( Frmk Wini. % Back to dier bowdary I#K Spocbm3, Wmter, 1992, p 17ý So not only is selkegulatim 
qubdwr, cheWer and mom ficable but nure effective m tam of qu2W. 
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Under paradigm 1, the Govermrs, who are the BBC, are responsible for ensuring that the 
management complies with the term aM conditions of the Corporation's Charter and Licem, mid 
with the reqwrements contained in any relevant legislation- The system is completely unitary with no 
separation of regulator and regWated. Under paradigm 2, the comiriercial television Authority is 
putty detached from the regulated industries. Although it Ls completely separate fi-orn the advertising 
indtý, it is fc)mwly attwhed to the television irAu&y by virtue of its broadcasting fiinction, under 
which it has responsibility for regulation of all broadcast matter, including advertising, Prior to 
transrnj&ýKn Under paradigm 3, the Authority, no longer the broadcaster, is formally detached from 
both rqplated irxkatrie66. 
6 Mote. 
- 
The rrA, and its swctmor the Independent BroadcasW* Authotity, did not confism exactly to the type of regulatory agency 
disicussed in Chapter I vA&h is wholly independent of the pnvately owned buswjm it mqxrvL,, es. As Wol%ang HoffmmAkm 
has pomted out, the British Audxxity, "m its role as broadcaster, could sictively influence prograime content m the dffecb= it 
wished; mme than a watchdog, it hunted with the hainds. The new Cannussion (the Independent Television Coommasma) is a 
ckfisic, detached s*crvmy body". WolQpng Hoffmann-Ricni, Ww&ft Vubmrable Vahm: Regukmxy Memum and 
Worcanmt DUmumm, m Jay Blumkr (cd. ) Tdevuxn and dw Nblic buavA LaWm - Sage, IM, p. 192) 
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Figure 10.2 shows the pyrarnidal structure of the hierarchy of authority in television advertising 
regulation, with the Depwtment of Nafional Heritage and the two other relevant government 
agencies at the top, the regulator with its Advisory Committees in the niidck and the television and 
adverhmig industries at the base. Indepecident feedback from the regulated industries to the state is 
represented by arrows. Because the model iiicludes the state the television and adverfising ftxIustries 
are represented as on the same level, as allies with a united interest, because they are both subject to 
audiority from above. 
Mqumlal Power rdadons mWain the rVxhwmy symfem 
1. T. C 
Drawing Mp 
und 
6fttutorx Bmmla#R 
-. i`*1*Ax1on Industry 
Bev-Regulation 
mmpuwwe with an regulatto 
Advertising Industry 
ccwVlkmee with aU raguktdons 
Figure 10.3 takes a narrower view which excludes the state and fi)cuses on the levels of authority 
wdin the regulator/regulated relationship. Ile television industry as the one responsible for self- 
regulation in the sense of enfbrcement of statutory regulation prior to tIMSmiSsiOn is shown above 
the advertising industry which must comply with both ITC and rrV Network Cewe rules. 
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Figure Id 4., Ike ncu agency. 
Figure 10.4 represents the ITC in the traditional role of mediator between constimers and PrOdUcels, 
with the vanous statutory and non-statutory infimniatiorud mputs to the advettising rqpMon Poky 
fonnafion process. 
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10.4 The ITC and the State. 
10.4.1 IlIe Department of National Heritage. 
The ITC's formal relations with the state are set out in the Broadcasting Act. The Minister of State 
for National Heritage is responsible for general policy, with occasional advice from the Parliamentary 
Home Affairs Committee. He must be consulted on more specific issues such as classes of 
advertisement and methods of advertising to be permitted or excluded and so forth. At times of 
ffindamental political change, however, policy generation may occur at the level of Prime Minister; 
the deregulation legislation of 1990 was a result of Margaret Thatchers vision of a new social and 
economic order for Britain. The broadcasting system had to be brought into fine with the prevailing 
Conservative ideology of the free market. Although the government has the last word, the regulator 
has not always been a mere passive partner in policy-making. In recent years, the IBA fought hard 
against the plan to auction off the ITV franchises to the highest bidder put forward in the 1989 WWte 
Paper, and the ITC campaigned vigorously to exclude the monitoring of advertising from the remit 
of the politically inspired quango, the Broadcasting Standards Council, and to prevent independent 
producers from having direct access to the ITV Network's Central Scheduler. 
With the BSC, the Comrnission argued plausibly that, in the first place, its own control machinery 
was quite capable of coping with all aspects of advertising regulation, and secondly, that two 
Merent agencies with overlapping responsibilities would actually make matters worse by causing 
confusion in the minds of consumers. It was supported in this position by a grand alliance of the 
ISBA, the IPA, the broadcasters and the consumer organisations, none of whom wanted the BSC to 
interfere in adverfisini. In spite of this formidable array of opposition the government sided with the 
Council, who were equally determined to keep advertising part of its brief In this instance, the 
political agenda of the day decided the form of regulation without regard to the practicalities. Apart 
from the BSC, everyone else whom I questioned felt that the duplication of regulatory functions 
which would occur if the BSC became involved in advertising control would do nothing to improve 
regulatory efficiency, 
7 Frank Willis told me: "it is no secret that Nw opposed Me establishment of the Broadcasting Standards Council; its history was 
very political. 1-he rrC argued sftuWy in parliament that the BSC should not become involved in advertising because we (the 
rrC) regarded this as completely unnecessary" 
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10.4.2 ne Office of Fair Trading. 
The regulatoes relations with the state in the shape of the Office of Fair Trading are more sharply 
defined than its relations with the Department of National Heritage, or with the government up to 
and including the Prime Mmister. There is, in theory at least, a clear separation of powers between 
the two agencies. The OFT has a formal interest only in the process aspect of advertising regulation, 
i. e. in competition issues and the trade practices of the parties concerned, and leaves the product side 
to the Commission. Apart from its active role in setting up the network arrangements for Channel 3, 
under the Broadcasting Act, it is intended to be used only as a last resort. The ITC is encouraged to 
make every effort to sort out any problems itself before referring them to the Office. It is not 
intended that the OFT should become involved in the content of commercials at all; the ITC insists 
on using its own control machinery to deal with complaints ofmisleadingness te. 
The ITC, by contrast, has obligations in both areas. In a consultation document on airtime sales 
practices sent out in July 1992, the Commission explains its two generally expressed competition 
duties "which are relevant o the regulation of television advertising sales arrangements". These are 
the "fair and effective competition" duty, and the "no unreasonable discrimination" duty9- The former 
is an "overarching" obligation which governs interpretation of the latter. It is a, condition of ITC 
granted licenses that the licensee "shall not engage in any practice or enter into any arrangement 
which is prejudicial to fair and efffective competition in the provision of licensed services and services 
connected with there"O. A second condition of the license empowers the regulator to issue directions 
from time to time for the purpose of ensuring that licensees comply with the first. 
The ITC identifies three possible areas where a licensee night be accused of not fulfilling the first 
condition: i) competitive advertising; ii) exclusivity, iii) price. The first relates to the denial of 
advertising facilities by any station to its competitors to advertise their services. The second relates to 
"negotiating a deal with one particular advertiser in a given category, whereby that advertiser enjoys 
the exclusive right to advertise for a given period"' 
1. The third deals with circumstances where the 
Premium charged to an advertiser is so high that it amounts to a refusal to sell at all or refusal to Sell 
8 Interview with Hugh Little. The OFr does in fact have the POYAT, in fli=y, to deal uith the content of television advertising. See 
below, p. 197. 
IM Consullanon Paper on Wo Unrazonable Disaiminaton Cl=e" 
News Release, 29 My 1992, p. 2 
10 ibi(L P. 2 
ibid P. 3 
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without imposing some other unreasonable or unfair conditions. All these instances could be 
interpreted as "unreasonable discrimination". 
The Commission acknowledges that thiS is an extremely difficult regulatory area. The regulator 
should be very wary of laying down too many prescriptive rules in advance for as sophisticated and 
complex a market as television airtime. To do so could be to stifle legitimate business activities, such 
as the offering of incentives. But it must also be alert to the possibility of aspects of sales practice 
crossing the borderline into illegitimate activities. The consultation paper seeks the opinions of 
interested parties on how such dffEcult judgements should be made in future as the post- 1993 market 
grows even more complicated, 
The document also clarifies the ITC's position with regard to general competition law, emphasising 
that its powers under the 1990 Act are without prýudice to the remedies available under this 
legislation. It states that: 
"In some cases the ITC may be able to use its powers of intervention to achieve solutions more 
swiftly and with wider application within the television industry than would normally be the case 
under competition law. But the ITC is unlikely to wish to impose more onerous restrictions than 
those likely to emerge from OFTAIMC procedures. Where the ITC does not conclude that it would 
be appropriate for it to intervene, it will still be open to interested parties to seek to invoke general 
12 competition law procedures, or indeed to do so without prior involvement by the ITC 
This last remark notwithstanding, the Office of Fair Trading has made it clear that it would prefer 
complainants to go through ITC channels first, before involving the OFT". 
The ITC's relations with the government's general competition regulator have not always been 
entirely smooth. In 1991, the ITC, in support of its licensees, entered into a long wrangle with the 
OFT over both Secfion 39 and Schedule 4 of the Broadcasting Act, which was not resolved until 
well into 1993. Secfion 39 and Schedule 4 contained clauses requiring the ITC to approve the 
proposals for a centralised scheduling network for ITV submitted by the companies. After extensive 
consultation and discussion with the OFT, the Commission duly approved what it considered to be 
12 ibid. P. 1 13 Inteniew with Hugh Little 
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an acceptable arrangement and referred it for final consideration by the Office in May 1992. The 
OFI' issued a Report on 3rd December which concluded that in its view the proposals still did not 
satisfy the first part of the competition test set out in Paw 2 (1) (a) of Schedule 4 and must be 
modified. The Director General was of the opinion that "the arrangements are intended to have the 
effect of restricting and distorting competition in connection with business activities in the United 
Kingdom"14 
, 
Two reasons for this were given: (i) that the proposed scheme required aff independent programme 
producers to contract with a licensee, not with the Network Centre, and (H) that it imposed standard 
terms of contract for acquisition of programmes which sought exclusive UK transrnission rights for 
10 years, renewable to 15, or, in the case of 100 % funding by the licensee, in perpetuity. Both these 
features were considered by the Director General to be anti-competitive. 
The second issue is a purely commercial one of no special interest to the regulator, but (i), the 
proposal to deny independent producers access to the Central Scheduler, which was objected to by 
the OFT, received strong backing from the ITC because it had important implications for regulation. 
The Commission argued that independent producers must contract with a licensee and not the 
Central Schedule; because only then could the Commission ensure that "individual licensees 
generally carry responsibility for undertaking compliance with its regulatory requirements for 
broadcast programmes"15. The Director General recognised the force of the argument, but felt that 
compliance could be achieved in the case of independent producers by means of a separate contract 
between the Network Centre and a licensee. The matter was eventually resolved after the 
intervention of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission which sided with the OFT, ordering that 
independent producers should be able to submit proposals directly to the Network Centre, and that 
programme rights should not normally be acquired for more than 5 years16. 
In arguing against allowing independents direct access to the Central Scheduler, the ITC was mainly 
worried about the possibility that requirements affecting programming might be evaded if 
responsibility for compliance were to be delegated to third parties not initially in direct contact with 
the regulator. But delegation of responsibility also means that rules on indirect methods of 
"Office ofFair Trading, Channel 3 NetwvrkAmIngements, A report by the it ng under the Director G neral Of Fair Tradi 
Broadcasting Act 1990, Section 39 and Schedule 4,3 Dec=ber 1992, P. I 
ibid. p3 
erg omm ssion, ham etc 16 ITC note 17. ITC Annual Report and Accounts 1993, p. 93 - 95 and Monopolies and M ers CiC el 3, . 194 
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advertising might also be more easily brokerL T'his danger is negligible at present (1994) in terrestrial 
television since it has been the policy of ITV and Channel 4, with rare exceptions, not to commission 
programmes with a sponsor attached. Other stations, uch as BSkyB, under less stringent regulation, 
can afford to be more relaxed about accepting pre-sponsored or advertiser supplied programming. 
But, as an official at the OFT acknowledged to me, when the market becomes much more 
competitive in the future, even Network companies might be prepared to "fight dirty" to retain or 
increase market share 17 
. 
They may not then be so particular about the source of their programmes, or 
of their revenue, and consequently less concerned about the editorial independence of programme 
makers, the main concern of regulation policy. 
There is nothing ME the Act specifically to outlaw advertiser-supplied programmes. Already, as one 
of the exceptions, the European soap opera "Riviera", co-produced in association with Unilever, 
i. e. partly sponsored by the company, has been screened on British television. Sponsorship is on 
increase. Even if the present system persists under which licensees have strict control over the 
content and distribution of spot advertising and sponsorship is tightly regulated, there is still the 
danger that independently obtained programmes funded wholly or in part by advertisers might be 
treated differently. In insisting on allowing independent producers direct access to the Central 
Scheduler, the OFT demonstrates that it gives priority, in current market conditions, to maximum 
competition rather than safeguarding regulation in any future situation. The dilemma posed for 
regulation by this type of funding outside the safL-ty net of the UK Copy Clearance system is 
considered in more detail in the following chapter". 
The Office of Fair Trading's activities in the area of process regulation can be illustrated by the case 
of Thames Television in the early 1980s. In 1982, the Office, responding to complaints by a leading 
agency, 1. Walter Thompson and several advertisers, looked into the supply of advertising time on 
Thames Television. The complaints centred on Thames'incentive discount scheme which entailed the 
tying of terms and conditions for advertising to the proportion of total expenditure on television 
advertising time in London committed to them by an agency. The OFT referred the matter to the 
IBA since overseeing the manner in which licensees! rate cards were published was one of the 
Interview with Hugh Little 
ogrammes warned that -tie detailed consumer protection " Note The ITC's 1992 Statement ofIntent on bartering of pr 
requirements in its code, both as regards the content and scheduling of advertisements, imply a level of editorial responsibility 
which might in practice be difficult for the broadcaster to deliver in conditions where airtime was sold other than to a kno'An end 
user or his agent In no circumstances will the ITC permit its licensees to delegate to others the responsibility for code 
compliance". Sm Chapter 11, p. 245 
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statutory duties of the Authority. The IBA duly issued a reprirnand to Thames for not disclosing the 
discount scheme on its rate card'9. 
The OFr was not happy to leave it at that, however, and commenced an ammination of the 
operation of television incentive schemes in general "to see whether they seemed to be operating 
prima facie against he public interest"". In his report issued in February 1982, the Director General 
concluded that "While the policy was discrimýatory as between both advertisers and agencies it was 
not anti-competitive". No action was takený'- 
When I interviewed the IBA! s Director of Advertising Control at the time, Harry Theobalds, he 
recalled that J. Walter Thompson had made their complaint directly to the OFr, by-passing the EBA, 
which caused the Authority some annoyance. It felt that the matter could have been sorted out by 
using its own consultation and arbitration procedures without bringing in another body. T'heobalds 
admitted, though, that advertisers quite often complained to the EBA of unreasonable discrimination 
but the Authority seldom took a sympathefic view. 
The OFr, then, has sometimes had occasion to intervene under the "unreasonable discrimination" 
clause featured in all the Broadcasting Acts. Most recently, it initiated an investigation into a 
complaint by Satellite broadcaster BskyB to the 113A that the ITV companies were refusing to accept 
its advertising. As a result of the investigation, the MA ruled that refusal to run the ads was anti- 
competitive and discriminatory, a ruling confirmed in 1992 by the ITC. ITV was compelled to take 
BSkyB's advertising even though it was a competitor. The judgement was made in the light of the 
current undeveloped Satellite market; if circumstances changed it could be subject to review. 
The examples cited show quite clearly that while the broadcasting regulator is intended to be the 
main actor, the state has the ultimate authority. It can direct the decision-making of the Authority or 
even overrule it. Recently, the OFT has clashed with the ITC over networking arrangements, and 
Hugh Liffle of the OFT told me that if it needs to exert its authority in firture it will, although it 
Prefers a co-operafive approachý. The Commission, for its paM jealously guards what it perceives as 
Brian Henry(edjBrjtjýh Tdetjjjo"AdvattjngLondw: Century BenhA 1986, p. 219 
'NdL p 219 
OFT, AM-cornp, &&w pcclices. WOtozhepýýOwof tim Act 1980, Imkm: OFr, 1986, p. 20 21 aC die Campet 
Mm'ch 
22 Inten'c"ith Hugh Uttle 
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as its specific preserve 
- 
the content of both prograrruning and advertising 
- 
and is keen to keep 
government departments from interfering in this area as much as possible. 
In the course of its normal duties the Office of Fair Trading Eases with the National Consumer 
Council and the Consumers Association, providing them with information and seeking their opinions. 
But in spite of the Office! s insistence that it does not exercise its consumer protection powers in 
respect of misleading advertising in field of broadcast advertising, the presence of a Trading 
Standards Officer on the Advertising Advisory Committee provides a link with this side of its work. 
A letter to Ile Times newspaper from the Chairman of the Copy Committee also makes it clear that 
"the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968, enjoins some 300 separate local authority inspectorates to 
enforce its provisions. Television advertising, like any other form of advertising, is subject to this 
nation-wide scrutiny"2. 
Hugh Little conceded that complaints to its Trading Standards staff may in fact be made concerning 
misleadingness in TV advertising, although this is more likely to happen in the regions where 
advertisements for local businesses are taken. A commercial for slimming products was investigated 
by Trading Standards OfEcers who, in this instance, did not consider the case worth pursuing in the 
court?. So there is, formally, an overlap of functions with respect to advertising content which the 
OFr denies in its recent publications, although in practice it rarely exercises this function. 
10.4.3 Ile Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission has an even more narrowly defined role in the regulation 
of commercial television than the OFr. Prior to deregulation in 1990 it had no reason to become 
involved in the tightly regulated television market. Post-deregulation it has contributed to the debate 
on the Channel 3 networking arrangements and has ordered certain modifications. It is possible, 
however, after the relaxing in 1994 of restrictions on mergers and take-overs, that a referral to the 
MMC could be made by individual franchisees, if they belieVed that a proposed merger posed a 
threat to competition. So far, two take-overs of licensees have occurred without any referrals being 
made. 
23 James Shaw, Claýw ofAdvaWsbig The Tinies, 30/ 06 / 1972. Note. The letter gm on to say that m= tbie Act came into force 
the rrCA W been immre of arily one prosecution being brougM in relation to a television advatimnent; aiis prosecution had not 
bam succesdu 
24 Note: lbs infonnation %us provided by Hugh Uttle 
197 
7he Djnamics ofRegulatory Adh* : Control andResimance 
Such a threat did appear to arise, however, when mergers were proposed between several of the 
television companies airtime sales houses in 199 1. Advertisers became concerned that the monopoly 
of airtime sales broken up by the 1990 Act was being re-assembled by the back door. The ISBA 
and the Association of Media Independents (AMI) objected strongly to this new trend and requested 
the ITC to use its competition powers to rule against sales house controlling more than 25% of the 
market for airtime, for the time being at least25 
. 
Despite strong resistance from the sales houses, who 
argued that their operations hould be treated within current legal restrictions on monopolies and 
merges only, the ITC ruled in favour of advalisers and media independents. A 25% ceiling on 
control of the total Channel 3 revenue was imposed until a general review of sales arrangements 
could be made in 199e. In this case, since the regulator was able to negotiate a deal, neither the 
OFr nor the MMC needed to become involved. 
10.5 The ITC and the Advisory Bodies. 
10.5.1 Ile Broadcasting Standards CounciL 
Although it is generally acknowledged to be an ideologically motivated body set up by an 
administration awdous to counteract any negative ffects of free market policies in broadCasting27, 
the Broadcasting Standards Council is constituted as an independent agency. It reflects the values of 
its political creator but does not carry out government policy as do the Department of National 
Heritage and the Office ofFair Trading. 
It has no executive authority and can only give advice. Its Director, Cohn Shaw, confessed to me that 
he considered it "odd to have an advisory body dressed up in statute", an observation which could 
equally well be applied to the old Advertising Advisory Conunittee. Ilie Council was deterniined that 
its rernit should extend to advertising, in the teeth of strong opposition by the ITC and both regulated 
industries, on the grounds that it would be "illogical" not to include it. Shaw took a more relaxed 
225 
KarcnHOUm4TVgun'bne"escuckcmaunderan3ckfrvrnchmuNtvketing 14MA I, p2 
6 Ca2f` agreed in rX reguladon baule, Cmpaign 1/ 03 / 199 1, p. 5. Note The review found that restricting the sales houses 
to 25% Of Channel 3 revenue did not muk satisfidarily and extended this lirnit to include the total advertising revenue frcm an 
mzcc'- 111C lffgCst, Operator, TSMS, for cample, now controls 35% of the Channel 3 mark-et. and Laser 34%. (rryin 1995. NbActing Week, 2610811994, p. 16) 27 Note Ile Thatcher 90vcmmmt feared that the unleashing of market fmcs in television nu& result m an uparge of sm 
violence and general Wstelcssness as the companies cam unda increasing pressure to maxmm audiences. 
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view of the spectre of regulatory clash than his opponents. In his opinion, the ITC had painted as 
black a picture as possible at the beginning for polernical reasons, but the expected conflict has not 
actuaUY materiaUsed, nor is it fikely to. And in case of any disagreement, as the BSC has powers of 
exhortation and publicity only, the ITC has the final authority. 
In the event, by 1992, the BSC had investigated a mere 25 complaints about television commercials 
and upheld only two of them. One had already been upheld by the rrC; the other, about an 
advertisement shown on BSkyB, had been directed to the BSC and not the ITC, which would have 
upheld it if it had had the opportunity. In Shaws view, the insignificant numbers involved, and the 
degree of agreem-mt so far between the two bodies, means that concern about regulatory duplication 
and possible conflict have not been borne out in practice. 
Insofar as it touches on advertising at all, the BSC, in contrast to the consumer groups, has a 
particular interest in matters of taste and decency and is not concerned with the truth of claims made 
in commercials. According to its Director, the Council is awdous, for instance, that "there shouldn't 
be naked women advertising lawnmowers. " It subscribes to the traditional view that unlike 
programmes, advertisements appear in the home without prior warning and this is one of the reasons 
why they need more careful monitoring. Colin Shaw believes that although "most television 
advertising is undertaken by large, reputable firms who have no wish to offend or alienate 
audiences". there are areas which are especiaUy sensitive, and some sections of the public are in need 
of special protection. 
For example, the Council received a number of complaints directed at a commercial for a Fuji Film 
product Which featured a mentaffy handicapped person. It considered the complaints, but did not 
make anyjudgernent in this case as there was insufficient completed research on the issue to inform a 
decision. The biggest charity for the mentaUy handicapped, Mencap, was carrying out a study at the 
time which was unfinished. Complaints were also received by the ITC and the advertisement was 
withdrawn voluntarily by the advertiser. The Council has not yet conducted any of its own research 
on presentation f the disabled in advertising, but has done some studies on gender stereotyping and 
monitors carefully the depicting of the sexes in commercial?. 
23 Now 11is infamation %us providW by Colin Shaw. 
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The Council does not have any formal contact with either the IPA or the ISBA, and only refers to the 
television companies if it needs material to investigate a complaint, or when it wants particular 
findings to be published on air. it does Ease with the consumer organisations because it regards itself 
as representing consumer opinion rather than the "professional" opinions of the ITC's civil service 
staff, or representatives of the advertising and television industries. It has to be said, however, that 
neither the NCC nor CA are particularly enthusiastic about tfis "anomalous" body. Even though the 
BSC has the facilities for independent research that the consumer epresentative bodies have been 
calling for, it has no brief to investigate the truth of claims made in commercials which they feel 
should be a much higher priority than taste and decene. In its defence, Shaw explained that the 
BSC's programm--. of research into offensiveness in broadcasting is intended to provide a factual basis 
for discussion so ihat simply "carrying on debate by assertion can be avoided! '30. 
Practical experience so far suggests that the ITC is likely to suffer much less interference from the 
Broadcasting Standards Council than it had anticipated. According to Frank Willis, however, it is still 
prepared to resist firmly any attempt by the Council to extend its activities in the field of advertising 
control beyond the present narrow limits". 
10.5.2 The Advertising Advisory Committee. 
Despite losing its statutory status the Advertising Advisory Comnittee Still plays an important Part in 
the machinery of control. It is necessary for the regulator to be seen to have consultative procedures, 
and Frank Willis recently descnibed it as the ITC advertising department's "flagship sounding 
board 02 
. 
And when I interviewed former Chairman Geoffrey Stephenson he argued that, far from 
being downgraded, the Committee has, in practice, become more effective. Stephenson maintained 
that while previously the expertise had been weighted in favour of industry, increased consumer 
representation has redressed the balance. In his view, the main part of the AACs job is still to 
oversee changes in the Codes, but there is now a more co-operative and less confrontational 
atmosphere. Since assuming fiiU responsibility for pre-vettffig commercials the ITV Network Centre 
Note: Both the NCC and CA uould like to see a single ccaTletely fixtependent body set up to safeguard conyma interests 
m broadcasting. Failing this 
- 
the idea has been mvmd a long time and has been ccrsiAendy r*cted by government - they 
uvuld like the ITC to cwchxt raa fiWepcndcat research into advertising claims ( not taste and decalcy ) than at Present- "Ic imm is looked at in more detail later in this Chapter. 30 Interview with Colin Shaw 31 Interview v6ith Frank Willis 
32FrankW-, Ms 71w rMD00, Votpanderto Ever ynquedCompta&=dCampaipIS10711M, p. 29 
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now has a more participatory and a less "complaining" role. The change in formal relations has 
therefore been a constructive one. 
Stephenson also sees the Committees task now as less to make specific reconunendations than to 
debate the issues My, arbitrate on points of dispute and arrive at a consensus. There is a lot of trust 
that under the present Director of Advertising and Sponsorship reasonable decisions will be made. 
The Committee tends to be "classically liberal" in the sense that it favours, progressive change. It 
seldom takes a strict view on the potential for some advertisement, or clams of advertisement, to 
cause offence. But it may take a strong line on misleadingness, or on some traditionally difficult areas 
such as financial or children's advertising where consumers may be especially vulnerable. It supported 
the controversial advertisement for Vespre Silhouette =ftary towels, and did not advise that it be 
taken off the air, the decision to withdraw it was eventually made by the ITV Network Centre 
itsel? 3. 
The AAC does not initiate research of its own but receives general information from the ITC, 
supplemented by papers summarising the fiffl range of consultations conducted on particular issues. It 
sees the fist of people and organisations to be consulted and can suggest additions. It can also ask 
specific questions. The rnýority of its work is concerned with the content of advertisements, but it 
also advises on distribution. It does not deal with the proportion of advertising to programmes; this is 
the preserve of the ITC. A breakdown of complaints is circulated to the Committee but the decisions 
as to whether to uphold particular complaints or not will have already been made by the ITC. Issues 
arising from complaints can of course be discussed. 
10.5.3 Dealing with Complaints: Policy and Procedures. 
As a part of its statutory obligations under the Control of Mislea&ng Advertisements Regulations 
the ITC operates a complaints procedure. It publishes a leaflet entitled Programmes widAdverlising 
on Commercial TeleiJsion: how to comment or compZ2in. Broadcasters are expected to respond to 
complaints made directly to them but they must also advise complainants that they may refer their 
Point o the ITC if they are not safisfied with the response 4- Records of complaints must be kept for 
a period of two years and made available to the ITC on request. 
33 Note 7be advettising of female s=txy protaton is treated in deepth in the case study m Chapter 12 
ITC Note II- Complaints Hanmin 
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Figure 10 5: Diagram How 771 e ITC Deals )4& Complaints 
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According to ITC Note II on Complaints Handling, all complaints are first assessed by a senior 
member of staff for urgency. Priority is given to cases where it is alleged that harm may arise from 
the advertisements (e. g. provoking dangerous copycat behaviour or triggering physiological 
reactions such as epileptic fits). As Frank Willis explained in Spectrum, "it was this system of 
prioritisation which last year helped ensure that we took off air an advertisement for Golden Wonder 
Pot snacks within a few days of receiving reports that it was provoking attacks of photosensitive 
epilepsy. This would not have happened with a first-in, first-out system. histead of locating one of 
the country's few specialists on photosensitive epilepsy and seeking urgent advice, the ITC officer 
concerned might have been composing tactful replies to Viewers objecting to the screening of 
9,35 
advertisements for lavatory paper at tea-tune 
Willis used this instance to demonstrate that the ITC's complaints handling system is action-oriented 
and geared principally to its consumer protecfion responsibilifies to the audience as a whole rather 
than being correspondence-orlented, WIth the mam emphasis on providing swifl feedback to 
35 Fmnk Willis, No U3e CmW1ainin' SpecüuM Spruig 94, pp, 17-18 
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individual viewer2'. Another example of the Commission! policy of judging first of all whether 
intervention is necessary in case of complaints rather than a simple reply is the 1992 Tango fizzy 
orange drink commercial. This showed a jolly orange monster playffilly slapping a man on his cheeks 
to illustrate the pleasant ingling feeling the drink produced. 28 complaints were received from 
"teachers, parents and the medical profession", who pointed out that this type of action could result 
in a perforated eardrum. Some complainants reported that actual harm had been caused as result of 
children irnitating this advertisement. When the reports of copycat behaviour came in the ITC 
instructed that the commercial should be moved to a post 5.30 slot; when evidence of actual harm 
was presented this was changed to post 9. p. m., and after further reports of harm it was declared 
unacceptable for broadcast at anytime". 
Although complaints about harmful or misleading advertising are given a higher priority, this does 
not mean that viewers' objections to commercials on the grounds of taste and decency are neglected. 
T'his category of complaint is in some ways harder to handle as offensiveness is necessarily a more 
subjective criterion than harmfulness or misleadingness. What is offensive or tasteless to one viewer 
is perfectly acceptable to another. The ITC rarely upholds complaints about individual 
advertisements on the grounds of taste, largely because by the time something arrives on screen it has 
already been closely vetted against rigorous standards governing nudity and sexual references, bad 
language and violence. Unfil recently, the regulator operated general bans on certain categories of 
advertising such as family planning, female sanitary protection, undertaldng and matrimonial 
agencies, but all these are now perinitted. The only unacceptable products or services now are 
medically related ones such as treatments for alcoholism or hair loss. 
Peoples idea of what is offensbve is not something that remains the same, however. Social attitudes 
change in the course of time and the rules of the Code and their interpretation change with thern. 
The ITC regularly discusses complaints in this category with those who do most of the vetting - the 
Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre 
- 
so that sensitive areas and issues can be identified. It also 
consults the Advertising Advisory Authority, and supplements its feel for the issues by input from the 
regional Viewer Consultative Councils, by complaints analysis and by viewer research of its own38. 
m ibi(L p. 18 
31 rrC: Complainti Report Febr=y 1992, P. 6 38 Frank Wil I Ls, 7 7je rIC Doej Not parde r To EvVX pi qw d Gmp Jý, op cit p. 29 203 
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Gender stereotyping is one area where attitudes have become less tolerant, particularly among 
women. Many more complaints are now received about the sexist portrayal of women in 
commercials than in the 1960s and 70s. But there is now more tolerance of nudity in television 
advertising. A recent French made advertisement for a shower gel showed a glimpse of a woman! s
nipple, which provoked 82 complaints. This was a relatively high figure but, as Frank Willis observed 
in Campaign magazine, "ten or fifteen years ago, it was unthinkable that anything like this should get 
anywhere near our screens"". In rýecting; the complaints, the ITC explained that it believed the time 
had come to change its approach to nudity on the screen because there had been a change in public 
attitudes4o. In this case, although the Commission did not uphold the complaints, it attempted to 
satisfy complainants by insfituting a research programme into attitudes towards the use of nudity in 
television advertising. This was not enough for the National Viewers and Listeners Association, one 
of the complainants, whose General Secretary accused the ITC of "caving in" to commercial 
pressure. But Steve Henry, a creative partner at agency Howell Henry Chaldecott Lury, was 
defighted: "Good ads try to find out where the barriers are in order to break them. There will always 
be taboos to be broken"I 
. 
Whatever the nature of the complaint, the ITC replies to all who have made their views known 
giving the reasons for its decision to uphold or to r6ect a complaint. It also gives a public account Of 
its decisions in the monthly complaints report it has been issuing since May 1991. In 1993, out of 
approximately 10,000 advertisements broadcast, the ITC received 2,581 complaints referring to 
1,062 advertisements. 33% of complainants alleged misleadingness, 37% were offended, 18% were 
concerned about possible harm or harmfid example, especially in relation to children, and the 
remaining 12% raised a wide variety of other aspects. The Commission upheld 44 complaints 
42 
altogether 
-31 'misleading', I 'offensive', 5 'harmful' and 7 'miscellaneous' 
According to all three main sources that I contacted - regulator, consumer groups, and industry - 
there has been no discernible increase in complaints from the public since the 1990 Broadcasting Act 
came into force, although it is stiff early days yet. This seems to indicate that, for the time being at 
3 on OUr SereaU plaZe. j; e, 39 MChele NjIrtin, JV 0 Ple ON 
. 
reBrjý, CMnpaign, 15/07/ 1994, p. 13 
ote. The regulatoes official line on its role as guardian of consumer interests intelevision advertising has been summed up by its press officer "we do not form public opinion, we arc only a barometer of W. (Barbara Argument, YheLast Taboo Coventry Evening Telegraph IS / 06 / 1992) But any institution responsible for setting standards in public life should be aware that such an 
activity is in part normative-, itsjudgements do not merely reflect opinions in society, but to an extent farm and rcinfa= thenL 
artin, JIV 4 
41 NficheIC IV,, 
42 Frank WflliS N0 
MrPles On Our&TWU Pleme, We're Brifisk op cit 13 
4 0 Us-* Compk&dn't-y op cit p. IS 204 
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least, the gradualist approach to change is worldng, and supports the contention that the results of 
regulation in practice, even with greater self-regulation, are so far much the same as under the old 
regime. 
Da 
Relying on the number of complaints received as the sole indicator of consumer satisfaction with 
advertising control does not always give the full picture, however. Former EBA Director of 
Advertising Control, Harry Theobalds, expressed the opinion that people are less willing to make 
formal written complaints about commercials than they are about programmes or programme policy. 
Advertising is still seen as much less important than the substance of broadcasting 
- 
programming 
- 
and easier to iVore if standards fall. Even if relatively few complaints come in about a certain 
commercial this may still point to a more widespread unvoiced public disquiet43. Much depends, too, 
upon who is doing the complaining. The reverse phenomenon occurs when numerically small but 
influential pressures groups express their disapproval of certain advertisements, or categories of 
advertising, without necessarily representing asignificant consensus of the viewing publie. 
While the majority of complaints come from members of the public, or organisations, representing 
the interests of the public generally, some members of the advertising industry are themselves active 
complainers. Advertisers and their agencies keep a close watch on rivals! commercials and are quick 
to point out any potential breaches of the Codes. According to Theobalds, in the early days of ITV 
when giant soap manufacturers dominated television advertising, the two biggest, Urtilever and 
Thomas Hedley (owned by Proctor and Gamble), regularly complained to the regulatory Authority 
about each other's campaigns. At that time the Authority (the rrA) was more concemed about 
complaints from viewers that the screens were being saturated with "hard sell" advertising from 
these two sources than adjudicating inter-company quarreW'. 
At the beginning of the 1980's, however, the IBA was obliged to become involved in a very public 
disagreement between two rival makers of lawnrnowers, Qualcast and Flymo, who were in dispute 
43 Interview with Harry Theobalds 
= xp ored in M in the case study in 44 Note. 
- 
'The difficulties surrounding the analysis and measuremed Of complaints C1 
45 
Chapter 12 
rules dra, %nup by the UA in September 1960. Because the Note: Brim Henry describes the so-called'Kitchcn' and'Laundry' 
repetition of a forceful sales message in a single product field out of a still limited total rm9e Was likely to cause irritation, all 
products in the washing field (soap powders and liquids etc. ) were classified as "IAundry", and thosc in the cleaning field (scourers, cleansers etc. ) as'Yitchm7. Not more than One product Out Of each field.,; as allowed per hour, although the rule was 
relaxed a little later on. This caused the "utmost difficulty" for cmtactors in distriluting ffie autme fairly bdAven the rival soap 
manufacturers. ( Brian Henry op. cit. p. 77) 205 
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over claims made in each other's advertisements. The MA refereed their complaints for nearly three 
Years, making a series of rulings that culminated in a dramatic midnight ban on one of Qualcasts 
commercials in April 1983 
. 
The IBA! s advertising control staff, including its Director, were then 
invited bY both companies to attend demonstrations of their respective machines' capabilities in order 
to judge for themselves if the complaint that had provoked the ban was justified. 
The dispute had arisen from a relaxation on the rules on comparative advertising. Qualcast had taken 
advantage of this relaxation to pursue a very aggressive comparative fine, which it justified on the 
grounds that it was Providing information to the public. Flymo complained that the Qualcast 
advertisement in question was actually misleading the public and eventually succeeded in getting the 
EBA to order modifications". This story illustrates not only the lengths to which some advertisers 
are prepared to go in using the complaints procedures to attack their rivals, but the much more 'hands 
on' style of the old regulatory regime'. Nowadays, in the new era of increased self-regulation and 
less Authority involvement, inter-industry (i. e. competitor complaints) are usually directed to BACC, 
which deals with them on a basis of confidentiality, only the parties concerned being informed of the 
outcome'. 
10.6 The ITC and the Regulated Industries. 
10.6.1 Regulator/ Industry Relations. 
Following the usual pattern for regulatory bodies, the Commissiods relations Aith its licensees and 
with the advertising industry are much more intimate than, ýNjth its political masters. From an external 
perspecfive, the closeness of this relationship has caused considerable disquiet over the years both to 
consumers and to politicians. Tlis feeling is echoed internally, as the regulated industries themselves 
have on occasion believed that the regulator was favouring one of them at the other's expense. This 
complaint has more ofien come from the advertising industry as the previous regulatory regime was 
46 How cut and thnw oflawwwwr businen WMIPUbfic. The Times 26 / 04 / 1983, p, 19. Jolm Kay, HoverBower TVAd 
RannedinBigMowrijar. IbeSunI4104/1983 
47NOte* With reference to the flood of complaints against the female sanitary products test campaigns ervened in 1979-80, 
Nfaiketing magazine reported: - "industry nimour suggests that most of the 1,200 lett= of complaint sent during the test v= 
"orchestrated7 by a leading manuflict= " While the rum(w is ahnost certainly Use, it does say sornething about the 
highly competitive atmosphere in uhich expensive television advertising campaigns are conducted ( IM Givev Backing to 
&Zn-Pro Ak Mwketing 13 10 6/ 1985, p. 10) 48 BACC, Regulation of Broadcast Adverfising in the UK IN 06 / 1994, p. 2. Alote. Sonic representative complaints, together 14ith 
the relevant ITC decisions, are given in Appendix 5 
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structurally biased towards the television companies. The history of regulation reveals a whole series 
of measures designed to reduce, within the structural boundaries of the system, the potential for 
capture of the regulator by any vested interest, and to encourage impartiality and objectivity in 
maldng and implementing policy. 
The provisions of the 1990 Broadcasting Act have fundamentally changed the forin of 
regulator/industry elations by removing the broadcasting function from the regulator, and by placing 
the burden of pre-transrnission enforcement of advertising control on the licensees. Ile detachment 
of the regulator from the television industry places them in a more traditionally adversarial 
relationship, and some recent unexpectedly tough decisions by the ITC suggest hat the television 
companies will not be allowed to abuse their increased powers of self-regulatiorý9. According to the 
interviewees from television, advertising and the consurnmer lobby, this structural separation of 
powers and a generally less controlled environment have yet to have much impact on the dayý-to-day 
operation of advertising regulation. With product regulation, apart from the inclusion of a wider 
range of permitted categories of advertising, the Code of Practice governing standards in spot 
advertising has not greatly altered. There is, of course, a whole new Code dealing with sponsorship, 
and although this area is potentially a source of greater egulatory difficulty and has so far done more 
to provoke the ITCs anger than spot advertising, it still represents only a small proportion of 
regulatory activity. The Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre shoulders the main burden of 
ensuring compliance with the Codes, including the new Code of Sponsorslip, and fornis the main 
nexus in the regulator/inclustry relationship. 
10.6.2 Copy Clearance. 
Despite having a more detached formal relationship, the ITCs advertising control staff still keep in 
regular contact with the ITV Network Centre, and the Director of Advertising and Sponsorship has 
regular meetings with the IPA and the ISBA representing the second regulated industry. He told me 
that he sees the role of the ITV Network Centre, which represents the interests of broadcasters, as 
to act as a "buffer" in the three-way relationship of regulator/licenseesladvertising industry. This is 
Yet another perspective on the regulator/regulated relationship vAich is modelled in Figure 10.6. 
49 Note. 
' See Chapter 11, P. 243 and Chapter 14 p. 320 
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Figure 10 6: Ihe HV Netwop* Centre as buffff betwom the ITC and the advenising bubmfjy. 
According to this view, as it was expWned by Frank Wilfis, the advertisers push to get particular 
advertisements through the clearance system, and to exiend the limits of what is generally acceptable 
to the regulator. The ITC resists this pressure and, in turri, pushes the iný to accept its codes and 
guidelines. It is up to the ITV Network Centre, with a professional staff trained as problem solvers, 
to mediate between the two. They must try to find solutions and compromises and reduce the 
overall level of conflict. Right at the heart of the relationship stands the Broadcast Adverti i 
Clearance Centre through wtfich up to 12,000 commercials a year pass. It operates a series of 
procedures to deal with pre-transmission vetting of television commercials intended fbr broadcast on 
ITV and on other client stations, including Channel 4, GMT, BSkyB and UK GOLD, who pay a fee 
fbr the clearance service 
BACC Secretariat now has three copy clearwice groups consisting of a group head, three executives 
and a group assistant, and a five-strong 'traffic' department. Each works on a portfolio of agerAies 
who subrnit proposed scripts at as early a stage as possible. These are then checked to see if they 
comply with the Code. if a script cannot be cleared at group leveL it goes to a twice-weekly meeting 
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consisting of the Head of Copy Clearance, his deputy and the group heaVo. Amendments will then 
be suggested to the agency to bring the script into fine with the rules. A problem script may 
ultimately need to be discussed by the Copy Committee at its monthly meeting. When a script has 
been approved, the BACC gives the official go-ahead and a videotape is made. 
Figure lo. 7. 
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Source: Independent Television Companies Assodafion, Copy Clearance, W Ay and How 
When the videotape is finished, BACC will make arrangements for it to be viewed by the clearance 
staff, and by any programme company executives who may wish to attend the viewing, in order to 
check that it has been made according to the script and that no problems have arisen from the visual 
treatment. Viewing sessions are conducted daily via a closed circuit fine. Strict precautions are taken 
to ensure that the e,, dstence and detail of all new commercials are kept confidential until the first 
lxkPcndcnt Television Companies Association, Copy Cleanwce, Why andHow, Number 8, in a series of notes guidance on 
television advcaWrl& (revised Amway 1985), p. 9. 
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public transmission of the campaign. At this stage every programme company has the chance to 
comment o the Network Centre to make sure that each commercial carries the approval of all the 
companies. If a commercial passes this final test it receives certification for broadcast. On average, 
97-98% of filmed commercials ubmitted at this stage are accepted and many of the remainder need 
only slight amendments. 
Figure 10.8. 
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Source: Independent Television Companies Association, Copy Clearance, 11 hy and How. 
Members of the ITC's advertising control staff also view finished commercials but for monitoring 
purposes only. This is not considered as involvement in pre-vetting as "decisions to accept for 
broadcast no longer depend on ITC reactions. Although the ITC does from time to time begin 
investigations as a result of this monitoring the ITC would not, except in the most compelling 
circumstances, direct the companies to suspend approval pending the outcome of such 
investigations"s 1. This is a significant admission that the regulator still considers that it has the power 
to override the television companies in exceptional ( but unspecified ) circumstances. It would hardly 
31 LcUff frmn Frank Wdlis, 7 January IM 
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be possiVe to infer tfýs from the descriptions of the ITCs post deregulation role in advertising 
control to be found in any of the relevant literature. 
The advertiser is always asked to substantiate any new factual claims for a product and Copy 
Clearance staff have a number of specialist consultants on whom they can call for advice. These 
include the Medical Advisory Panel and additional consultants in the fields of general engineering, 
soaps and detergents, analytical chemistry, finance, motor engineering, dental prosthetics, law and 
agficwt=52. 
Routine clearance normally takes three working days but more complex assessments can take several 
weeks. The Notes of Guidance published by BACC include advice on copy submission requirements, 
visual treatments, financial advertising, medicines, treatments and health claims, food and drinks and 
special problem areas such as childreds advertising, portrayal of the royal family, testimonials and 
comparative advertising. 
The recent experience of an advertising agency in Bristol illustrates the kind of problems accounts 
managers and creative teams have to deal with in getting an advertisement through clearance. The 
Bristol agency submitted a script on behalf of their clients, a West Country cheese maker, for a new 
cheese commercial. The copy included the phrase "made by man not by machine" to emphasise the 
fact that the product was hand-made on the farm and not factory produced. They were asked to 
re-word it as the word "man" night be considered sexist in this context. The word "machine" was 
also unacceptable because it implied that cheese made by other manufacturers was machine-made 
and this might be thought to constitute a "disparaging reference". They were also asked to 
substantiate the claim that the product was entirely hand made, and a finther claim that the 
cheesecloth wrapping used by the maker left it in better condition than the plastic vacuum packing 
used by competitors. After these requirements had been fulged the advertisement was accepted for 
13 broadcasting on IrrV, Meridian and Channel 4 
" rrvA Notes of ouidarm copy ci=m=. why and tioug 33 Note: This infannation was given to me in private convemtion mith the accmnt manaM,, whomished to rernain anon)mous. 211 
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10.6.3 Tle Advertisers' View. 
Advertisers and agencies have a slightly different perception of the regulatorlmdustry relationship 
depicted in Figure 5, particularly the role of the Network Centre. If they share broadly the same 
notions as the regulator of what regulation is designed to achieve, they sometimes Mer from it with 
respect o the methods of implementation. When I asked Kenneth Wes, Director General of the 
Incorporated Society of British Advertisers, if he saw it as the job of the Network Centre to act as a 
buffer between regulator and advertisers, he replied, "not quite", although he is aware that the 
regulator sees it that way. His organisation would Eke to see "a little more self-regulation", which he 
defined as the ITV companies haring more of the responsibility for control with advertisers and 
agencies. The advertising industry is not happy that its co-regulatees have sole responsibility for 
enforcing compliance with regulation; they would prefer a more balanced distribution of power. 
Advertisers evidently feel that the "self" in self-regulation should not refer primarily to the companies, 
but should be extended to include the advertising industry on a more equal basis. 
The ISBA is also callin for more accountability on the part of the Network Centre and the ITC. 
They should explain their decisions more My and be more open to discussion. When I put this 
point to Frank Willis of the ITC, he commented that often instructions or explanations are passed on 
by telephone and the message might be garbled or misunderstood. This is a reminder that regulation 
is carried out by human beings in a complex environment where good communications are essential. 
However well thought-out the structures may be, they are only as good as the people who work 
within them and a certain arnount of 'Interference? ' is inevitable where information has to be relayed 
between a number of different institutions each with its own agenda. Ile ISBA, however, would 
prefer greater clatity of communication so that the regulator is unable to hide behind the "noise" 
factor. 
While some individual members of the ISBA may feel that certain advertisers do receive favourable 
treatment, and complaints have been made on these grounds, their trade association does not 
acknowledge that there is a real problem with discrimination. Kenneth Wes assured me that his 
Organisation has faith in the objectivity of the Network Centre in carrying out copy clearance 
procedures. It is also broadly satisfied with the performance of the regulator, recognising that the 
broadcasting codes were drawn up after full consultation with all interested parties, so they do in fact 
represent agood consensus of opinion. 
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Traditionally, advertisers in the UK have not taken a confrontational approach to advertising 
regulation, and have not been particularly keen to run controversial campaigns on British television. 
Deborah Morrison, director of marketing and communications atthe ISBA, told Campaign that most 
companies err on the side of caution: "No-one wants controversy and pressure groups coming down 
on them. A few even phone us up for advice because they feel cautious about the creative work they 
are being offered by their agencies"54 
. 
Advertisers are not always happy with regulatory decisions, however. The television authority's 
refiisal to allow general acceptance for advertising of the category of female sanitary protection until 
1988 angered a. *east one large manufacturer, Lilia-WUte. The company spent E30,000 on the first 
experimental campaign in 1972 only to be told after three months that the experiment could not 
continue because of adverse public reaction. Its marketing director criticised. the EBA for leading it 
into an expensive test which had to be cut short, and was reported to be "absolutely finious" at the 
way in which the ITCA had handled the situation". 
After a second experiment ended in a finiher ban in 1980, manufacturers Johnson and Johnson were 
extremely dissatisfied with the decision, which they publicly opposed 16 
. 
By this time, however, Lifia- 
VVNte had come round to the MA! s point of view. Its marketing director said he believed the 
decision was right, and that in 1972 test results had showed that people did not want to see San-pro 
ads in a family situation 17 
. 
Kimberly Clark, a third big advertiser, also accepted the regulator's 
judgement, saying it did not want to go on television "until the time was right"58. 
So although they may disagree with particular decisions, especially if a lot of money has been spent 
on a campaign, advertisers on the whole support the gradualist approach to relaxation of the rules, 
and the trial and error philosophy that has served the regulation business in the UK well in the past. 
Even though British advertisers have become enormously more aware of the potential of broadcast 
advertising since their first cautious involvement in the 1950's, and have exploited this potential 
enthusiastically in the boom years of the last decade, they are still not looking for a revolution. 
34 Mclicle Mmtin, No Nipplej On Our Screem plaug, We Ire Briash op cit. p. 13 
MA baw 'Offauive'cmmerriaLy, Ad Weekly, 311 IM 
Gail KenV, Sanpro Chief, Clash OwL%4 Bým, Campaigr4 28 /11/1980 51 iNcL Ga Kemp 
M Yorkshire Post Reporter, TVDebutForSýmjjaryproduct cmmenjal, Yorkshire Post IN 02 /1979 
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10.6.4 The Agencies' View. 
The Director General of the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising, Nick Phillips, giving the 
agencies! point of view, a took a similar fine to the ISBA. He claimed when I spoke to him that his 
Organisation does not see any great need for change and finds the Codes satisfactory. The IPA agrees 
with the ITC and others that the self-regulatory aspect of the UK system makes for speed and 
fle,, dbility, and helps to get the participants committed to it. Ile continuing role of the AAC in 
dealing with traditionally difficult areas is appreciated. The agencies! pecial concern, as those most 
directly on the receiving end of regulation, is that there should be consistency and coherence in copy 
clearance policy, and uniforTrity of interpretation of the rules. This has been facilitated recently by 
bringing all LJK broadcasters into the system. Phillips criticised the Broadcasting Standards Council, 
in this context, as confusing and "totally irrelevant to advertising". 
Aso official representatives of advertising interests who must deal with the television regulating 
Authority on a regular basis the chiefs of the ISBA and the IPA are naturally more diplomatic and 
conciliatory when spealdng on the record than some of their members. Advertising agencies in 
particular, who are responsible for the creative side of the business, often find the rules and 
regulations extremely fiustrating. What agencies have to say in the advertising and media trade 
journals possibly gives a more accurate picture of their views on the hpact of regulation on 
advertising's front line. 
Inevitably, it is the ruling on taste and decency and avoiding "offence to public feeling" 
- 
Rule 12 of 
the Code of Practice 
- 
that causes the most difficulties. The regulating authority and the television 
companies! copy clearance staff have often interpreted this rule much more strictly than agencies feel 
is necessary. Campaign magazine reported in December 1987 that "agency people often berate the 
IBA and the ITCA for setting themselves up as arbiters of taste and morality. A typical remark is that 
the two bodies pander to the "vicars, idiots and Mary Whitehouses of this world". There is a feeling 
59 that the control organisations are out of touch with the consumer" 
Gail Amber rqpmU on the tussles between, agenocs and the MA and rrCA over TV coinnicrcials: 7he Great CroadWy Battle, 
Campaign, 4/ 12/ 1987. Ilie ITCA had in fact changed its name to the ITVA (independent Television Association) in Sepk=iba 
1987 in an evidently not entirely successful bid to gain wider public recOOtion. 
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showing a publican, appearing at first sight to be a vicar, with the sound of church beUs in the 
background, was r6ected as potentially offensive to religious feelings, even though the Bishop of 
Biriningham. had approved the idea. An advertisement for Hamlet cigars, where a man attempts a 
world record for keeping ferrets down lis trousers, was rejected on grounds of tastelessness. And an 
advert showing a brand of small mints falling into an aquarium of fish was refased clearance by the 
ITCA, first, because the mints might poison the fish, and then, when the agency proved that this 
would not be the case, because "falling mints might constitute a danger to fish"60. 
Not all agencies are so unsympathetic to the copy clearance system or the general principle of 
regulation of aý-, rerdsing in general. During the great San-pro debate, a director of Leo Burnett, the 
agency handfinj the account of sanitary protection manufacturer Kimberley-Clark at the time of the 
second TV test campaign, approved of the IBA! s decision not to lift the ban on this category. 
Speaking of the complaints received by the 113A and the television companies about San-pro 
commercials appearing on television he said: "We were astonished by the level of complaint and the 
startlingly well-argued and intelligent nature of the complaints"61. An account director for agency 
Allen Brady and Marsh made the observation that working within regulations can actually provide a 
spur to creativity. "Cigarette advertising is definitely a chaflenge. You have to do outstanding, 
creative work which gets noticed 
- 
aU the time with your hands tied behind your back"62 
- 
10.6.5 The Television Industry's View. 
The ITV Network Centre, representing the Channel 3 licensees, has yet another perspective on 
recent events in the broadcasting world, and on its own position in the regulatory scheme. As the 
ITV companies, apart from the aggressively market-oriented new franchise holders with no history of 
public service broadcasting, have been the losers under deregulation they are, understandably, much 
less happy with the situation than those who have gained - the advertising industry and rival non- 
terrestrial commercial stations. 
In the run up to the 1990 Act, the existing ITV comparies joined forcesvNith the regulator (then the 
IBA) to oppose key parts of the proposed legislation. They both particularly objected to the auction 
60 ibid. Gail Amber 
's 1 Gail Kemp, Son-pro Chiefs Ckuh Over L6A Ban op at 62 Tony Cohen, Indecent Eaposure, Nbrkefiq Week 15109/ 1989, pp. 4243 
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In the run up to the 1990 Act, the misting ITV companies joined forces with the regulator (then the 
MA) to oppose key parts of the proposed legislation. They both particularly objected to the auction 
system and the companies' trade association believes that its initial fears have been justified. 
According to Trevor Barton, Secretary of the ITVA (successor of the ITCA) several licensees bid 
far too much money for their fimchises and will be unable to sustain their programme plans. They 
may face collapse and take-overs are already happening. All this means "uncertainty and disruption to 
the Network and in consequence a threat to viewer services"63. 
When I asked Trevor Barton if the television companies were satisfied with deregulation as it 
affected advertising, he replied: "in a word 
- 
no". Barton stressed that deregulation had had no 
impact on Satellite broadcasting, but that ITV stiff had at least twenty points of regulatory difference 
from BSkyB and other stations outside the Network. They have the advantage in terms of longer 
permitted advertising minutage (an average of 9 minutes per hour instead of 7), more flexibility with 
commercial breaks, more categories of advertisements permitted etc., Which gives them a 
competitive dge over the terrestrial channels. 
To add to the problem from rIVs point of view, since the listorical relationship between ad-spend 
and GNP over time does not reveal any significant increase in the former over time, the proliferation 
of channels means more competition for a fixed advertising market. Previously, there had been a 
reasonable balance between the BBC, ITV and a few marginal Cable systems, which led to 
competition for quality and an escalation in programme excellence. Now the balance is distorted, 
there will be increasing competition for revenue that is already being eroded by sponsorship and 
niche marketing. The ITVA believes that "25 years of regulatory custom and practice and carefiffly 
built up case law is in a state Of I]UX04. 
Consequently, the majority of the Network companies, especially the old-style producers- 
broadcasters are fairly uncomfortable with some aspects of deregulation, particularly on the process 
side. Iley certainly do not want to see any speeding-up of the pace of change in the advertising 
market, but at the same time feel resentful that they do not have a level playing field with regard to 
non-terrestrial stations. If they did have the same loose regulatory regime as BSkyB and other 
competitors, however, they fear that the downward trend of programme services would be 
63 Interview uith Trevor BmtM. 64 hkrview %ith Trevor Bmtm 
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would inevitably have an effect on their programming values, and "companies may feel pushed to 
clear a particular commercial because they need the money"'. This seems to imply that the clearing 
system is not in fact as immune to pressure as it is claimed to be, nor as objective as the ISBA 
maintains. Some advertisers and agencies already suspect this, but on the slightly different grounds 
that large influential advertisers are believed to be getting a better deal with copy clearanc666. 
The programme companies also have an ambivalent attitude to their new relationship with the 
regulator. On the one hand, they appreciate the fact that the task of pre-vetting should become easier, 
in one sense, now that there is less interference from the regulator. This will result in more fle)dbihty 
and less bureau. --acy, and the ITVA firmly resisted an attempt by the ITC to install a computer 
monitoring system to give ongoing coverage of clearance procedures. The regulator had to be 
satisfied with an invitation to view the videotapes of finished commercials, without, of course, having 
any veto at that stage. The companies' attitude was that if they were to carry out self- regulation as 
directed by Act, they must be trusted to do the job without routine supervision by the regulator. By 
the end of the year, the ITC would know if regulatory policy was being properly implemented or 
not67. On the other hand, removal of the backstop of the ITCs active involvement in Pre-vetting 
might encourage the temptation to go too fiLr too soon. If the result were an increase in complaints 
this would have a negative impact on viewer credibility. The clearance staff have to be carefW to 
tread a middle course. 
Acting as a buffer between the regulator and the advertising industry, though they accept that 
conception of their role, is not something that the television companies find particularly easy. There is 
no suggestion yet, thoug% that they particularly wish to accede to the advertisere desire for a further 
sharing out of the responsibility for self-regulation. The observation by Trevor Barton that the 
regulator still wants to keep as much power for itself as it can under the new regime is equally 
applicable to the ITV licensees themselves. Deregulation has already shifted the balance of power 
significantly in favour of the advertisers who lobbied hard for it. The licensees will strongly resist any 
63 Interview mith Trevor Barton. 
Note: In 1987, pre-deregulation, Campaign reported a %vorrying opinion7 expressed by agencies about copy clearance. 11ey 
believe the ITCA is inter ested more in money than in morality There are numerous tories about the ITCA which give the 
'on it would far sooner upset a small spender than a big one " (Gail Arabor, Yhe Great Creadwly Battle, op cit. ) The post- 
. increase in competition is likely to make this impression even stronger. Even now, seventy ears later, Sykes' 
warning that smffcr advertisers would resent the power of the big spenders i still valid with respect to the high cost medium of 
television. 
6' Interview, %ith Trevor Barton 
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further moves to reduce their powcr-base as compctition hots up, and primary responsibility for 
regulation is an important element in that base. 
10.7 Ile ITC and the Consumer Organisations. 
10.7.1 Ile Consumer's Nlew. 
Ibc consumer groups have 642ys occupied a cr diff CrIt territory from the profcssional regulators, 
and from broadcasting and advertising executives involved in regulation. In the past, the IDA had a 
dclibcrate Policy of inviting on to the Advertising Advisory Committee individuals who were thought 
to represent ordinary people 
- 
leading figures in the Womcifs Institute, the Townswomcn! s Guild and 
so on 
- 
rather than those working ror official consumer organisations. Men, as Harry Thcobalds told 
me, it %-as "just somebody one happened to know". 
The effectiveness of this undoubtedly well intentioned approach was questioned by one of the 
pernunent staff of the National Consumer Council whom I interviewed, Diana %Wtworth, who 
recently served on the AAC. She believed that as complete amateurs these ladies, though vcry 
worthy, were at a disadvantage when it came to holding their own against oqxdcnccd professionals 
from the advertising and television worlds. As a result the cons=ces voice was not heud as 
forcefully as it should have been. 
7bc NCC rcpresatativv herself fclt that she was regarded rather as an outsider when she first joined 
the AAC, in the days of the IBA. She found it hard for a while to penetrate the "cosy rclationship" 
cnjoycd by the rcgulator and the regulated industries. But an extensive background and training in 
consumer afflairs gave her the confidcncc and expertise to take a more active part in righting the 
cOnsumces comcr. In fact, such was the degree of her evcntual acceptance asone of the team that 
aftcr scývral years ervice she resigned, on the basis that too close a relationship bctwccn parties with 
responsibilities towards different constituencies was not conducive to effictivc rcgulafion. It is now 
the NCCs policy to change rcprcscnta6vcs onthe Advisory Committcc fairly rcgularly to keep the 
consumer pcrspcctivc fi-csh. NCC philosophy is that there should always be someone present who is 
not wholly absorbed into the system, and who does not take things for granted 
- 
rcgulation as usual 
- 
but challenges the system. This shows an unusual dcgree of sensitivity to the problem from the 
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inside. It is rare, if not unique, to find anyone involved in regulation who is willing to adrnit that they 
might personally be susceptible to influence by the dominant interests. 
Both the National Consumer Council and the Consumers Association believe that it is too soon to 
say whether deregulation will result in a decline in advertising standards, but they are watching 
careffly to see if more "borderline cases" slip through. According to Diana VV%itworth, on the whole 
they are satisfied with the principle of self-regulation because it leaves room for experimentation a d 
is sensitive to public opinion and to new problems. For consumers, the new roles of the ITC and the 
Network companies have both advantages and disadvantages in the implementation of this principle. 
The more "arms 'ength" relationship between regulator and regulated may be an improvement; less 
"cosiness" and therefore less possibility of capture. The Network Centre is nevertheless still paid for 
by the companies and is their servant. It may not be strong enough in interpreting the rules without 
the pre-clearance backing of the ITC. Consumer organisations expect the clearance staff to show 
their independence and earn their credentials. 
The system of rectifying errors or withdrawing commercials only after they have been broadcast also 
causes ome disquiet in the consumer comer because of the invasive nature of advertising, its lack of 
warning and constant repetition. Corrections are much easier to make in the print media. The large 
amounts of money which would be lost if an advertisement had to be scrapped could make the 
regulator reluctant to take drastic action. The ITCs swift response to the Tango orange drink 
advertisement was a positive sign, however, and the potential cost of withdrawal may mean that even 
greater care will be taken with clearance procedures in the first place. 
With respect to the advertising industry, the NCC believes that there is a possibility with 
self-regulation that consumers might perceive it as too powerful. In its opinion, while there might be 
some truth in this perception, advertisers in the UK have historically been very committed to getting 
things right, in their own interests if nothing else. They have sometimes been more cautious than the 
consumer organisations for fear of alienating potential customers. Ile point about self-regulation, 
that it can only work if industry is My committed to making it work, was made by all the interested 
parties that I spoke to, and is a generally accepted pre-condition for all voluntary regulatory systems 
to work 
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As part of the practical apparatus for carrying out regulation, the Advertising Advisory Committee 
came in for some criticism, although the NCC agrees that with a broadening of representation in the 
last couple of years it has become more effective. The perception of the old IBA that the Committee 
was well balanced between industry and consumer interests is not shared by the consumer groups. 
The balance may be better now but the ITC and the industry still set the agenda nd the Conmittee 
consequently has too passive a role. For the most part, it merely considers what is put before it. With 
the exception of the publication Your Food- nose Choice, edited by the NCC, which was 
discussed at two meetings, no issues initiated by outsiders, (i. e. those outside the regulator/industry 
axis) have been examined. As a result of concerns raised in this book advertising of sugar and fatty 
foods will be revýawed regularly. The consumer representatives on the AAC hope that the ITC will 
allow more items to be initiated by others rather than always creating the agenda itself 
Complaints were not just directed at what was seen as bias on the part of the regulator in setting the 
agenda for debate too narrowly. The lack of quality independent research was also heavily criticised. 
The Consumers Association in particular felt that research tended to be industry originated and yet 
too easily accepted by the regulator as impartial. Its spokesman Sue Bloomfield cited to me the 
recent campaign for Mars chocolate bars as an example of what CA believed to be a tendency by the 
ITC to be too accommodating to industry at the expense of consumers. Mars had resurrected an old 
advertising slogan: "a Mars a day helps you work, rest and play" for its new campaign, but the 
consumer pressure group, Action and Information on Sugars, lodged a complaint that it was 
misleading. The ITC rqJected the complaint, influenced in part by a study done by Mars on consumer 
impressions of the advertisement. CA, although in this instance it supported the Commission's 
decision, was disappointed that no-one was allowed to see the advertisees response to the complaint 
or the relevant research The refusal by the ITC to make either of these available was seen as 
unnecessary secrecy ". 
Sue Boomfield also cited another instance where the advertiser (again a large and powerful one) had 
been given the benefit of the doubt. This concerned Abbey National Bank using an endorsement 
from an obscure specialist magazine, "Which Mortgage? ", that had given Abbey National a Best 
Lendee award. The presentation of the commercial misleadingly suggested that the mass circulation 
Consumers Association publication, "Which? ", was the source of the endorsement. CA lodged a 
68 Note. 7he rrCs account of its actions in this case is given in the concluding pm-agraphs below 
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very strong objection to this presentation after conducting its own independent research which 
clearly showed that a significant number of consumers were being misled. The ITC, however, 
"disnissed the complaint out of hand, without testing the findings of CA". 
These two cases raise two separate issues in television advertising regulation of concern to consumer 
organisations. One is the specific problem of who conducts research. The NCC, the Consumers 
Association and other groups with similar aims would Eke to see a single consumer body talcing on 
the functions of the Broadcasting Standards Council and the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, 
with proper resources to carry out completely independent consumer esearch. Otherwise they 
believe that the z-dsting "information asymmetry", where the regulator appears to be over dependent 
on industry generated research which inevitably presents the industry's case in the most favourable 
fight, will only get worse. The other is the more general problem of openness, accountability and 
access, which has caused concern to other participants in the regulatory process. 
From the consumer groups point of view, the need for more pro-active research that is independent 
of the regulated industry in question is not met by the BSC. Its remit to consider only the taste and 
decency aspects of advertising and not the truth of claims means that it cannot uses its resources to 
this end. Since the NCC does have a duty to safeguard the interests of more vulnerable consumers, it 
supports the use of resources to investigate the potential offensiveness of advertising when it touches 
on areas such as gender or racial stereotyping or the disabled. CA does not take a view on the 
subject, but does take a strong position on rnisleadingness and industry bias. In particular, it feels that 
the ITC should not follow the example of print advertising where, for example, market research 
Provided by the motor industry is accepted as consumer research on cars even though it is patently 
far from neutral". 
With regard to accountability, consumer organisations, like advertisers, would prefer the regulator to 
be more open in discussing what has caused it to reach particular decisions. Complainants should be 
able to see the response of advertisers, which at present they are prevented from doing. If industry 
research is accepted against independent findings, or in the face of valid consumer objections, this 
should be made available for consumer representatives to see, and to respond to. There must be no 
doubt in any one! s inind as to the complete independence of any consultants appointed by the 
Intm-view vdth Sue Bloomfield. 
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regulator, especially if they are drawn from within the regulated industries. Full information on all 
consultants hould be available to ensure that they are impartial and will not display any bias towards 
industry in their advice. 
There also was a feeling that the ITCs Advertising Advisory Committee operates too much "behind 
closed doors". While they realise some degree of confidentiality is necessary for members to feel able 
to speak freely, the consumer epresentatives I spoke to regret that there are at the moment no 
externally published minutes of committee meetings. Iley feel that the case of openness would be 
served by the publication of a summary of the proceedings at least. According to Sue Bloomfield, 
one recent reprc--. -. ntative was very unimpressed by the performance of the AAC and questioned the 
use of having such committees at all. Ms appeared to be a minority opinion, however, and the 
others have appreciated the opportunity for consumers to be on the inside of the decision making 
process. 
On this point, Diana Whitworth considered the case of regulation requiring that commercials for 
children! stoys should also include an indication of the price of the toy to be a partial success for the 
consumer epresentatives. The rule, long a source of irTitation to toy manufacturers who repeatedly 
lobbied for its abolition, was reviewed from time to time by the Conmittee. The majority of 
Committee members eventually agreed that the time had come to rescind flis requirement and 
advised the ITC accordingly. The consumer epresentatives presented a strongly worded minority 
report to the ITC dissenting from this view. The ITC supported them and rýected the advice of the 
Committee. The advertisers continued to exert pressure and finally a compromise was reached: toys 
costing more than 115 would have to retain price indications. The episode offfers, proof that 
regulator can sometimes be more rigorous than the AAC in terms of consumer protection7o. 
The consumer organisations also perceive regulation as on occasion biased in favour of industry on a 
more general level. Although programmes devoted to consumer issues provide a valuable 
counterbalance to the flow of positive images that advertising strives to present, there is little scope 
for actual "anti-industry" advertising. Sue Bloomfield referred to the Food Commissioifs claim, for 
instance, that if they were to run informational advertisements to counteract industry claims, the ITC 
would be much harder on them The fact that some of their draft commercials were rýected by the 
Arote. *ihe same case is also quow by the rrc as an ideal cample ofthe Mx of consensus decision-making practised in the British *stem. of regulation, and as one of the very few instances vhm the advice of the AAC has been riýected. 
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ITC as "offensive" was given as evidence for this negative perception. The Food Commissions 
response to the regulator was that "this was the whole point. They were meant to be 
- 
to the food 
industry 01 
. 
Environmental groups are not allowed to broadcast advertisements criticising the nuclear 
industry, because the rrC judges that this would be crossing the boundary into political advertising 
which is still prohibited. But the nuclear industry is permitted some Idnds of indirect promotional 
advertising which nevertheless brings it to public awareness in a favourable fight. While it is perfectly 
acceptable for advertisers to use the "green" angle to persuade people to buy their products, it is 
viewed with suspicion when used as an argument against products which may be environmentally 
damaging. The regulator's policy on these matters seems to consumer organisations to be somewhat 
inconsistent. 
10.8 Conclusion. 
Tle extent to which the dymarnic of control and resistance propels the regulatory process forward 
and channels its direction is evident not only from the ongoing series of issues raised and debated, 
and decisions made and implemented, but by the language the participants in the process use. Words 
and phrases such as "push", "resist", "buffer", "pressure", "break barriers", "cave in" come up 
regularly in the context of television advertising regulation. Ile various parties affiected. by 
regulation see themselves either as trying to extract concessions from the regulator in order to 
reduce the burden of restrictions on them, or as utilising the existing rules as much as possible to 
their advantage. The regulator, in turn, has to ensure that if concessions are made they do not go too 
far, and that if barriers are to be broken this should be done in a controlled way so as to cause as few 
repercussions on other individual participants as possible and a minimum of shock to the system as a 
whole. 
What also emerges clearly is that most of the participants do accept that this process of negotiation 
has to take place within a certain framework of rules. There is almost universal support for the 
principle of advertising regulation and recognition that the system as a whole is more advantageous 
to the regulated parties than disadvantageous. The majority of rules are perceived as sensible and 
fair. Resistance takes place more at the periphery of the system than at the core, which is not to say 
that it is not extremely active at times. 
71 jllterýiCW uith Sue Bloomfield 
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The ITC, who is chiefly responsible for the forces of control in regulation, is always anxious to 
emphasise that control is exercised with maximum restraint. The regulator has constantly stressed 
that consensus, conciliation and compromise are the key features of its decision-maldng process. The 
complexity and multi-directional nature of the operation of control is also evident. It is not just a 
question of the ITC controlling the regulated industries on behalf of consumers. The advertising 
industry often puts pressure on the Commission to control the activities of the television companies, 
particularly in the still disputed area of airtime sales practices. The television companies themselves 
have considerable control over the behaviour of the advertising industry, especially since 
deregulation. And the ITC, itsel4 is ultimately controlled by the state and its agencies, who may be 
on the receiving end of lobbying from the regulated industries or from consumers. 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, some of the heaviest criticism has come from the consumer side. The 
Commission is concerned to answer the complaints made by the NCC and CA that it displays 
industry bias and is not sufficiently open or accountable in its decision-making processes. In response 
to the first criticism, particularly with reference to the issue of whose research informs regulatory 
decisions, Frank Willis made the following points. Industry research is by no means the only factor to 
be taken into account in making decisions, and this was true in the Mars case cited by CA- The ITC 
has its own professionally quaMed research staff who are not likely to take at face value research 
commissioned by interested parties. The Department of Advertising and Sponsorship has "the 
experience and expertise to make a proper assessment of material of this kind and will not accept as 
admissible evidence any surveys which appear to have a pre-determined bias, ". In addition, he 
emPhasised that the ITC does conunission research of its own "although for reasons of expense this 
is geared to policy issues rather than individual enforcement cases"73. 
On the subject of openness and accountability, particularly with respect to criticisms of the way in 
which the Advertising Advisory Committee operates, Willis explained that "consensus i important 
for the ITC 
..... 
and the committees which make the most progress and are most successful at building 
consensus are those which do not conduct their deliberations before a public audience". This is why 
the minutes of the AAC are not formally published. He feels that, mi any case, the breadth of 
membership of the AAC gives a good standard of accountability. 
72 Leter from Frzmk Wdlis, 27 June 1994 
73 ibu 
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There are also difficulties attached to making industry research available for inspection by outsiders. 
Unlike the Trading Standards Officers, the ITC's powers enable it to require advertisers to satisfy it 
as to the accuracy of claims. This involves the ITC being shown commercially confidential material 
such as test protocols, product specifications, and consumer research crucial to a company's 
advertising strategy. The regulator, therefore, does not find it surprising that "that advertisers prefer 
(it) to respect the confidentiality of material such as this when it comes to the question of publication 
of decisions which may in part be based on it 1174. 
There is considerable justification in the ITC's argument that AAC meetings need to have a degree of 
confidentiality foe members to be able to speak freely, without feeling that their opinions could be 
used for factionai purposes or the polemics of vested interests. It is perhaps an exaggeration to 
suggest that the consumer groups want the AAC to deliberate "before a public audience"; the request 
was merely for a summary of the proceedings to be made available which need not contain opinions 
attributed specifically to any named members. There is slightly less justification for the Commissiods 
position on the confidentiality of industry research. It is rather a circular argument to state that 
material cannot be shown because it is confidential, when the need for confidentiality is itself being 
questione& Agah it is a question of degree. CA, which raised the point, was not asking for a blank 
cheque to see every piece of genuinely commercially confidential information, simply to see the 
industry's "response" to independent research if two sets of research results appear significantly 
divergent. 
The NCC's complaint that the regulator sets the agenda for AAC discussions, which reduces the 
Possibility for the Committee to take a more active role in regulation, is a valid one. The problem has 
been highlighted by political theorists Barach and Baratz who studied the exercise of political power 
in the formation of policy by examining the decision-maldng process. They concluded that there are 
two types of power. The first is positive, where one faction exercises power over another by 
imposing its preferences on its rival. Power is then reflected in concrete decisions made after a 
Plurality of options have been put forward for consideration. The second is negative, where one 
faction limits the scope of the decision-maldng process to considering only those issues which are not 
potentially damaging to its interests, excluding from the agenda rival plans which might reduce its 
74 ibid. 
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chances of imposing its preferences. So whoever is able to decide what appears, or what does not 
appear, on the agenda for debate and eventual decision possesses considerable power. 
Ths is not to say that the ITC deliberately suppresses topics which are controversial or unpopular 
with the regulated industries, but the regulator nevertheless has its own perspective. It is bound to be, 
to a degree, regulation-oriented, and to be inclined to consider only those issues which do not cause 
too many difficulties for regulation. Enabling 'outsiders' to contribute to the agenda would give the 
AAC a more pro-active role and make the power relations between it and the statutory regulator 
more equitable, but possibly at the cost of maldng the decision-maldng process less smooth. Merely 
broadening the rnernbersliip of the Committee does not automatically guarantee accountability. If 
consumer epresentatives and independent members cannot formally introduce for discussion issues 
in advertising which they believe to be important (health issues in food advertising and 'green! issues 
are often mentioned) then their presence is not as meaningffil as it could W5. 
McQuairs definition of the public interest is again extremely useful in analysing the operation of 
television advertising regulation in the UK Detailed analysis of the rrCs activities demonstrate how 
it actually adjudicates the competing claim made on it by different groups each with a prima facie 
case for representing the public interest in some aspect or other. Consumer representatives claim 
that rigorous control of advertising is in the public interest; advertisers claim that the freedom to 
impart commercial information unhampered by too many restrictions, and competition in general, are 
in the Public interest; and broadcasters claim that regulation which protects their ability to provide a 
quality service and at the same time satisfy their shareholders is in the public interest. All these claims 
are Potentially, but not necessarily, in conflict with one another. For the regulator, it is a question of 
deciding the order of priority among the claim at any given time, but the fact that all of them are 
considered to be to some extent justifiable affects the way in which decisions are made. Extreme 
75 bod Note Regulation moves m, since this paragiaph was written consumer representatives seem to have made advances on the f 
advertising front Whereas before, the regulator was reluctant to use its po%crs actively to promote objectives uch as dietary 
reform or finprovenients in public health which are not specifically part of its remit new guidelines have just beea introduced 
which will force advertisers to pay more attention to the goverments Health of the Nation diet strategy. Commercials showing 
people consuming an oxms of fatty or sugary foods, such as a recent chocolate bar advertwhere a TV personality crams a 
shopping trolley with the product, will no longer be acceptable unless it is clearly established that the purchase is -not for 
individual use". Some have questioned the right of the regulator to "indoctrinate' the public, and the ITC insists that it is 
"against using its medimn as a tool for change and denies it is prey to the whim of well organised lobby groupe. ( Nicholas 
Hellen and Tim Raymcnt If7jen Namy Kwws Best, Suiday Times S/ 02 / 1995, p. 14) Ihe Commission clearly has 
govemincrit tacking for these moves, however, and it is possible did in the Ature, given the increasing evidence that poor diet 
is related to a number of serious medical problems and that advertising plays some part in determining wliat people, particularly 
children, choose to eat, it may take a more proactive role in the regulation of food advatising. 
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measures which have the effect of excluding certain claims altogether are rarely taken; they all have 
to be looked at seriously and most are validated and then satisfied to some degree in the ongoing 
process of bargaining and negotiation between clairrmts. 
The ITCs task is more complex than the analogous Office of Fair Trading, which also has both 
competition and consumer protection obligations, because in broadcasting the relationship between 
process and product regulation is much closer. The OFT does not have to consider, except in the 
most general terms, the effect of its competition activities on consumers, acting on the basic 
assumption that the promotion of competition benefits consumers. Its competition and consumer 
protection arms-- operate separately. The ITC, by contrast, must always take into account the 
implications for ihe broadcasting and advertising product of decisions made with respect to the 
process. Policy on advertising minutage, distribution of commercial breaks, and commercial activities 
such as sponsoring, broking and product placement all have a potential impact on programming, as 
well as on advertising as a series of commercial messages received by consumers. Too much 
emphasis on the rights of consumers and too many restrictions on the content of advertisements, 
however, will have a negative impact on the ability of industry to do its job properly, i. e. on the 
process. 
Although the new regulatory system has not been in operation long enough to judge whether it has 
succeeded or fOed in any final sense, there are definite structural stress points. It is possible to 
argue, as many have done, that the 1990 Broadcasting Act, by re-structuring the regulating authority 
so as to reduce bias towards the existing broadcasting industry at the expense of new entrants and 
advertisers, and to introduce more objective criteria in the awarding of licences, simply shifted the 
bias towards business interests at the expense of broadcasting. X in the long term, a more 
competitive market results in advertisers wielding excessive power and destroying quality public 
service broadcasting this could be seen in the future as an much greater egulatory fOure 
. 
The structure of the Advertising Advisory Committee has been attacked periodically for being 
weighted in favour of industry rather than consumers. In order to compensate for losing its formal 
statutory powers, it, too, was re-structured in order to broaden its base and counter-balance industry 
influence. So although its formal powers have been weakened, its practical role in the operation of 
regulation has been increased. 
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Detaching the regulator from the television industry may have clarified the regulator's function and 
made it easier to implement from that point of view, but it has not completely resolved the old 
difficulty, identified by Beveridge and Pilkington, that the television companies are obliged to serve 
two masters at the same time. The ITC itself restated the problem in its January 1992 Complaints 
Report. With reference to its decision not to uphold complaints from a significant number of viewers 
about a controversial sanitary towel advertisement, the Commission spoke of the dilemma faced by 
the companies in trying to reach the right balance between "consideration (or courtesy) to viewers" 
and the commercial interests of advertisers, given that they must "supply two types of product to 
two types of customer (programmes to viewers and viewers to advertisers)"76. The attempt o supply 
one satisfactorily cannot always be reconciled with the attempt o supply the other and responsible 
policy-making, as the Report ernphasised, must necessarily be "something of a compromise"77. The 
problem of theoretical incompatibility of objectives is nevertheless inherent in the structure of a 
commercial television system which is at the same time a public service, and will not be resolved until 
one or other function is either removed or seriously downgraded. This is not considered either likely 
or desirable in the UK and so the balancing act will continue to be a feature of terrestrial commercial 
television regulation in this country for the foreseeable future. 
Instrumentally, it is clear that individuals do have considerable influence on how regulation is carried 
out in practice within the structural boundaries that limit their actions. Generally speaking, for 
consumer representatives, there does exist a feeling of "them and us", although what the Director of 
the Broadcasting Standards Council referTed to as "the professionals" of the television and 
advertising industries and the regulation business might be reluctant to admit it. Consumer groups 
Perceive the leading figures in industry and regulation as being likely to share similar views and 
objectives, and to enjoy an more intimate relationship with one another than with anyone from the 
consumer side of the fence. There is a beliet justified in part, that consumers do not have the kind of 
real power that the regulated industries have, and that the presence of consumer representatives on 
the AAC, for example, has sometimes been tokenism rather than genuine power sharing. 
The present Director of Advertising and Sponsorship nevertheless appears personally to command a 
ligh degree of respect and trust from all sides. It takes a considerable degree of imagination and 
communicational skills to obtain a consensus from such widely differing sets of interests as those 
76 rrc: comptaints Report jam=y 1992 
77 rrC: Complainti Repof lanuazy 1992 
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involved in commercial television regulation, particularly when it is people's aesthetic and social 
values and creative judgement which are affected by regulatory decisions, rather than business 
practices and profits. So far, although the present regulatory system gives much less scope for 
individual values and idiosyncrasies to affect the outcome of regulatory practice than under previous 
'Imds on7' regimes, the personalities of those at the top levels of regulation policy-maldng, from 
both regulating and regulated sides, appear to be malcing apositive contribution to the process. 
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Chapter 11 
Deregulation or Re-regulation? The Paradox and the Problems. 
11.1 Introduction. 
One of the most interesting questions to arise from the 1990 Broadcasting Act is whether 
deregulation has, in fact, resulted in any significant decrease in the amount of regulation talcing place. 
This, after all, was the whole point of the exercise. Is the situation in Britain the same as elsewhere in 
Europe, where many of those involved in broadcastin& when asked what their experience of 
deregulation has been, simply reply- "deregulation? What deregulation? " Ile implication, of course, 
is that deregulating legislation has often had the opposite effect from what was originally intended. 
But when the question is posed Eke this it becomes apparent that regulation is not easy to quantify. 
11.2 Deregulation: More or Less? 
In considering the problem it is important to remember first of all that the general definition of 
regulation is the imposition of nfles which limit freedom of action in certain areas, including the 
freedom not to do something when a nde takes the form of a positive requirement. Deregulation 
entails the removal of rules to enable greater freedom of action, which is why the term 
"fiberalisation" is often used synonymously with "deregulation". So, at the level of the primary 
regulatory structures, i. e. at the process level, if there are fewer rules to restrict action it can be said 
that the amount of regulation is less. However, in the case of television advertising, when it comes to 
the secondary level of product regulation, the amount of rules do not necessarily decrease just 
because there has been a reduction at the pfimary level. In reality, the opposite has been the case. 
This parado)dcal spect of deregulation was noted by Sir Bryan Carsberg, Britaids current Director 
General of Fair Trading and first Director General of telecommunications regulator OFTEL, in 
connection with the recent privatisations of nationalised industries2. Although the privatisations 
'Peter Goodwin: The Af5j4h ofFreedom, 9/02/1990, p. 28. 2 Business Conunent: Regulating theRegulators, Ile Sunday Times, 29/ 08/ 93, Section 3, p. 2. 
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themselves were intended as major pieces of deregulation, a series of new regulatory bodies had to 
be created alongside the privatised companies, to control their behaviouzý chiefly with respect to 
competitioný. T'his irony is also noticeable in the deregulation of commercial television, and especially 
of advertising. It would be hard to argue that the amount of regulatory activity has decreased overall 
since 1990, despite the lessening of restrictions at the primary level. The ITC still has seven members 
in its Advertising and Sponsorship Division who are directly responsible for regulation, and BACC 
maintains 23 professional staff in the Clearance Secretariat. Frank Willis of the ITC, and Uisdean 
MacClean, Head of Copy Clearance, assured me that neither of their respective organisations 
envisages reducing the level of staff involved in regulation in the future. 
Although the ITC has withdrawn from one area of regulation altogether 
- 
the pre-transmission 
vetting of commercials 
- 
this has not resulted in less activity for the regulator in general. It now has 
an additional area of responsibility 
- 
sponsorship 
- 
which is likely to take up more resources as the 
importance of sponsorship to the television market grows. For the television companies, the amount 
of regulatory activity has actually been increased by including non-network stations in the clearance 
system, by having to deal with more categories of advertising with associated rules contained in the 
new Code of Practice, and by sharing responsibility with the ITC for control of sponsorship as well 
as spot advertising. And the creation of a new body, the Broadcasting Standards Council, to all 
intents and purposes with a regulatory function even though officially it can only give advice, adds to 
the impression of increased regulatioh'. 
The paradox as it applies to the control of television advertising lies in the expansion of the scope of 
regulation that deregulation has brought. Relaxing the restrictions at one level (process) to admit 
not just extra categories of advertising to be policed, but a whole new way of bringing in revenue for 
a wide vaziety of programmes, has resulted in more rules having to be codified at another level 
3 Xote., Concrete evidence of regulation actually increasing post-deregulation, in spite of the governments intention to 
reduce it, is provided by Carsberg in his contribution to Regulators and the Market. He admits that when OFTEL was 
being set up the government were thinking of staffing levels of around 50 but *%hen we demonstrated a need for more, we 
had strong ministerial support and were able to increase our numbers steadily to the present level of about 130". (Sir 
Bryan Carsberg, OFFEL: Offlce of Telecommunications: Competition and the Duopoly Review, in Cento Ve1janovsky 
(ed. ) Regulatory and tAe Market, institute of Economics Affairs, 199 1, p. 98) 
4 Note. 
- 
Jay Blumler comments: "if the free market ideology behind the 1990 Act was deregulationary in intent, other 
enactments moved in the opposite direction. Ilese had to do with standards of taste and decency, as well as with public 
morality itself " Referring both to the Broadcasting Standards Council and the inclusion of broadcasting under the 
provisions of the Obscene Publications Act for the first time, Blumler emphasises that it is "no longer left only to the 
Governors of the BBC or the Board of the ITC to safeguard the public good". (Jay. 0. Blumler (ed. ) Television and the 
Public Interest, London: Sage, 1992, p. 74) 
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(product). A separate code has had to be drawn up to cover the particular issues that programme 
sponsorship raises that spot advertising does not. 
The paradox only arises, however, if the deregulation is a partial one; complete deregulation which 
gets rid of all rules is self-consistent. Partial deregulation of commercial television in the UK, while 
increasing the number of options available to broadcasters and advertisers (more competition, more 
kinds of trading practices, more forms of advertising etc. ) still retained a substantial role for the 
regulator'. Politically and socially, the UK is not yet ready for absolutely unregulated television 
advertising, relying only on the legal system to protect consumers, as Alan Peacock recommended. 
When I discussed the problem with Frank Willis, he summed it up as follows: "if you liberalise an 
area you must still have rules and standards for it. But just because the Code is thicker it does not 
mean that the system is more restrictive"'. 
One of chief ways in which deregulation can be said to have taken place is the move to fidl pre- 
transmission self-regulation by the programme companies. This liberalising measure enables them to 
exercise their own discretion in accepting or rýecting commercials for broadcast, rather than the 
decision resting with the regulator. So it is also possible to measure regulation qualitatively by 
looking its intensity, or the degree of its application, rather than its scope or its amount. In fact, the 
words most often used in describing regulation in the context of both broadcasting and advertising in 
the UK are "light", and "heavy" or "tight". Prior to 1990, the system of advertising control was 
"fightly" or "heavily"' regulated. The Hunt and Peacock Reports, the 1989 White Paper and the 1990 
Broadcasting Act all speak of introducing a "fighter", regulatory regime, which would be less intense 
as well as having fewer primary restrictions. The freedom for industry to use its own judgement, even 
though that judgement must still be based on regulatory criteria as well as commercial ones, is a 
crucial element in defining what constitutes fighter rather than heavier regulation. Heavy regulation 
entails a high degree of statutory involvement by the regulator at all stages. With fighter regulation 
regulator can only intervene after the event of broadcasting, but has strong punitive powers which it 
7 
can exercise if its rulings are disobeyed 
.. 
Note. 
- 
As David Meflor,. Minister responsible for getting the 1990 Broadcasting Bill through Parliament exTlained, the 
Bill "deregulates in some matters, but where it regulates it does so fumly". (David Glcncross. HC. The Reform of 
Broadcasting Regulators, in Cento Ve1janovsky (edL) Regulators and the Market, Institute of Economics Affairs, 199 1 
p. 141) 
laterview with Frank Willis 
Note. ý This is what is implied in David Mellor's remark about doing less regulation but doing what remains wfmnly". 
See: Xote 5 
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In the fight of the above, it is clear that there can be no simple one word answer to the question of 
whether there is now more advertising regulation or less. There is less as regards the basic liberalising 
of the system to allow more freedom of action for industry, more taldng into consideration the 
number of extra rules covering the increased scope that must be drawn up and enforced. 
Deregulation has brought about both qualitative and quantitative changes, and partial deregulation 
has inevitably resulted in a certain amount of re-regulation to ensure that standards are still 
maintained within the looser overall framework. 
11.3 Sponsorship: A Slippery Slope? 
The new area of Sponsorship is one of the most complex problems for regulation posed by 
deregulation. It has its own code, drawn up by the ITC after "the appropriate consultation", including 
advice from the AAC, which aims to preserve as far as possible the axiom that any promotional 
message should be kept distinct from programme content. 
The Code commences with a definition of sponsorship: 
IA progrmnme is deemed to be sponsored if any part of its costs oftroduction or 
transmission is met by an organisation or person other than a broadcaster or 
television producer, with a view to promoting its own or another's nume, trademark 
image, activities, products, or any other a7rect or in&rect commercial inferests'ý 
The basic principles in summary are: 
1) Sponsorship isallowed only for whole programmes or substantive programme strands. 
2) Any television programme may be sponsored, unless it falls into one of the excepted categories 
Usted in rule 8 
3) No sponsor is permitted any influence on either the content or the scheduling of a programme. 
4) Any sponsorship must be clearly identified at the beginning and/or at the end of the 
programme. 
ITC Code ofProgramme Sponsorship, January 1994, p. 2 
233 
Deregulation or Re-regulation? The Paradox and the Problems 
5) No promotional reference to any advertiser or sponsor, or to any products or services, is 
permitted within any programme. 
6) No programme may, without the previous approval of the Comnission, be sponsored by any 
person whose business consists in the supply of products or services prohibited from being 
advertised by the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice. 
7) Product placement is prohibited9. 
There are also a number of more specific requirements. Two programme categories are 
unsponsorable: news programmes and current affairs programmes, including business and finaricial 
reports containnig interpretation and comment. Cultural, sports and weather reports may be 
sponsored. On sponsor influence: no-one may sponsor a) a programme or series which contains 
within it material which has the effect of promoting the sponsoes product or service (with the 
exception of game shows for which there are separate rules); or b) which, had it not been sponsored, 
might reasonably have been expected to contain editorial content Which night conflict with the 
sponsoes, interests, e. g. consumer advice programmes. There must be no promotional reference 
within the programme itself to the sponsor or any of the sponsoes products or serviceslo. 
The Code contains quite detailed rules on sponsor credits: there must be front or end credits or both 
(visual or aural), and may be bumper credits entering and leaving a commercial break Front credits 
must precede, and not be integrated within, any element of the programme, apart from its title 
sequence provided that sequence does not include extracts from the programme itself, end and 
bumper credits must not overlap for more than five seconds. only expressions Re "sponsored by", 
or "in association with" are acceptable to explain the sponsoes connection with the programme; 
those such as "brought to you by", which suggest that it has been made by the sponsor, are not. 
There must be no visual or aural extracts from, nor elements which closely resemble, the sponsoes 
advertising campaign in any credit trailer or programme; trailers may have only one simple reference 
to the sponsor. Unlike other classes of licensee, ITV and Channel 4 have special restrictions on 
length of credits 
- 
15 or 20 seconds for a front credit, for one sponsor or more than one sponsor 
respectively, and 10 seconds for end or bumper credits. 
9 ibid. p. 3 
10 ibid. p. 4 
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There are rules for televised sponsored events, which were the only Idnd of sponsorship allowed 
prior to deregulation (apart from some factual programming on Channel 4), for game shows and 
viewers' competitions, and an appendix on sponsorship by religious bodies. These rules are more 
rigorous for ITV and Channel 4 than for Cable and Satellite. 
Prohibited sponsors are: 
1) anybody whose objectives are wholly or mainly of a political nature. 
2) any person whose business consists wholly or mainly in the manufacture or supply of tobacco 
products; pharmaceutical products available only on prescription; any other product or service 
which may not be advertised under the Code of Advertising Standards and Practice (without 
the prior approval of the Commission)" 
Sponsorship, long a major form of advertising in the United States and elsewhere, has had a quite 
different history in the UK Until the government began to prepare for commercial television in the 
early 1950s, obtaining an income from sponsored programmes was regarded by policy-makers as 
potentially less harmffil than from spot advertising. It was partly an aesthetic argument: discreet 
sponsorship 
-a brief acknowledgement that a prestigious firm had supported aquality programme, as 
it was envisaged by early supporters uch as Sykes, Selsdon and Ullswater, or even many of those 
who called for it in the Beveridge Report 
- 
was considered less intrusive than repeated commercial 
breaks. When the implications of sponsorship for the editorial integrity of programming were more 
thoroughly examined by those responsible for setting up the structures for commercial television, its 
potential dangers became apparent. 
From a strictly commercial point of view, sponsorship is less attractive to most advertisers than spot 
advertising as it communicates much less quickly. Instead of offering a direct message with instant 
impact, it relies on slowly building familiarity with the product 12 
. 
The process can, of course, be 
accelerated by much more aggressive pushing of the sponsors commercial message in and around 
the programme. But this would have been unacceptable in Britain in a broadcasting environment 
hostile to US-type 'hard sell I commercialism. A fairly strict regulatory regime was planned for 
advertising at the start of ITV, and quite apart from its inability to bring in much revenue to the 
ibi(L p. 9 
N. C. Walford, How it works 
- 
sponsorship effectj and adve? *Wng comparison, Admap July/August 1992, p. 32 
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fledgling companies in a "discreet" form, sponsorslip posed, and stiH does pose, exceptional 
diffictilties in the context of Bfitish regulation pohcy. 
Tlis is first of all because it blurs the boundary between programme and advertising which has 
always been the cornerstone of British policy, and secondly because of the open-ended nature of the 
sponsoes involvement in the programme he funds. As soon as a direct financial connection is made 
between an advertiser and a particular programme, the incentive is there for the advertiser to try to 
get more value for his money by more exposure for his product. 17his puts pressure on the television 
company to be more accommodating and ultimately on the regulator to relax the rules. This why 
even those who 'dave welcomed the arrival of sponsorship after deregulation have referred to it as a 
slippery slope. 
It is tricky to regulate in practice, not just because it is far from easy to judge where to draw the fine 
on the amount of exposure the commercial message should have, but because it is much more 
difficult to ensure compliance with any decisions made than with spot advertisements. Once an 
ordinary commercial has been cleared for broadcast there is no scope for anyone to exert any 
influence on it afterwards. But there is always scope in the sponsoring of a series of programmes, 
either new or exisfmg, for the advertiser to try and influence the programme makers, over a period of 
time, in Ways that are not easy to detect, even with rigorous monitoring. So there are problems not 
only in drawing up the rules, but in implementing them too. 
The ITC's Code of Progmmme Sponsorship was described to me by Professor Geoffrey Stephenson 
as "sophisticated", and it appears to reflect the regulatoes objective of preventing "manipulation of 
programme ditorial by commercial interests" 13 
. 
Its provisions are directed at making it as difficult as 
possible for sponsors to manipulate anything at all. The limiting of the message to brief product or 
service mentions preceding and following the programme (plus bumpers), but not integrated with any 
element of it, makes the distinction of message and programme quite clear to viewers. The rule 
prohibiting any programme from being sponsored if it "contains material Which, intentionally or 
otherwise, has the effect of promoting (the sponsoes) product or serviceil" , in he with the EC 
Directive on Broadcasting, addresses the more complex and subtle question of where 
"Mchael Kavanagh, TVrponsoride-codeLgA'imessageBroadcas%211111990, p. 10 
" ITC Code of Progrmnme sponsorship, op. cit p. 4 
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appropriateness of fit crosses the boundary into an identification with the programme's ubject 
matter close enough to constitute promotion. 
This matching of the sponsoes message with the theme of the programme 
- 
"the art of affinity which 
spot advertisers have never mastered, but still feebly yearn for"" 
- 
is something that needs judging 
careffilly. From the sponsoes point of view, compatibility of product/service with the subject matter 
of the programme is one of the keys to successful sponsorship, while from the regulatoes perspective 
too close a link could represent either the effect of promotion, or a conflict of interests, or both. 
Two recent cas.. -s illustrate how the ITC assesses whether the sponsoring of a programme 
contravenes the Code by giving the effect of promoting the sponsor"s commercial product. In one, 
the ITC ordered a pet food manufacturer to withdraw as the sponsor of an animal welfare series, 
because although the animals would not have been seen eating that particular brand of pet food 
(strictly forbidden) there would have been too strong a connection in viewers' minds between 
promotional message and programme content. In the second, the ITC reversed a decision to allow 
PPP, the private medical group, to sponsor ITV's top-rated drama series Peak Practice, about the life 
of a country doctor, after viewers complained that PPP's name was displayed prominently and that a 
help fine was given out at the end of the programme to enrol customers. In this instance the company 
had overstepped the boundary by promoting its product too aggressively. 
On the question of possible conflicts of interest, Barclayeard is an acceptable sponsor for a travel 
programme because a credit card is a useful thing to have when going abroad, but is not something 
actually produced by the travel industry. A member of the travel industry itselt on the other hand -a 
tour company or hotel chain 
- 
would not be acceptable because its financial involvement with the 
programme might make the presenter reluctant to criticise its products or services on air, even if no 
influence was overfly exerted 16 
. 
Two of the most famous cases of sponsorship, Bearnish Stout's association with Inspector Morse 
and Croft Port's association with Rumpole of the Bailey, have achieved their success by a subtle 
marriage of the brand's image to the values and life-style expressed by these popular programmes. 
15 Broadcastprogrammes sponsorship 
-a medium still in search oftessages? Admap July/Aug 1992, p. 28 16 Note: I am indebW to Frank Willis for these examples. 
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Naturally, neither Morse not Rumpole are permitted to be seen actually drinking Bearnish or Croft's, 
which would break the "no promotion in the programme" rule, although, interestingly enough, 
market research has shown that viewers often assume in spite of this that the claret favoured by 
Rumpole is port 17 
. 
There are, of course, some programmes the content of which is so neutral, or so 
difficult to influence, that sponsorship resents no threat at all, weather reports being the most 
obvious case. It is not very likely that Legal and General would try to persuade weather forecasters 
to predict more storms so they could sell more insurance. 
The advertising trade associations and the rrV Network Centre are reasonably satisfied with the 
Code and with we ITCs general policy on sponsorship. IPA Director General Nick Phillips told 
Campaign that the Institute was "having continuing meetings with the ITC with a view to ensuring 
there's a sensible interpretation of codee'. He added that he believed "the codes should be organic 
things that grow with usage' and urged the ITC to keep them flexible and not get tied down too 
much with numbers's. With programme credits, for instance, the IPA is asking for integrated credits, 
and permission to show the actual product in the credit, not just an animation or graphic 
representation as the rules dictate at present19. Individual agencies may wish to see the regulator take 
a less cautious line, but the IPA received support from a media account director at BNT DDB 
Needham, who felt that the Code is "fair at the moment, but as sponsorship grows the rules will 
become more relaxed. The only danger is when companies push it too hard, because that will bring a 
greater esistance to change"20. 
Trevor Barton, speging for the ITV companies, told me that they still want sponsorship to be tightly 
regulated to avoid upsetting viewers and attracting adverse reaction, but the Controller of 
Sponsorship at Thames Television maintained that "clients will continue to seek the extension of 
sponsor credits wherever possible. We don't want to go as far as the Americans or the Australians, 
but there are certain things we could say in a strapline format' '21. This is a very moderate position in 
comparison with that of Satellite channel BSkyB. Its Controller of Sponsorship claimed that his 
company would like to see the Code "become much more commercial, along the fines of the US or 
the Australian approacif'. He said that although BSkyB was 'ýiot at war with the ITC, if the rules 
X CNalford, op. cit p. 31 
Can the ITC control the rWni of TVsponsorship? Campaign, 5106/1992, p. 13 
Interview with Nick Phillips 
Campaign 5 /06/1992, op. cit. p. 13 
21 ibid. p. 13 
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were not reviewed, the industry would soon be regulated out of e)dstence"22. The station took this 
hostile stance after being reprimanded by the ITC for giving undue credit to the sponsor within the 
programme format of Cricket World Cup coverage instead of confining it to the title sequences and 
break bumpers. 
All broadcasters and agencies are very =dous that sponsorship should represent new money coming 
into the systern, and not just a recycling of e: qistirig advertising budgets. It only constitutes a small 
percentage of revenue so far, but all see it as a growth area, perhaps eventually accounting for 10% 
-12% of the market. The advertisers and the television companies Mer on whether sponsorship 
money should be distributed among the companies as a percentage of their net advertising revenue, 
with a Tnder's fee' for the one who arranged the deal, as at present or should be directed towards the 
programme sponsored. Kenneth Wes of the ISBA has said that advertisers "take the view that the 
sponsorship contribution should go to the specific prograrnme, not the general pool of programming 
money"'. If this is not done there is no particular benefit to the consumer. Sponsorship should be 
used to create programmes that would otherwise not be made, or to improve eNisting programmes. 
The Network companies resist this suggestion. Trevor Barton argued that it must be up to the 
individual companies to decide whether to put the residue of sponsorship money towards offsetting 
Programming costs or not; it should remain in their gift. 
Consumer organisations are not unduly concerned about the principle of sponsorship, provided that 
it is careffilly regulated. Sue Bloomfield of the Consumers Association told me that CA wanted 
research to be done on the effects of sponsorship on viewers, particularly how they receive messages. 
She explained that while qualitative research on viewers' attitudes and responses to sponsorship in 
the UY, has been commissioned by the broadcasters and the advertising industry, this has been done 
from a commercial rather than a consumer angle. Consumer groups feel that the receivers of 
sponsors' messages should also be considered for their own sake. 
The general opinion on sponsorship so far is that we should "wait and see". Unlike campaign 
advertising, it is an immature method of communication on television, though it has arrived in a 
mature and sophisticated medium. When ITV was set up in 1954, regulation was strict in order to 
22 ibid. p. 13 
23 Michael Kavanagh, op cit p. 10 
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allow enough time for a tradition of quality programming to be built up in the commercial sector 
without undue interference from advertisers. If regulation of sponsorship in the 1990s follows a 
similar pattern, evolving gradually and not imitating American methods, a decline in programme 
standards or viewer enjoyment will not necessarily occur. The regulator sets the pace for change 
within the television industry and its careful approach gets particular support from programme 
makers who are by no means as keen on sponsorship as sales executives. The creative teams 
responsible fior programming production are still "deeply fearfW of threats to their editorial 
integrie4 
. 
Even nowadays, neither public service broadcasters, regulators nor consumers wish to 
see British television becoming too American in style. The majority of the advertising industry, too, is 
close to this vie,. -v, even though large US based conglomerates, uch as Proctor and Gamble, would 
be unlikely to sponsor in the UK as they would not be permitted the kind of editorial control of 
programmes they are accustomed to exercising across the Atlantic. 
In America, sponsor influence is a very real threat. Episodes of the popular series "Rosanne" and 
"Thirtysomething" were not broadcast because of advertiser pressure. Both dealt with controversial 
social issues: teenage dfinldng and AIDS respectivel)M. Regulation is designed to reduce the 
possibility of such intervention occurring here. Robin Duval, now Deputy Director of Programmes 
at the ITC, has nevertheless alleged that some advertisers have already been sufficiently worried by 
the criticisms made by Mary Whitehouse of certain programmes to threaten to withdraw their 
advertising from in and around these programme? '. 
11.4 Additional Problem Areas: Broking, Bartering and Product Placement. 
While sponsorship may now be broadly acceptable, the situation with its adjuncts - broking, bartering 
and product placement 
- 
is quite different. Product placement - the inclusion of a product or service 
within a film or programme in return for payment in cash or kind - is categorically forbidden by the 
Sponsorship Code and by the EC Broadcmang Directive, which refers to it as "surreptitious 
advertising7. The ITC is still firmly opposed to ft. So, too, are consumer groups. Consumer policy 
advisor Jeremy Mitchell of the Voice of the Listener (UK) criticised it as "a state-of-the art 
deceptive marketing and communication technique, where the danger does not he in advertising of 
24 Ad=p July/August 199Z op. cit. p. 28 
" Robin Duval, The Regulatory Environment. AdmaP. Octobcr 1990, p. 12 
26 ibidL p. 12 
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brands, but in the concealment of this fact"7. He was referring in this instance to American made 
feature films, but expressed anxiety on behalf of consumers in the UK that, despite the ITC's 
prohibition on product placement both in British made programmes and those acquired from outside, 
48 feature films "may deviate from the Code where this is unavoidable 
The ITC Code allows the programme maker to acquire a product or service "at no, or less than full, 
cost" if it is essential to the programme. Even under the previous fight regulation it was 
acknowledged that well known commercial brands would always be visible in programmes, 
especially larger items such as cars, but they must only occur in a natural way and not be given 
"undue promincuce". But the integrity of the programme should not be destroyed by focusing the 
camera too obviously on a product, which would inevitably be part of the deal if a sponsor had paid 
to have it included. The provisions of the Code are aimed at removing the incentive from television 
companies to do this by prohibiting them from getting paid for allowing named brands to be seen on 
air. The only people who can receive money for placing products on air are PR firms and specialist 
agencies who organise props for television. 
While the regulator and the consumer groups are emphatically against the practice there are mixed 
views among broadcasting and advertising professionals. As usual, the advertising trade associations 
take a fairly moderate line 
- 
the IPA do not want it and are against "secret deals 1129 9 and the ISBA 
believe the principle is right but perhaps there could be some relaxationýo 
- 
but some individual 
advertisers and agencies are more enthusiastic. The magazine PR Week claimed recently that a 
growing number of top UK brands now have organised product placement strategies. This benefits 
television companies as well as advertisers because budget levels have not risen to keep pace with 
costs and producers are keen to have a source of free or cheap props3l. An editorial in the journal 
Media Week called for the ITC to legitimise product placement so that underground deals could be 
eliminated and the revenue generated ploughed back into production budgets. Media Week argued 
that "as production budgets shrink, there will be an ever stronger pressure towards advertiser- 
27 Productplacement, Consumer Affairs, Septcmbcr/Octobcr 199 1, p. 17 
22 ibid. p. 18 
29 Interview with Nick PhiUips 
m Interview with Kenneth Wes 
31 prodUCt pjaCe7nent, pR Week, 9/ 0611994, p. 8 
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Supplied Programming; at least placement allows editorial control to rest with the producer, who in 
tum is answerable to a commissioning edito? '. 
The regulator was not impressed by tfis warning, however, and Frank Willis rýected the call in the 
same magazine a fortnight later, listing substantive objections to the editorial's arguments. Most 
importantly, if product placement were to be allowed, broadcasters "would not stop at selling 
fortuitous "opportunities to communicate', they would actively create inventory to sell. Each 
programme would then rapidly acquire its mandatory allocation of brand Slo&%33. In his view, this 
would eventually have a profound and detrimental effect on the way in which programmes are made, 
and the ITC has io intention of going down this road. In arguing against he practice, Willis might 
also have said that it is ultimately self-defeating to try to "improve" production values using money 
obtained from a practice which attacks the very roots of quality programming. 
The television companies are perhaps the most divided on the issue. Trevor Barton told me that the 
companies' trade association does not support the practice officially, but it is aware that while the 
creative people, the programme makers, are mostly vehemently opposed to conditions being imposed 
on their artistic freedom, sales executives are in favour of any device that can increase sales and 
revenue. Tlis clash of interests is a long-standing one in televisiom He also admitted that it is not 
always easy to prevent product placement from going on covertly, and often managing direCtOrs Of 
34 Network companies wiU denounce it in public but encourage it in private 
There have already been several notorious cases where the practice has been uncovered. The 
presenter of a cookery series on TV-am, Rustie Lee, was sacked afler the Sun newspaper exposed 
the fact that she personally accepted thousands of pounds to use a number of culinary products in her 
prograrnme. In this case there was not even the justification. of production improvements to benefit 
the consume? s. A programme commissioned by London Weekend Television on the opening of the 
Euro, Disney theme park was severely criticised for the excessive amount of promotion for Disney 
32 Productive Placements, Media Week, 4/ 0611993, p. 15 33 Frank Willis The unacceptableface ofadverrising Media Week, 18106/ 1993, p. 14 34 Intcrview with Trevor Barton. The PR Week article quoted above also claimed that "deals are being struck behind the 
carneras'ý The same article nevertheless made the point that under the present rules the placement agencies are 
intermediaries and have no ability to change scripts. Because advertisers have no direct control, products they donate are 
frequently "abused and misused- by being presented in a detrimental lightý or simply never seen at all. So advertisers do 
not have it all their own way. 
PR Week 9 June 1994, op. cit. p. 9 
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that it contained, amounting according to some observers, to one long advertisement for Disney and 
its products. Makers of other programmes uch as Brookside, Aspel and Company and Surprise 
Surprise have also been reprimanded by the ITC for overstepping the mark and focusing too 
obviously on, or even pushmg, branded products. LWT, one of the worst offenders, has been told by 
the regulator to eKpect a fine if it per-sists36. 
Ths illustrates just how difficult it is for the ITC to regulate effectively in this grey area. What 
constitutes "undue" promirience of a product or service is a matter for debate, especially when, as 
BBC Radio correspondent Torin Douglas has pointed out, sponsors are unsure what "due" 
prominence might be37. What is a blatant plug to some might be a natural occurrence to others. 
The practice of airtime broking 
- 
the buying up of television airtime in bulk on a speculative basis in 
order to sell it on, whether by advertising agencies or specialist media-buying firms, if not actually 
illegal in Britain before 1993 38 
, 
was not permitted by the regulating Authority and has never been 
practised in the UK since the vague attempt by agencies to do something resembling it was firmly 
squashed by the television companies themselves in the very early daye9. Even now, despite some 
independent interest shown in the idea, it is strongly opposed by the advertising industrY's trade 
associations. Kenneth Miles of the ISBA gave the following reasons for its opposition to the practice. 
In the first place, it threatens the advertiser 
- 
agency relationship; an agency is expected to give 
objective advice on media buying and if it is in the business of selling television airtime as well as 
recommending it to clients there could be a conflict of interest. The ISBA also fears that the 
involvement of middlemen would result in higher costs. It does not want a repetition of the French 
and Australian experiences where broking is widely practised and large brokers have a significant 
hold on the airtime market4o. Despite conflicting views within its Media Policy Group, the IPA 
came out against the practise in a statement to the ITC in 199,41. 
36 Tony Douglas, HCpufl the offendingplug, Marketing Week, 23/ 07/ 1993, p. 20 
37 ibidL p. 20 
38 Broking 'is not fflegal'- lawyer, Media Week, 11/10/ 1991, p. 3. While legal opinion is divided over whether broking 
would have broken the law before the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the 1990 Act says nothing on the issue and therefore gives 
39 no 
legal powers to the regulator to prohibit it 
See Chapter 5 p. 95 
40 Interview with Kenneth Miles 
41 sarah MacDonald, rx to impose broking curbs? Marketing Week, 6 /09/ 199 1, p. 14 
243 
Deregulation or Re-regulation? The Paradox and the Problems 
The Network companies are not in favour of broking for the sound commercial reason that they have 
no trouble in selling their airtime. Despite more competition, supply is still limited which stimulates a
healthy demand. All the potentially interested parties pointed out to me that broking is only attractive 
to small, financially insecure stations who need a guaranteed income or are suffering cash-flow 
problems. This situation does not apply in the UK at the moment and broking is unlikely to be 
needed as a solution in the foreseeable future, for ITV and Channel 4 at least42. T'his is partly because 
the ITC, while not opposed in principle, would be concerned if large scale broking were to distort 
the market for airtime, as would the OFT. 
The ITC held cc-. isultations with all interested parties in 1991. It followed this up with a statement of 
intent wl&h made a number of important points. 
"Ms consultation exercise revealed a strong consensus within the advertising industry that media 
brolcing is unlikely to be in the best interests either of advertisers or most television broadcasters. On 
the other hand, the argument was advanced to the ITC that media broldrig offered, especially for 
smaller satellite broadcasters, an opportunity to secure revenue without in any way damaging the 
interests of advertisers at large, for whom the advertising opportunities which such stations can offer 
are at best marginal. 
The ITC has concluded that it would be difficult to justify a blanket proscription of sale to media 
brokers and accepts there could be cases where such action would be excessive and disproportionate. 
However, the ITC vAshes to make the following points clear 
a) sales of airtime to'media brokers, particularly on stations accounting for significant shares of 
advertising opportunity, either nationally or regionally, could make it very difficult for broadcasters 
concerned to satisfy the statutory requirements that "there shall be no reasonable discrimination 
either against or in favour of any particular advertiser", 
b) the "'unreasonable discrimination! ' clause [Section 8(2)(b) of the 1990 Broadcasting Act ] protects 
the interests of advertisers, not other categories of media buyer, and cannot be invoked to oblige 
television companies to sell to media brokers; 
42 David Harrison. Even ifitibruLing don't try tofix! 4 Media Weelc, 2511011991, p. 13. Xote. ý This article explores the 
possibility of Satellite and Cable companies being willing to engage in antane broking as an additional means of secunng 
revenue. 
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c) the rrC reminds its licensees that the detailed consumer protection requirements in its code, both 
as regards the content and scheduling of advertisements, imply a level of editorial responsibility 
which might in practice be difficult for the broadcaster to deliver in conditions where airtime was 
sold other than to a known end user or his agent. In no circumstances will the ITC permit its code 
licensees to delegate to others the responsibility for code comphanc6"43 
. 
ITC policy has not changed since then, and the threat of widespread brolcing and the arrival of large 
French media buyers eager to break into the British market appears to have receded for the time 
beine. 
Airtime bartering, wifich is big business in the US and spreading in Europe, is virtuaBy non-eNistent in 
the UK Barter is "the exchange of a programme for commercial advertising time in and around that 
programme, via a third party 
..... 
There is no explicit link between the programme bartered and the 
advertiser t#45 
. 
With cash barter the programme is exchanged for a combination of cash and airtime. 
The seller 
- 
the third party 
- 
may be an advertising agency, an advertiserwishing to promote his own 
goods or services, an independent production company acting in association with an advertiser, a 
media-buying roup acquiring the airtime on behalf of one or more clients, or a distributor who Will 
sell the airtime on to a third party. Barter is popular in the United States syndication market where 
programmes are sold to more than one market. As Ford and Ford have pointed out, the distinction 
between barter and sponsorship can be blurred. When a programme format and concept are Offered 
to an sponsor before a pilot is made, advertising spots and specified airtime can be pre-sold on the 
basis of the formats alone. The advertiser in this case is, in effect, underwriting the programme. 
Although any barter combined with a broking element would not have been possible before 1993 as 
this was prohibited under the 1980 Broadcasting Act, direct deals between TV company and 
advertiser/agent could in theory have been done. Ile 1990 Broadcasting Act appears to perrnit 
barter in the fuller sense of selling on airtime received in exchange for a programme to a broker, but 
the commercial broadcasting environment in the UK has not up to now made bartering an attractive 
I Afedia Broking. rrc: Nem Release, 22/ 10/ 91 
44 Suzan Leavy, Brokery wwming Television Today 24/ 09/ 199 1, p. 21 45 Bianca and James Ford, Television and Sponsorship, Oxford. Buderworth-Heinemann, 1993, p. viii 46 ibid. p. ix 245 
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proposition. The dominance of in-house production, albeit gradually being eroded by the 
independents, and the ease with which good cash deals could be obtained made bartering 
unnecessary from a strictly business point of view. Even if it made good business sense there are stiff 
very considerable problems for the licensees in ensuring compliance with regulation 
The ITC's Code of Programme Sponsorship, Section 15, has this to say about advertiser-supplied 
programmes: "the constraints set out in the European Directive upon editorial influence by an 
advertiser are especially hard to reconcile with any programme made for, or substantially funded by, 
an advertiser. Before accepting such a programme licensees must therefore fiffly satisfy themselves 
that it conforms- -with the provisions of this Code other than those relating to the provenance of the 
programineit47. It goes on to say that licensees must take particular care in the case of factual 
programming and be alert to the possibility of indirect attempts by commercial interests to influence 
public opinion. Without prior approval of the Commission no programme "wholly or substantially 
funded, co-produced, or provided to a licensee by an advertiser, an advertiser's agent or a company 
(including a production company) closely associated to an advertiser" may include promotional 
references to the advertiser or his products or servicee. 
There is a note appended to Section 15 which states that in order to avoid any doubt, the provision 
of a programme in exchange for advertising airtime (barter) does not in itself bring the arrangement 
within the defmition of programme sponsorship and therefore make it unacceptable. But licensees 
should note that "commonality between a prograrnmes content and an advertiser's advertising might 
constitute grounds for regarding the programme as having a promotional purpose""". The ITC is 
clearly determined to prevent sponsors from using barter as a means of evading the strict rules on 
separation of promotional message from programmes, and trying to sneak their own commercial 
agendas in through the regulation systenYs back door. The Deputy Director of Programmes has 
made it clear that "any advertiser-supplied programme is likely per se to be in breach of the ITC 
requirement ofeditorial independence from advertisers750. 
47 M Codefor Programme Sponsorship op. cit. p. 10 
48 ibid. p. 11 
49 ibid. p. 11 
50 Robin Duval, The Regulatory Environment, Admap Octobcr 1990, p. 13 
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There is a considerable difference of opinion between the regulator, the broadcasters, the advertisers 
and the agencies over the acceptability of barter in the UK. The ITC accepts it in principle, but still 
not in association with broking. Media consultant Chris Quinlan, writing in Admap about barter in 
Europe, observed that advertisers welcome the practice because it can not only secure them a better 
deal than buying airtime direct, but may give them more control over the programme nvironment in 
which their commercials will be shown. Broadcasters are against it because they are reluctant to lose 
control over programming and advertising scheduling". Ile spokesmen for British advertisers and 
broadcasters whom I interviewed expressed the same differences of opinion. The ISBA find barter 
"reasonable" provided that there is a good framework of control, but the ITV Network Centre states 
categorically &, a there will not be bartering on any scale; Eke broking it is unnecessary in the 
flourishing UK television industry where good prograrnmes are not in short supply, and it causes too 
many problems for regulation. The IPA agrees with this view as regards the UK, but a number of 
large British agencies are active in the barter market in Europe and elsewhere, where the television 
industry is more fragmented and less stable than in this countryý 2. 
Another problem that barter poses for the regulator is in calculating the value of bartered airtime for 
A- 
- 
Ui &mly that the ITC's accountants are Cae purposes of the Treasury levy. Frank Wi s told me quite 
prepared to challenge any licensee who might use the barter system to devalue the proportion of its 
qualifying revenue to be paid to the Treasury. This prospect will not affect Cable and Satellite 
channels as they do not pay the levy. 
11.5 Advertising Minutage: The Right Balance? 
The amount of advertising on television has always been a matter of concern to the regulating 
authority, and often a matter of dispute with the regulated industries. It has, however, remained 
relatively stable for ITV since 1955, increasing only a fraction at a time to its present Emit of an 
average of seven minutes per hour over a single day, and seven and a half minutes in any one hour. 
Channel 4 has always had slightly more flexibility in arranging the distribution of its airtime minutage, 
and Satellite and Cable channels now have a daily average of 9 minutes per day, and a maximum of 
12as perrnitted under the ECBroackayfingDirecfive, and COuncilOfEurTe COnvenliOll. 
51 Chris Quinlan, TVprogramme barter, Admap June 1993, pp. 46-48 
-12 Interviews with Nick Phillips and Kenneth Wes 
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As with so many other aspects of television regulation it is a question of finding the right balance 
between conflicting demands. There is some survey evidence that a considerable percentage of 
viewers actually enjoy advertisements and only a minority find them initatinJ3. The regulator has 
nevertheless tended to take a conservative stand on the amount of advertising it will allow and the 
issue has always been a politically sensitive one. Successive governments have adopted the policy fine 
that large amounts of advertising are antithetical to the public service ethos, and broadcasting 
legislation has always given explicit responsibility to the regulating authority for keeping it to a 
minimum. The 1990 Act is no exception. 
I The advertising industry is also well aware, from a commercial perspective, that this largely 
favourable response on the part of viewers could well be jeopardised if exposure to advertising were 
to increase beyond certain Emits. This Emit of toleration beyond which the process becomes 
self-defeating has to be finely judged. The current minutage is the result of a compromise negotiated 
between the advertisers, who initially pressed hard via the ISBA for ITV to be allowed to sell airtime 
up to the EC Emits as well as Cable and Satellite channels, and the ITC, which was reluctant to grant 
more than a maximum of seven minuteS54. Agencies are slightly less keen than advertisers on 
increasing the amount and the EPA definitely do not want to extend it any further. Director General 
Nick Phillips explained to me that "while having up to twelve minutes in a clock hour may reduce 
costs by 20-30%, the impact of the message becomes diluted and viewers cease to pay attention". 
Tle television industry, while originally supporting the ISBA! s bid for EC fin-dngs, now claims to be 
satisfied with the present limits, and change as regards ITV is not envisaged for the foreseeable 
future". This is welcomed by the consumer groups who were unhappy about the proposed 
increases. The National Consumer Council, in particular, believes that "the amount of childrerfs 
advertising is already excessive, especially around Christmas". Spokesperson Diana NNUtworth told 
me that the Council wants the regulator not only to take into account timing, but to curb over- 
exposure to certain categories of advertising as well 
- 
'"Mallory Wobcr and Barrie Gunter, YhePublic'r View AboutAdve? lising on Television. April 1988, pp. 6-16 
m Interview with Trevor Barton. Note., Channel 4 had its permitted airtime minutage ir=eased in 1993. It can now show 
advertismg: breaks of up to four minutes, and can show more Um the 75 minute average in off-peak hours, a rel&xationwhich 
allows it 14 minutes a day extm lie ITC granted the channel the extra minutage to make up for revenue lost by having to 
show between two and three hours of edlucational programming daily under its remit ( rX givej C4 go-aheadfor longer breala, 
Media Week 12 February 1993, p. 4) 
Interview with Trevor Barton 
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A further aspect of the amount and distribution of advertising which occasionally causes 
disagreement is programme promotion, partly because there are no explicit regulatory rules to tell 
the television companies what they should do. The companies have recently increased the quantity of 
their own advertising in line with the more competitive environment, but the promoting of 
programmes in advance, despite being a form of advertising, does not count as such for the purposes 
of calculating the minutage. It can be added on to the maximum making actual commercial airtime 
per hour as long as nine minutes This is causing some unease among advertisers and agencies who 
feel that the resulting "clutter" on the air is distracting from the main commercial messages, airtime 
for which has been bought at very high Cost56 
. 
Although they recognise the legitimacy of programme 
promotion and the benefits to advertisers if audiences are built in advance, the IPA has requested the 
ITC "to put pressure on the Network companies to make their promotions more systematic and less 
bitty and ConffiSing"57. 
11.6 Conclusion. 
In answer to the question posed in the title of this chapter, it would appear that the broadcasting 
policy which was presented to the British public in the 1980s as a fiberalising response to the 
revolution in media technology has resulted in re-regulation almost as much as deregulation. 
Although at the process level there has been a removal of previous regulatory restrictions on market 
entry in television, and on certain forms of advertising practice, and the regulating Authority has had 
two important functions rernoved from it 
- 
broadcasting and pre-transmission control of advertising 
- 
the scope of regulatory activity has increased and with it the number of rules. 
Deregulation and re-regulation in Britain have Presented the regulatory system with a number of new 
challenges. Not everyone is convinced that the structures put in place by the 1990 Broadcasting Act 
will be able to cope with these challenges in the long term. Wolfgang Hoffinan-Riem, for example, 
finds that broadcasting supervisory bodies throughout Europe deal uneasily with the difficulties 
presented by product placement, concealed advertising and sponsorship: "the advertisers, testing the 
regulatoes tolerance, are always shifting their ground, devising new forms of advertising as soon as 
the regulators have come to terms with the old"". 
Mark Edwards, Real 'first 
-in-breaks " vanished, Campaign 27/ ON 1992, p. 17 Interview with Nick Phillips 
Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Defending Vulnerable Falues: Regulatory Aleasures and Enforcement Dilemmas, 
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In Britain, there is a high level of awareness of the potential threat to programming standards 
represented by the newly ex anded class of advertising practices. The ITC is very det ed that T ermin 
the integrity of programmes will not be sacrificed for economic ends. It depends to a much greater 
extent than before, however, on the co-operation of its regulatees, particularly the ITV companies 
who are responsible for ensuring on a practical level that the rules are enforced. At present 
sponsorship is still a relatively low key business, and none of the participants is in favour of broking, 
bartering ( except advertisers who are not against in principle but are not enthusiastic) or any form 
of concealed advertising. 
A strong tradition of doing both television and regulation in a certain way in Britain means that those 
involved regard what is acceptable practice here differently from elsewhere. Advertising agencies, for 
example, who are eager to become involved in broking and bartering in Europe do not see it as 
particularly appropriate for this country. So long standing attitudes and values with respect to the 
primacy of programme making in television still prevail in this country, in spite of the changes made 
to the basic framework, both commercial and regulatory, within which programme production takes 
place. Whether these attitudes will be able to resist erosion in the long term through lack of strong 
statutory regulatory support, combined with increased commercial pressure, is a matter for 
conjecture. 
in Jay. G. Blumler (edL) Television and the Public Interest, Umdon: Sage, 1992, p. 191 
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Chapter 12 
Case Stu dy. 
- 
The Regulation of Female Sanitary Protection (San-pro) 
Advertising on Television. 
12.1 Introduction. 
The history of process regulation reveals some interesting features about the social and cultural 
attitudes instrumental in shaping the broadcasting system in Britain. But decisions about structure 
have always been very general ones about what kind of system and what kind of regulation is most 
appropriate for Britain, given a particular set of political and economic circumstances. It is product 
regulation of advertising which provides a more detailed picture of how viewers and regulators 
actually feel about what appears on their screens during the commercial breaks. 
As attitudes and expectations in society change over time, so do peoples' views about what they find 
acceptable on television. This applies to the content of both programming and advertising, although 
programming has tended to take the lead in extending the boundaries of acceptability and brealcing 
down taboos, leaving advertising to follow more cautiously behind. This is partly for sound 
commercial reasons 
- 
offending potential customers is bad business 
- 
and partly because advertising 
has always been more tightly controlled with respect to content than programming. Things that 
would be unobjectionable in a scheduled programme are not permissible in an advertisement. 
This chapter, which looks at how the advertising of an individual product category has been 
regulated over a twenty year period, focuses on how regulators exercise control in practice, 
especially the key decision-making body the Advertising Advisory Committee. It examines the ways 
in which public reaction to this category is tested, measured and assessed, and the contribution the 
information obtained through this process makes to the task of adjudicating between various 
competing sets of interests. 
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The category of female sanitary protection is exceptionally interesting as its treatment by regulators 
reflects a set of Peculiarly British attitudes towards bodily fimetions in general, and sexual matters in 
particular, which sets this country apart from other Western European countries'. British social and 
legal history demonstrates that attitudes to sexuality here have, at least since Victorian times, been far 
less open than on the continene. The UK still has tough obscenity laws, which in the past have been 
used in attempts to censor serious works of literature as well as pornography, and following the 1990 
Broadcasting Act, broadcasting has been brought under the provisions of the Obscene Publications 
Act. The theatre was subject o censorship by the Lord Chamberlain until 1968, and the cinema and 
video industries are still controlled by the British Board of Fifin Classification, which can refuse to 
classify films or videos containing "excessively" violent or pornographic scenes unless modifications 
are made. Some may not be shown at all. 
In the case of television, although the regulators have directed their attention to the portrayal of 
violence, especially in the last few years, and are concerned about offending religious sensibilities3, 
the treatment of sex and other intimate matters on television has traditionally bome the brunt of 
official censorship and public disapproVa14 As recently as 1994, a journalist writing in a Sunday 
newspaper complained that compared with the French, Germans and Italians "sex on our television is 
stripped Of a jOY, fun or adventure. Instead, it is dressed up as education, introduced by chipmunk 
earnest anthropologists and sexologists, and is about as erotic as a blancmange', '. Tliis translates in 
television advertising regulation terms into bans on family planning advertising of any Idnd by the 
11BA until 1972, on mentioning specific methods of contraception or branded products until 1987, 
and on all advertising of female sanitary protection, except on a limited experimental basis, until 
1988. 
1 Note: Many of the p= articles covcmg the San-pro debate refwed to the taboos associated Aith these su1jects in this country. 
Sophie Bate in Marketing Week-, for instance, maintained that "embarrassincnt is lodged deep mithin the British psyche. The big 
taboos surround sex and death, though in the UK pret* much any sort of bodily ftiction is a sourm of embarTassed 
2 
amusement" (Sophie Bate, Tabm ornot taboo, Nlark-etmg Week, 4/ 10/ 1991, p. 28) 
Note Ctramisons %; ith more libeW continental attitudes výae often made by advertising cn ecutives defending their right in the 
3 
media trade journals to be allowed to advertise sanitary protection products on televmon 
Note: Blasphemy is still a common law offence in Britain, although no state prosecution has been brought for over 70 
years (ITC Notes, No. 34) 
4 Note: According to ITC research, since the 1980s violence has overtaken sex as a cause of offence on ITV but not on 
Channel 4. (ITC Notes, No. 35 ) 
3 Jonathan Miller, Around the %vrId in 80positions, Sunday Times, 28/ 08/ 1994, section 4, p3 
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12.2 The Mtory of San-Pro RegWation. 
Rule 12 of the MRs Code of Advertising Standards and Practice, which states that "no 
advertisement should offend against good taste or decency or be offensive to public feeling", has 
been the one responsible for restdcdons on advertising in the area of sanita ry protection as well in 
other sensitive areas such as contraceptive advice, bereavement and disability. But as Stuart 
Patterson, advertising press officer at the MA in 1989 commented then, "the Code isn't the Bible. It's 
subject to a great deal of interpretation. 
.... 
Tbirty years ago, for instance, an ad which showed a 
woman being wolf-whistled at by a gang of workers on a building site would not have caused 
offence. Now we night well object to that under Rule 12 as offensive to public feeling"6. He went on 
to comment that while San-pro products had previously been deemed offensive in broadcasting they 
were now allowed. Incontinence pads, on the other hand, which were worn by a significant 
percentage of the adult population at some point in their fives, were likely to cause embarrassment in 
the target audience if they were advertised. So although the San-pro taboo was gradually being 
broken down, others still remained firnily entrenched. 
The change of heart on the part of regulating Authority which finally brought this category Of 
advertising on to both commercial television channels nationwide took a long time to come, 
however. The first experimenW screening on ITV of a commercial for a brand of sanitary protection, 
Lil-lets tampons, took place in the Tbarnes area in 1972, in response to requests by advertisers for 
the ITA to lift the ban. The decision to allow this controversial product to be advertised on television 
was greeted'with horTor in Church newspapers, particularly the Catholic Press. Yvonne Millwood, 
ITA Advertising Control Officer and Secretary to the Advertising Advisory Committee at the time, 
told me that the ITA immediately received a number of letters complaining that the advertisements 
were "foul" and "obscene, " and their presence on screen was "corrupting". She Was obliged to vaite 
7 
and explain that the campaign had not yet started 
. 
6 Tony Cohen, Indecent Exposure. Marketing Week, 15109 / 1989, pp. 42 
- 
43 
7 Interview, %ith Yvonne Millwood 
, 
rrA/IBA Advertising Control Officer. Note: A similar phenomenon occurred during a 
1997 MA survey which asked the question: 'Doyou ever see adverts on rrVIX-am or on Channel 414C which youfind 
offensive? " Top of the list of named, unprompted items were adverts for sanitary protection products, (interesting enough 
in itself ) followed by those concerning AIDS and for contraception. The MA commented that "the latter is a most 
interesting finding because this survey was carried out before any condom advertisements had been shown on television". (Mallory Wobcr and Barrie Gunter, 77, e Public's rjew About Television Advertising, IBA Research Document, 1988, 
p. 40) 
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When it did appear the commercial was so discreet 
- 
an extremely oblique script and a brief glimpse 
of the product in a woman! shandbag 
- 
and contained so little information that it was difficult to tell 
what product was being advertised unless the viewer was already familiar with it. Even so, there was 
considerable negative reaction. By the end of the campaign the ITA had received 50 letters of 
complaint, including one from ýArs. Mary VvUtehouse, influential campaigner on questions of taste 
and decency in the media and President of the National Viewers and Listeners Association. Aft 
V&tehouse claimed that a number of women had written to her to say that they felt that the 
advertisements left them no privacy by intruding into a "mixed family situation" while watching 
television. She condemned the decision to permit television coverage of the product as "insensitive", 
and claimed this was a result of the ITA being "predominantly male". 
In be with routine procedure, the IBA referred the matter to the Advertising Advisory Committee, 
which had earlier approved the experiment, for discussion at its October 1972 meeting. According 
to Yvonne Millwood, the Committee, whom she described as a "sophisticated set of people, " was 
astonished by the unexpected strength of feeling against the advertisements. Although no individual 
member of the Committee admitted to being personally offended by the ad, the ladies representing 
women's organisations such as the National Union of Townswomen's Guilds reported that 
embarrassment at seeing this subject on television, however tactflAy handled, was widespread among 
their membership. Male AAC members, on the other hand, thought that, in principle, the advertising 
of sanitary protection for women would not be generally offensive to women if there were greater 
restraints on the content of advertisements. 
After much discussion, the consensus of opinion on the Committee was that the Lil-lets 
advertisements themselves had not been generally offensive, since the research results showed that 
only 2.4 percent of those interviewed made spontaneous mention of the Lil-lets advertisements as 
ones which they found to be particularly unpleasant or in bad taste, with a further 2 percent objecting 
to their timing. But this had to be balanced against he fact that 30 per cent of the sample of viewers 
surveyed registered objections in principle, and that a number of letters and telephone calls had been 
received by the Authority, the programme company concerned and individual members of the 
Committee, including the Chaiman, expressing strong opposition to this category of advertising. It 
was therefore decided to recommend to the Authority. 
l Few PrOjest over Lil-lets, Campaip 8/ 07 / 1972 
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(i) that the evidence from this experiment would not justify an immediate decision to open television 
advertising to the general advertising of sanitary towels and tampons; 
(ii) that the Lil-lets advertisements should be repeated in London if the advertiser so wished, until the 
end of January, and reviewed thereafter; 
(ifi) that simultaneously, the experiment should be extended to another area 
- 
for example, the North, 
(iv) that more research into viewer reaction should be carried out at the end of the fiinher period of 
experimentation in the two areas to see whether the results were more conclusive? 
The October 1972 deliberations of the Advertising Advisory Committee give some idea of the Idnd 
of considerations which Committee members and the regulating Authority have to take into account 
when making their decisions. Chief among these is ensuring that the data presented on viewer 
reactions is as accurate as possible and that the interpretation they have put on it is correct. This is 
not an easy task The most obvious method of ascertaining public opinion is from an analysis of 
complaints received. An attempt is made to gauge the overall level of dissatisfaction from the letters 
and telephone calls made directly to the regulator, the television companies or even, as in this 
instance, to the Chairman of the AAC. But this method presents difficulties as such complaints can be 
misleading in two quite different ways. 
They may be numerically small; but concrete evidence that only a small number of viewers are 
unhappy relative to the audience as a whole does not necessarily imply that all other viewers are 
completely satisfied. The complaints may be representative of many more people who dislike what 
they see but do not actively express their disapproval by writing or phoning in. Supporting this 
interpretation, a spokesman for the regulator claimed in 1992 that "If we get 500 complaints, you can 
be sure that there are at least 500,000 out there who object"10, INWe this may bt7 an exaggeration, 
both former EBA Director of Advertising Control Harry Theobalds, and former Advertising Control 
Officer Yvonne Millwood suggested to me that in their experience people generally regard 
advertising as trivial and are reluctant to write in and complain about commercials, particularly if they 
feel the ads are merely offensive or tasteless and not actually dangerous or misleading. This does not 
always mean that they are happy with particular advertisements or categories of advertising". 
9 The Advertising of Tampons 
- 
AAC Paper 13 (72). 
10 Barbara Argument, The Lut Taboo, Coventry Evening Telegraph 
, 
18 / 06 / 1992 
11 Interviews with Harry Theobalds, Former MA Director ofAdverfising Control and Yvonne Millwood, former 
Advertising Control Officer 
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The opposite inference can also be drawn in the case of a large number of letters or calls of 
complaint, several hundred for instance: that it is unrepresentative of the general mood of the 
public and may even be part of an orchestrated campaign by an influential and vocal minority with a 
particular ideological standpoint, often with media support 12 
. 
It is difficult for regulators to prove 
conclusively that certain complaints have not originated spontaneously with individual viewers but 
have been channelled through organised pressure groups. Nevertheless, pointers such as the "tone" 
of the letters or calls, the use of common phrases, a large number of complaints originating from a 
single area, and the mention of things contained in press coverage of the advertisements but not 
actually shown on screen, help to give staff a shrewd idea of how representative complaints are of the 
general viewer 13 
. 
Because complaints can be misleading in these ways the Authority and its advisors place greater 
reliance on the results of research. Qualitative and quantitative surveys are regularly commissioned 
by the Authority, the television companies and, more recently, by the Broadcasting Standards 
Council. The Authority also sounds out audience opinion by regular public meetings, but such 
meetings can be packed with supporters of special interest groups whose attitudes are not necessarily 
those of average viewers. 
At the end of 1972, although the AAC had recommended that the test be repeated, the regulator (by 
then the IBA) felt that, taken together, both their own research and the level of complaints howed 
that the time was not yet right to lift the prohibition on San-pro advertising. It was unwilling to 
offend the significant number of people, almost exclusively women, who found this category 
offensive in principle. The IBA told Ad Weekly that it had come to the conclusion that because of 
adverse public reaction "this kind of advertising is not yet right for the medium of television7 14. 
In 1978, the ITCA approached the MA to ask if approval could given for another test campaign to 
be conducted on ITV, since this category was now permitted, subject to certain guidelines, on 
12 Note: A director of David Williams and Ketchum, the agency who made the Lil-Lets commercial, complained in the 
November I Oth 1972 issue of Campaign magazine: "I suspect there are minority pressure groups at work here. If the I13A 
has had 50 letters we need to know a bit more about them. 
-The extent of the objection and relevance of these letters is 
13 
known only to the IBA". (Row grows over LOA ban on Lil-lets ads, Campaign, 10 / 11 / 1972) 
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now permitted, subject o certain guidelines, on Independent Local Radio". As there had been little 
negative reaction to tests carried out on radio in the previous two years, the Authority had decided in 
1978 to accept the category on ILR "subject to tight control on copy and suitable tinýing restrictions 
to avoid giving offence" 16 
The ITCA evidently hoped that attitudes towards San-pro on television had become less hostile since 
the last experiment. The Advisory Conunittee was again consulted and again adopted a liberal 
position broadly sympathetic to advertisers and to the concept of providing information to those 
women who might appreciate it, although an attempt to persuade it that advertising should be 
accepted merely on the grounds that a market existed for the product which was not being reached 
was unsuccessful. The Chairman reminded those present that "the underlying starting point for all 
AAC discussions was that the Authority accepted advertising without judging whether it was 
necessary or unnecessary. Safety and good taste were the criteria" 17 
. 
On this occasion, while one female Committee member felt that every woman knew about sanitary 
en eir Ifig e an th protection and that advertisements for such products would 05 d th inte enc ,o er 
believed that advertising would promote competition between makes and provide information about 
the differences between sanitary towels and tampons. On balance, the Committee was in favOur of 
extending consumer choice, which is not quite the same thing as assessing whether a Palfcular 
market needs to be reached from an advertiser's point of view. It recommended that the advertising 
of different brands of sanitary towels and tampons be accepted in two or three ITV regions for six 
rnonth test campaigns and that viewer reactions be assessed by research. The same copy 
requirements currently goveming ILR should be applied with the following additional paragraph. "all 
visual treatments should be tastefid and restrained. No advertisement may feature an unwrapped 
towel or tampon. Pack shots are acceptable". They also advised an initial post 9 p. rn, timing 
restrictioný8. 
13 Note : Following advice by the AAC, the IBA had authorised trials on radio in 1976-77. lbe ads were transmitted at 
times when women were likely to be alone and "controls ensured that no advertising could undermine an individuars 
Confidence in her own personal standards nor was any inference of sexual or social insecurity permitted. EBA Annual 
Report 1976-77, p 42). 6 IBA Annual Report and Accounts 1977 
-78, p. 48 17 The Advertising of Sanitary Towels and Tampons on Independent Television - AAC Paper 5 (78) 
"The Advertising of Sanitary Towels and Tampons on Independent Television - AAC Paper 5 (78) 
257 
Case Study. 7he Regulation of Female Sanitkay Protedion (Sam-pro) A dverdsing on TWevision. 
The IBA accepted the recommendations and test campaigns were scheduled to commence in 
February 1979 in seven ITV areas: an advertisement for panty shields would be shown in London 
and one for sanitary towels in the ATV, HTV, Scottisb, Westward, Tyne Tees and Yorkshire areas. 
If regulators and commercial decision-makers had hoped that any negative response to San-pro on 
television would be more muted this time round, they were to be disappointed. Although this time 
more viewers waited to see the commercials before expressing their disapproval", there was soon 
evidence of even greater opposition than before, partly because of the wider scope of the campaign. 
The test campaign was therefore halted in April 1979, after only three months, in order for all those 
involved to consider whether it was advisable to continue it given the scale of adverse reaction in 
some quarters. There had been 205 additional letters of complaint during the actual period of 
transmission. 97 of these were from the Yorkshire area, which appeared to the Advisory Committee 
to suggest an orchestrated campaign from that area, but the number of "genuine" complaints was 
also exceptionally higI? O. Once again, the complainants were almost entirely women, the majority of 
whom were either older women in the over 55 age bracket, or women watching with young children 
who resented having to face questions about menstruation when they were not yet ready to explain 
the facts. A number of teenage girls wrote to Yvonne Millwood to say that they were embarrassed to 
see the advertisements in the presence of their boyfriends. 
The Advertising Advisory Committee discussed the matter at its July 1979 meeting, concentrating 
on the problem of how to interpret the research presented to them by the IBA. The ITCA argued 
that opposition would decrease as people became acclimatised to the advertisements. The research 
results, however, did not make it possible to draw clear inferences from pre- and post-test data, as it 
was not possible to quantify the numbers of those who had and those who had not seen the 
advertisement, but who had been asked for their views before and after the advertisements were 
screened. The Committee could interpret the evidence either as a change of opinion, or as 
unconvincing either way. When a Committee member asked what degree of embarrassment in terms 
of a percentage of viewers had to be proved for a product to be considered offensive to public taste 
19 Note: Prior to the first showing the Yorkshire Post reported an IBA spokesman as saying: "we have had a handful of 
letters objecting to the principle, but I gather they are only a small amount. " (Yorkshire Post Reporter, Mdebutfor 
sanitary product commercial, Yorkshire Post, 14/ 02 / 79) 20 Advcr6sing of Sanitary Towels and Tampons 
- 
AAC Paper 5 (79) 
258 
Case Stu4,. 
- 
Ihe Reguladon of Fmale San&ary Protedion (Sam-pro) Adverdsing on Tekvision. 
and decency, the Chairman pointed out that the Committee never set numbers: they were influenced 
by attitudes. 
This discussion underlines how diflicult it is to gauge audience attitudes accurately, or to assess how 
significant overfly cxTressed dissatisfaction is in relation to the number of viewers 
- 
the vast majority 
- 
who do not express an opinion. Given that the experiment had run for only three months instead of 
the planned six, the AAC decided to recommend that a firther six month trial be conducted in 
conformity with current guidelines, and that "tightly structured research be conducted into pro- and 
post-test attitudes by the ITCA, the research organisation chosen liaising with the IBA Research 
Departments about techniques"21 
. 
The IBA accepted the recommendation and three new campaigns were prepared for transmission i  
January 1980. By April, the Authority had received 400 letters of complaint, mainly from women 
who objected to this class of advertising being screened at all rather than the content of any particular 
commercial. Two viewers expressed approval22. After the experiment had fnished a report was 
prepared for the AAC collating the results of the researck 30% of those questioned stiff found the 
advertising of sanitary protection not at all acceptable and 40% not very acceptable, and over 1,000 
letters of complaint had been received both by the Authority and 272 by the programme companies 
involved. This was a high figure as it equalled the average yearly total of complaints for a categories 
of advertisine. 
in spite of the fact that individual Committee members once more found the commercials "discreet" 
and were not personally offended, and even though San-pro advertising was now acceptable in 
Canada and the United States and radio advertising had attracted few complaints, the Committee still 
adopted a cautious line. It recommended in October 1980 that "as advertisements for sanitary 
protection appeared to offend a significant minority, the category should not be accepted on 
television 44 
. 
The 113A followed this advice and San-pro was once more relegated to the Est of 
banned classes of advertisingý 5. 
21 ibid. AAC Paper 5 (79) 
22 Advertising of Sanitary Towels and Tampons - AAC Papa 14 (80) 23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
25 MA throws in the sanitary towel, Broadcast 1/ 12 / 1980 
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By the beginning of 1983, however, advertisers were becorning increasingly frustrated with their 
continued inability to use the medium of television to promote their products. Further representations 
were made to the Authority to reconsider its decision. Manufacturers Johnson and Johnson claimed 
that their own more recent research justified another test campaign as it demonstrated a fall in 
resistance to San-pro advertising since the IBA surveys of 1980 
- 
8126. They were invited to put their 
case to the April meeting of the AAC, at which they proposed test showings in the aflemoon 
between the hours of 2.00 p. m. and 3.30 or 4.00 p. m., with a test duration of a year accompanied by 
a research prograrnme. The Committee was then obliged to sit through a reel of international TV 
films advertising sanitary protection. 
Members of the Committee were nevertheless unconvinced by Johnson and Johnsods research that 
attitudes had changed sufficiently to wan-ant another experiment so soon. Female members tated 
that their own private research revealed that a surprising depth of feeling against this kind of 
advertising still existed among women of all age groups. Male members were generally supportive of 
their colleagues! assessment. In fact, on the San-pro question at least, the regulators cannot be 
accused of bowing to industry pressure. The ITCA argued forcefully on behalf of advertisers that 
disqualification from using television considerably restricted their marketing strategy, particularly in 
view of the fact that the category was banned in no other countries apart from the Republic of 
Ireland and South Mica. It also warned that the 1BA might soon be forced to accept San-pro 
advertising otherwise large sums of money could be lost to Cable channels. The Committee remained 
unmoved, recommending that San-pro should not be considered for acceptance for another two 
years. But if advertisers wished to initiate new research projects in the interim they would be looked 
at 27 
. 
This effectively buried the matter until 1985. 
The problem did not go away, however, and in 1985 the manufacturing iant Procter and Gamble 
entered the fray with its own research figures, which it presented to the AAC at its April meeting. 
THs research showed that 60 per cent of women respondents claimed they would not be uneasy if 
they saw the French advertisement for the product, and, of the remaining 40%, 20% found it 
acceptable within strict time limitations and orgy 18% said they would never find it acceptable. 
Procter and Gamble suggested that an experiment on Channel 4 might be more acceptable, 
26 Advertising of Sanitary Protection 
. 
AAC Papa 4 (83) 
27 Advertising of Sanitary Protection 
- 
AAC Paper 5 (83) 
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particularly since the relevant legislation required the Authority to encourage innovation and 
experiment in programming on Channel 4 and there was no reason why this should not be extended 
to advertisinis. 
Although some members of the Committee f lt that 40% of respondents admitting unease was still 
significant, and that the manufacturees r earch did not reflect he reality of women viewing in mixed 
company with males or with children which caused the greatest embarrassment, thepoint about 
Channel 4 was accepted. 'Ms channel had a different audience profile; people tended to view more 
as individuals because programming was not geared to mainstream family audiences. Channel 4
audiences were also more "sophisticated", according to Yvonne Mllwood. In support of this view, 
the Committee was reminded by one member that the Home Secretary had emphasised atthe time of 
the 1980 Broadcasting Bill debates that advertising on Channel 4 and the Cable channels could be 
different from that shown on ITV. 
It was decided, therefore, to recommend that a two year experiment be conducted on Channel 4 and 
on Cable, with revision after one year or earlier if there was marked evidence of public offence. 
There would be no specific timing restrictions because, as Harry Theobalds later explained to 
Marketing Week, "Channel 4 tends to attract the sort of mature audiences that won't be shocked or 
embarrassed by this sort of commercial"29. But advertisements had to be slotted in and around 
suitable programmes, leaving this to the common sense of the ITV companies. More audience 
research also had to be carried OUt3O. 
The test campaign started in 1986, subject to the following set of guidelines: 
(i) The commercials cannot contain anything that could undermine a persons cc. -&dence in her 
personal hygiene 
(ii) Visa treatment should be tasteful and restrained. The advertisements may not feature 
unwrapped towels or tampons but packs are acceptable. 
(iii) Marketing techniques uch as pack offers or samples are acceptable. Personal endorsements will 
not be permissibO 1 
23 Advertising of Sanitary protection 
- 
AAc Papa 8 (85) 
29 L%4 gives backing to janpro ad, Marketing, 13/ 06 / 1985, p 10 30 Advertising of Sanitary Protection Products 
- 
AAC Paper 8 (85) 
31 NI 0e Ibis rule was rescinded later in the year. 
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(iv) There must be no suggestion of sex or intimation of social insecurity 
(V) Use of potezifiaUy offensive words such as odour, (or period, leakage, blood or bulky) are not 
ac. ceptable32 
In spite of strict adherence by advertisers to these very constricting set of rules the complaints once 
again flowed in- This time, however, the AAC took a more robust view. After carrying out the 
scheduled review in April 1987, despite more than 1000 complaints, the AAC agreed to recommend 
to the Authority that no firm case had been made out for the cessation of the experiment or for an 
immediate restriction on timing. It appeared from research that there was a distinct trend towards 
people accepting the advertisements after actually seeing them. Specific consideration should be 
given to timing if the general acceptability of San-pro advertising were to be recommended at the end 
of the trial in a year's time 33 
. 
The research on public attitudes to sanitary protection advertising which had influenced the Advisory 
Committee's decision was part of an ongoing programme commissioned by the IBA between 1984 
and 1988. This consisted of four surveys among representative quota samples of 1,000 - 1,200 adults 
contacted throughout mainland Great Britain (and Northern Ireland in 1988); qualitative research 
conducted by the Harris Research Centre in January 1984; surveys conducted in July 1984, 
December 1986, and March 1987 by the Harris Research Centre and in March 1988 by the 
Schlackman Group. In 1984 and 1988 questions about San-pro advertising were contained in 
surveys which dealt with the much broader issue of taste and dwmcy on television in general. In 
4 1986 and 1987 these questions were also canied on standard omnibus survey2 
. 
Three questions were asked: (i) should various products or services be advertisad on TV?; (ii) how 
comfortable or uncomfortable would people feel if various products or services were advertised on 
TV?, (iii) with whom would people feel most uncomfortable if they ever watched various products 
or services advertised on TV?. 
The main findings showed that since 1984 there had been a steady increase in the numbers of 
respondents, both male and female, willing to accept San-pro advertising on TV. In 1988,66% said 
32 M giveibacking to janpro ads Marketing. ] 3/06/1985, plO, A Curse on the tellyMs London, 18/04/ 1988, p. 10 33 The Advertising of Sanitary Protection Products 
- 
AAC Paper 8 (87) 
34 Advertising ofFepnale Sanizwy Protection, Research on Nblic Attitudes Commissioned by the IBA 
,p2 
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it should be allowed compared to 55% in 1984. Increased acceptance was particularly marked 
among female respondents; in 1984,51% approved but by 1988 flis figure had risen to 64%. On 
timing restrictions, 60% did not feel there needed to be any and 34% wanted a post 9.00 p. m. limit. 
There was also a growth in the percentage of respondents who said they would not be made 
uncomfortable if they saw sanitary protection products advertisements on TV from 67% in 1984 to 
78% in 1988. Respondents were most likely to feel uncomfortable seeing them in the presence of 
members of the opposite sex or with children under 16, with females more likely than males to be 
embarrassed in this situationý'. 
Table 12 1 
Should TVadveTtisemmis for SanPro he allowed? 
Should ShouldNot Don'tKnow 
July 1984 55% 38% 6Yo 
December 1986 62% 35% 4% 
March 1987 63% 32% 4% 
March 1988 66Yo 30% 4% 
Sour= Advertising offemale Sanitary Protection, Research on Public Attitudes Commissioned by the IBA 
Table 12.2 
How comfortable or uncomfortable wouldyoufind it if SanPrO 
was advadsed on TV? 
Very Fairly Neither Fairly Very 
Comfortable Comfortable Don'tKnow Uncomfortable Uncomfortable 
July 1984 16? 1o 24% 2 7? 1o 22% i wo 
December 1986 16? 1o 30106 22% 19% 12% 
March 1987 20% 28116 22% 19% 10% 
March 1988 19% 35% 24% 15% 6Vo 
Sourw. AdverWsing ofFe7nale Sanitary Protection, Research on Public Attitudes Commissioned by the EBA 
35 ibid. p. 4 
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Table 123 
Should TVadver&ententsfor SamPro be allowed ? 
Sex Differences 
Should ShouldNot Don'tKnow 
Males 
July 1984 61% 30% 9% 
December 1986 7010o 24% 6? 1o 
March 1987 70% 24% 6% 
March 1988 6810o 2 7? 1o 5% 
Femakes 
July 1984 51% 46? 1o 4% 
December 1986 54% 44% 2% 
March 1987 5 7Yo 40% 3% 
March 1988 64% 33% 
Source AdverWsing offemale Sanitary Protection, Research on Public Attitudes Commissioned by the EBA 
The statisfics for male respondents are also interesting. While very few men bothered to complain in 
writing or to telephone xpressing concern about san-pro advertising, and none of the male members 
of the Comnittee admitted to the slightest reservations about the category on their own or on other 
rnen! s behA a surprisingly large percentage of men surveyed, 3 0% in 1984, felt ,, ýat it should not be 
shown on television. But unlike for the female respondents, the figure for males remained virtually 
unchanged between 1984 and 1988, when it was 27%, a slight increase in disapproval over the 
previous year. The relafive intransigence of a significant minority of mens attitudes towards sanitary 
protection advertising on television is hard to account for. 
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Table 12 4 
Should WadvwisanentsjorSanPro beallowed? 
Age Differences 
Age 
16-24 2544 45-64 65+ 
July 19841 
December 1986 66916 78? 1S 50106 43% 
March 1987 76Y6 75% 55% 42% 
March 1988 77916 73% 63% 39Y6 
'Different age categories were used in 1984 rendering age-group compailsons difficult 
Percentage are ofthose saDdng SanPro adWrasing should be allowed. 
Source; Advertising offentale Sanitary Protection, Research on Public Attitudes Commissioned by the EBA 
Positive opinions measured according to age differences are fairly predictable, with the 16 
- 
24 age group being most in favour 
- 
77% in 1988 
- 
and the over 65s least 
- 
39% in the 
same year. 
Table 12 5 
ShouldlYaaýýisementsfor SanPro be aflowed ? 
Class Differences 
Class 
AB CI C2 DE 
July 1984 58016 59% 56% 51% 
December 1986 6016 62Yo 67Yo 58010 
March 1987 67? 16 67Yo 6 7? 16 55% 
March 1988 73% 72Yo 68% 5016 
Percentage are of those sa)Ing SanPro adverusing should be allowed 
Source. Advertising offemale Sanitary Protection, Research on Public Attitudes Commissioned by the MA 
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Measurement according to socio-economic class differences produced some startling figures. Classes 
AB and CI went from an acceptance level of 58% and 59% respectively in 1984, to 73% and 72% in 
1988, a very significant shift of opinion. Figures for class DE, on the other hand, remained almost 
unchanged at just over half accepting San-pro advertising on TV, with an increase of only 5% in 
respondents aying they approved in the four years during which the surveys were conducted. This 
statistical evidence shows up a much greater conservatism among working class people in their 
attitude to the subject. The MA! s 1988 research document, "The Publics Views About Advertising 
on Television", confirms these statistics, recording that "older people and those from the C2A)E 
social classes were especially likely to cite advertisements for sanitary protection, AIDS and 
contraceptives/condoms as classes of offence 06 
. 
Ile EBA! s very comprehensive r search was influential in persuading the Advertising AdvisorY 
Committee to recommend that the advertising of female sanitary protection should be a generally 
accepted category and permitted on ITV as well as on Channel 4, when the test period ended in April 
1988. Although both the level of complaints and the results of research consistently demonstrated the 
eNistence of a hard core of people who still found such advertising offensive in principle, regardless 
of how bland and innocuous individual commercials might be", this minority feeling had to be offset 
against an increasingly large percentage of viewers, particularly women, who found it acceptable. 
And if they found it acceptable, their rights as consumers to make an informed choice on the different 
products available needed to be taken into account. In an attempt to avoid causing offence to the 
persistent objectors the Committee advised the 113A that time restrictions should apply to ITV. 
Advertising could not be screened between 6 a. m. and 9 a. rrL, and 4 p. m. and 9 p. m. on weekdays 
when children were likely to be watching and could only be shown post 9 p. m. at weekends and on 
public holidays. Channel 4 would have no specific restzicdons but the companies would have to 
9 follow a policy of sensitive schedulinj 
. 
36 Mallory Wobcr and Barrie Gunter, The Public ýI iews about Advenising on Television, IBA Research Document, April 
1988, p 41 
"Note., The most recent (1994) Broadcasting Standards Council research into taste and decency on television even now, 
after six years of widespread TV advertising, records a persistently high level of distaste for San-pro as a category. It 
evidently still touches a nerve %%ith many %women. ( Intervim, -Aith Yvonne Millwood 38 Advertising of Female Sanitary Products 
- 
AAC Papa 12 (88) 
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There was, however, another major factor which affected the AAC's and the MA! s decision to allow 
general acceptance of San-pro advertising on television when they did: the arrival of AIDS. The 
seriousness of the ADDS threat, to public health had prompted the government o launch an 
unprecedently frank series of information campaigns on television in the mid- I 980s, which shattered 
the taboo (and the IBA guidelines ) on contraceptive advertising. As Yvonne Millwood, who was 
part of the decision-maldng process at the time, pointed out to me, it would not have made sense to 
adopt a puritanical approach to sanitary towels when television was being saturated with 
programming containing much more explicit material on the use of condoms and the mechanics of 
safe sex. If the surrounding programmes were using language and visuals which would have been 
impossible only a few years earlier, and "over which the MA had agonised",, discreet sanitary 
protection commercials began to look tame by comparisoný'. 
San-pro advertising still continued to attract criticism but the level fell steeply. Only 108 complaints 
were recorded between May 1988 and December 1991, bearing out the ITCA! s claim that viewers 
would in time become accustomed to seeing the products on televisioe. The regulator, by this time 
the ITC, felt able, therefore, to lift the limit of a maximum of ten advertisements per day in 1989, 
and to remove the rule prohibiting the showing of unwrapped products in 1990. In December 
1991, taldng advantage of an apparently more tolerant climate, Johnson and Johnson launched an 
unprecedentedly explicit commercial for its Vespre Silhouette sanitary towels on Channel 4 and 
ITY, featuring agony aunt and broadcaster Claire Rayner. 
Tle campaign broke new ground because it was the first actually to brave public disapproval and 
show an unwrapped product, and to demonstrate its use in a direct manner. NU. Rayner performed a 
(blue) "ink test" to prove the towel's absorbency and held it up in front of a studio audience of 
women to display its innovative shape "with wings", a clinical demonstration format based on nappy 
marketing. The campaign also pushed out boundaries by screening the commercial more frequently 
on Channel 4 across a much wider range of programmes, including early evening programmes 
popular with children. 
39 IntervieW uith Yvonne MilluDW 
, 
Advertising Control OMcer 
40 Janis GTinycr, TimeforSensifivity. Spectrum, Sunnner 1992, p. 8 41 Louella Miles, Protection Packet, Marketing Business, June 1993, p. 19 
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It was greeted uith a storm of protest. The ITC received over 500 complaints about sanitary 
protection advertising in the first four months of 1992 alone, most of it directed at Vespre. Tbs 
compared with 2,500 about all advertisements in the whole of 199142. Again, complainants were 
mostly women who were embarrassed athaving to discuss the matter with iheir children. "I want to 
explain periods to my children when I feel they are ready to know 
- 
and I don't need TV adverts to 
force it on me". ran a typical letter to the rrC43 
. 
Others complained atthe commercial popping up in 
the middle of Poirot or Little House on the Prairie, both programmes with family audiences; disliked 
the way the towels were "handled"; or found the ad's appearance during mealtimes distasteU". 
An article in the Independent which repeated the last three common complaints, described such 
attitudes as "peculiarly British". Comparing Britain with more enlightened countries on the continent, 
the writer claimed that "in European commercials, actresses can handle towels and tampons and talk 
about leakage and odoUr"45 
-A similar point was made by Christine Ebeling Long, Account Director 
at Saatchi and Saatchi, makers of the advertisement, when she remarked that "the same kind of 
product demonstration shown in other European Countries such as Italy, Greece and Gemlany has 
never caused any problem". Claire Rayner herself was reported to be "dumbfounded" by the 
reaction, and particularly saddened that it came from women rather than men, and that they felt it 
would hann their children. She believed that a lack of discussion would be much more han"7. 
Ile ITC stood firm and sided with the advertisement's supporters. It did not uphold the complaints, 
giving the reasons for its judgement in the January 1992 Complaints Report. The Commission found 
"nothing anti-social, immoral, hurtfW or, by most conventional standards indecent about the 
commercial". It believed that "the issue was not whether the piece of f3lM was reprehensible or 
irresponsible, which it manifestly was not, but the degree of consideratim or courtesy which 
broadcasters could reasonably be exTected to display to the section of the audience concerned". The 
television companies had a duty to satisfy both audiences and advertisers, and "a responsible policy 
must necessarily, therefore, be something of a compromise". 
42 Janis Grinyer op. cit pp 8-9 43 Clare Longrigg, Honest but Indecent2, Ile Times: Life and Times, I 1/ 03 / 1992, p. 4 44 Liz Hunt, Women obiect to Sanitary towel adverts, The Independent 14 / 03 / 1992, p. 6 45 ibid. p. 6 
46 Christine Ebeling Long puts the case for Vesprc's campaign, Honest, Miss, Spectnun Surnmer 1992, p. 10 47 The Independent op. cit p6 
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It is significant hat the word "offensive" was not used in the judgement. Although the commercial 
had definitely offended a large number of people, and the potential to offend had previously been a 
consideration in banning San-pro as a category, offensiveness had proved to be a fairly subjective 
criterion and one which was difficult to quantify. By adopting "harder" criteria such as "anti- 
socialness", "immorality" and "hurtfulness", i.e. qualifies which are much less easy to demonstrate as 
belonging to a television advertisement, and by placing the emphasis on "most conventional 
standards" of indecency, it was able this time to dismiss the claims of the outraged minority. 
Although the ITC did not pull the adverdsement off the air, it did admit the need to review timing 
restrictions for San-pro on Channel 4. As a result, from May I st 1992 Channel 4 could only screen 
this class of advertising from 9.00 p. m. onwards, a move backed by Saatchi and Saatchi and its 
client. Christine Ebeling Long said that Arith hindsight the agency understood why "the appearance 
of the commercial at inappropriate times has upset parents with young children", and it preferred to 
be constrained by timing than on what it could sayýs. 
The content of San-pro advertising was nonetheless on the agenda of the Advertising Advisory 
Committee when it debated the Vespre Silhouette issue. Both the ITC and the Committee felt that 
although the development of this class of advertising had been slow and careful, and had been 
consistently researched, something had clearly gone wrong and public opinion had been misjudged. 
The general feeling among viewers who found it distasteful was that this was not a product that 
should be sold like soap powder. The problem, however, lay in the content and presentation of the 
advertising, not in the product itself, except for the hard core of objectors which this time included 
Muslims from the Asian community. A letter to a member of the Committee from an Asian family 
described their fear of watching commercial television at all, particularly in the presence of the older 
generatiorý9. Timing was therefore not the main issue, though the restrictions did help prevent some 
potential difficulties. The main priority for regulators was to look again at ways of making the 
Content less controversial". 
48 Christine Ebeling Long puts the case for Vespre's campaign op. cit p. 10 
Note: When I interviewed Geoffrey Stephenson, he said that the opposition to the Claire Rayner advertisement voiced by Muslim groups had caused the ITC considerable concern. 
AAC Paper 6 (92) 
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While the ITV Association (formerly the ITCA and now the ITV Network Centre) warned of the 
dangers of ovcr-reactin& flis view was endorsed by the Insfitute of Practifioners in Adverdsing, 
whose representative on the AAC felt that detailed guidance was needed on what could appear on 
television. He claimed that, overall, he would rather see advertising in the sector operate under 
greater estraint for the good of the advertising industry. The Committee gave cautious upport to 
the status quo, agreeing with the ITC to continue monitoring the situation closely". In the end, it 
was the ITV Network Centre itself which "over-reacted" by withdrawing the advertisement in 
January 1993. Complaints had remained at a high level even after the removal of the advertisement to 
a post 9.00 p. m. slot, and extensive research by the Copy Clearance Committee revealed that people 
objected to the format of the advertisement. In particular, as the journal Marketing reported, "it was 
felt that the 'group discussion' staging of the ad was unsuitable for such an intimate subject 
matter, 02. 
12.3 Conclusion. 
The 20-year history of San-pro advertising regulation in Britain represents a microcosm of 
advertising regulation in general. It illustrates how the formal mechanisms by which the regulating 
authority decides and implements policy 
- 
the statutorily appointed (until 1993) Advisory Committee, 
the complaints procedures, the Authority's Research Department and the ITV companies' copy 
clearance system 
- 
operate in the real world. It also shows how attitudes both within the regulatory 
network and outside in society determine the decision-making process. Great importance is placed 
on analysing feedback from the viewing public in a variety of ways, and it is clear from their 
discussions that regulators bend over backwards not to allow their own often relatively liberal 
opinions to override what they believe to be the wishes of a significant proporilon of the television 
audience 53 
. 
The search for consensus and compromise and the desire to placate certain sections of 
society has sometimes led to a rather unadventurous approach. 
51 AAC Paper 6 (92) 
52 Mat Toor, t esprg adsfinally takm offthe air, Marketing, 17 r 12 / 1992, p. 4 53 Note. In the S=mner 1992 issue of Spectrum Geoffrey Stephcnsm described the general attitude of the AAC as "singularly 
ImpnAsIf', uhich is mtiy it r=ained -unmoved by the recent spate of complaints about a particular San-pro campaign. " (Professor Geoffrey Stephenson, SowdAdvice, Specumn, Summer 1992, p. 11). Evidently, by this time, the pmpor6on of the 
Public %%ho ad complained was no longer considered sigmficant 
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The crucial question that has to be answered was succinctly put by Winston Fletcher, Chairman of a 
major advertising agency and a past President of the IPA, in an article in the London Evening 
Standard: "should advertisements hat are generally acceptable but deeply offensive to minorities be 
banned? n54 As the series of experiments and debates show there is no easy one-word answer to this 
question for regulators. A great deal depends on who the minorities are and the perceived strength of 
their opposition to certain classes of advertising or particular instances of it, compared with the level 
of active support shown for these classes or instances, and with the general climate of opinion in 
society at the time. 
For instance, EBA research into taste and decency issues in television advertising noted that "there 
were marked Merences, in extent of perceived offence as caused by some 
... 
items as a function of the 
sex, age and class of respondents"". Peoples religious views were also sought as part of the research 
and a link found between the degree of religiousness of respondents and their distaste for certain 
classes of advertising which they felt invaded their sense of privacy, such as sanitary protection and 
birth control. Ile views of religious believers as an objecting minority, exposed by research and 
through the complaints procedures, have always been given considerable weight by the AAC and the 
regulating Authority. Religious opposition to San-pro advertising, especially from Catholics, but 
more recently from Muslim too, was an influential factor in preserving the ban on San-pro and in 
reviewing the guidelines after it had been accepted, but no emphasis was placed on the persistent 
distaste for this category in social class DE. The opinions of women across age and class boundaries 
have, of course, been of overriding importance in deciding San-pro regulation. 
The feelings of offended minorities have nevertheless to be balanced against other considerations in 
foming regulation policy. The early experiments in 1972 and 1979/80 had generated alot of hostility 
and relatively little support, but by the late 1980s, and the beginning of the 100s the climate had 
changed. Apart from the AIDS coverage on television, the advertising industry was lobbying much 
harder for a relaxation of the regulations on San-pro, with considerable backing from feminists and 
personalities uch as Claire Rayner, who claimed to speak for the majority of women. The pro-San- 
pro lobby even received support from a Commons motion, signed by 22 Labour NTs, many of them 
women, calling for the Vespre campaign to be re-instated. The motion rather unfairly blamed the 
m Evening Standard, 12 / 12 / 88, p. 7 
-55 NMory Wober and Barrie Gunter, 7he PubU6 I Yews aboutAdve? Wsing on Television IBA Research Docurnent, April 
1988, p. 41 
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ITC for the ban, condemning its "coy administration in banning this advertisement as contributing to 
an outdated and ignorant approach to menstruation, which forms a natural part of womens' lives! ý56. 
Criticism of regulation policy was also appearing in the national press from the opposite perspective 
to that of the objectors. An article in The Times, for ample, complained that the Authority's 
guidelines "read Eke a cross between the Official Secrets Act, the rules for charades, and a Victorian 
Lady's Advice to Her Daughter", and accused it of creating "a genre of commercials that is mostly 
patronising to women and puritanically archaic compared with standards abroad 07 
. 
The Women's 
Environmental Network objected in the Guardian that "the ads reinforce every single taboo about 
menstruation! '. Its spokeswoman said: "we want periods to come out of the closet because there 
serious concerns about the safL-ty of tampons and the pollution caused by non-biodegradable 
products"58. This highlights an informationid aspect of sanitary protection advertising which goes 
well beyond the right to more commercial information for women about the kinds of products 
available 
. 
The advertisements that had been shown on television had received a very positive response in 
commercial terms, even the notorious Vespre one. And while regulators do not base their decisions 
on the commercial success or otherwise of particular campaigns, the fact that large numbers of 
women had responded positively to the campaigns indicated that they appreciated the extra 
information provided about the product". The regulating Authority would be entitled to consider 
this fact under its general duty to facilitate the extension of consumer ights such as access to 
information and expansion of choice, even at the cost of offending a minority of people. In 
recognition of this aspect of its responsibility the MA admitted 1986 that "San-pro advertising is 
socially and commercially useful"". But banning an entire category of advertisimg, or having rules 
for the presentation of commercials that are so restrictive that little explicit information can be 
given, which was the case with the earlier San-pro adverts, conflictswith the access to information 
duty. Finding the right formula for informing and yet not offending was a continuing problem for 
both the regulating Authority and the AAC. 
Louella Wes, op. cit p. 18 
Richard Lander, A Sanifised View of ffomen on YeIeWsion, The Times 31/ 01 / 1988, p C9 
Judy Sadgrove, High and Dry, Guardian, 17/ 03/ 1992 
Honest but Indecent? The Times: Life and Times. I 1/ 0311992, p. 4. 6' Virginia Matthew, Gentle Approach to Lifting a Curse, Guardian, The Media Page, p. 13 
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The answer to Winston Fletcher's question, therefore, would probably be "no", if a sufficiently strong 
case can be made for the mýority view, particularly with respect to advertising for a whole category 
of products rather an individual commercial. With sanitary protection, a positive case for allowing it 
to be advertised on television was lacIdng at the beginning, but as a number of different factors came 
together over the years to provide a strong argument in favour, the claims of minority interests 
became relatively less powerful. 
This is not to say that in sensitive areas, where strong social taboos are still in place, it may not be 
advisable on occasion for the regulator to order withdrawal of an individual advertisement solely on 
taste and decency grounds, if it can be demonstrated that a minority of viewers are for some good 
reason deeply offended by it. Ile fact that, in an unexpected reversal of roles, in the Vespre case 
such action was not taken by the regulator but by the commercial sector itself, may be of some 
comfort to those who fear that self-policing in the new era of light regulation and tough competition 
means a policy of anything goes. 
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Chapter 13 
EC Regulation of Television Advertising; 
Consumer Protection vs. Freedom of Commercial Speech, 
13.1 Introduction. 
Although the role of consumer bodies in the drawing up and implementing of television advertising 
control in Britain has already been described, the development of EC regulation in this area, which 
was to a significant extent consumer inspired, has not been dealt with in detail. The primary aim of 
advertising regulation is, of course, to protect the consumer but consumer claim have to be weighed 
against he interests of the advertising industry. The two sets of interests should not, in any case, be 
fundamentally different. Advertisers are always quick to point out that both they and the buying 
Public are moving in the same direction. Most consumers also recognise that in providing 
information, advertising is on the whole a good thing, and that it cannot do its job properly if it is 
burdened, with so many restrictions that the message does not come across. But they are also aware 
that in having access to a uniquely powerfid medium to carry their messages, television advertisers 
may be tempted to make the relationship exploitative rather than mutually beneficial. 
Regulation policy-makers have always struggled to find and maintain the ideal balance between 
making sure that consumers are treated fairly and with respect, and leaving advertisers with the 
legitimate freedom to communicate effectively with their markets. The ongoing endeavour to 
reconcile these two potentially conflicting aim has raised a number of interesting questions. In 
Britain, with its tradition of developing regulation policy incrementally over a long period of time, 
regulators addressed these issues step by step, in a spirit of co-operation with the advertising industry 
and consumer groups. During the 1970s and 80s, however, in the highly politicised context of 
European Community and Council of Europe law-making, andwith very little in the way of existing 
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Community wide-consumer protection policy, the two sides became much more polarised'. Since EC 
legislation affects television advertising control in this country, though much less than originally 
anticipated, this chapter ommines the issues arising from the consumers vs. advertisers debate by 
tracing the development of legislation from the 1970s to the present day and looldng at its impact on 
the UK. 
The debate centres on the potential clash between the fundamental political principle of freedom of 
speech and the social objective of consumer protection, both of WHch have been important 
considerations in framing European legislation. While the international advertising industry claimed 
that EC regulation of television advertising posed a threat to the all-important right for an advertiser 
to communicate with his market, the consumer movement argued that advertisers were abusing this 
right and needed to be restrained. Laws are not drawn up overnight, and the present rules on 
television advertising have been in the making for two decades. The process of their development 
reveals the positions taken by the two sides, and their relative effectiveness in getting their aims 
translated into action by the European Conunission. 
13.2 Baffle Commences: The Rise of the Consumer Movement in the 1970s. 
The early discussion documents is ued by the Commission, and the first efforts at general legislation 
to control advertising make very little explicit mention of television, as opposed to general, 
advertising but concern about the power of the broadcast media, especially television, was one of the 
driving forces behind the consumer movement's campaign to increase the scope of advertising 
regulation. As two prominent members of the advertising world have noted, 'the introduction of 
television made people more conscious of advertising than they have ever been before. Consumer 
organisations exerted pressure on governments to introduce or sharpen existing legislation to control 
advertising in all its forms, particularly asit appeared ontelevision 4. 
Note: Armand I&Vzlart and Miclacl pahw state tha Oduring the 1980s, the European Community and the Council of Europe 
became tjje mam battlegrounds as the vanous partes concerned by the firture of advertising in Eumpejostled for position. 
-Both the (EC ) Mmfive and the ( coE ) Convention have became exercises in the politics of confiontation and lobbying. " (Annand 
Mattelart and Michael Pab= AdvvzWng m Europe prunuses pm&wrej andphfalls, Media CWture and Society, Vol. 13 (1991) 
2 
p. 543) 
Rein Rikens and Cvmxlon Miracle, Eurvpean Regulation qfAdvertwng Arnstemlain, Elsmer Science, 1986, p. 92 
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The first serious confrontation began in the early and middle 1970s. Increased economic prosperity 
within the European Community had by this time resulted in a big rise in consumer spending power 
and a growing awareness that consumer interests were not being adequately addressed within the 
EEC legislative framework. There was, however, no specific reference to the need for a consumer 
protection policy in the Treaty ofRome which could provide a definitive legal basis for a Community 
sponsored consumer program. In fact, until the Maasticht Treaty (Article 129A) there has been no 
proper legal basis for promoting consumer interests3 
. 
However, in the opinion of Emile Noel, 
Secretary General of the European Commission in 1972, the Treaty sketches out "the policy lines to 
be pursued in the main areas of economic activity, leaving it to the Communities institutions 
.... 
to 
work out the actual arrangements to be applied". This interpretation enabled the Community to 
become involved in the field of consumer affairs and, by extension, with the controversial area of 
advertising control. 
In 1973, the Corninission produced a preliminary Consumer Protection Program which was formally 
adopted by the Council of Hnisters in 1975. The Program was founded on five basic rights already 
set out in the Council of Europe Consumer Protection Charter (i) the right to protection of health 
and safbty, (ii) the light to protection of economic interests; (iii) the right of redress; (iv) the right to 
information and education; (v) the right of representation (i. e. the tight to be heard). The 
Corrunission also set up the Consumer Consultative Committee to replace a previous ineffective 
body. 
The Consumer Program dealt with a wide spectrum of issues of which advertising was only one, but 
one which has always been especially contentious and difficult for regulators. The problem was 
addressed more specifically in 1975 with the publication of the Draft Direcfive on Mislea&ng wid 
Unfair Adveifising. It is a measure of the difficulties in getting this pioneering piece of regulation 
approved by aU twelve (by that time) Member States that it took them until 1984 to reach agreement, 
with a further two years allowed for the introduction of legislation implementing it in their respective 
countries. 
3 Monique Goycns, Jfhem Themý a 11711, Yljemý a Way! A Pnwtffionerý Rew Journal of Consumer Policy, VoL 16, No 34,1993, 
pp. 377 
- 
378 
Emil Nod (1981) Working Togedw, Luxembourg Official Publications of European Conununities, 1982, p. 15 
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The UK took until 1988 to give effect to the 1984 Directiw by issuing the Control of Misleaft 
Advettsements Regulations. This gives added statutory backing to the part statutory, part self- 
regulatory framework for regulation of commercial television in the UK, now administered by the 
Independent Television Commission. This delay had to do not only with the controversial content of 
the document but with the complicated organisational structures of the EC. The decision-making 
processes are extremely slow and one commentator has described the business of getting 
amendments agreed as "horrendously convoluted"s. For example, at least four different Directorates 
General have been involved in advertising policy 
- 
DGs I[L M, XH and XV. The advertising industry 
has recently requested that the Commission come up with a more co-ordinated and coherent 
approach to advertising, amove that consumer groups are in sympathy with. 6 
The Memorandum put out by the Comrnission to accompany the first draft of the Direcfive 
recognised the important part played by advertising in "the development of the modem industrial 
economy in its role as intermediary between producers and consumers. By directing consurners' 
attention to the relative merits of the various products the market has to offer it has promoted 
efficiency of distribution and consumer choice"7 
. 
It followed this positive view of advertising with the 
qualification that, nevertheless, "there is a ternpta: tion for a producer of goods to base his advertising 
less on the inherent qualities, price, usefulness or differences of his product but on false or misleading 
information. " The Memorandum goes on to explain that this not only prevents the consumer from 
making the right choices but distorts competition by giving the producer who misleads an unfair 
advantage over his competitor. It concludes that " the essential needs of society are not well served 
by such distortions of the truth of competition and it is therefore essential to regulate such abuses"9. 
The Draft Directive itself backed up these strong statements with a comprehensive series of 
proposals to "protect consumers, persons carrying out a trade, business or profession, and the 
5 JIM Gibbons, 77jeEC Way Out, Spectrinn, Auturnn 1994, p. 20 
6 Consuam in the European Comminuty CiroW, "Advatising and CalSIMM", CECG document, 1993, and Stephen CrmVm (CECG 
SccretarY) interview, 21/ 04/ 19% 
7 Memorandum on approximation of the lam dMembers States on fair Competition :A fiskading and Wair advalWng, 
Diedmutc-Gý for Intanal Market of the Corinnission of the FAropean Communifics, Working No. 2 MC / 93 / 75 - F, 
BriMscls'November, 1975 (inbDductim) 
1 ibicL (introducdon) 
9, 'bi(L (intDductim) 
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interests of the public in general against unfair and misleading advertising. " (A? Wcle 1). Advertising is 
defined fkWy widelylo and misleading advertising is defined as that which is "entirely or partially 
false 
.... 
(Which) misleads or is likely to mislead persons addressed or reached thereby"; (. 4? WcIe 2) 
unfair advertising refers extremely broadly to "any advertising which casts discredit on another 
person by improper reference to his nationality, origin, private life or good name", or injures his 
commercial reputation by defamatory comments, or appeals to sentiments of fear, or promotes social 
or religious discrimination, or inflinges the cultural equality of the sexes, or exploits the trust, 
credulity or lack of experience of a consumer. (Arficle 2) It proposed that Member States should 
"adopt adequate and effective laws against misleading and unfair advertising. " (Arficle 5) 
The very comprehensive set of proposals contained in the preliminary version of the Direcfive 
provoked an outcry in the advertising world. The Internaflonal Union of Advertising Associations 
(rUAA) and the European Association of Advertising Agencies (EAAA) compiled a Memorandum 
of their own in response. In it, they ciiticised the impression given by the Commission that abuses in 
the advertising media were widespread, and indignantly denied that distortions of the truth were 
having important repercussions on the competitive character of the market. On the contrary, they 
argued, "a major interference with the capacity of the producer to communicate with the consumer 
about his products could be very damaging to a free enterprise conomy 
... 
By framing the proposed 
law to deal with occasional abuses of the freedom of communications, the precise terms of the 
Direcfive are such as would make it difficult for the advertiser to communicate with his market"' I- 
The position of the advertising industry here is based on the concept of freedom of communication 
and it clearly felt that the EC proposals represented a significant threat to its right to exercise this 
freedom. Although it is not mentioned in the joint Memorandum, later publications by the 
advertising lobby explicitly refer to the guarantee of freedom of expression set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and to similar formulations contained in subsequent European 
Conventions and Directives. In this document, however, the industry concentrated on attempting to 
water down the provisions of the Drayl Directive, arguing against detailed harmonising legislation, 
10 Note: The fall definition given inArticle 2 is "Advertising means the making ofanypronouncement in the course ofa 
trade, business orprofessionfor the purpose ofpromoting the supply ofgoody or services ff 1 Memorandum on approx=tion of the laws of Members States on fair c=petition : Afisleading ivid Unfair advertising, 
op. cit. (introd=tion) 
278 
EC Reguladon of Tekvision Adverdsing Consumer Protection vs. Free&m of Commacid Sý, eý 
since the occasions when identical advertising campaigns would cover all countries were few, 12 
against corrective advertising and the ban on comparative advertising; and in favour of minimum 
rules, greater reliance on self-regulation and leaving legal measures of enforcement to individual 
Member States. 
13.3 The Debate Continues. 
Advertisers and agencies had perhaps over-reacted to Draff Directive, which was very far from being 
established policy, let alone law. It was intended as a discussion document the contents of which 
were up for negotiatiorL Negotiations in fact went on for the next nine years, during which the 
advertising industry mobilised its forces to lobby both the EC and the governments of Member 
States for changes to the proposed legislatiorL It considered this unwelcome instrument of the 
Consumer Protection Program to be "heavily biased against business and advertising, especially 
regarding the exaggerated and unsubstantiated assertions about the negative influence of advertising 
on consumers "13 
. 
Adverfisers and agencies acted to seize back the initiative taken by organised 
of consumerism" in the early part of the decade, when consumer pressure groups encouraged the 
Commission down the regulatory path. 
The advertising industry's position during this period is surnmed up by Rein Rijkens, former president 
of the European Association of Advertising Agencies and Gordon Miracle, Professor of Advertising 
at Michigan State University, in their definitive book, Europe= Reguladon ofAdýejWsing. In it they 
take a somewhat cynical view of people they refer to as "consumerists". Rijkens and Miracle 
maintain that most consumers are complacent about advertising and do not choosc to be represented 
by activists, with whom they often disagree, and whom they feel to be politically inspired or too 
extreme. " For their part, the authors themselves accuse consumer advocates of political or selfish 
motivation, and of receiving so little bacldng from those they seek to protect that they cannot claim 
any mandate to represent them. 
12N 1. 0 e. Ibc Commission was ahead of its timcAith Us notion - the issue of hmmonisation vmuld only become pressing %%bcn 
global advartift alonguith Satellite aW Cable tcchnology, became a fad of life in the 1990s. 13 Rein Rjjj(MS and Gordon U=lc op. cit p xxii 14 ibicl p. xx 
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Similar views were expressed by Daniel Oliver, Chairman of America! s Federal Trade Commission. 
In a lecture to the Advertising Association given in London in 1987, he claimed that "the great 
danger in government regulation of any market (be it for ideas or goods) is that power invites abuse. 
This is nowhere more evident than in the politics of consumer protection. The temptation to abuse 
power is often abetted by the efforts of consumer advocacy groups that refuse to believe ( or acctpt 
that consumers' values and tastes may Mer from their own"15. Ile accusation of abuse of power 
habitually levelled at the advertising industry by the organised consumer movement is here thrown 
back at them. 
But according to Rijkens and Nkacle, such organisations often have only modest finaricial and 
human resources and are not well equipped to "deal with well informed and experienced operators in 
the field of consumer advertising. They often seem to shy away from direct confrontation with 
opponents who have greater knowledge and resources to enter into dialogue and to debate the 
issue"16. Ths assertion was put forward as an explanation of the lack of communication and 
discussion between the advertising world and the consumer movement in the period following the 
establishment of the Coymmer Prowfion Program and the Dra#It Direcfive. 
There are a number of inconsistencies in this position, at least as it is represented by Rijkens and 
Miracle. With all their references to freedom of communicaflon, the "free flow of accurate 
information in the marketplace" and so forth, the advertising industry seems to have forgotten that 
consumers also have the right to freedom of speech. Perhaps what really upset advertisers and 
agencies, however, was that consumers were actively exercising their "right to be heard" enshrined in 
the Consumer Program. For large, powerfid and wealthy industrial pressure groups in a modern 
democracy do not usually worry when opponents weaker and less well organised than themselves 
express their views; what they do find olýecfionable is that others in power should listen. And that is 
what happened in the European Community, in the early 197Us, when consumers were able to get 
the ear of the politicians and bureaucrats of the Commissiom 
is Dalliel Oliver, g7io ShoujdRegujaeAdvvMij7g gznd; i; ly? The Adverfising Associatim Presideds LactuM 1987, Internatimal 
Journal ofAdvcrtisin& 1988,7,1 
-9 16 Rein Rijkew and Gadon Miracle, op. cit p. 92 
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Consumer groups would be only too willing to agree with Rijkens and Miracle's rather disparaging 
analysis of their abilities. The European Consumer Law Group complained in 1983 that the 
bargaining power of consumer organisations is not usually strong enough to conduct negotiations 
successfily when confronted with highly specialised sectors of trade and industry. They lack money, 
manpower, resources and research facilities. This situation is exacerbated by "the small degree of 
organisation of the individual consumer who Ekes to be protected but does not like to be an active 
member of a consumer organisation"17 
. 
This is the consumer movement's problem seen from the 
inside. The situation it describes has been confirmed both by the scholarly literature on regulation of 
business in general" and by the experience of individual consumer epresentatives who have been 
involved in negotiations over regulation with the advertising industry19. 
Again, the advertising industry appears to be inconsistent in its approach to this problem. On the one 
hand, it protests that its freedom of expression was being seriously threatened by consumer pressure 
groupswith a disproportionate amount of influence, and on the other, it complains that these groups 
were too timid and ill equipped to stand up to it after it launched its counter-offensive against the 
draft proposals. When Rijkens and Mmcle declare in their book that the advertising world would be 
only too happy to dealwith sophisticated, informed and educated consumers (as opposed to naive 
and pofitically motivated activists) they seem to be implying that such people, when presented with 
the advertisers point of view, would immediately abandon any remaining pr6udices, publicly embrace 
the blessings of advertising and leave the industry in peace. Free speech is often only a valued light 
for others if they are intelligent enough to agree with you. 
The criticism that those who campaign against the established order are interested in personal power 
rather than obtaining a better deal for the disempowered is a common one. Rijkens and Miracle may 
be partly right in their analysis of the consumer movements of some EEC countries in the more 
radical 1970s, but recent opinion polls conducted by the Commission show that an astonishing 89% 
17 ECLG, (I 983al Non-LegiskfiveMeanj qfCammerPrOtwfi0n. JMmaI of Consumer Policy, p 217 
18 Robert Britt Homitz, Yhe Iruny ofReguLaton Robrw Ihe Deregulation ofAmencan TdeCmvnun'catjon, New York, Ch. dbrd 
University Press, 1989, p. 37 19 Arole.. 'Me Consumer Council represeiitafive on the Advertising Advisory Committee told me that %Ntien. she first joined the AAC 
she found herself treated to some extent as an outsider And although she herself became accepted in time, and as a professional 
consumer expert %%us able to stand up to the kxhLstry and commercial television representatives, she felt that the ladies chosen 
intentionally to repmcnt consumers an a lk, basis simply did not have the experience and comniunicational. skills to put the 
consurner case cirectively 71cir vlc%%s toxW to be easily overridden. 
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of consumers believe that the standard of consumer protection should be the same in all Member 
States,, i. e. harmoniý up to the levels of the most developed countries 
- 
the Netherlands, Denmark, 
the UK and Germany. 2' This is surely evidence that consumer leaders in the 70s were simply doing 
what was necessary to raise the profile of consumer issues and get the EC to take positive steps to 
address some very genuine concerns among the buying public. Perhaps it was the advertising 
industry and rather than consumers who were guilty of complacency, which is why the Draft 
Directive on Misleading x2d UnfairAdverlising came as such a shock. 
The relative weakness of consumers in the 1970s, with which the European Commission 
sympathised, was summarised by Sidney Freedman, Head of Division, EC Promotion of Economic 
and Legal Interests, at a conference on AdWri&ng Control Under UK tind EC Law wid Practice 
organised by the City University Business School in September 1978. He stated that "taking these 
factors into account: (i) the control over the supply of goods and services to the consumer exercised 
by large enterprises; (ii) the range and complexity of those goods and services; (iii) mass production 
and the methods of commercialisation to vAich it has given rise, it is clear that the individual 
consumer has very little power. He or she is often no more than a unit in a mass market. The balance 
is tipped against the consumer and there is a need to readjust the balance. That need has been 
recognised by the European Community". 
Freedman went on to explain, for the benefit of "those.... who have been wondering why the 
Commission has made a proposal on misleading advertising", that "we were invited to do so by the 
governments of the Nine in order to satisfy a recognised need"21. He added that the Consumer 
Protection Program had been debated in the House of Commons and had the bacIcing of the British 
Governrnent. 
20 Lothar U[aierLnsttutjbnalCbnsmerj? epnimtationmtheEuropeanCownwziýyJoumaI of Cammer policy, Vol. 16, No. 34 1993, 
21 
p. 358 
Sidney Freedman, Yhe EEC Cawni&sion Is Dmft Prqposd for a Directive on Misleading Advertising in Advertising Control 
under the UX and theEuropean Community Law andPractice The City University Businew School, 28th- 29 September 
IM, p. 48 
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The impression given by advertising spokesmen that the Draft Directive was the result of a handful 
of consumer activists conspiring with out of touch EC bureaucrats i  therefore not entirely accurate. 
Ilere, was widespread support at all polifical levels for some sort of initiative on behalf of consumers. 
13.4 The Advertisers' Success and the Formation of EAT 
Advertisers and agencies remained hostile, however. Their two main trade associations in Europe 
and world-vide, the European Association of Advertising Agencies (EAAA) and the international 
Union of Advertisers Associations (IUAA), later renamed the World Federation of Advertisers 
. 
ft Directive. r, of course, the (WFA), formed a coalition to press for a dilution of the Dra In eality 
industry possessed considerable clout and was ultimately successful in persuading legislators to 
. 
ft Directive was fo remove some of the more contentious restrictions22. When the Dra rmally adopted 
as a Proposalfor a Council Directive on Mislea&ng mid Unfair AdWitsing in 1978, comparative 
advertising was to be allowed in principle and a much greater ole assigned to self-regulation. But the 
inclusion of "unfair" advertising and the controversial Article 5 requiring Member States to adopt 
"adequate and effective laws" against it and against misleading advertising still remained. 
The Proposal was accompanied this time by an Explanatory Memorandum whose introduction was 
far more favourable towards advertising than the previous one had been. Rijkens and Mimcle relate 
approvingly that the opening paragraphs were in fact written by John Hobson, a leading member Of 
the LTK advertising world and a participant in an EAAA delegation to the EC in 1977.23 However, 
problems with the concepts of "comparative" and "unfair" in relation to advertising, which Member 
States still could not agree on, caused fiuther delays, and the requirement for Member States to pass 
laws on advertising control rather relying on existing self-regulatory procedures did not meet with 
universal agreement. By 1982, both consumer organisations and the advertising trade associations 
were becoming impatient. EAT and BEUC (Bureazi Europeetz des Uniotis de Consommateurs) 
overcame their differences sufficiently to write jointly to the Council of Ministers urging a speedy 
decisiorL They confirmed their agreement on the basic principles of the Draft Directive and 
acknowledged that "their application is necessary both to protect consumers! purchasing power 
22 Note: UeEur(T=AdvatsingTripmtte(EAT), %zs formed as a pressure grow in 1990 in order to build m this sumess. 
23 Rein Rijlcns and Gordon MirwIt, op. cit p118 
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,h 
against misleading or unfair claims and to avoid distorting of competition. The advent of satellite and 
increasing transnational dvertising will make the directive particularly relevant as a basis for agreeing 
on practices in Member States"24 
The Directive on Mislea&ng AdWrIWng was finally adopted in September 1984 but concerted 
lobbying by the advertising industry, both of the EC and the individual governments of Member 
States, had effectively neutraEsed ft. Even Rijkens and Miracle are forced to admit that "virtuaUy all 
controversial elements have been deleted or made optional, leaving a somewhat truncated version of 
the previous document"25. Article 5 now merely called for adequate and effective "means" to be 
adopted, not laws. The concept of "unfair" advertising had been dropped altogether. 
13.5 The Position of the UK on the Draft Directive. 
The UK government had persistently argued for a form of wording that preserved the self-regulatory 
system and did not undermine it26. In 1978, Sidney Freedman had emphasised to British 
broadcasters, regulators and advertising industry representatives that "the draft directive recognises 
the value of self-regulation and contemplates its continued existence "27. He explained that the 
Commission did not believe that there was "an inherent contradiction between statutes and codes", 
pointing to the fact that in the region of 60 statutes governing advertising were already in existence 
without diminishing the role of self-regulationý'. But those responsible for implementing any future 
Directive were not convinced that extending legal rights to consumers was either necessary or 
desirable. 
It was argued, first of A that courts in England and Wales, from magistrates courts to the higher 
civil courts of the 1-figh Courts of Justice, were already empowered to hear actions alleging 
misrepresentation or to enforce any of the other statutory rules and regulations made in the interests 
24 BEUCEAT (1982/19831 joint lWafrcmtheEBUC and the EAT of June 30,1982 and February 15,1983, to the President of the 
25 
Council of Ministers of the EEC, on the proposed Direefive an Misleading and UnfairAdvatsing 
15 
Rein Milms and Gordon Miracle, op. cit p. 121 
Philip Ci i cu s, Indwmy SeJf-Repkfio n, Intern atia a al Jour ad of Adver tis ir i g, 19 8 8,7, pp. 3 11-3 12 27 Note: AiWcle 7 of the DmaftDjrwfiw dates, -Where a Member State pennits the operation ofcmtrols by self- regulation bodies 
for the purpose of counter-wmg misleading orunfair advertising, orrecogruses such controls, p=ms or associations having a 
right to take legal proceedings underArricle 5 shall have both that right and the right to refer the matter to such self-regulatory bodies". (Sidney Freedman op. cit p. 56) 28 Sidney Freedman ibid pp. 55 
- 
56 
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of the general public. While there was no overall legal concept of "unfair competition" (and hence of 
"unfair advertising") in the UY., there were " private rights and remedies for the purpose of protecting 
personal and business reputation and goodwiff"29 which covered many of the aspects that came 
within the definition of "unfair" advertising iven in the Dra 
. 
ft Directive. These included actions for 
personal libel, slander of tide, slander of goods and passing oflý wlich were felt to give sufficient 
opportunities for redress if self-regulation proved inadequate in any particular case. 
Ile Director-General of Fair Trading at the time, Gordon BorTie, expressed strong doubts "as to the 
criteria provided for determining whether an advertisement is "unfair", and doubts as to whether a 
directive seeldrig to prescribe uniform procedures for the EEC as a whole is either legal under the 
Treaty of Rome or sensible". 11is greatest doubt was "whether it is necessary or practicable to extend 
the law into the many areas of advertising control which at present in the UK are the sole preserve of 
the self-regulatory system. Not only would such an extension face the courts with considerable 
difficulties of interpretation but it might face the self-regulatory system with extinction, for what 
30 would be the point of finaricing it in a situation where it would simply duplicate the law" 
Advertising Standards Authority Chaffinan, Lord 17hornson of Monifieth, also expressed concern on 
behalf of those directly responsible for self-regulation in the UK including the "hybrid" commercial 
television Authority, the MA. He believed that the impact of a community-wide system of legal 
enforcement, based on the German national system with its reliance on litigation, existing in Parallel 
to the UKs domestic self-regulatory system, would result in the destruction of the latter. "A system 
of redress which is swift, flexible and free to the consumer" would be replaced by "a slow, rigid and 
no doubt expensive legal process"". He hoped that the Dra)? Direcfive could be amended to avoid 
the basic mistake of applying the German national system to the Community as a whole 
-a mistake 
as senseless as trying to apply the pragmatic British system to other countries whose history of 
regulation was quite different. 
29 Peter Fcrd. lbe Courts and Advertising Control, op. cit. p. 3 30 Gordon Bcnic: The Work- of the Clorice ofFair Trading in Adixrfising COntml. in Advertising Cmftl wider the IX and 
European CommunityLawandpý-aace, City University, Business scbool, p. 21. Ibcsc doubts%%= 9wedbythe gover=cnt 
and mtc: ulatod in the House of Jords Select Committee Report on the implications of the proposed legislation. (Select Committee 
on European Communifiej. A&Iaz&g advatWng. Dmft Direc&e concaning unfair and misleading advaMing, Wth nunutes 
31 
of Mdence (Session 1977-78: HL 230) London: MM, 1978. ) 
L. ord Tbomson of Monifi eth, PC : Yhe Uni ted Kingdom Volwwry Convvl System in Advertising C4ntrd wider the EX and 
EuroPean CommunityLaw andPýacdce, City University, Business Scbool, pp. 29 
- 
35 
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The views of British broadcasters, regulators and advertisers on the Draft Directive's proposals are 
understandable given the country's strong tradition of effective self-regulation, built up over many 
years, which appeared to be under threat. The commercial television Authority, in particular, already 
had powerfid statutory backing for its rules goveming broadcast advertising. The Consumers 
Association, however, had a slightly different perspective on the matter at that time. In its written 
evidence to the Scrutiny Committee of the House of Lords in preparation for the Cominittee's 
Report on misleading advertising, the Association said: "we favour the use of codes of practice but 
think, in many trades, to be effective, these need in the background general legislation if they are to 
bite. We think this true of adVertiSing"32. CA evidently did not think that some minimum legal 
guarantee of consumers' rights would bring down the whole edifice of self-regulation. It would 
simply give it more teeth. 
13.6 Regulation of Transfrontier Television: The Appeal to the international 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 10. 
The fact that the advertising pressure groups had been so successful over this Period in exercising 
their rights of communication, in terms of practical results, hardly supports their view of the 
consumer movement, even with EC bacIdng, as a powerful force for censorship of the business 
voice. In reality, it turned out to be somewhat of a paper tiger. The main body representing consumer 
interests in the European Community, the Consumer Consultative Council, consisted of 25 delegates 
- 
four from each of the four European consumer organisations plus various independent experts in 
consumer affairs. National consumer organisations were only represented indirectly. Its status as a 
Committee meant a relatively low ranldng in the EC hierarchy, one of two hundred such committees 
representing more than five hundred special interest groUPS33. Critics of the Consultative Council's 
effectiveness have based their judgements not only on the low status of the Committee, but also on 
the fact that it was not active enough in defending its members! interests, and its opinions were not 
published by the CommisSion34. So, in Contrast to the advertising industry, who was invited to 
32 Sinchicy Freedman I'lie ECC Commission's Draft Proposal for a Directive on Misleading Advertising op. cit p. 57 
33 Lothar Maier, lwfitufiond Cvnswner RepromWfion in the Europeim Cmvnwdty, Jomnal of Consumer policy, Vol. 16, No 3-4 1993, 
34 
p. 363 
L KxAmcr, E110-Perbrauchmwht, Ba&n-Badcn: Nomos, 1985, p. 50 
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publish its own opinion of itself in the official explanatory document accompanying the Draft 
Directive on Mislea&ng and Unfair Advenising, the opinions of the Consumer Committee were not 
pubficly heard at A 
Nevertheless, the advertising lobby seized on the concept of freedom of speech as a negotiating 
weapon in the next round of battles over the ECs proposals for the regulation of transfrontier 
television, particularly its attempts to offer consumer protection in the field of advertising. As 
Mattelart and Palmer have pointed out, in debate the EAAA makes copious use of texts, 
conventions, declarations etc. upholding the freedom of commercial speech 
- 
in other words 
advertising. Free enterprise, free speech and free choice are constantly being invoked to justify its 
pursuit of new target audiences, new customers, new social uses of the media and new 
communication technologie2'. The source most often cited in support of freedom of speech 
arguments throughout he 1980s is Article 10 (1) of the European Cotmention oil Humwl Rights. 
The Convention was drawn up in 1951 as a defence against fascism and the potential threat to civil 
rights posed by communist Eastern Europe. It is not EC law but an international agreement applying 
to many countries in Europe, most of whom have incorporated it into their provisions for basic rights 
at national leVel. 36 The UK ratified it in 1951 but did not accept its enforcement machinerY until 
1966. AiWcle 10 (1) states: 
"Ever 
. 
ýwze has the fight tofreedom of expression Ais right inchdesfreedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and Jmpml infonnation mid ideas without interference by 
ff public authority and regardess offtonfiers 
. 
This important general principle received added confirmation from the Council of Europe's 1982 
'Declarafion of Freedom of Expression mid Informadon "9 where it is stated that in the domain of 
mass media the following objective should be obtained: 
33,4jnIand lVlaftlat and MCbacl palMer, Op. Cit p 541 36 Wolfgang Hof 6nann-Ricm, Tredi m Developnent OfBroadcalfing Law in Westem Europe, Finupean Journal of COnImumcaton, 
Vol. 7, (1992) p. 157 
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"The protection of the right of everyone, regardless of frontiers, to express hirnselý to seek and 
receive inforination and ideas, whatever their source, as weU as to impart them under the conditions 
set out in Article 10 of the ECHR, " (Committee ofMinislers, 1982) 
ArWcIe 10 (1) concludes, however with the proviso that: 
"Ais a? Wcle shall notprevent Stwesfrom requifing the licensing of 
broadcasfing, television or cinetw enterprises" 
Licensing has accordingly remained national policy in all European countries. 37 
The clash between the defenders of freedom of commercial speecl? s and those who sought to 
protect consumers from abuses of this freedom took on a much broader scope than over the 
Directive onMislea&ngAdvertising with the development in the 1980s of the new broadcast media 
- 
Direct Broadcast Satellite ( DBS ) and Cable television and the attempts by the EC to put together 
an updated Community audiovisual policy which would take these new developments into account. 
13.7 EC Broadcasting Policy: The Green Paper and the Broadcasting 
Directive on Transfrontier Television. 
In the 1980s, the possibility of an increasingly internationalised broadcast media brought 'with it 
enormous opportunities for advertising to transform itself into a truly global force. The stakes were 
high as the numerous additional private television channels expected to follow as -i result of the new 
media would be dependent on advertising for revenue, greatly enhancing the prospects of the 
advertising industry. Consumers, however, were concerned about uncontrolled exposure to 
31 Nole.. For a while during the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s a number of unlicensed private commercial radio and television 
stations started openMng illegally in Greece, The Gre& goverment am the process of trying to remedy the situation. 
38 Note: Defenders of fi=dom of commarW speech under ECHR Article 10 are not on vezy fum legal ground. Professor Dirk- Voorhoof of 
Ghent University, Belgium, has recently come to the conclusion that,, %Ue case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has made 
clear that "information of a commercial nature" falls under the protectim ofArticle 10, When it comes to challenging ihc legitirnzq of 
restrictions imposed on. television advertising N freedorn of corrunercial speech is not given very much additional protection within the 
framework ofArticle 10. P (Dirk Voorhoo& RejIn chons on Weviston Advertising and Article 10 ofthe European Convention on 
Hwnan Rights, International Journal ofAdvertising, 1993,12, p. 189. ) 
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commercials broadcast from abroad, given that very different standards of consumer protection in the 
field of television advertising operated in different Member States. 
The situation as regards transfrontier advertising had been complicated by the European Court of 
Justice's judgement in the "Debauve" case in 1980. Although in an earlier judgement ("Sacchi", 
1973) the Court had ruled that it was in violation of the Treaty of Rome for countries to restrict the 
right to receive broadcasts from other Member States and re-transmit them, in "De&ww". it held 
that restrictive national rules governing the broadcasting (including by DBS) of television advertising 
in the national territory 
- 
including its prohibition 
- 
were justified by the general interest, and, by 
extension, the same applied to restrictions on the re-transmission of advertisements by Cable 
television. It ruled that "in the absence of any harmonisation of the relevant rules, a prohibition of this 
type9 falls within the residual power of each Member State to regulate, restrict or even totally 
prohibit advertising on television in its territory on grounds of general interest"40. The existence of 
widely divergent national systems of broadcast, as opposed to general, advertising control was 
therefore a powerful impetus for legislation to harmonise the rules Community-wide. 
EC thinldng on the whole question of audiovisual policy in the new media era was Profoundly 
influenced by the German MEP Wilhelm Hahn's Report on Radio tvid YeIeWsion BrOadcasting in 
the European Commurifty, adopted as a Resolution by the European parliament in 1982. In the 
Report, Hahn argued that "Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European 
integration. 
... 
The instruments which serve to shape public opinion today are the media. Of these, 
television, as an audio. 
-visual means of communication is the most important". Hahn stressed that 
Satellite technology would alter irrevocably the character of the broadcast media, breaking down the 
boundaries of national networks and replacing them with "wide-ranging transmission areas"42 
. 
The European Commission responded by issuing two policy documents: Realities and Tendencies 
in European TejeWsion: perspectives ad Options (Commission of the European Communities 
39 Note : The case arose from a challenge to the Belgian GOvenm=fs PrOhibitio" Oil re'transm'sson of advert'sing on foreign- 
40 originated 
Mle cbmmels to conform %Niai  domestic policy i4hich outlawed television advertising 
41 
Green Paper op. cit. p. 150 
Europcm Parliament (1982) Report on Ra&o and Teleýýon BroadcaWng in the Eumpaw Camnunity on bdialf of the 
C4nunittee on yout& Culture, Education, Infonnation andSporl rlbc Hahn Report J, PE Documcnt 1-10013/81, p. 8 42 ibid. p. 8 
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1983) and Towards a European YeJeWsion Policy (Commission of the European Community 1984). 
These papers explored the ways in which the new technology could be used to further the goal of 
political, cultural and social integration, already implicit in the concept of a Single European Market, 
without the national identities of Member States being submerged by excessive Pan-Europeanism or, 
worse, by an increasingly American dominated Anglophone broadcasting culture. 
The most significant initiative, however, was the preliminary draft for the creation of a legislative 
framework for establishing a single broadcasting market. This took the form of a Green Paper 
entitled TeIeWsion Wilhout Frontiers, which was issued in May 1984. The Paper acknowledged the 
need for substantial revision and hannonisation of national laws in specific areas. "Harmonisation was 
needed for advertising regulations, in particular the total bans on broadcast advertising in some 
member states and varying prohibitions on advertising specific items in different member states; 
national laws concerning the distribution or redistribution of foreign broadcasting signals; national 
laws on tight of reply, and copyright. "43 
In proposing an agenda of expansionist trade measures, the authors of the Green Paper, as Richard 
Collins has pointed out, had also to try to 'sell' its liberal doctrine of an integrated Community 
broadcasting market to interventionists who were concerned that national cultures would be 
undermined. They did this by claiming that the Single Market would both assist the growth of 
European culture as a whole and strengthen the economic foundations of the European audio-visual 
induste, although the concept of European culture "as a whole' is not a particular clear one. 
A number of interested parties contributed to the debate. The European Broadcasting Union issued 
a Declaration of Principles Regar&ng Commercial Television Adýenising by DBS, in which it 
advocated a self-regulatory approach following the International Chamber of Commerce Code of 
Advertising Practici? 5, adapted for the operation of DBS broadcasts. It advised that its members 
should comply with domestic laws, which should be strengthened where necessary to outlaw 
advertising for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, and recommended a review of rules on advertising 
43 Richard Collins, European Dossier No 23: Audiovinwd and Broadm5fing POUcY in dw Europew Cammwuty, North London 
44 
University Press 1993, p. 11 
45 
ibid. p. ii 
Note: The ICC Code, drawn up in 1937, is the basis for both sclftegulatary and statutoty codes in force in many comtrieswrldMde 
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for pharmaceutical products, medicines and childrens advertisine. Purely commercial, as opposed 
to public service, broadcasters have, on the whole, supported the advertisers' plea for minimum 
regulation. The Association of Commercial Television in Europe (ACT), for example, complained 
fairly recently that television advertising is regarded with mistrust by some Commission members and 
is subject to "detailed and pointless restrictions"47 
. 
On the political front, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted a recommendation on 
Yhe Use of Satellite Capwity for Yelewslon tvid Sound Ra&o as a prelude to drawing up a 
convention of its own to deal with audiovisual policy for European countries able to receive 
transmissions from EC Member States but not necessarily themselves members of the EC. It deals 
mostly with programme standards but includes toy advertising as an area where broadcasters should 
protect "the sensitivity and the physical, mental and moral personality of children and young 
persons". The purpose of regulation was "to avoid the filth and violence which a few makers of 
television programs pour out unhindered 
- 
under the mask of their right to freedom of expression"49 
. 
This is strong language. There is no suggestion that television commercials are significant sources of 
filth and violence, but the Council of Ministers were clearly aware that freedom of expression 
arguments hould be subject o scrutiny and not just accepted at face value. They may be used 
cynically or other considerations may outweigh them. 
BEUC issued a report entitled the Impact of Satellite cuid Cable YeIeWsion on AdvefWsing in which 
it criticises the EBU and CoE documents as weak and too general. The report acknowledges that 
self-regulation and codes of practice "have a useful part to play" and are "a marginally helpful aid to 
raising advertising standards", but called for an international fimework to remedy the inadequacies 
of self-regulafioný9. 
The European Commission was faced with the awkward task of trying to reconcile consumer 
demands for stronger Community-wide legislation to standardise regulation of television advertising 
46 EBU, DecIvation ofbinciples Rega? &ng Commercial 77'Adverrising Broadcast by DBS, a statment fian the European 
Broadcasting Union, EBU Review, ProgrammcsAdministration, Law, (, X)CKMNo. 5,7-8,1983, Gcncva: Septmbcr5. 
47 14atteo Maggiore, Audiovisual production in the single market, Commissicn of the European Co; =unitics, p. 203 48 Council ofEurape (I 984b) European Skmdanisfor Mevision Advertising, Recommendation No. R(84) 3, Strasboiny Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
, 
Febnoy 23 
49 13EUC (19831 7he Impact ofSatellfte and Cable Tdeý&on on AAertising, a Report prepared by the BEUC for the Commission of the 
EC, Brussels: August 1983. 
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with advertisers! insistence on the absolute minimum of interference with their right of expression. 
However, in weighing up the consumers' case, policy-makers were able to take into account not 
only AtWcle 10 (1) of the Convention on Human Rights so popular with the advertising industry, but 
AiWcle 10 (2) wlich quaHes (1). This states that the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in (1), 
since it cames with it aWfies and responsibififtes, may be subject to such formalities, con&tjons, 
restrictions or penalties as a7e prescribed by law and are necessmy in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of &sorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of reputation or tights of others, for 
preventing the &sclosure of infomzation received in confidence or for maintaining the authority 
mdimpwWality of theju&ciwy. 
The belief that the broadcast media possess exceptional power for good or ill as vehicles of 
communication has long been a consideration in placing the ldnd of restrictions on them pennitted. 
un d er A tWcle 10 (2). 
The consumer movement's position is based on the fact, recognised in the Convenfion, that freedom 
of speech, however liberally defmed, carries with it "duties and responsibilities" and that advertisers 
are as bound by these as anyone else. The advertising industry would not, of course, dispute this. In 
involdng the principle of free speech in the context of television regulation policy it is arguing 
essentially about the degree to which the qualifications in EMR 10 (2) justify restrictions on 
advertising. And should restrictions be necessary, the argument is extended to the methods of 
implementing them which should be compatible with the maximum freedom of expression. Self- 
regulation has always been the preferred method with legisMon, at either domestic or Community 
level, as a last resort 
. 
The Green Paper had a great deal to say about advertising. It considered it in connection -,Nith the 
economic aspects of television; with the legal aspects - the range of the applicable laws, i. e. the 
international scope of public advertising law, and the applicability of national law on television 
advertising to commercial dvertising from abroad; and with harmonisation of regulation. Part 6, 
Harmonisation of Legislation, has a whole section on advertising nfles. But it also acknowledged the 
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positive contributions that broadcast advertising had made in facilitating the free movement of 
goods, persons and services within the Community, and referred to the necessity for the freeflow of 
infonnation, across frontiers (ECHR 10 (1)). 
On this point, the Commission gave the fact that two Member States 
- 
Belgium and Denmark 
- 
permitted no commercial television at all as its main reason for having a directive. Legislation would 
have the liberalising effect of bringing about a genuinely common market in television. The Green 
Paper stressed that the national rules on broadcast advertising created "major obstacles" to the free 
flow of advertising across frontiers. So long as domestic supervision systems were applied only to 
the first hand transmission of advertisements this would not constitute a barrier to the free movement 
of services. But it could be considered abarrier if a domestic supervisory body should seek to restrict 
advertising broadcast from abroad, or a distortion of competition if one national system was so much 
stricter than another that advertising was actively discouraged by that system. At the same time, the 
Paper acknowledged that "the specific supervisory systems 
.... 
also merit attention in that they provide 
a suitable tool for aligning broadcast advertising in the common market on common standards"" so 
as to ensure that fiberaHsafion did not damage the interests of business, consumers, or society as a 
whole. 
The Commission was aware that some kind of trade off would be necessary if it was to get the 
support of both Member States with restrictive policies on television advertising and the consumer 
movement for its objective of structural liberalisation. This would most likely take the form of 
harmonising the different national rules on timing, distribution, classes and content of advertising 
according to the toughest standards operating in the Community. It therefore proposed a number of 
limitations, including a total ban on advertising of tobacco products; restrictions on alcohol 
advertising; severe firnits on the timing and distribution of commercial breaks; clear rules on 
sponsorship; and strict standards for advertising directed at children and young people. 
In public debate, consumer groups did indeed concentrate on limiting the amount of time devoted to 
advertising and the "Upwards" harmonisation of rules and regulations. Not unexpectedly, those 
"0 Commission of European Communities (1984a) TeIeWsion 97thout fivnifem Green Paper on the establisbment of the Ccnunm 
Market for broadcasting especially by satellite and cable. COM (84) 300 final. Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. Luxembourg p. 258 
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representing advertising interests argued for the opposite 
-a liberalising policy which avoided maldng 
the most restrictive misting rules the benchmark They particularly opposed the idea that "national 
legislatures would remain free to impose stricter rules for broadcasts originating within the national 
territory"". Active lobbying over the next five years continued on this basis. Many in business and 
advertising questioned the need for a directive at all since it appeared that they stood to lose more 
than they would gain. 
The UKs Confederation ofBritish Industry and Advertising Association, for ammple, issued an anti- 
Directive joint statement in 1985, citing AiWcle 10 (1), and pointing out that a common market in 
advertising services already e)dsted in many countries (the addition of the Danish and Belgian 
markets was clearly not worth much); that no real damage was being done that required legislation; 
and that there had been no call for legislation from any significant number of corisumers. 52 In the 
same year the International Advertising Association called for "the liffing of arbitrary, artificial and 
unnecessary restrictions and their replacement by responsible freedom in the use of radio and 
television, both terrestrial and satellite, and related distribution systems, (and) the amount of 
advertising time permitted in all electronic media"53 
. 
British broadcasters also lobbied hard against those proposals which would standardise according to 
the "strictest common denominator" and which therefore represented a step backwards for UK 
regulation. The severe restrictions on alcohol advertising, the tobacco ban, a timing Urnit of a 
maximum I O'Yo, i. e. six minutes, per hour on advertising and the prohibition of commercials in natural 
breaks, when the UK had a flexible policy permitting a seven minute maximum and the showing of 
commercials in natural breaks, particularly worried the IBA and the television companies. 
Of these, the tightening up of process regulation was potentially the most damaging measure. The 
Green Paper (and later the draft for the CoE Convention) favoured the "block" system operated in 
Germany and elsewhere, where advertising is presented in lengthy blocks rather than distributed 
more evenly throughout he schedule, a method very unpopular with advertisers and consistently 
31 ibid. para, 38 52 CBL (19851 ConsumerProtecdon in the European Cawnunity, a joint statement fian the Confederation of British hxhisty and The 
AdVatising Association, IAxdm: January, pp. 13 
- 
14 
53 IAA, (I 985b), GlobalAfedia Camimion Re5olution, the international Advertising Assomation, New York: July 2 
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rýected in the UK EBA Controller of Advertising Harry Theobalds declared: "this is unacceptable to 
us. We wiN put maximum pressure on the British Government not to accept his. And I intend to 
contact the European Comrnission and certain NIPS,, 54 
. 
He was joined by the British advertising 
lobby who tried to persuade the Home Office that any European regulation must not endanger the 
UKs vilsting an-angements for commercial televisioný5- 
The Green Paper dealt with a great deal more than advertising, however. It considered the technical, 
legal, political, economic and cultural issues arising from a common broadcasting policy. The 
governments of individual Member States had numerous objections and reservations as well as the 
advertising industry. The difficulties notwithstanding, a draft directive was hammered out and 
published in 1986. Tlie Directive on Television Broa*aving, was finally promulgated in 1989, once 
again allowing a breathing space for Member States to ratify it and incorporate it into their national 
legislation. And as with the Directive onMisIea&ngAdOenWng the final document is considerably 
less far-reaching and ambitious than the discussion paper. Rules on alcohol advertising were more 
relaxed, maximum advertising minutage was doubled to up to 20% of airtime (twelve minutes ) and 
natural breaks were allowed. 
The Broadcasting Directive reflects the compromises made along the way between what Richard 
CoUins has caUed the "fiberals" and the "dirigistes"56. In CoUir& view the original Green Paper was a 
fiberal manifesto which placed broadcasting at the forefront of the move towards economic and 
cultural integration of Europe. It emphasised "the promotion of television as a medium of 
Community unity"". The dirigistes, on the other hand, were more comrnitted to "the protection of 
an anterior diversity and cultural pluralism"" and the eventual text of the Directive represents a
partiaRy successful defence of national industries and broadcasting systems against a more centralised 
pan-European policy. 
54 Marta Wohrle, UK anger at EC ad rw&icfioM, Media Week, 25/ 10/ 1985 p. 14 55 Note : Ile British government did give valuable support to the anti-European regulation lobby in the UK- During the run- 
up to the adoption of the CoE Convention in 1989, the British ambassador to the Council was briefed, and Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd and Home Office Minister Timothy Renton travelled throughout Europe to put the British case. 
They succeeded in imposing their views which 'to all intents and purposes were the views of the British advertising 
community, agencies, advertisers and the commercial television operators. " (A. Mattelart and M. Palmer, op. cit. 
56 pp. 
545 
- 
546 ) 
Richard Collins, European Dossier Series No 23Audiovinal andBroadcasling Policy in AeEumpaan Co"ununity, North London 
University Press 1993, p. 13 37 ibid. p. 12 58 ibidL p. 12 
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As Collins points outý while "interventionist" provisions are numerically more numerous, they are 
rather weak and none are of such fundamental importance as Article 2, fiuthering the liberal goal of a 
single market, which prevents Member States from restricting "retransmission on their territory of 
television broadcasts from other Member States". These conflicting agendas are primarily concerned 
with the supply of programming as a cultural product and not with advertising, although the need to 
deregulate in this field was the initial excuse for the Directive. The advertising industry, which is not 
interested in national cultures except as sources for the most effective means of getting commercial 
messages across, supported the liberal objective of the single market and the removal of barriers to 
trade, but took a dirigiste position on regulation of advertising content and timing. The less 
hazmonisation there was in this area and the more anterior diversity the better. This is, of course, the 
classic Euro-sceptic stance 
- 
support for a free trade area but no centralised law-making 
- 
which 
makes sense to advertisers because harmonisation of content usually threatens more bureaucratic 
restrictions, They therefore actively intervened to protect domestic self-regulatory systems of control. 
The European Commuinly Directive on Broa*asfing, Yelewsion Without Frontiers, adopted in 
October 1989, came into effect on 3rd. October 1991. It declared that "the broadcasting and 
distribution of television services is also a specific manifestation in Community law of a more general 
principle, namely the freedom of exTression as enshrined in Article 10 (1) of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ratified by all Member States 
.... 
subject only 
to the limits set by paragraph 2, of that Article"59. With respect o paragraph 2, the Directive also 
stated that "in order to ensure that the interests of consumers as television viewers are fully and 
properly protected, it is essential for television advertising to be subject to a certain number of 
minimum rules and standards and that the Member States must maintain the right to set more 
detailed or stricter rules and in certain circumstances to lay down different conditions for television 
broadcasters under theirjurisdiefion. "60 
So, although the advertising lobby had won the battle on harmonisation - minimum standards were 
harmonised ownwards not upwards 
- 
it had failed to make this compulsory. The UfVs commercial 
59 ECDirec&eo"Broadowfing: 89/552/EEC Council Directive of 3 October 1989, p. 2 
60 Ibiti pp. 3- 4 
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television regulator, while fighting hard against some aspects of the new legisMon, has in fact since 
taken advantage of the ability to impose stricter ules than those contained in the Directive 
- 
The UK 
still has a 7.5 minute maximum of advertising per hour on ITV instead of 12 minutes, for ocample. It 
is also supports the tough restrictions on sponsorship and the prohibition on surreptitious advertising 
Artcle 10 of the Direcfiw contains the crucial provision that "television advertising should be readily 
recognisable as such and kept quite separate from other parts of the programme service by optical 
and/or acoustic methods"61. This is buttressed by provisions prohibiting subliminal advertising and 
m=epfitious advertising ( product placement ), and tough rules on sponsorship designed ensure that 
sponsored programmes are clearly identifiable as such, and to prevent sponsors from exercising 
influence on the content and scheduling of sponsored progranunes "in such a way as to affect the 
ibiEty and editorial independence of the broadcaster""(Aitcle 17). News and current affairs responsi 
programmes cannot be sponsored. 
The ban on advertising of aU prescription drugs remained, as does the one on tobacco products 
(leading to the disappearance from British television screens of cigar and pipe tobacco commercials) 
and rules on alcohol and childens'advertising arestill strict, represenfing a victory for consumers. But 
vhth timing and distribution the advertisers had prevailed 
- 
the concept of natural breaks was 
accepted and a maxin= hourly average of 15% and a maximum of 2(YYo in any one hour were 
permitted 
-a significant increase on the ori_6W suggestions. 
T'he Council of Europe Convention on Trmuftonfier Television was adopted a little earlier than the 
Directive, in. ýIay 1989, but did not come into effect until I st Nby 1993. The Convention also refers 
in fts preamble to ECHR Arficle 10 and affirms the Council commitment the free flow of 
information. The two documents have very similar rules on advertising and sponsorship. The amount 
of spot advertising is limited to 15% of daily transmission time and 201/o per hour, and the 
distribution of commercial breaks is reguWed, with natural breaks permitted. There are requirements 
regarding advertising of alcobol and commercials directed at children, and complete bans on tobacco 
products and prescription medicines. Editorial independence in programming and proper separation 
61 lbiCL P. S 
62 
ibid. p. 9 
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of programme content and promotional message must be ensured and to this end there are bans on 
swreptitious advertising and restrictions on sponsorslip. 
13.8 Summary of the Current Legal Position of the EC on Freedom of 
Commercial Speech Under Article 10 (1) 
A brief look at the concrete circumstances of the ECs pursuit of two potentially contradictory aims 
reveals a considerable conflict of interest between the consumer and advertising industry agendas. 
Much consumer legislation does not present any challenge to the right to free speech, but when it 
imposes limits on what may be said in the course of a commercial transaction there are, arguably, 
grounds for claiming that such Emits are an unacceptable curtailment of this right. In so arguing, the 
advertising industry has sought to give its case substance by referTing to the right to impart 
information guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. Whether it is justified in 
doing so in law very much depends on the interpretation of the concept of "information" in this 
context, i. e. whether or not it covers commercial information, and, if it does, on the weight given to 
this type of information in comparison with others. Also of importance is to what extent the 
qualifications in Article 10 (2) may be used by supporters of consumers' rights to justify restrictions. 
On the former point, while case law of the European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights has clearly and explicitly interpreted commercial information or 
commercial speech as falling under the protection of ArWcle 10 (1), it does not accord it a high 
priority. The Commission has explained that although it "is not of the opinion that commercial 
'speech! as such is outside the protection conferred by A? Wcle 10, it considers that the level of 
protection must be less than that accorded to the expression of 'political' ideas, in the broadest sense, 
with which the values underpinning the concept of freedom to expression in the Convention are 
chiefly concerned tt63 
. 
This firmly places political speech at the heart of ArWcle M protection; 
commercial speech is regarded as more peripheral. 
63 Church of Scicntology (1979 )K Com. JLR., 5 Iday 1979, AppL 7805/77 B Jansen and Church of Scientology vs. Sweden, Dec. and 
Rep. (16), 6& 
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With respect o the evaluation of restrictions referred to in AtWcle 10 (2) the European Court does 
not view them as constituting a conflicting principle. There is one principle of freedom of expression 
that is subject to a number of narrowly interpreted exceptions. Any restriction on communication 
must pursue a legitimate aim and fiM a "pressing social need 04 
. 
The protection of the general 
public as consumers from the more harmfill aspects of advertising (assessed ifferently in different 
Member States) has evidently been accepted by the European Commission both as a legitimate aim 
and as socially necessary. The prohibition on advertising of tobacco products and prescription drugs, 
for example, could be justified as "protection of health", as could restrictions on alcohol, and rules on 
children and young people would fall under "protection of morale'. 
A complete ban on broadcast advertising such as that which existed in Belgium and Denmark might 
be stronger grounds for claiming a violation of AiWcle 10 (1) than restrictions on categories or 
content. As Nicholas Garnham reports: Me Commission and Court of Human Rights have never 
ruled directly on the question of whether a complete ban 
..... 
violatesftcle 10, but have occasionally 
indicated their attitude. In one case the Commission rýected a complaint that the British prohibition 
on paid political advertising violated AiWcle 10 arguing that: 
Re notion of ficeining implies that, in grwiting a licence, the State may subject radio and 
felewsion broa*ayfing to certain regubtions, In this context the practice in &fferent member states 
of the Council of Europe shouki be taken into consideration, It is clear that a number of these 
States do not acknit any adverlWng at all on radio or television, whereas other Member States allow 
such advertising but have, at the same hme, laid down rules concenung the tMvs of advertisements 
admitted In these circumstances, the Commisslonfituh that the provisions ofArficle 10 (1) should 
be interpreledaspermiffing the state, in granting a licence, to exclude 
.. 
certain specified categories 
j65 ofaaWrtisements' 
Ile Commission of Human Rights seems to have taken a similar fine to the European Court of 
Justice in the Debauve case, using existing uidely divergent national laws and the absence of 
common legal standards to justify a particular natiohs policy on advertising. Under tEs 
64 Dirk Voorhoo& op. cit pp. 192-193 65 James Mchacl, MeRegulation of Bruadcasfing by Eumpean Instwom, Economc aml Social Research Council, 1988, (picT 
Policy Research Papers: no. 5) pp. 10 
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interpretation, the judgement in favour of the British government's prohibition on paid political 
advertising does not conflict with an Austrian Constitutional Court ruling in 1986 that the refusal of 
domestic broadcasting Authorities allow radio commercials for a magazine did violate the right to 
receive and impart informatiorP'. Each government is entitled to make its own policy on advertising 
control. So although in countries where it has been made a part of domestic law, the European 
Convention on Human Rights provides a guide to the relationship between freedom of expression 
and restrictions on advertising 
, 
it is not one that has been particularly useful to the advertising lobby. 
In their book, Rijkens and Mracle express the hopes of the advertising world that ifAIWcIe 10 does 
cover commercial speech some of the restrictions on communicating with Consumers Will be Iffled67. 
This hope has yet to be realised; until now, no report of the European Commission and no judgernent 
of the European Court has ever established a breach of ECHR AiWcle 10 with regard to an 
implementation of advertising regulatiorO. 
13.9 Conclusion. 
In many of the books, articles and papers which claim to represent their point of view, advertisers 
and agencies eem to be somewhat ambivalent about the claim that advertising is such an important 
mode of imparting information that it merits consideration under Article 10. Their use of it can 
sometimes appear to be self-serving. Although there were prima facie grounds for claiming that 
freedom of commercial speech was being inhibited by the inability of the Belgian and Danish national 
advertising industries to use television as a medium at all, the powerful UK advertising lobby actually 
opposed the EC Directive, which was designed to promote such freedom in these countries, because 
it did not suit its own particular interests. And although the EAAA protested vociferously to the EC 
that consumer protection measures infiinged its members! right to impart information to the public, 
when it came to refuting the frequent charge that advertising is a manipulator of culture and of 
people9, the organisation took a rather different fine. It accused consumers of being confused about 
66 James Michael ibid. p. 12 67 Dirk Voorhoof 
, 
op. cit p. 187 
" Nd. p. 207 
69 See: Vance Packard 77je Hiddm permladen. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957 and Williarn Ieiss, Stephen Kline, Sut 
Jhally., Social Gwýcado" Advffdiiqg, Loadon: Routledge, 1990. 
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the nature of advertising, emphasising that it was a mistake to think of it as an information service, as 
a part of consumer education, or as a significant cultural influence. The EAAA! s 1984 Information 
Bulletin complained that there are "thousands of influential people out there 
...... 
( who ) muddle 
advertising with other forms of communication: information, entertainment and instruction. Curiously 
enough, though they recognise that entertainment does not have to be packed with 
information 
... 
they fA to see that advertising is salesmanship not journalism"70. This is surely the 
industry trying to have its cake and eat it. If advertising is really no more than an entertaining form of 
salesmansHp, the EC cannot be blamed for not affording it protection on a level with the right to 
speak freely on political, social and religious issues which fies at the heart of a democratic society, 
and which is the real substance ofAiWcIe 10. 
Consumers, on the other hand, do have the right to be represented effectively and to express their 
views, even if these clash with those of the advertising industry, and even if the result is a curb on its 
freedom of action. The European Commission and Court of Human Rights have found national 
regulation to control television advertising to be in the "general interest", a concept virtually 
synonymous with the "public interest". The regulation eventually adopted, if it can be enforced, 
represents a reasonable compromise between protecting consumer interests and satisfying the 
commercial objectives of advertisers and their agencies. And by its own admission, things have not 
turned out too badly for the advertising industry. The March-April 1989 issue of the Ms magazine 
InteniafionalAdýeiWser contained a message of congratulation for the different organisafions whose 
efforts lay behind the success of the lobby 
- 
with special mention of the URs AA and ITVA - Which 
concluded: "this has shown the economic importance of advertising. Success was achieved because 
the end-result was a compromise favourable to the industry"71 
. 
While the UKs commercial television regulator had joined forces with the advertisers and television 
companies in fighting some of the Direcfive's proposals, it was by no means opposed to its general 
intention and actively supported the setting down of clearly defined rules on sponsorship and product 
placement as a back-up to domestic regulation. Orly recently, at a workshop on the ITC Code on 
Sponsorship and related topics at the 1994 Television Show in London, the ITC's Frank Willis was 
70 FAU Informahon Bullefin 1984 in Armand Mattelatt and Michael Palmer AdvatWng in Europe prumber, pnwurej and 
71 piVUh, 
Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 13 (199 11 P 542 
Armand Mattelart and Michael Palmer, op. cit. P. 546 301 
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able to cite the EC ruling as the ground for the regulatoes continued r6ection of product placement 
in the face of strong demands for the policy to be scrapped. 
And finally, just in case anyone still believes that advertising is under serious threat from proliferating 
EC regulation, Mattelart and Palmer have a story to tell which appears to give some more empirical 
confirmation of capture theory. In 1979 and 1983, the IAA organised two highly successful 
international conferences on public service advertising. The EC was so impressed that it engaged the 
IAA as a consultant to advise it on its own advertising and public relations, a job it still does. As the 
authors wryly comment: "to be taken on as a communications consultant by an organisation which 
seeks to regulate advertising is no mean feat"2. 
72 lbicL p. 538 
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Chapter 14 
General Conclusion. 
14.1 Overview. 
This thesis has explored a number of related issues that have informed the debate on broadcast 
advertising regulation in the UK throughout its history, including the "negative" period when, 
except for limited sponsorship, advertising was regulated out of broadcasting altogether. The 
most fundamental consideration in policy-maldng has always been the relationship between 
broadcasting and society, and the central role of regulation in that relationship. Generally 
spealdng, it has been the function of regulation to mediate between broadcasting, as a medium of 
social communication, and the audience as receivers of the message it communicates. The history 
of broadcasting shows that regulation as an institution both reflects the society that created it, and 
is constitutive of it; the choice of a particular set of regulatory arrangements at any one time has 
depended on pre-e)dstizýg British social and political beliefs, and has also played a part in 
determining future beliefs. 
The general theme of the relationship of broadcasting to society includes the more specific issue 
of what kind of broadcasting, and consequently what kind of regulation, is appropriate for British 
society. Policy-makers consciously addressed themselves to the question of kppropriateness from 
the very start. At first, there was a very clear idea of what was not wanted in British broadcasting 
- 
no disorder and no commercialism 
- 
but a slightly less clear idea of how these things could be 
prevented while at the same time developing an entirely new industry. It took several years of 
experimental operation for the principle of unity of control to become established as the best 
means of ensuring order in the system, and for it to be embodied in a particular regulatory 
institution. 
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Unity of control, however, did not in itself rule out any commercial input to the system. The 
regulatory decisions, first to exclude direct advertising from the BBC, and later on to allow it on 
part of the system only, were reached after examining another crucial issue for broadcasting 
policy. the relationship between advertising and broadcasting. This relationship has been the 
subject of continuous debate and controversy, especially with respect o television; beliefs about 
how advertising affects both the television service itself, and consumers who receive televised 
advertising messages, have been almost as influential in British regulation policy as attitudes 
towards broadcasting and society in general. 
Hostility to commercialism among the opinion-forming classes who directed broadcasting policy 
in Britain, especially where it connected with culture, was an extremely influential factor in the 
choice to r6ect broadcast advertising in the initial stages and to regulate it heavily later on. 
Advertising is the most visible symbol of the commercial spirit, it was seen by the pioneer makers 
of broadcasting regulation as trivialising and debasing. There was no place for "advertising 
chatter" in the Reithian vision of broadcasting as a medium for bringing high culture to the 
masses. The public interest argument against advertising in the pre-war Committees was partly an 
aesthetic one. It was considered silly and intrusive rather than positively harmfiW in any of the 
more serious ways that worried policy-makers responsible for drawing up commercial television 
regulation in the 1950s. This is why "discreet" sponsorship was felt to be more acceptable than 
the more obvious spot advertising. The Hankey Committee was the first to acknowledge that 
sponsorship in fact raised more worrying questions than direct advertising but it did not elaborate 
on them. 
The fact that the earliest regulation allowed broadcasting to take the form of a private company, 
and that commercial television and radio were subsequently introduced, indicate that it was not 
so much business as a framework for broadcasting that was seen as the problem, but business 
influence on the content of broadcasting, or, more precisely, advertising influence. Advertising 
was regarded from the very beginning as incompatible with a quality service, i. e. with a high 
standard of programmes and the freedom for audiences to enjoy them without interruptions. It 
was also vq)ensive, and advertisers were Rely to concentrate their spending on entertainment 
programmes with mass appeal, squeezing out broadcasts with a serious educational or informative 
content. The original British Broadcasting Company was therefore allowed to operate as a 
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private enterprise, but was not allowed to become involved with the only thing which night have 
made it viable as a business 
- 
advertising. And when a choice had to be made between 
broadcasting constituted as a My commercial operation supported by advertising revenue, or as a 
wholly non-commercial public service, the decision was not difficult to make. 
Anti-Americanism is also a recurring theme in the official reports on broadcasting policy, and in 
the evidence submitted to them. The American model was always being held up as one that was 
completely unsuitable for the UK Originally, this belief was not so much based on dislike of 
American popular culture, although this might have been a part it, but grew out of the feeling that 
cultural products should not be contaminated by commerce. American radio, and then American 
television, were dislilced not so much because they were American, but because they were 
commercial and therefore dominated by advertisers. 11is was thought to be a bad thing not only 
because it meant saturating the ahwaves with advertising, but because advertisers and programme 
sponsors were not interested in broadcasting for its own sake, only as a vehicle for promoting 
their goods and services. There is no incentive in an advertisbg-driven system for broadcasters to 
produce quality programming; the priority is popular programming. Whether this assessment was 
entirely fair or notý the belief that the American brand of broadcasting, funded by commercial 
interests and catering to mass audiences, was inappropriate for Britain was an almost universally 
held one. Even supporters of commercial television in the 1940s and 50s, including, significantly, 
the UK advertising industry itseg did not want it to be too American in style. 
While the cultural tendencies of anti-commercialism and anti-Americanism were not by 
themselves reasons for regulating broadcasting in the first place 
- 
technical and political 
considerations were primary 
- 
they were carcmely influential in giving the 
regulatory/broadcasting system its particular form. The exclusion of advertising and the operating 
of broadcasting as a public service monopoly for the vital first decades of its e7dstence were by far 
the most important factors in determining the course of regulation of commercial television when 
it finally arrived. And a good deal of regulation directed at the private sector was, and still is, 
devoted to controlling the participation of the advertising industry in the broadcasting system. 
Another fundamental issue in the story of television advertising regulation is that of the public 
interest. nlis study omnined the concept and concluded thg despite the difficulties surrounding 
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it 
, 
it has been so frequently used in connection Yýith regulation that it cannot just be dismissed. 
The three successive paradigms of broadcasting regulation, i. e. non-commercial monopoly with 
advertising regulated out; duopoly of two services, one non-commercial and one advertising- 
funded but heavily regulated; and a plurality of services with varying degrees of regulation were 
all given explicit public interest justifications by those responsible for their creation. 
Broadcasting is an especially difficult area in which to define the public interest for a number of 
reasons. It affects so many different sections of society in so many different ways, unlike other 
regulated industries, so the public, in the context of broadcasting, is a far from homogeneous 
notion. In the early days, the public referred primarily to potential audiences for broadcasting, and 
it was their interests Which were felt to be at risk by allowing advertising on the air. Among 
listeners, and later viewers, the sub-sections of children and, to a lesser extent, religious believers, 
were singled out for special consideration. As broadcasting developed, and analysis of 
broadcasting and its relationship with advertising rew more sophisticated and informed, the 
interests of other sections of society were included in the definition of the public who would be 
affected by regulation 
- 
performers, such as actors and musicians, and those employed in the 
radio and television industries, for example. 
If the idea of the public is not altogether unproblematic, orrectly identifying a single interest, or 
set of interests, and setting up regulatory structures to safeguard them, is even more difficult. 
This is why the concept of competing claims, each prima facie justiflable, has proved so much 
more useful in the study of broadcasting than the traditional notion of the public interest found in 
much theory of regulation, which is based on a straightforward division of society into consumers 
and producers with necessarily conflicting interests. As this study sho, % 4 policy-makers 
responsible for regulating radio in the 1920s and television in the 1930s faced a relatively simple 
situation. The public as a collection of listeners and viewers was at first not very large for either 
mediurn, and, as John Reith pointed out in defence of the BBC's programming policy, no-one, 
including audiences themselves, really knew what they wanted, or what their interests were. 
Regulatory decisions that certain things, including advertising, were against the public interest 
were not hard to make, could be settled without huge debate, and provoked little opposition 
when they were implemented. Given the newness of broadcasting, its potential cultural 
significance, and the need for it to be protected from commercial pressures in order to fiffi the 
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extremely Hgh expectations it had aroused, the claim that unity of control was in the public 
interest, and the claim that broadcast advertising was against it, were not merely prima facie 
justifiable, they were the only ones to be seflously advanced at the time. 
In the late 1940's early 1950's, at the time of the Beveridge Report, broadcasting had widened in 
scope enormously and the situation had become more complex. Regulatory decision-making 
became correspondingly more difficult; not only were there many more possible ways of viewing 
the interests of the public, but the public as viewers and listeners had become much more aware of 
what their own interests were. The claim that broadcast advertising was not in the public interest 
was no longer the only prima facie justifiable one. The opposite claim was also justifiable, and 
within a few years the political system had validated it; advertising on television was regulated 
into existence in the public interest. The second broadcasting paradigm wlich was introduced 
following this decision still retained something of the previous one. The relationship between 
advertising and television was stiff adversarial. Consumers were perceived as vulnerable and 
advertisers powerful; strict controls were thought to be necessary to protect the public from 
advertiser influence. The television companies, although they were commercial enterprises, i. e. 
producers, were producers of a cultural product which was also vulnerable. Consequently, 
regulation was designed to protect them as well by granting them regional monopoly rights to 
advertising airtime and restricting market entry. 
It was only when broadcasting had been in existence for more than half a century that the 
conception of the public interest in broadcasting, and the role of regulation in promoting it, 
changed. Tbatcherite ideology favoured competition over co-operation; the market was no longer 
seen as failing in important ways to serve consumer interests and in need of controls, but as a 
better means of benefiting consumers than regulation. In broadcasting, the resulting deregulating 
legislation was mainly concerned with transforming process regulation, allowing much greater 
scope for market forces to direct events. But although competition is now the main priority, the 
need for control over advertisements on the air is still recognised as vital for the protection of 
consumers and an extensive apparatus for product regulation of advertising has been retained.. 
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14.2 Theories and Approaches: An Assessment 
As already menfloned, this thesis has concluded that public interest theory in various forms is still 
the most useful in explaining how the structures for regulation oftelevisiort advertising in the UK 
were set up and altered at different stages. Although it was developed in America to account for 
the rise of government regulation ofprivate business, it is able to explain why broadcasting  the 
UK was structured as a regulated non-commercial public service monopoly for the first thirty 
years; as a public service duopoly with a unified and tightly regulated commercial sector for the 
next hirty five; and, finally, as a more competitive multi-media system, with different degrees of 
regulation. Viewing the public interest as a collection of competing claims with a normative 
component makes the concept relevant to the duopoly phase of broadcasting, and to the 
deregulation phase when the "competition" model of regulation replaced the old command and 
control system. 
To say that public interest theory is the most successful in explaining the genesis of broadcast 
advertising regulation, although it is by no means a complete xplanation, is to make a judgement 
about the success of the regulatory system itself For if this theory is accepted as for the most part 
correct, it must also be accepted that not only do regulation policy-makers claim to be acting in 
the public interest 
-a claim that ought not to be taken at face value because it is such an obvious 
one to make 
- 
but that the histofical evidence supports their claim. 
Public interest theory not only sheds light on the genesis of regulatory arrangements, but provides 
the starting point for regulatory failure theories dealing with the flaws that become apparent as 
regulation progressed. These theories hold that, while regulatory agencies are created in the public 
interest, this interest is betrayed by the eventual failure of agencies to 444M their intended 
purposes. Influence models of perverted public interest theory, and especially the notion of 
capture, have been helpful in analysing what happens during the actual operation of broadcast 
advertising regulation in Britain. 
As a critique, the instrumental approach stresses the negative effects on regulation of individuals 
with similar backgrounds and outlooks occupying opposite sides of the fence as regulators and 
regulated parties. If the employees of agency and industry have too much in common their 
separate roles become blurred. It is harder for regulators to distance themselves and take an 
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0e view of what needs to be done. In the pre-commercial era of BBC monopoly, the 
regulatory structure was unified and not adversarial, but the extent to which the BBC was 
dominated by the particular social and inteHecttW ethos of its Board and top management, and the 
weakness of the advisory bodies, came in for sharp criticism in the late 1940s. 
The regulation of commercial television was set up on more adversarial fines but, nevertheless, the 
fact that the regulator was also the broadcaster entailed a close connection between it and the 
television industry. This structural feature, combined with the television companies' financial 
dependence on advertisin& made it difficult for the regulator to maintain sufficient distance 
between it and the two regulated industries. Their closeness and its detrimental effect on 
regulation was heavily criticised by the Pilkington Committee and, later on, by consumer 
organisations. So even though individuals have made their mark on regulation, they cannot do 
more than take advantage of the structures available to them. Most of the operational weaknesses 
of UK broadcasting regulation resulted from design faults. Monopolies, however justifiable at the 
beginning, tend in time to become complacent and unresponsive to public needs. With commercial 
television, the inherent structural bias towards industry made capture more likely than in a 
completely detached system, and adjustments had to be made from time to compensate for the 
systematic favPuring of television and advertising interests. 
Capture has proved a valuable notion in analysing the failures of UK television advertising 
regulation. The concept has been generalised in this historical survey from the original narrow 
reference to the excessive influence of regulated private business on a detached regulatory agency, 
to the tendency for individuals, or groups of individuals, responsible for maldng the regulatory 
z system work to become too sympathetic to the needs of the regulated industry 
Tlis tendency was noted in the earliest days of the BBC under Reith, when the Corporation 
successfully imposed its own agenda on a series of compliant advisory committees; in the 
Advertising Advisory Committees tendency to be dominated by advertising and television 
interests; in the influence of large advertisers over the network companies' copy clearance staff, 
and in the success of the advertising industry in imposing its views on the EC as a regulation- 
making body. The possibility of becoming over eager to agree with the dominant interests has 
even been noticed by consumer epresentatives, whose relationship with the regulated industry 
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ought to be the most adveisarial and on whose behalf advertising regulation is primarily intended. 
Organisation theory, which focuses on the autonomous life of institutions, has also had 
explanatory value in looý: ing at the way in which regulation as an institution actually operates. The 
fim two commercial television regulatory Authorities exhibited to a varying extent the faults 
identified by organisation theory. They developed a certain degree of "regulafion-mindedness"; 
rules and regulations profferated and they became excessively involved in relatively trivial cases 
of interpretation of the rules. They were driven partly by organisational imperatives such as self- 
preservation', and the impulse to retain and expand their own power as institutions. Criticism of 
regulation from this perspective, especiaRy from the political right who focused on the negative 
impact on private business government sponsored bureaucratic organisations with wide-ranging 
discretionary powers, was a strong influence on the deregulation movement in the UK from which 
regulation of broadcasting and broadcast advertising was not excepted. 
In contrast to the public interest group of theories, the "private interest" or conspiracy models of 
regulatory failure have not proved particularly relevant to UK to broadcasting regulation. Until 
the 1980s, successive British governments, without needing any persuasion, put forward policies 
which resulted either in no competition in broadcasting at all or strict control of market entry. 
Even after the period of monopoly ended, the structuring of commercial television as a cartel 
with monopoly powers was wholly state initiated. Before they came into existence, it was decided 
that the new cominercial companies hould be given a regulatory framework which guaranteed 
security of income by protection from competition. Without this security the conditions for 
producing a public service of a comparable standard to the BBCs was not thought possible. The 
effects of regulatory controls on market entry and competition were, as it tumed out, extremely 
beneficial to the television industry, but the system continued to be justified as the best means of 
combining public service television with finance through advertising. By the time deregulation 
was being planned, television had matured into a considerable industrial power and lobbied very 
hard to retain its privileged position in the face of Thatcherite pro-competition policies. But, apart 
from some small modifications to the 1990 Broadcasting Act, these efforts were not successful. 
Note: the MRs refusal to give detailed reasons for its decisions on fi-anchise awards for fear of legal action is a classic 
example of an agency taking evasive action to protect itself from external challenge mtdch could undcrmine its 
authority. 
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Capitalist state theory and other political perspectives on regulation have widened the context in 
which broadcasting and broadcast advertising regulation can be analysed. One of the afins of this 
thesis was to show how advertising regulation fitted in to an overall broadcasting regulation 
policy, and how this was, in its turn, shaped by broader political and social considerations. Major 
innovations and changes in broadcasting have been politically inspired, but the political system 
depends for its survival on support from society. The state must legitimate its activities before the 
electorate and in terms of the legal system and regulation is one of the mechanisms by which it 
achieves this end. 
For the first three decades of its existence, the social purpose of broadcasting was given a higher 
priority than the accumulation of capital, although in its formative years the BBC's monopoly 
actually worked in favour of the development of a highly successful and prestigious industry, 
giving Britain a leading share of the world broadcasting market. When monopoly became an 
obstacle to the development of a new industry, television, a different regulatory institution was 
introduced to encourage the increase of capital without neglecting broadcastings social 
dimension. And when regulation began to be perceived as a burden in principle to economic 
prosperity, the state drastically reduced its scope on the grounds that the market, in accumulating 
capital, would also contribute towards fifffflffig the social purpose of television and radio. The 
role of advertising in television, and the particular form that advertising regulation took, have 
always been partly dependent on moves within the political system to balance the two 
fundamental imperatives of a capitalist d=ocracy- the need for business to accumulate capital and 
the need to compensate those sections of society who do not immediately benefit from this 
accumulation. 
The theories classified by Horwitz offer explanaflons and critiques of regulation from a number of 
different perspectives. Iley are means of assessing the success or failure of the regulation as a 
principle and in practice. The approaches identified by Dyson are simply some complementary 
ways of looldng at regulation without implying any particular judgements about it, negative or 
positive. The theories have all been developed primarily from economic or political perspectives, 
or have considered some general features of organisational behaviour. This study has, in addition, 
adopted a cultural approach, looldng at the contribution made by cultural features specific to 
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Britain in determining the form and manner of broadcasting and broadcast advertising regulation. 
A particular style of doing regulation has developed over the years which is clearly reflected in the 
whole decision-making process of television advertising control. An institutional approach has 
also been adopted in so far as the worldngs of the commercial television regulator as an 
Organisation have been ommined, and the part played by coalitions of interests in advertising 
regulation policy has also been considered. The international dimension has not been so important 
as this is not a comparative study, but the impact of EC legislation on advertising control on the 
UK regulatory system means that it can no longer be viewed only in relation to the domestic 
situatiom 
14.3 Television Advertising Regulation in the UK: Successor Failure? 
Apart from public interest theory, the theoretical perspectives used here are highly critical of 
regulation and concentrate on its flaws. They have been useful in analysing broadcasting and 
advertising regulation and this is evidence that there have been problems. But the fact that public 
interest theory still most accurately describes the genesis and the operation of regulation 
represents a positive verdict on its effectiveness 
. 
If state regulation of broadcasting, including 
broadcast advertising, has actually been initiated and operated in the public interest, rather than for 
the benefit of political or business elites, and is still in force after seven decades, it must have been 
on the whole a success. 
Perhaps the most convincing argument for the success of broadcasting regulation, both in 
principle and practice, is the extent to which it has survived the recent period, when ideological 
opposition to all forms of state intervention in the economy was strong. The o-ther public utilities 
- 
gas, electricity, water and telecommunications 
- 
have been privatised, but there is still no real 
competition in any of their markets and new regulatory agencies have had to be set up to mitigate 
the effects of private monopoly. Broadcasting, by contrast, since the arfival of Cable and 
Satellite, is already much closer to being a genuinely competitive market, and in purely market 
terms regulation of commercial television could have been much fiulher relaxed along the fines 
recommended by the Peacock Committee. 
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Although broadcasting was not intended to be an exception from the Conservative government's 
general deregulation policy, and very considerable changes were made to the structure of 
commercial television, the 1990 Broadcasting Act actually retained a much greater role for 
regulation, particularly for control of programming and advertising content, than was consistent 
with T'hatcherite pro-market economic policy. The creation of the Broadcasting Standards 
Council and the inclusion of the "quality hurdle" in the criteria for the awarding of ITV franchises 
are classic pieces of regulatory compensation for the probable failure of the market to provide 
for social needs. And, ironically, the widely held view that, even with this qualification, the 
competitive tender system of awarding fimchises would be extremely damaging to the television 
service was confirmed by IN&& Thatcher herself In her now famous letter to Bruce Gyngell, head 
of TV AK on the loss of the company's franchise to a higher bidder, she acknowledged that the 
system had had unintended and regrettable results. 
Ile general principle that the broadcasting service is not the same as other commercial services, 
and its providers should therefore not be forced to conduct heir operations according to purely 
commercial criteria is still valid nearly seventy years after its first formulation. The degree to 
which this principle has been implemented has, of course, altered over the years, but that its 
adoption was a major factor in the success of British broadcasting is almost universally 
recognised. During the first phase of broadcasting history, the "brute force" of monopoly2 
provided the right conditions for buflding the service into one whose reputation for excellence led 
the world. During the second, regulation of competition ensured that the existence of an 
alternative commercial television service did not undermine this reputation, 
According to Reith, "without monopoly many things would not have beenso, easily done 
.... 
The 
BBC might have had to play for safiny, prosecute the obviously popular lines; count its clients; 
study and meet their reactions; curry favour'O 
.A possibly more objective, observer, the American 
academic Burton Paulu, came to a similarly favourable conclusion about the effects of the British 
system of broadcasting regulation: "both BBC and ITA operate under constraints which limit both 
the amount and nature of their competition. That is one of the main reasons why, in my opinion, 
21C. W Rcith, Into the ffind, Hoddcr and Stought0n, 1949. P. 99 3 ibi(L p. 100 
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that Britain is better served by its broadcasters than the Americans are by theirs t@4 
. 
And even Sir 
Alan Peacock, a convinced anti-regulationist, admitted in his Report that "the BBC and the 
regulated ITV system. have done far better in mimicking the effects of a true consumer market, 
than any purely laisser-faire Vgem financed by advertising could have done under condifions of 
spectrum shortage"5 
. 
Advertising has always been central to the competition debate. From the start, economic realities 
dictated that if there were to be serious competition to the BBC, it would have to be funded by 
advertising, direct or indirect. The BBC's financial resources have always been stretched and the 
license fee method was unable to provide a single nationwide television service in a reasonable 
time frame, let alone support several other non-commercial corporations. The political will to 
make money available for such alternatives from taxation was lacldng within the party of 
government when the monopoly was dismantled. So when advertising was introduced, it was 
introduced as something necessary for the removal of monopoly, which had outlived its 
usefulness, but also as potentially harmful to the broadcasting product itself Advertising and 
quality programming were not seen as a natural combination. 
Non-commercial monopoly, which could afford to set extremely high standards for public service 
broadcasting, created an environment in which the broadcast medium might become "a part of the 
permanent and essential machinery of civilisation (and) an instrument of social good which could 
instiuct and mould public opinion, banishing ignorance and misay"6. These ideals were inherited 
to a great extent by the commercial television companies. Without the ethos already built up by 
the BBC monopoly, it is hard to imagine that wholly advertising funded television channels would 
have felt the need to claim, as a number of them did to the Pilkington Committee, that they should 
"lead" or be "in front of' public taste, or had a duty "to funiharise people with something they 
have not had before "7. These are all anti-populist aims and represent arisky course to take from 
an advertisers point of view. 
4 Burton Pauluý Television andRadio in the UnitedKingdom, London: MacmiUan, 1981, p. 45. 5 Report ofthe Comminee on Financing the BBC (the Peacock Report), Cmnd. 9824, London: HMSO, 1986, p. 131 6 ibid. p. 103 
7 Report of the Committee on Broadcasting 1960 ( Chairman: Sir Harry Pilkington) (Cmnd 1753) London : HMSO, 
1962, 
P. 18- 19 
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With regard to the old problem of whether broadcasters should give the public what it wants or 
what they Oink it should have, so well analysed in the Pilkington Reports, it is a measure of the 
success of regulation that commercial enterprises, dependent solely on advertisers for their 
survival, should nevertheless have been encouraged to look finiher than the first requirement of 
advertisers 
- 
to give the public what it wants 
- 
and set themselves the goal of a "broadening and 
deepening of public taste"9. It is also hard to envisage a specialist channel like Channel 4 e)dsfing 
in a fiffly competitive unregulated commercial broadcasting system. Regulation made this 
innovative alternative service possible and, after a shaky start, it has won over its target audience 
and gained the support of advertisers. The general regulatory structures governing the role of 
advertising in the broadcasting system, in terms of shaping the aims and purposes of broadcasting, 
have therefore served the public interest by enabling television, in particular, to become 
considerably more than just another medium for the promotion of goods and services by 
commercial firms. 
If broadcasting regulation in the M as an overall design, can be judged success&ý what of the 
more specific arrangements for advertising regulation since commercials were first permitted on 
the air in 1955? Some of its flaws have already been described in assessing the value of the 
different theoretical approaches. But at least one thing that has been identified as a general 
symptom of regulatory fOure 
- 
the attempts by agencies to reduce conflict and build consensus 
networks 
- 
has always been regarded as one of the particular strengths of advertising regulation in 
the LJK The concept of the public interest as a series of competing claim puts a positive value on 
the complex environment in which agencies operate and on the variety of conflicting demands 
they face. Since the public interest is heterogeneous, it is the duty of the agency to find ways of 
adjudicating between claims and reconciling different interests. The prefeience for consensus 
decision-making, relying on negotiation and compromise rather than command and decree, is a 
feature of the British way of doing things. This particular "UK style" has been summed up by 
$, Vote.. It is hard to understand how PilUngtes conclusions can have been so misrepresented by the Standing 
Conference on Broadcasting. The SCOB Papers state on page 17 that with reference to broadcasting, the Committee 
debated "the constant and sensitive relationship, %ith the moral condition of society" as consisting essentially of a 
choice between "giving the public what it wants" and "giving the public, %bat is good for it*, %hich is condemned by 
SCOB as 'a superficial either-or classification. ' In fact, PilUigton, paras 49 and 50, make it absolutely clear that 
'the antithesis: *broadcasting should give the public, %tiat it wants, and not, %hat someone think is good for the 
public" is... a gross oversimplification of a complex and continuing problem. " lle Report goes on to say that neither of 
the two extremes wcre accepted by the programme companies, who considered a uide range of possibilities lying in 
baween. 
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Vogel in the context of regulation as "informal, discretionary, co-operative and closed", as 
10 compared with the "US style", which is "rigid, rule-bound, adversarial nd open" 
s approach may have its problems but it has been especially useful in television advertising 
regulation because of the degree of self-regulation involved, even prior to deregulation. The 
television regulator has always had a general legal fi7arnework within which to operate, and has 
statutory powers to back its Codes of Practice, but it is still completely impractical in advertising 
regulation, given the potentially infinite possibilities for advertising content, for the regulator to do 
more than give general guidelines for what is or is not acceptable. Constraints on time and 
resources, even in the days when close supervision was a statutory obligation, meant that the bulk 
of the control work was carried out by one of the regulated industries. As this thesis has already 
emphasised, self-regulatory systems cannot function at all effbctively without the commitment and 
co-operation of the industries concerned. So there is a greater need for consensus and conflict 
reduction in television advertising control than, for example, in the more adversarially structured 
regulatory bodies responsible for overseeing the other public utilities in the UK Another benefit 
of the discretionary consensus-building approach is that it is cheap, quick and fle)dble. All the 
participants in television advertising regulation have stressed that flexibility and speed are essential 
elements in the successful operation of the system and that, by and large, the regulatory 
an-angements in Britain have encouraged these elements. 
The most serious drawback to this style of regulation is its lack of openness and accountability, 
or, as Ve1janovsky puts it, "one of the less appealing features of UK regulation is its 
seaetiveriess"' 1. T'he television regulatory authorities were constituted in a way that enabled them 
be less than open. As a matter of general regulation policy, with respect to the ITA! s method of 
awarding franchises, Sendall records that "the arbitrary and secret nature of the selection process 
and the apparent concentration of power in a body not itself directly answerable to the electorate" 
caused some disquiet 12 
. 
The MA! s similar unwillingness to reveal the criteria and the reasoning 
behind its decisions after the last franchise round it conducted has already been noted. 
10 D. Vogel, National Styles ofRegulation, Ithaca, New York Cornell UniveTsitY Press, 1986, 11 Ccnto Ve1janovsky, Regulators and the Market, Institution Of Economic Aff-kirs, 199 1, P- 9 12 Bernard Sendall, Independent Television in Britain, Vol. 2, London: Macmillan rrV, 1983, p. 
. 
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Specifically in advertising control, both advertisers and consumer groups have called for greater 
openness in the ITC's decision-making. Consumer representatives on the Advertising Advisory 
Committee, in particular, are frustrated at the tendency of the ITC's Advertising Control 
Department to accept an advertisees arguments in support of his campaign without giving access 
to the material on Which the arguments are based to people who may wish to challenge them. In 
the regulator's defence, Director of Advertising and Sponsorship, Frank Was, pointed to the 
need for confidentiality in trying to accomplish decision-making by voluntary negotiation, and the 
obligation to respect the wishes of advertisers that commercially sensitive information should not 
be made generally available. If efficient regulation depends on a system where the regulator has 
considerable powers of discretion, they must be used responsibly and with care. It is not clear that 
the balance between respecting the legitimate rights to confidentiality of industry and of those 
involved in regulatory decision-maldng process, and allowing the maximum of information into 
the public domain in the interests of accountability, has always been the tight one. 
Another question that needs to be answered is whether or not, given the structures invented for it 
and the attitudes which affect its actual practice, regulation of television advertising has 
succeeded in its primary aim of consumer protection. Viewers should be protected both from 
being irritated by the intrusiveness of commercials and from being misled into buying things which 
do not fit the description given on television. The numerically low level of complaints made, and 
the even lower level of complaints upheld, tend to suggest that these goals have been achieved. 
The supervisory procedures are rigorous enough to ensure that very few serious breaches of the 
Codes have got through, and the capability for a speedy response means that rnistakes have been 
rectified almost as soon as they were spotted. Ile whole system has tended to err on the side of 
caution, and while the step-by-step approach and the reliance on case law and vrwedent may have 
frustrated the advertising industry, it has benefited consumers. From their point of view, the 
regulator is more likely to fiffi its consumer protection obligations by playing it safe. Perhaps the 
Authorities might have taken a more innovative approach to taste and decency issues and paid 
less attention to the views of vocal minorities, but the commercial television regulators never saw 
it as their duty to be in front of public taste when it came to advertising control. 
Surveys of public opinion nowadays consistently show a reasonable level of satisfaction with 
advertising on television, and there is the old cliche, recently repeated in an article by Mark Jones 
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13 in The Evening Standard, that "the ads are so much better than the programmes' 
. 
Jones goes 
on to compare British commercials favourably with the "deeply boring" American hard sell style 
of promotion. While regulation has never had the specific regulatory objective of enabling 
"quality" advertising to be made in the same way that it must ensure quality programming, the 
restrictions have, as some in the business have adrnittedý had the e&ct of forcing the makers of 
commercials to find a more subtle and intefligent means of getting the message across. 
14.4 Advertising and Television: A Look to the Future. 
"Broadcasting today is so invitricably woven into the fabric of our society that it is difficult to 
imagine what fife would be like without it"14. Exactly the same thing can be said about 
advertising. But it is the combination of the two that has had most impact on peoples fives. 
Commercial television commands huge audiences and with careful regulation the advertisements 
broadcast into the home have not only not detracted from viewers enjoyment, they have often 
added to it. There is no doubt that ITV provided the BBC with the right End of competition in 
the years following its inauguration, and the tightly regulated duopoly managed to combine 
advertising and public service ideals succesd*. 
In the last few years, however, the broadcasting landscape in the UK, as elsewhere, has been 
irTevocably changed. The power of broadcasters is declining as the new technology and 
deregulation of the system provides more competition- But this has not yet meant hat, in practice, 
the power of advertisers has correspondingly increased. The broadcasting process has been 
opened up to allow more opportunities for advertisers to shop around in the airtime market. 
Nevertheless, the inroads made by Cable and Satellite are so far insignificant'and ITV a retains 
much the largest share of the commercial television audience. This is chiefly because, as Blumler 
points out, "a great strength of public service broadcasting, as practised in Britain, has been how it 
has carried the mass audience along with it; often catering for popular tastes with high quality 
production standards and offering diversity to stretch interests and horizons without creating an 
13 Mark Jones, How We7jAfjjs77jeSajchiAfqgic, Evening Standard, 16/12/1994, p. 12 
14 ne SCOB Papers : Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Evidence to the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting, 
7le Standing Conference on Broadcasting: London. January 1976, P. 15 
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impression that upa was being imposed"15. The popularity of public service television, the result 
of the eý&emely effective regulatory marriage of public service ideals and advertising early on in 
broadcasting history, gives it a strong foundation for resisting the challenge of the new media. 
The role of regulation in making or breaking the broadcasting system is still a vital one. The 1990 
Broadcasting Act, which tried to introduce a more objective and accountable method of awarding 
television fimchises, went too far in the direction of the market with the auction systen-L This has 
already had the effect of destroying two broadcasters with a proven record in programming and 
replacing them with others whose standards have since been widely criticised 
- 
GMTV and 
Carlton; GNITV, in particular, has had several warnings from the ITC about the poor quality of 
its service. Ile regulatory framework must provide the right overall conditions for quality, range 
and diversity in broadcasting to survive. Ilere is no evidence that the market alone can provide 
these things; more competition and more channels do not necessarily mean more real choice. On 
the contrary, most evidence points to the fact that a lightly regulated, highly competitive 
broadcasting market fails to cater for the communication needs of the whole of society. 
The de jure removal of the broadcasting function from the television regulator, removing at the 
same time its obligation to carry out pre-transmission, has not yet resulted in a significant de facto 
change in advertising regulation. The machinery for copy clearance remains structurally more or 
less the same, apart from the inclusion of non-terrestrial stations & the exclusion of pre- 
transmission involvement of the ITC. Ile intention on the part of the ITV companies is that 
standards of programming and advertising control should remain as rigorous under a regime 
having a greater ole for self-regulation as under the previous one. As the Network Centre's 1994 
Review states: "ITV cannot afford to slip downmarket, despite occasional reports to the contrary. 
If anything, the reverse is true in an age when advertising has moved beyond the confines of 
ketchup and baked beans. " The increasingly competitive nvironment may make this aim difficult 
to achieve, however. 
The network companies dilemma was summed up by Trevor Barton, formerly Secretary of the 
17V Association: "on the one hand, the ITV companies, as businesses, resent the fact that they 
15 Jay. 0. Blumler, ? Aa1co1mBr)7iiu and T. j. NossiterBroadcasfing Finance andprognvnmeQuality. - An International 
Review, European Journal of Communication, 1986,1 (3): pp. 343 - 64 319 
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have a more restrictive regulatory regime than Cable and Satellite and cannot operate with a level 
playing field. But, as broadcasters, they are acutely aware that an "anything goes! ' commercial 
approach would accelerate the downward trend of standards both in programming and 
advertising control.. " He claimed that from that perspective, the comparnies are happy that they 
still have relatively strict regulation governing amount, distribution and content of advertising 
wlich removes the pressure to compete on purely commercial terms with their rivals. So the 
principle that regulation should protect public service broadcasting from commercial pressures 
must remain a central part of fixture policy. Too much has already been surrendered to the "'brute 
force' of the market. 
Sponsorship is another area where problems may occur for regulation in the future. At the 
moment it represents only a small part of total television advertising revenue but it is set to grow 
as advertisers become more familiar with its use. The temptation for companies to push out the 
current narrow regulatory boundaries on sponsorship will undoubtedly increase as opportunities 
to obtain money from this source become more generally available. The ITC has so far taken an 
extremely tough line on sponsorship and product placement. Its Director of Advertising and 
Sponsorship is determined that the rules will remain strict and will be strictly enforced. A recent 
1500,000 fine imposed on Granada Television for stating that a cookery competition was "in 
conjunction with" She magazine, thereby breaking the rule in the Sponsorship Code that forbids 
such expressions, is clear evidence that the ITC means what it says16. This was the first time that 
the regulator had used its powers under the 1990 Broadcasting Act to levy fines for infringement 
of the codes of conduct. The Commission also cited seven instances in 1993 and 1994 when This 
Morning programme gave "undue prominence' to brand name goodS17. So it may be that 
continuing fight control of the content of spot advertisements will have the unr: brtumte side effect 
of companies trying to satisfy advertisers by breaching the rules in areas where such breaches are 
more difficult to detect, such as sponsor interference in prograrnme editorial or product 
placement. 
The outlook for advertising control in the future is uncertain. The syrsternatic and structural 
changes to commercial television regulation have not yet filtered through to the copy clearance 
16 Mark Jones op. cit P. 1 17 ibid. p. I 
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procedures for spot advertising, which are still dealt with in much the same way as before. The 
new system of sponsorship, with its cluster of problems, will need particular vigilance on the part 
of the regulator. But so long as the legacy of forty years of ensuring that advertising serves the 
interests of broadcasting, and not the other way round, is not undermined, and broadcasters, 
advertisers and regulators continue to work together as they have done in the past, the new 
competitive environinent need not mean that the long partnership between advertising and public 
service broadcasting isat an end. 
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Appendix 
TELEVISION ACT 1954. 
SECOND SCHEDULE 
RULES AS TO ADVERTISEMENTS 
1. The advertisements must be clearly distinguishable as such and recognisably separate from the rest of the 
programme. 
2. The amount of time given to advertising in the programmes shall not be so great as to detract from the value 
of the programmes as a medium of entertainment, instruction and information. 
3. Advertisements shall not be inserted otherwise than at the beginning or end of the programme or in natural 
breaks therein, and rules (to be agreed upon from time to time between the Authority and the Postmaster 
General, or settled by the Postmaster-Gcneral in default of such agreement) shall be observed: 
(a) as to the interval which must elapse between any two periods given over to advertisements; (b) as to the classes of broadcasts (which shall in particular include the broadcast of any religious service) in 
which advertisements may not be inserted, and the interval which must elapse between any such broadcast and 
any previous or subsequent period given over to advertisements. 
4. In the acceptance of advertisements, there must be no unreasonable discrimination either against or in favour 
of any particular advertiser. 
5. The charges made by any programme contractor for advertisements hall be in accordance with tariffs fixed 
by him from time to time, being tariffs drawn up in such detail and published in such form and manner as the 
Authority may determine. 
Any such tariffs may make provision for different circumstances and, in particular, may provide, in such detail 
as the Authority may determine, for the making, in special circumstances, of additional special charges 
6. No advertisement shall be permitted which is inserted by or on behalf of any body the objects whereof are 
wholly or mainly of a religious or political nature, and no advertisement shall be permitted which is directed 
towards any religious or political and or has any relation to any industrial dispute. 
7. If in the case of any of the television broadcasting stations used by the Authority, there appears to the 
Authority to be a sufficient local demand to justify that course, provision shall be made for a reasonable 
allocation of time for local advertisements, of which a suitable proportion shall be short local advertisements. 
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Appendix 2 
PRINCIPLES FOR TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
INDEPENDENT TELEVISION AUTHORITY 
JUNE, 1955 
FOREWORD 
The rules about adývrtisin contained in this booklet are based on the recommendation of the Advertising Ach'isoxy 
Committee appointed by the Authority under Section 8 (2) (b) of the Tcle%ision Act, 1954. It is the duty of the 
Authority under the Act " to comply and secure compliance i4ith the recommendations" of the Achisory Committee 
"subject to such exceptions or modifications, if any, as may appear to the Authority to be necessary or proper ha%ing 
regard to the duties incumbent on the Authority" othcmise then under subsection 8 (2). The Authority has accepted the 
Committees recommendations and they therefore govern all advertising on the AuthoriWs senice until further notice. 
It should be noted that paragmph 2 of the "Principles for Telmision Advertising" expressly reserves the right of the 
programme contractors and the Authority to impose stricter standards of advertising conduct than those laid doAn in 
the "Ptinciples" and its two Appendices. This right is comparable to the recognised right of owners of other advertising 
media to rcject any advertisements they %Nish. 
The "PrincipIcs for Tclevision Achertising" represents a general code of television advertising conduct. Appendix I to 
the "Principles" contains rules about specific classes of ad%=Uscmmts and methods of advcrdsin& 
Appendix 2 is a rcprint of the " British Code of Standards in relation to the Advertising of Medicines and Treatments" 
which, under paragraph 2 (a) of Appendix 1, go%== the achvrtising on television of medicines 
and treatments. 
Under Section 4 (5) of the Tclc%ision Act the Authority is obliged to consult he Postniastcr-Gencral about the classes 
and descriptions of goods or scnices which must not be ad%wfised and the methods of advertising which must not be 
cnTloyed. and to carry out any directions which he may give them on the sufýecL The Authority has consulted the 
Postmaster-Gencral about the rules here published and he has accepted those to which Section 4 (5) is applicable. 
If an advertisa or achutising agent is in dodot about arky a&vrtiscment, he should approach the contractor or 
contractors, %ith whom he proposes to place the achutiscment or the Authority. He should not approach the Achvrtising 
Achisory Committee or any of its members direct. 
PRINCIPLES FOR TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
Preamble 
I- The general principle which will govcm all television achutising is that it should be lcgaL clean, honest and truthful. 
It is rccognised that this principle is not peculiar to the television medium, but is one which applies to all reputable 
achvtsmg in other medin in this country. NawlicIess, television, because of its greater intimacy within the home, 
ghves rise to problems which do not necessarily occur in other media and it is essential to maintain a consistently high 
qualfty of television adverfising 
2. The de: taffed principles set out below are intended to be applied in the Spirit as well as the letter and should be W= 
as hi)ing doAn the minimum, standards to be obscrved 7bey should be read in conjunction with the rules about spedfic 
classes of advcrdscn=ts and methods of advertising which arc set out in Appendix 1. Ile programme contractors, and 
the Authority, may in certain circumstances impiose stricter standards than those hm laid down and these principles do 
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not override or supersede the standards of practice laid down by individual or organisations as inaimbent upon their 
own members and applying to their own particular trade or industry 
3. Definition 
The word " advertisement" has the meaning implicit in the Television Acý i. e. any item of publicity inserted in the 
programmes broadcast by the Authority in consideration of payment to a programme contractor or to the Authority 
4. Legal Requirements 
Advertisements must comply in every rcspectwith the law, common or statute In the case of some Acts, notably the 
Merchandise Marks Acts, rules applicable to other forms of advertising may not, on a strict interpretation of the Acts, 
cover television advertising Advertisements must however, comply in all respects with the spirit of those Acts. 
5. False or Misleading Advertisements 
No advertisement taken as awhole or in part shall contain any spoken or visual presentation of the product or service 
advertised, or statement of its pricc, which directly or by implication misleads. 
In pcvtculan 
(a) SPECIAL CLAIMS 
- 
No advertisement shall contain any reference which is likely to lead the public to assume that 
the product advertised, or an ingredient has some spxial property or quality which is in fact unknown, unrecogrused or
incapable of being established 
(b) SCIIZI-=C AND TECENICAL TERMS 
- 
Statistics, scientific terms, quotations from technical literature and the 
like must be used with a proper sense of responsibility to the ordinary viewer. The irrelevant use of data and jargon 
must never be resorted to make claims appear more scientific than they really arc. Statistics of limited validity should 
not be presented in such a way as to make it appear that they are universally true. 
(c) IMITATION 
- 
Any imitation hWy to mislead viewers, even though it is not of such a kind as to give rise to a legal 
action for inflingement of copyright or for "passing off" must be avoided 
6. Disparaging References 
No advertisement shall contain any statement intended to promote sales by unfair comparison with or reference to 
competitive products or services. 
7. TeWmoniah 
Documentary evidence or testimonials may be required as a condition of the acceptance of advertisements. The 
irresmnsible use of testimonials must be avoided 
& Guamntee 
The word *guarantee" should be used with caution and sparin& and only in relation to some specific description of 
quafity and the dewiled terms of any such guarantee must be available for inspection by programme contractors. Where 
the guarantee is associated with another to return the purchase price, it must be made quite clear to what it applies and 
in what way it protects the purchaser. 
9. Competitions 
Advertisements mwting the public to take part in competitions where allowable under Section 3 (3) or the Television 
Act 1954, and the Betting & Lotteries AM 1934 (which requires the presence of an element of skill), should state 
clearlY how Prospectrvv entrants rnay obtam the printed conditions including the arrangements for the announcement of
results and for the distribution of prizes. 
10. Advertising in Children's Pn)grammes 
No prodLict or senice may be advwfised and no method of advertising may be used, in association with a programme 
intended for children or %hich large numbers of children are Wwly to see, i4hich might result in barm to them 
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physically, mentally or morally, and no method of advertising may be employed which takes achantage of the natural 
credulity and sense of loyalty of children. 
In particular: 
(a) No advertisement which encourages children to enter strange places or to converse with strangers in an effort to 
collect coupons, wrappers, labels, etc., is allowed. The programme contractor must irivestigate the details of any 
collecting scheme and satisfy himself that it contains no element of danger to children. (b) No advertisement for a commercial product or service is aDowed if it contains arrf appeal to children which 
suggests m any way that unless the children themselves buy or encourage other people to buy the product or service they 
wiU be failing in some duty or Licking in loýWty umards some person or orgarusation whether that person or 
organisation is the one making the appeal or not. (c) No advertisement is allowed vi hich leads children to believe that if they do not own the product ad%, eWsed, they wiU 
be infýfior in some R-ay to other children or that they are liable to be held in contempt or ridicule for not o%ning it (d) No advertisement dealing with the activities of a club is allowed without the specific permission of the programme 
contractor who must satisfy himself that the club is carefully supervised in the matter of the beha%iour of the children 
and the company they keep and that there is no suggestion of the club being a secret society. (e) While it is recognised that children arc not the direct purchasers of many products over which they are naturally 
allowed to exercise preference, care should be taken that they are not encouraged to make theinseh es a numnoe to 
other people in the interests of any particular product or service. 
APPEADIX I 
R ULESABO UT SPECIRC CL4, WES OFAD VER 77SEAd=AAD A=ODS OFAD VERYYSAIG 
1. Unacceptable Products or Services 
R th, the Advertisements or products or services coming within the recognised character of, or specifically concerned i 
following should not be accepted: 
(a) money-lenders 
(b) matrimonial agencies and correspondence lubs 
(c) fortime tellers and the like 
(d) undertdk-ers orothers associated with death or burial 
(e) organisations/companies/persons eeldng to advertise for the purpose of giving betting tips 
(0 unlicensed employment services, registers or bureaux 
(g) specifics for slimming or bust development so far as they are not dealt with in the British Code of Standards (h) contraceptives 
(i) smoking cures and 
0) products for treatment of alcoholism. 
NB. 
-An advertiser who markets more than one product may not use advertising cop), de%UW to an acceptable 
prodact for purposes of publicising the brand name or other identification of an unacceptable product. 
2 Advertising of Medicines and Treatments 
(a) 7he Brifish Code ofStanda-ds 
The advertising of Medicines and treatments may be accepted on the Authority's service provided it complies with the 
basic standard of "The BhfiSh Code of Standards in relation to the Advertising of Medicines and Treatments" which is 
attached as Appendix 2. 
(b) r7sualpresenwon ofdoctors, dentists, nurses, 
ftfidWves, &a 
In the advertising of medicines and treatments, statements, gestures or representations that give the unpression of 
Professional advice or recommendations should not be allowed 
3. Mail Order Advertisements 
Advertisements for the sale of goods by mad order should not be accepted unless the coritractor has satisfied himself that adequate stodcs of the goods in question are carried and that they correspond with the deScriPtiOn given in the 
advertisement. Such advertisements should not be accepted where an accommodation address is given. 
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All advertisements should make it clear that the customer is entitled to return the goods within seven days if not 
satisfied and to obtain fiffl rdimd of the purchase price. 
4. Homework Scheme Adverfisements 
The fullest possible particulars of any schemes must be supplied and where it is proposed to nuke a charge for the raw 
materials or the components and uhm the advertiser offers to buy back the goods made by the home-worker, the 
advertiser=t must not be accepted 
5. Financial Advertisements 
In view of the importance of giving full information in connection with any offer to the public of debentures, bonds and 
shares and in view of the difficulty of ensuring that such information is given in the limited time of the normal 
television advertisement, invitations to invest should be limited to the following : (a) invitations to invest iii British Ckwerninent stock: s (including National Savings cerfificates), stocks of public boards 
and nationalised industries in the United Kingdom and Municipal Government stocks in the United Kingdom; (b) invitations to place money on deposit or share account with building Societies (c) invitations to place money on deposit with the Post Office or any Trustee Savings Bank 
No advertisement should be allowed which contains any review of or advice about the stock market or investment 
prospects, or which offers to advise on investments. 
6 Him Purchase 
Where a price is mentioned in an adwrtisemcrit or reference is made to any form of instalment buying, care must be 
taken to ensure that the amounts quoted indicate to prospective purchasers how much extra money is required for hire 
purchase and dD not mislead them into thinking that the total cost; inclusive of interest and additional charges/ancVor 
Purchase Tax, is less than in fact the case. 
7. Instructional Courses 
Advertising offering courses of instruction in trades or subjects leading up to professional or technical cxaminat'Ons 
should not impfy the promise of employment exaggerate the opportunities of employment or remuneration alleged to be 
open to those taking such courses; neither should it offer unrecognised "degrees" or qualifications. 
Betting (including Pools) Advertisements 
Betting (including Pools) a&crusernentswill not be pennitted for six nionths and the quesdon will then be reviewed 
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Appendix 3 
TELEVISION ACT 1964 
SCHEDULE 2 
RULES AS TO ADVERTISEMENTS 
I. 
- 
(1) The advertisements must be clearly distinguishable as such and recognisably separate from the rest of the 
program. 
(2) Successive advertisements must be recognisably separate. 
(3) Advertisements must not be arranged or presented in such a way that any separate advertisement appears to 
be part of a continuous feature. 
(4) Audible matter in advertisements must not be excessively noisy or strident. 
2. The standards and practice to be observed in carrying out the requirements of the preceding paragraph shall 
be such as the Authority may determine either generally or in particular cases 
I The amount of time given to advertising in the programmes shall not be so great as to detract from the value 
of the programmes as a medium of information, educational entertainment 
4. Advertisements shall not be inserted otherwise than at the beginning or the end of the programme or in 
natural breaks therein. 
5-- (1) Rules (to be agreed upon from time to time between the Authority and the Postmaster General, or settled 
by the Postmaster General in default of such agreement) shall be observed as to the classes of broadcasts (which 
shall in particular include the broadcast of any religious service) in which advertisements may not be inserted, 
and the interval which must elapse between any such broadcast and any previous or subsequent period given 
over to advertisements. 
(2) The Postmaster General may, after consultation with the Authority, impose rules as to the minimum 
interval which must elapse between any two periods given over to advertisements, and the rules may make 
different provision for different circumstances. 
6. In the acceptance of advertisements there must be no unreasonable discrimination either against or in favour 
of any particular advertiser. 
7- (1) The charges made by any programme contractor for advertisements hall be in accordance with tariffs 
fixed by him from time to time, being tariffs drawn up in such detail and published in such form and manner as 
the Authority may determine. 
(2) Any such tariffs may make provision for different circumstances, and, in particular, may provide, in such 
detail as the Authority may determine, for the maldng, in special circumstances, of additional special charges. 
8. No advertisement shall be permitted which is inserted by or on behalf of any body the o1jects whereof are 
wholly or mainly of a religious or political nature, and no advertisement shall be permitted which is directed 
towards any religious or political end or has any relation to any industrial dispute. 
9. It in the case of any of the telmision broadcasting stations used by the Authority, there appears to the 
Authority to be a sufficient local demand to justify that course, provision shall be made for a reasonable 
allocation of time for local advertisements, of which a suitable proportion shall be short local advertisements. 
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Appendix 4 
The Independent Television Code of Advertising and Practice 
Independent Television Authority 
JULY, 1964 
Section 8(l) of the A4 1964, states that it shall be the duty of the Independent Authority (a) to draw up, and from time to time review, a code governing standard and practice in advertising and 
prescribing the advertisements and methods of advertising to be prohibited, or prohibited in particular 
circumstances; and 
(b) to secure that the provisions of the code are complied with as regards the advertisements included in the 
programmes broadcast by the Authority. 
The rules about advertising contained in this bDoldet govern all advertising on Independent Television until 
further notice. In drawing up this code the Authority has consulted the Advertising Advisory Committee and the 
members of the Medical Advisory Panel appointed in accordance with Section (5) of the Television Act, 1964. 
Under Section 7(5) of the TeleNision Act 1964, the Authority must consult the Postmaster-General about the 
classes and descriptions of advertisements which must not be broadcast and the methods of advertising which 
must not be employed and to carry out any directions he may give them in these respects. The Authority has 
consulted the Postmaster-General on the rules here published and he has accepted those to which Section 7(5) is 
applicable. 
It should be noted that section 8(2) of the Television Act, 1964, expressly reserves the right of the Authority to 
impose requirements as to advertisements and methods of advertising which go beyond the requirements 
imposed by this code. The programme contractors, too, may in certain circumstances impose stricter standards 
than those here laid down 
-a right comparable to the recognised right of those responsible for other advertising 
media to reject any advertisements they, %ish. 
Preamble 
The general principle which N%U govern all tele%ision advertising is that it should be legal, clean, honest and 
tn'WW. It is recognised that this principle is not peculiar to the television medium, but is one which applies to 
all reputable advertising in other media in this country. Nevertheless, television, because of its greater intimacy 
within the home, gives rise to problems which do not necessarily occur in other media and it is essential to 
maintain a consistently high quality of television advertising. 
2 Advertisements must comply in every respect, %ith the law, common or statute. In th;.: case of some Acts, 
notably the Merchandise Marks Acts, rules applicable to other forms of advertising may not, on a strict 
interpretation of the Acts cover telmision advertising. Advertisements must, however, comply in all respects 
with the spirit of those Acts. 
3 The detailed rules set out below arc intended to be applied in the spirit as well as the letter and should be taken 
as laying down the minimum standards to be observed. 
4 71e word "advertisement" has the meaning implicit in the Television Act i. e. any item of publicity inserted in 
the Programmes broadcast by the Authority in consideration, of payment to a programme contractor or to the 
Authority. 
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5. Programme Independence 
No advertisement may include anything that states, suggests or implies, or could reasonably be taken to state, 
suggest or imply, that any part of any programme broadcast by the Authority has been supplied or suggested by 
any advertiser 
- 
Television Act, 1964, Section 7(6). 
6. Identification of Advertisements 
An advertisement must be clearly distinguishable as such and recognisably separate from the programmes 
- Television Act, 1964, Schedule 2, paragraph 1(1). 
7. Subliminal Advertising 
No advertisement may include any technical device which, by using images of very brief duration or by any other 
means, exploits the possibility of conveying a message to, or otherwise influencing the minds of, members of an 
audience without their being aware, or fully aware, of what has been done 
- 
Television Act, 1964, Section 3(3). 
8. Good Taste 
No advertisement should offend against good taste or decency or be offensive to public fechng 
- 
Television Act, 
1964, Section 3(l)(a). 
9. Gifts or Prizes 
No advertisement may include an offer of any prize or gift of significant value, being a prize or gift which is 
available only to television viewers of the advertisement or in relation to which any advantage is given to viewers 
- 
Television Acts, 1964, Section 3(4). 
10. Stridency 
Audible matter in advertisements must not be excessively noisy or strident 
- 
Television Act, 1964, Schedule 2, 
paragraph 1(4). 
11. Charities 
No advertisement may give publicity to the needs or objects of any association or organisation conducted for 
charitable or benevolent purposes. (This does not preclude the advertising of 'flag days' fetes or other events 
organised by charitable organisations or the advertising of publications of general interest. ) 
12. Politics 
No advertisements may be inserted by or on behalf of any body the objects whereof are wholly or mainly of a 
religious or political nature, and advertisements must not be directed towards any religious or political end or 
have any relation to any industrial dispute 
- 
Television Act, 1964, Schedule 2, paragraph 8. 
13. Appeals to fear 
Advertisements must not without justifiable reasons play on fear 
14. Unacceptable Products or Senices 
Advertisements for products or services coming within the recognised character of, or specifically concerned 
with, the follo, %ing are not acceptable: 
(a) moncy-lenders 
(b) matrimonial agencies and correspondence clubs 
(c) fortune-tellers and the like 
(d) undertakers or others associated with death or burial 
(e) unlicensed employment services, registers or bureaux 
M organisations/companies/persons seeking to advertise for the purpose of giving betting tips 
(g) betting (including pools) 
N. B. An advertiser who markets more than one product may. not use advertising copy devoted to an acceptable 
product for purposes of publicising the brand name or other identification of an unacceptable product. 
15. Reproduction Techniques 
It is accepted that the technical limitations of photography can lead to difficultics in securing a faithfid portrayal 
of a subject, and that the use of special techniques or substitute materials may be necessary to overcome these 
difficulties. These techniques must not be abused: no advertisement in which they have been used will be 
acceptable, unless the resultant picture presents fair and reasonable impression of the product or its effects and is 
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not such as to mislead Unacceptable devices include, for example, the use of glass or plastic sheeting to simulate 
the effects of floor or furniture polishes. 
16. Description and Claims 
No advertisement may contain any descriptions, claims or illustrations which directly or by implication mislead 
about the product or service advertised or about its suitability for the purpose recommended In particular: 
(a) Special Claims 
- 
No advertisement shall contain any reference which is likely to lead the public to assume 
that the product advertised, or an ingredient has some special property or quality which is incapable of being 
established 
(b) Scientific Terms and Statistics 
- 
Science terms, statistics, quotation from technical literature and the like 
must be used with a proper sense of responsibility to the ordinary viewer. hTelevant data and scientific jargon 
must not be used to make claims appear to have a scientific b- they do not possess. Statistics or limited validity 
should not be presented in such a N%2y as to make it appear that they are universally true. 
Advertisers and their agencies must be prepared to produce evidence to substantiate any description, claims of 
illustrations 
17. Comparative Advertising and Disparagement 
Substantiated competitive claims inviting fair comparison with a group of products or with other products in the 
same field may be acceptable. Such claims may not be presented in a way which by distortion or undue 
emphasis, is likely to mislead. Advertisements may not contain disparaging references to another product or 
service. 
18. Imitation 
Any imitation likely to mislead -viewers, even though it is not of such a kind as to give rise to a legal action for 
infringement of copyright or for "passing off", must be avoided. 
19. Price and Claims 
Visual and verbal presentations of actual and comparative costs must be accurate and incapable of misleading by 
undue emphasis or distortion 
20. Testimonials 
Testimonials inust be genuine and must not be used in a manner likely to mislead Advertisers and their agencies 
must be prepared to produce evidence in support ofany testimonW and any cWms therein. 
21. Guarantees 
The word "guarantee" should be used with caution and sparingly and only in relation to some specffic 
description or quality and the detailed terms of any such guarantee must be available for inspection by the 
Authority. Where the guarantee is associated with an Offer to return the purchase price, it must be made quite 
clear towhat it applies and in what way it protects the purchaser. 
22. Competition 
Advertisements inviting the public to take part in competitions where allowable under Section 3(4) of the 
Television Act, 1963 and the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963 (which requims the presence of an 
element of skill), should state clearly how prospective entrants may obtain the printed cerditions including the 
arrangements for the announcement of results and for the distribution of prizes. 
23. Homework Schemes 
Fullest Particulars of any schemes must be supplied and where it is proposed to make a charge for the raw 
materials or components and where the advertiser offers to buy back the goods made by the home-worker, the 
advcrfi, sement is not acceptable. 
24. Sale Hire Purchase 
Advertisements relating to the sale of goods on hire-purchasc or credit must comply with the provisions of the 
advertisements Mire-purchase) Act, 1957, and from I st January 1965, Part IV of the Hire-Purchase Act, 1964. 
25. Instructional Courses 
Advertisements offenng courses of instruction in trades or subjects leading up to professional or technical 
examinations must not imply the promise of employment or exaggerate the opportunity of employment or 
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remuneration alleged to be open to those taidng such courses; neither should they offer unrecognised "degrees" 
or qualifications. 
26. Mail Order Advertising 
Advertisements for the sales of goods by mail order are unacceptable unless adequate stock of the goods in 
question are carried and they correspond with the description given in the advertisement. Such advertisements 
are unacceptable where an accommodation address is given. 
All advertisements hould make it clear that the customer is entitled to return the goods within seven days if not 
satisfied and to obtain full refund of the purchase price. 
27. Direct Sale Advertising 
Direct sale advertising is that placed by the advertiser %ith the invention that the articles or services advertised, 
or some other articles or services, shall be sold or provided at the home of the person responding to the 
advertisement. Where it is the intention of the advertiser to send a representative to call on persons responding to 
the advertisement, such fact must be apparent from the advertisement or from the particulars subsequent 
supplied and the respondent must be given an adequate opportunity of refusing any call 
Direct sale advertisements are not acoeptable, "ithout adequate assurance from the advertiser and his advertising 
agency (a) that the articles advertised %ill be supplied at the price stated in the advertisement within a 
reasonable time from stocks sufficient to meet potential demand and (b) that sales representatives then calling 
upon persons responding to the advertisement %ill demonstrate and make available for sale, the articles 
advertised. 
It will be taken as prima facie evidence of misleading and unacceptable "bait" advertising for the purpose of 
"switch selling" if an advertiser's salesmen seriously disparage or belittle the cheaper article advertised or report 
unreasonable delays in obtaining delivery or othemise put difficulties in the way of its purchase. 
28. Financial Advertising 
In 
-view of the importance of giving full information in connection with any offer to the public of debentures, 
bonds and shares and in view of the difficulty of ensuring that such information is given in the limited time of 
the normal television advertisement, invitations to invest are limited to the following: 
(a) invitations to invest in British Government Stocks (including National Savings Cerfificates), stocks of public 
boards and nationalised industries in the United Kingdom and Local Government stocks in the United Kingdom. 
(b) invitations to place money on deposit or share account with building societies. 
(c) invitations to place money on deposit with the Post Office or any Trustee Savings Bank, and, normally, 
banking companies which are recognised as such for the purposes of the Eighth Schedule to the Companies Act, 
1948. 
Advertisements by Unit Trusts authorised as such by the Board of Trade may be accepted provided that these are 
strictly limited to the name and description of the Trust, the address of its manager, and an invitation to viewers 
to, %Tite to the manager for full particulars of the units aN-ailable. To person may be shovm on the screen during 
the course of the advertisement. 
Advertisements announcing the publication in established national and provincial newspapers and journals of 
prospectuses offering shares or debentures to the public may be accepted provided that these are strictly limited 
to giving the name of the company whose shares or debentures are being offered, the amount of the offer and the 
names and dates of publication of the newspapers and journals in which a prospectus maý be found. No Person 
may be shown on the screen during the course of the adv ertisement. 
No ach, ertisement is acceptable which contains any reNiew of or advice about the stock L=ket or investment 
prospects, which offers to advice on investments. 
29. Cigarette Advertising 
In cigarette advertising, the following are unacceptable: 
(a) advertisements that greatly over., emphasise the pleasure to be obtained from smoking 
(b) advertisements featuring the conventional heroes of the young. 
(c) advertisements appealing to pride or general manliness. 
(d) advertisements using a fashionable social setting to support the impression that cigarette smoking is a 
"go-ahcad" habit or an essential part of the pleasure and excitement of modem living. 
(c) advertisements that strildngly present romantic situations and young people in love, in such a way as to seem 
to link the pleasures of such situations with the pleasures of smoking. 
(f) advertisements that state, suggest or imply, without valid evidence, that it is safe to smoke one brand or type 
of cigarette than another. 
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30. Advertising and Children 
Particular care should be taken over advertising that is likely to be seen by large numbers of children and 
advertisements in which children are to be employed. More detailed guidance is given in Appendix 1. 
31. Advertising of Medicines and Treatments 
Within the generality of the Advertising of Medicines Independent Television Code the advertising medicines 
and treatments is sulýect to the detailed nfles given in Appendix 2 
Appendix I. 
- 
Advertising and Children 
I. The Viewing Child 
No product or service be advertised and no method of advertising may be used, in association with a programme 
intended for children or which large numbers of children are likely to see, which might result in harm to them 
physically, mentally or morally, and no method of advertising may be employed which takes advantage of the 
natural credulity and sense of loyalty of children. 
In particular. (a) No advertisement which encourages children to enter strange places or to converse with strangers in an effort 
to collect coupons, wrappers, labels, etc., is allowed. The details of any collecting scheme must be submitted for 
investigation to ensure that the scheme contains no element of danger to children. (b) No advertisement for a commercial product or service is allowed if it contains any appeal to children which 
suggests in any way that unless the children themselves buy or encourage other people to buy the product or 
service they will be Wing in some duty or lacking in loyalty towards some person or organisation whether that 
person or organisation is the one making the appeal or not. (c) No advertisement is allowed which leads children to believe that if they do not own the product advertised 
they will be infcrior in some way to other children or that they are liable to be held in contempt or ridicule for 
not owning it. 
(d) No advertisement dealing with the activities of a club is allowed without the submission of satisfactory 
evidence that the club is carefully, supervised in the matter of the behaviour of the children and the company 
they keep and that there is no suggestion of the club being a secret society. (e) While it is recognised that children are not the direct purchasers of many products over which they are 
naturally allowed to exercise preference, care should be taken that they are not encouraged to make themselves a 
nuisance to other people in the interests of any particular product or service. In an advertisement offering a free 
gA a premium or a competition for children, the main emphasis of the advertisement must be on the product 
with which the offer is associated. 
(0 If there is to be reference to a competition for children in an advertisementý the published rules must be 
submitted for approval before the advertisement can be accepted. Thevalue of prizes and the chances of wining 
one must not be exaggerated. 
(g) To help in the fair portrayal of free gifts for children, an advertisement should where necessary, make it easy 
to see the true size of a gift by showing it in relation to some common otjoct against which its scale can be 
judged. 
2. The Child in Advertising 
The appearance of children in advertisements is subject o the following conditions: 
(a)Employment 
It should be noted that the conditions under which children are employed in the maldng of advertisements arc 
governed by certain provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (Scotland 1937) and the Act of 
1963; the Education Acts 1944 to 1948; and the appropriate by-laws made by local Authorities in pursuance of 
these Acts. 
(b) Contributions to Safety 
Any situations in which children are to be seen in television advertisements hould be carefully considered from 
the point of vim, of safety. 
In particular. 
ded treet scenes unless they are obviously old enough to be (i) children should not appear to be unatten in s 
responsible for their own safety, should not be shown playing in the road, unless it is clearly shown to be a play- 
street or other safe area; should not be shown stepping carelessly off the pavement or crossing the road without due care; in busy street scenes should be seen to use zebra crossings in crossing the road; and should otherwise 
be seen in general, as pedestrians or cyclists, to behave in accordance with the Highway Code. 
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(ii) children should not be sccn Icaning dangerously out of windows or over bridges, or climbing dangerous 
cliffs. 
(iii) small children should not be shown climbing up to high shelves or reaching up to take things from a table 
above their heads. 
(iv) medicines, disinfectants, antiseptics and caustic substances must not be shown within reach of children 
without close parental supervision, nor should children be shown using these products in any way. (y) children must not be shown using matches or any gas, paraffin, petrol mechanical or mains-powcred 
applianec which could lead to their suffering bums, electrical shock or other injury. (vi) children must not be shown driving or riding on agricultural machines (including tractor-drawn carts or 
implements). Scenes of this kind could encourage contravention of the Agriculture (Safety, Health and Welfare 
Provisions) Act, 1956. 
(vii) an open fire in a domestic scene an advertisement must always have a fircguard clearly visible if a child is 
included in the s=c. (0 Good Manners and Rchaviour 
Children seen in advertisements hould be reasonably well-mannered and wcIl-behaved. 
334 
AppendU S. Television A dverfising Complaints Report. 
Appendix 5 
Independent Television Commission 
Television Advertising 
Complaints Report 
September 1992 
OFFENSIVE 
CUSSONS AQUASPA SHOWER GEL 
Complaints from: 9 viewers 
I VCC Member 
Nature of complaint: 
The complainants thought that the advertisement, which showed a couple wearing oilsidns in shower and 
referred to "safcr showering", was unsuitable to be shown when children might be watching and that it 
trivialised the health education message of "safe se)e' 
Assessment: 
The product benefit claimed in the commercial was that the gel was a mild formulation designed to minimise 
removal of natural skin oils. In accepting this advertisement for transmission the television companies had not 
felt that this way of alluding to protecting skin would be generally seen as trivialising the use of condoms. The 
ITC agreed. The commercial did not contain any visual material likely to cause offense and the fact that "safer 
showering" was an oblique allusion to the expression "safer sex" was not likely to be understood by children. 
Nevertheless, in the light of viewers' comments the advertiser undertook not to schedule future runs of the 
advertisement in or adjacent o children's programmes. 
Decision: COMPlaints not upheld 
KP FRISPS 
Comolaints from: 10 viewers 
Nature of complaint: 
The complainants thought that the advertisement which featured a crisp before a firing squad, was distasteful in 
that it trivialiscd violent death. Some complainants referred to the current conflict in former YugoslaVia. 
Assessment: 
The advertisement was part of a campaign based on the slogan "The crisp is dead 
- 
long live the Frisp! '. In cases 
such as this the ITC has to form a judgment on whether the degree and extent of likely offense is sufficient to 
require an advertisement to be withdrawn. In this case, on balance, the ITC did not feel justified in intervening 
although, had the theme of the commercial been developed more strongly, this might have been appropriate. 
Nevertheless the case does illustrate that however divorced from reality, humorous references to death in 
advertising for commercial products do have the capacity to offend some viewers. In order to prevent gratuitious 
Offense the ITC reminds that such references are best avoided. 
Decision: Complaints not upheld but guidance given 
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SLIM FAST 
Complaint from: I viewer 
Nature of compliant: 
The complainant objected to the schedaling by Thames Television of advertising for a slimming product 
ediately after a trader for ITN which carried film of hunger and maltreatment in Bosnia 
Assessment: ITC rules require that television companies exercise responsible judgment, and operate appropriate 
systems, to avoid inappropriate juxtapositions between advertising and editorial material. Thames explained that, in this case, their schedulers had understood that the trailer focused on news of a strictly military nature 
rather than personal human suffering and agreed that the juxtaposition was unfortunate. They also explained that they had tightened up the systems designed to prevent such occurrences. The ITC recognised the difficulty 
of maldng such systems fully effective but nevertheless concluded that the complaint %2sjustified- 
Decision: Complaint upheld 
HARMFUL 
COI 
- 
CHILDREN AND BOTTLES SAFETY 
ComDlaint from: I Nimer 
Nature of comDlaint : 
A public information film demonstrated a safety message to parents by presenting the ways in which very 
dangerous chemicals and substances might be attractive to young children. For example, one sequence depicted a 
little &I pouring anti-frecze from a lemon & lime bottle into a cup from her tea set and then drinking it. For this 
reason, the commercial had attracted a post 2100 hour timing restriction but the complainant alleged that when 
watching children's Saturday morning television with her four year old daughter she saw the commercial, and 
thought it highly irresponsible to schedule it at such a time. 
Assessment : 
The ITC raised the matter with Granada, the television company concemed, and those responsible apologised for 
the error in scheduling. The ITC asked for reassurances that measures would be taken to ensure that such an 
error would not re-occur. 
Decision: Complaint upheld. 
GLADE PLUG 
- 
IN AIR FRESHNER 
Complaints from: 26, %icwcrs 
Nature of complaint : 
Advertising for this product showed it being plugged into and unplugged from an electrical socket without the 
power first being switched off. The complainants objected that this is contrary to recommended lectrical safhy 
advice and, in particular, that it, %-as unwise for children to be set this bad example. 
Assessment : 
The ITC received from the Department of Trade and Industry's Consumer Safety Unit the advice that, although 
the actions shown involve only slight danger, it vv2s unhelpful that television advertising should contradict "safe 
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practict" advice. Independently, S. C. Johnson, the makers of Glade, became aware of the public concern and 
, withdrew the commercial. The advertising will not reappear until appropriate amendments have been made. 
Decision: Complaints upheld 
MISCELL4AWOUS 
DUL 
-A- DATE 
Complaint from :I Competitor 
Nature of comMaint : 
71c Association of British Introduction Agencies believed that an advertisement for this company transmitted on 
European Television network's (ETN) "Lifestyle" channel infringed the ITC Code. Specifically they did not 
believe that the company did in fact match individual clients and that the requirement for an address or 
published telephone number for that address to be included in the advertisement was not met. 
Assessment : 
ETN informed the ITC that they had considered that the relevant Code rule was not applicable to an "interactive 
service". The ITC did not accept that the specific characteristics of the service justified exemption from the 
general rules applicable to matrimonial and introduction agencies. 
In re-tiewing the advertisement he ITC also noted that the statement relating to the charges for the 
prcmium-rated telephone number was at variance with the ICSTIS Code and fiu-ther did not comply with the 
ITC Guidance Notes on the legibility of superimposed text which had been circulated to all licensees. 
ETN were reminded that it is a requirement of their license from the ITC that they have adequate procedures for 
ensuring compliance with the ITC Code. 
Decision: Complaint upheld. 
SUNDAY MIRROR 
Comnlaint from: I viewer 
Nature of complaint : 
An advertisement featuring a newspaper supplement on the Kama Sutra was shown on Central Television at 
approximately 8.30 p. m. whereas the viewer believed that a post 9 p. m. watershed restriction Nms more 
appropriate in view of the nature of the commercial. 
Assessment : 
The commercial had been cleared by the ITV Association for transmission only after 9 p. m. This restriction was 
overlooked in the course of rescheduling other advertisements and the company concerned, Central Tele-vision, 
apologised, for the error. 
Decision: Complaint upheld. 
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